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    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Dialogue Interactions in Oral Hearings</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Latifa Al-Abdulkarim</string-name>
          <email>latifak@liverpool.ac.uk</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Computer Science University of Liverpool</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The human reasoning process used in conducting arguments to resolve conflicts and reach a decision is an interdisciplinary study. Modelling argumentation has a great impact on the development of theories and applications in AI especially in critical domains that involve richness of reasoning such as Law. Therefore, argumentation has been recognised as a core topic in AI and Law. Developing computational argumentation systems that simulate legal reasoning requires resolving distinctive challenges that concern contextual rules, procedural issues and the interpretation of different elements. This PhD research aims to provide a supportive computational model for analysing stages in the Supreme Court starting from the oral hearings. In particular, a key aim is analysing the social values of the legal arguments from different perspectives, and finding the relation between the Court opinion and the components constructed in the Court oral hearings. This paper gives an overview of the current PhD research proposing the problem, the overall aims and the approach required to fulfil the aims. Furthermore, it provides a summary of the background in argumentation in the domain of AI and Law and presents the deliverables obtained so far.</p>
      </abstract>
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  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>This work aims to develop a framework for deliberation through which Supreme Court
oral hearings can be analysed in order to identify the components from which arguments
are constructed for delivering the opinion. Following on from the analysis, a dialogue
system will be defined to capture the moves made during the hearings. This dialogue
system will be validated through application to selected cases in various courts. It will
then be investigated how the framework can be generalised so that it can be applied to
other domains in which deliberative reasoning occurs.</p>
      <p>In comparison to other contexts, dialogues in the legal domain combine arguments
from different sources, i.e. argument about the case evidence and facts, argument from
legal rules, argument from precedent cases, argument from hypothetical tests and
others which are required to resolve the ambiguity of the conflict issues. However, the
structure of exchanging arguments in legal dialogues is not clear, the argument types
are interleaved and there is no particular order for the parties to pose arguments which
makes the analysis of the oral hearings more complicated.</p>
      <p>Furthermore, coming to a decision in a legal case dialogues is a separate process that
requires legal analysis in order to derive the case facts, apply the facts to the current law,
which intended to reflect the values of society, and announce the decision that is limited
to two outcomes (deciding for plaintiff and decide for defendant), in a form of Court
opinion that explores the arguments supporting the decision. Modelling these aspects
provide challenges in the computational development in the domain of AI and Law.</p>
      <p>Thus, in particular, this PhD research is initially attempting to fulfil the following
aims:
– Define a representation based on conflicts in social values that enable to show the
components of the arguments for the U.S. Supreme Court oral hearing dialogues.
– Provide a full analysis of the oral hearing dialogues by studying a particular legal
case study using the defined representation.
– Develop a dialogue system by defining speech acts and a dialogue protocol .
– Analyse the subsequent Court opinion arguments by finding the relation between
the argument components that emerge from the oral hearings through selecting and
justifying the options.
– Demonstrate the model using other Supreme court cases and other jurisdiction.
– Generalise the model to handle deliberation dialogues in non-legal contexts.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Background Research</title>
      <p>
        Extensive work has enriched the domain of argumentation in AI and Law over the last
25 years [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. The nature of legal dialogues emerge different types of arguments which
result in different types of argumentation schemes such as argument from analogy,
argument from expert opinions, argument from rules and others. These argumentation
schemes are used extensively in modelling legal reasoning.
      </p>
      <p>Thus, modelling reasoning with legal cases has been a central topic of AI and Law
from the beginning, and there is now a good degree of consensus, especially with regard
to the main elements involved. This consensus can be expressed as a tree of inference
with a legal decision as the root and with evidence as the leaves. Between the two there
are a number of distinct layers.</p>
      <p>
        Immediately below the decision there is a level of issues [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ], or values [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], which
provide the reasons why the decision is made. The idea here is that laws are made
(and applied) so as to promote social values: whether a value is promoted or not is an
issue. Where more than one value is involved and they point to different decisions, the
conflict needs to be resolved. Sometimes it is appropriate to give priority to one value
over another (as in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]), sometimes a balance needs to be struck (as in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]). Note that
the relation between issues may be seen as a matter of ordering, or requiring a balance
between the values: there is as yet no consensus on this point [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        At the next level down there are a number of factors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. Factors are stereotypical
fact patterns which, if present in a case, favour one side or the other by promoting a
value, and so are used to resolve the issues and permit comparison between the cases.
Sometimes (as in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]) it may be convenient to group several factors together under more
abstract factors, so that we may have two or three layers of factors, moving from the
base level factors through more abstract factors, before reaching the issues.
      </p>
      <p>
        Below the factors there are the fact patterns used to determine their presence. These
facts supply reasons for and against the presence of the factor which need to be
considered and weighed to make a judgement. At the lowest level there is the evidence.
