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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Proposition of a guide for investigating, modeling and analyzing system operating modes: OMAG</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vincent Chapurlat</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Nicolas Daclin</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2013</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>87</fpage>
      <lpage>97</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>- This paper presents and illustrates an approach that allows designers exploring and reasoning, checking and then arguing the consistency of the operat- ing modes of a system. The goal is to help designers to build system's functional architecture by linking operating modes, allowed configurations and operational scenarios i.e. the set of functions displayed by the system in each mode in order to fulfill its mission taking into account its current configuration, requirements and environment. This approach is implemented as a guide called OMAG and is here illustrated on a vehicle design.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>- System Engineering</kwd>
        <kwd>System modeling</kwd>
        <kwd>Operating Mode</kwd>
        <kwd>Operational scenario</kwd>
        <kwd>Verification</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        System Engineering (SE)
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">(INCOSE 2011)</xref>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">(SeBOK 2012)</xref>
        (Fiorè
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26 ref4">se et al. 2012</xref>
        ) is
a design approach approved and largely used in industry. Based on concepts and
principles coming from system s
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">ciences e.g. (Féliot 2007</xref>
        ), SE promotes
simultaneously a model based approach
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">(INCOSE 2008)</xref>
        and a process oriented approach
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(ISO 2008)</xref>
        covering the whole cycle of a system design project. We consider here
only technical activities related to architecture design
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">(Sharman et al. 2004)</xref>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Blanchard et al. 2011)</xref>
        . The goal is here to help designers’ to make emerge poten- tial
alternative solutions of functional architecture. We propose for this to cover some of
designer’s modeling and verification needs:
-­‐ To find what are the relevant operating modes of the system considering its
mission and the moving environment in which this mission has to be fulfilled.
      </p>
      <p>-­‐ To become able to imagine how the system can evolve from an operating
mode to another one when considering various events (external coming from
environment as internal coming from the system itself e.g. dysfunctions) and system
configurations.
 
-­‐ To model the expected behavior of the system when considered in each
retained operating mode. It is here question to model various operational scenarios for
each mode, each operational scenarios showing what are the requested
functions of the system in this mode and how these functions are then dynamically
processed.</p>
      <p>
        -­‐ To precise then what are the links between modes, configurations and
scenarios allowing then to improve the coherence of the entire model of the
system.
-­‐ To analyse the resulting behavior of the sy
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26 ref4">stem as proposed in (Chapurlat
2012</xref>
        ) by 1) checking modeling expectations in order to detect modeling errors or
mistakes (e.g. unwanted deadlock or model consistence), and 2) cheking some
functional requirements as far as possible detecting then some potential omissions.
      </p>
      <p>
        Considering modeling needs, designers often use their experience, know-how,
sometimes approaches based on creativity e.g. brain storming or mental
representation. They can also use, when they are formalized, best practices, design patterns
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">(Schindel 2005)</xref>
        or some guide such as GEMMA (French acronym of Guide d’Etude
des Modes de Marches et d’Arrêts
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(ADEPA 1981)</xref>
        ). This guide helps manufacturing
systems designers to determine the control part. So it is proposed here to develop an
approach and to implenment it in a guide called OMAG (Oper- ating Modes Analysis
Guide). OMAG promotes a graphical formalism facilitating its use by designers e.g.
allowing them to select, decompose or refine an operating mode, a configuration or a
scenario.
      </p>
      <p>
        Considering analysis aspect,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(Monin 2003)</xref>
        and
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">(Grady 2007)</xref>
        propose using some
formal approaches and particularly those focusing on
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">properties proof (Da- guspta
2010</xref>
        )
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">(Yahoda 2012)</xref>
        . So a formal operational semantic1 is proposed for OMAG
and a technique based on property formalization and proof
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Mallek et al.
2011)</xref>
        is used as described in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17 ref19">(Chapurlat 2013a)</xref>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17 ref19">(Chapurlat 2013b)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>Last, this guide has to be fully interoperable with existing modeling languages and
tools currently used in system engineering domain. This article presents the OMAG
concepts and principles briefly illustrated on the case of a vehicle named
VERECINT. Second, it presents the basics of the verification approach before
concluding about perspectives and developments.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Modeling aspect</title>
      <p>VERECINT is a vehicle allowing firemen and experts in the field of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) crisis to explore, to evaluate the
different elements characterizing a crisis situation (data e.g. temperature or radiation
level, information and expertise e.g. that follows the observation and the expertise of
a phenomenonon on the site), and to communicate them to crisis managers hav- ing to
decide actions to take. VERECINT has then to be able to act accordingly to these
actions. At this stage, we assume that VERECINT mission, purpose and ob- jectives
as environment (other systems in interaction all along its life cycle and enabling
systems), requirements, life cycle and all or part of requirements have been
defined. These element cannot be detailed in this article.</p>
      <p>1 The set of principles and rules allowing a model (defined here as an instance of
a modeling language) execution</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>OMAG principles and elements</title>
        <p>OMAG (Operating Modes Analysis Guide) is a graphical guide proposing a set of
pre-defined Operating Modes and of pre-defined Transitions between Operating
Modes considered as generally relevant and helpful for various kinds of systems.
Applied in VERECINT case, OMAG is diagrammed in Appendix. Let’s notice for
instance that VERECINT as any a system to be designed must 1) fulfill its mission is
some nominal Operating Modes, 2) have to ensure either the continuity of ser- vice
of this mission as much as possible in non-nominal Operating Modes, and 3) assume
security of goods, people and its immediate environment. Then, before presenting
briefly the requested elements of OMAG, let’s reformulate its goals as follows:
-­‐ To allow a designer to select and choose what are the relevant Operating
Modes and Transitions (evolution conditions and events) by taking into account a list
of Operating Modes and Transitions having generally to be taken into account. This
choice has to be made accordingly to the available knowledge about system
definition, the current state of the set of requirements and about system environment.</p>
        <p>-­‐ To determine gradually what are the possible, unavoidable or interesting
configurations of the system and having then to be considered.</p>
        <p>-­‐ To facilitate the modeling of operational scenarios relevant in each mode i.e.
to guide the research of the requested functions of the system and the description of
how they have to be dynamically associated to describe the expected behavior
of the system.</p>
        <p>-­‐ To allow designers to trace these choices, to change or modify a choice
during design activities and to check, evaluate and compare alternatives solutions of
functional architectures induced by these choices.</p>
        <p>Considering a system S, OMAG (see Figure 1) requires to define first a set A of
data from time, shape or space nature. These ones are chosen and can be evaluated or
estimated in order to characterize the temporal aspect (time), the structural as- pect
(shape) and the situational aspect (space) of S and of its environment. They do not
specify any candidate for architectural solution of S. They aim only to take into
account as far as possible, for instance, dimensional constraints, specific at- tributes,
expected delays, speed i.e. non functional requirements. A is initialized at the
beginning of the design process and enriched bit by bit. Second, OMAG high- lights
three main Phases named respectively Deployment, Exploitation and End of life. A
Phase is a set of Operating Modes of S that are logically linked or depend- ent. The
Exploitation Phase is it self divided into Operating, Maintenance and De- fault sub
phases.</p>
        <p>An Operating Mode of S is a state reachable by S during its life cycle exhibiting
then particular behaviors. By hypothesis, S is in one and only one Operating Mode
called active Operating Mode (conversely, disabled) at each moment of its
evolution. Each Operating Mode O of S is characterized by (E, C, OSO, T) where:
-­‐ E is defined by a name and a set SE A. It aims to describe the
environment of S, even partial or simplistic i.e. the context in which S has to be
able to execute various functions when O is active. For instance VERECINT may
evolve the night, under snow or rain, or on roads that may be damaged due to the
crisis.
-­‐ The set C contains one or several Configurations relevant for S in O. A
configuration c determines and refines the description of the state of S when it is in
O. VERECINT can be for example described by configurations named
‘exercice’, ‘operation on SEVESO site (site containing large quantities of dangerous
substances)’ or ‘operation on a city’. A configuration c is defined by a name and a
set Sc A defining the requested data from A to describe the configuration. At least
one Configuration is required for S, then considered as default configuration c0.
Last, S can evolve from a Configuration c to another Configuration c’ crossing a
Transition as explained below.
-­‐ The set OSO contains one or several Operational Scenarios describing
expected behavior of S when S is characterized by the current configuration. An
Operational Scenario is defined by a functional model compose of a set of
functions dynamically linked i.e. a part of S functional architecture describing how S
must fulfill its mission. The behavior of VERECINT can be for instance
specified by a scenario ‘To observe and to measure specific values from crisis area’.</p>
        <p>-­‐ The set T contains one to several input and output Transitions. A Transition
links a source object here an Operating Mode O (or a configuration C) to a target
object i.e. an Operating Mode O’ (or configuration C’). A input Transition describes
how O’ (resp. C’) can be reached (O’ or C’ are then activated). Conversely, an
output Transition describes how O or C are deactivated. A Transition is then
formalized by a 6-uplet (source, destination, c, e, d, [op]) where source and
destination describes respectively source object and destination object, c is the
tiggering condition (computed taking into account data from A), e is the initiating
event (internal to S or coming from the environment) and d is the delay (null by
default, but allowing to describe for instance duration of a requested
reconfiguration time) under which S can evolve from the source to the target (from the
same Phase or not). Last, a Operational Scenario op describing the behavior of S
when it is reconfigured can be associated to the Transition.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>OMAG: modeling principles</title>
        <p>Establishing an OMAG model for a system S begins by defining a first version of
set A i.e. by defining the set of space, shape and time data with approximate values.
Then designer selects what are the appropriate Phases and Operating Modes.
Indeed, those proposed by default (see Figure 1) can be selected by the de- signer or
conversely may be rejected considering they are irrelevant regarding the mission,
objectives, requirements, and context of S. If an Operating Mode O is se- lected:
-­‐ The set of Transitions allowing to activate O (input transitions T for which
the source Operating Mode has been also selected) and to desactivate O (output
transitions T’ for which the destination Operating Mode has been also selected) are
selected and defined by giving the 6-uplet (source, destination, c,e,d,[op]) which
characterizes T.</p>
        <p>-­‐ Configurations of S reachable in O and Operational Scenarios authored by these
configurations can be determined. Then, transitions T’ between Configurations have
to be determined by determing the 6-uplet (source, destination, c,e,d,[op]) which
characterizes T’ where the firing event e can be linked to one of the proposed
Operational Scenarios that can induce a modification of the current configuration.</p>
        <p>Obviously, as OMAG, all the possible Configurations that can appear in the
Operating Modes and the set of Transitions between Configurations forms a new
state model that allows to decompose S from a different point of view, here by
refining its possible Configurations whatever may be the Operating Mode on which S
is.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>VERECINT application</title>
        <p>Applied to VERECINT system, selected Phases are:</p>
        <p>-­‐ Deployment: the system is subjected to operations to ensure its storage and
deployment onto a site on which its mission can begin. This phase is relevant for
VERECINT which is involved in activities such as waiting, preparation, adaptation,
training, exercise, or regulatory maintenance.</p>
        <p>-­‐ Exploitation: the system is ready and deployed in operational conditions. This
phase is relevant for VERECINTand means that it can be used by stakeholders, here
firemen and experts having to explore and evaluate a crisis site. In order to avoid any
interpretation, this phase is split up into three Families as follows:</p>
        <p>Operating (O): the system is in nominal condition being able to fulfil its
mission in coherence with specified requirements, hypothesis, and planed resources.
In this Family, VERECINT fulfils efficiently its mission and exhibits nominal
behaviours and configurations.</p>
        <p>Maintainance (M): the system undergoes operations to restore the
operating conditions due to anticipation, failure diagnosis, request for
modification, adaptation, evolution, etc. In this Family, we choose to consider
VERECINT in predictive or currative maintainance that may be done eventually on
the operational site where the crisis occurs.</p>
        <p>Default (DS): the system is in a safe state or degraded operation
following order, failure, damage, or more generally to an internal or external
interference that may cause damage. In this Family, VERECINT has to check default
and to decide what maintenance is requested considering it must continue as
possible to fulfil its mission eventually with loss of performance but a loss of
security of users cannot be acceptable.
-­‐ End of life: the system is removed from service being concerned by
decommissioning, partial resuse or reprocessing of part of all of its components
and subsystems for possible future use. The feedback, uses and special cases of
operational scenarios 'lived' by the system are finalized, indexed and stored to feed the
design of possible future releases. This phase is also selected for VERECINT.
The possible Operating Modes of S and those that are retained by a designer for
VERECINT are then the followings:</p>
        <p>-­‐ D1 - System is ready and waiting for deployment: VERECINT is available
but stopped and possibly stored out of operational site, ready and packed to be
deployed on site and then exploitable by stakeholders. By hypothesis, D1is defined as
the initial Operating Mode of the studied system (graphically denoted by a box with
large borders in Appendix) here VERECINT.
-­‐ D2 - Operational retirement: VERECINT has to be removed from the site
and repackaged or prepared to be redeployed afresh on another site.</p>
        <p>-­‐ D3 - System functions for tests, maintenance, or training out of
operational site: VERECINT, although not deployed, is operating, possibly in a
degraded or reduced testing environment for functional tests, training, or regulatory
service beyond operational site.</p>
        <p>-­‐ O1 - S is deployed and operational on site: VERECINT is operational on site,
ready to fulfill its mission in identified operating environments.</p>
        <p>-­‐ O2 - Preparing the system to assume its mission in nominal mode:
VERECINT requires preparation before it can fully perform its operational mis- sion
on site (e.g. preheat, audit checklist usage, etc.).</p>
        <p>-­‐ O3 - S functions in nominal mode: VERECINT fulfill its mission
maximizing its performance on specified operating environment.</p>
        <p>-­‐ O4 - Preparing S to end normally its mission: VERECINT requires to be
prepared before stopping its mission normally so various Operational Scenarios
can be expected in O4 for VERECINT e.g. cleaning, decontamining, etc.</p>
        <p>-­‐ O5 - S functions for tests, regulatory maintenance, or training on
operational site: VERECINT functions, possibly in a degraded or reduced functional
coverage for testing, training, regulatory maintenance on the operational site
where VERECINT is currently deployed.</p>
        <p>-­‐ DS1 - Stop after a default or a dysfunction: VERECINT has to be put in
safety due to an internal dysfunction or a default detected which threatens its own
integrity and safety or the integrity and safety of the environment.</p>
        <p>-­‐ DS2 - Diagnosis for default or failure detection: VERECINT is submitted to
tests and procedures (led by itself or by one or more contributors systems) of
assessment and diagnosis of failures of its functions and components.</p>
        <p>
          -­‐ DS3 - S functions in non-nominal mode: VERECINT suffers the
consequences of an internal failure or external events affecting its operational capabili- ties
but continues to fulfill its mission staying in a range of acceptable values in terms of
risk, performance or respect of some chosen non-functional characteris- tics - safety,
security, survivability, maintainability, interoperability, ... called "- ilitie
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26 ref4">s" (Weck et
al. 2012</xref>
          .).
        </p>
        <p>-­‐ M1 - Diagnosis and corrective maintenance: VERECINT has to undergo
operations permitting to restore a specified configuration so that it is able to
ensure its operational mission again.
-­‐ M2 - Diagnosis and Preventive Maintenance: VERECINT has to undergo
operations for the replacement, revision or repair of one or more of its components
before the dreaded occurrence of a default respecting a maintenance plan.</p>
        <p>-­‐ M3 - Diagnosis and adaptive maintenance: The system has to undergo
operations to adapt, for example due to the possibility of using new technologies to
better fulfill its initial operational mission. This includes reengineering activities.
This Operating Mode is not relevant for VERECINT so M3 and each input and
output Transition of M3 are the graphically identified by a red line has
diagrammed in Appendix.</p>
        <p>-­‐ M4 - Diagnosis and evolutionary maintenance: The system has to undergo
operations to make it evolve, for example due to the possibility to extent its
functional coverage to respond to new requirements or modify its initial operational
mission. This includes also reengineering activities. As for M3, this Operating Mode
is not relevant for VERECINT.</p>
        <p>-­‐ F1 - Retirement: VERECINT has to be taken out of service permanently.
-­‐ F2 - Dismantling: VERECINT has to be dismantled and its various
components and subsystems may be stored, packaged or stored for reuse, conversion,
reprocessing.</p>
        <p>
          A set of generic Transitions between Operating Modes is given in Figure 2. These
transitions are quoted as follows: Classic Transitions (Ti, i = 1 to 20), Stop (Si, i = 1
to 3), Application Maintenance (AMJ, j = 1 to 4) End of Maintenance (EMj, j = 1 or
2) or Fault Detection Security (FDS). Only input and output Transi- tions of selected
Operating Modes have to be specified by the designers. For more information, the
reader can find all conditions and events having to be specified for each selectable
Transition in OMAG in
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17 ref19">(Chapurlat et al. 2013c)</xref>
          .
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Verification aspect: OMAG semantic</title>
      <p>
        The operational semantic of OMAG is formalized for two reasons. First, it
allows describing without ambiguity how a model OMAG can be interpreted and
executed and then to define and implement OMAG simulation mechanisms.
Second, it allows to formalize what are then expected modeling properties
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17 ref19">(Chapurlat
2013b)</xref>
        that must be satisfied in order to help designers to improve the quality of
OMAG e.g. absence of modeling errors, but not its relevance or adequation with the
modeled system. In this case, OMAG transformation rules are proposed in or- der to
transform an OMAG model into a formalism authorizing proof of a- temporal
and temporal properties as proposed for in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26 ref4">stance in (Mallek et al. 2012</xref>
        ). In this case,
techniques are based on the use of Conceptual Graphs for a-temporal properties and
on Model Checking techniques for temporal properties. The reader interested by
these two complentary techniques can find definitions and illsutra- tions in the
referenced articles.
      </p>
      <p>
        By definition, OMAG is conform to the Interpreted Sequential Machine (ISM)
described in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">(Larnac et al. 1999)</xref>
        and is then an extension of a State Machine.
Operating Modes and Configurations are formalized by states and Transitions are
described as conditioned transitions between states. By hypothesis, an Operational
Mode or a Configuration can be decomposed giving then a new ISM. The ISM
operational semantic is then enriched by model decomposition rules as proposed by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">(Harel 1987)</xref>
        for Statecharts. This semantic can be summarized in the next. There
always exists an initial Operating Mode i.e. initial state for each level of
decomposition and the next hypothesis of behavioral determinism are required:
-­‐ For each moment in the evolution of the OMAG, the same input vector applied
to the same active state S induce always the same resulting output vector and the
same next reached state S’.
-­‐ A transition T is triggered at a null time i.e. there is no potential event e
(internal as well as external) that can be omitted during triggering of T.
-­‐ For a given state S, the evolution condition associated to output transitions of S are
exclusive i.e. only one transition T can be triggered at each moment.
      </p>
      <p>Thus, the transition triggering is done in two stages. If the condition c is true
and the trigger event e appears (always occurring by default if it is not specified),
then the Operating Mode or the Configuration is deactivated. This induces eventually
to be able to stop current Operational Scenarios that are associated with this one. It
can also require the execution of the so called reconfiguration operational scenario
op which describes what the required functions are allowing S going from the
current Operating Mode or the current Configuration to the next one. After the delay
d (equal to null by default), the targeted Operating Mode or Configuration is
activated. In the case of an Operating Mode, a default configuration is de- fined and
then, is activated. In the case of the activation of a Configuration, authorized
Operational Scenarios are launched and executed. Conversely, any Operational
Scenario may induce a modification of Configuration, possibly causing the trigger a
new transition between this configuration and the next one.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>
        An abstract and a concrete syntax are under development by using DIAGRAPH
tool box (Pfi
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26 ref4">ster et al. 2012</xref>
        ) under Eclipse modeling framework. It provides a
graphical user interface allowing to handle operating modes, configurations and
operational scenarios. By hypothesis, eFFBD (enhanced Functional Flows Block
Diagram)
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">(DoD 2001)</xref>
        modeling language is here adopted to describe operational
scenarios. So, a first perspective consists to use operational semantic of eFFBD
proposed by (Seidner 2006) for synchronizing OMAG and Operational Scenarios
evolution. Last, the modeling tool will aim to be interoperable with various SE tools.
For this, transformation rules and mechanisms are studied by using ATL
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">(ATL
2006)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        Verification techniques have now to be adapted and tested on complex
examples. The perspective is to enrich these two techniques (Conceptual Graphs and
model checking) by considering extensions proposed by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">(Thierry-Mieg et al.
2004)</xref>
        allowing to gain in performance and relevance when facing problematic of
growing up models’ size and complexity (e.g. due to number of refinements lev- els)
to be analyzed during verification activities.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Appendix: OMAG graphical representation for VERECINTexample</title>
    </sec>
  </body>
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