Facts are determined by particular items of evidence, and where evidence conflicts a
judgement will need to be made: often this judgement is made by a jury of lay people
rather than lawyers. In the lower courts there will be real items of evidence, but by the
time a case reaches the Supreme Court, the facts are usually considered established and
beyond challenge. one example of work concerned with this stage includes Gordon’s
Pleadings Game [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ], which identifies which facts are agreed by the parties and which
will require resolution in the trial itself.
      </p>
      <p>Thus a complete argument for a case will comprise a view on what can be
considered as evidence for relevant facts: what facts are required to establish the presence
of various factors, and how they relate; how the factors can be used to determine the
issues; and, where issues and values conflict, how these conflicts should be resolved. In
the first stage of this research we will show how these elements relate to the individual
and collective goals of the oral hearing dialogues.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Research Methodology</title>
      <p>Towards the main aim of establishing a deliberative reasoning framework, this research
is intended to follow a qualitative method as shown in the following description.
Oral Hearings Analysis and Representation The research begins by investigating the
dialogue interactions in the legal domain, particularly in the U.S. Supreme Court
oral hearings. After that, we analyse the oral hearing transcript using a case study
from the domain of AI and Law and provide a preliminary representation of the
arguments components exchanged at this stage. Based on the defined components,
we also define the speech acts required to capture the moves in the oral hearings
and construct the arguments representation for every party in each oral dialogue.
Opinion Analysis and Representation Following the oral hearing, we define a
representation for the court opinion and analyse the decision by navigating through the
arguments constructed from the oral hearings.</p>
      <p>Dialogue System Toward automation for this analysis, we develop a dialogue system
to support the process of constructing the argument components representation
using the defined dialogue moves. Throughout this stage, we need to define the legal
case ontologies for the components to provide the grammar that set out the rules
for how the components can be combined and constructed. Further more, we will
define the algorithm that is required to navigate through the trees to provide the
analysis for the decision made and propose a protocol for the oral hearings
dialogue.</p>
      <p>Evaluation In order to evaluate the system, we apply the implemented system to a
number of supreme court cases and cases from other jurisdictions to identify
required modifications of the ontologies and representation.</p>
      <p>Generalisation Finally, the work elements will be combined together, generalise the
developed system to include deliberative dialogues in non-legal contexts, and
conduct an empirical evaluation and theoretical analysis on the final version.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Research Results</title>
      <p>This section shows an overview of the findings we obtained so far. First we will
investigate the dialogues in the oral hearings stage and identify a normative set of speech acts
which could be used by counsel and Justices to achieve their dialogue goals. After that,
we explain how the illocutionary force of these acts can be represented in terms of a
developing Arguments Component Tree (ACT). For illustration, we use the transcript of
the oral hearing in California v Carney , and give the resulting ACTs. Finally, we relate
the ACTs to the majority and minority opinions in Carney.
4.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Dialogues in Oral Hearings</title>
        <p>There are three nested dialogues in the main oral argumentation dialogue of the Supreme
Court. Each of the three dialogues will involve a counsel and nine justices. Prior to
analysing the arguments in the oral hearings dialogues, we will describe the initial
situation, the individual goals and the collective goal for Oral hearings accordingly.</p>
        <p>In the initial state of the petitioner presentation, briefs from the petitioner,
respondent and any ”friends of the Court” are available. These will set out (and justify) a set of
tests forming candidate arguments: the arguments of each counsel will, if accepted give
rise to a decision for their clients. These briefs will also state the accepted facts of the
case, and draw attention to relevant precedent cases. The collective goal is to obtain a
clear statement of the argument for the petitioner. Individually the counsel will wish to
state his argument and answer any critical questions satisfactorily: modifying his tests
if necessary. The justices will wish to clarify any points that had not been made clear in
the original brief, and to pose challenges arising from other briefs.</p>
        <p>The collective goal of the second dialogue, the respondent presentation, is to obtain
a clear statement of the argument for the respondent. The respondent dialogue differs in
its initial state because the petitioner has already presented. Thus as well as presenting
his own argument, counsel for the respondent may wish to rebut the argument proposed
by the petitioner, and so will have the goal of questioning the petitioner’s argument as
well as presenting his own argument. The justices remain interested in clarification and
eliciting answers to questions arising from the other briefs.</p>
        <p>While the collective goal of the rebuttal dialogue is again a clear statement of the
arguments, the initial state now also contains the respondent’s argument and the
individual goal of the counsel is to pose questions against this argument. Justices usually
say very little during this stage, but they may seek clarification of the exact questions
being posed.</p>
        <p>The goal of the three dialogues together is to provide a clear statement of the
arguments for the petitioner and the respondent to provide a basis for the justices to decide
the case.
4.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>Speech Acts Used in Oral Hearings</title>
        <p>
          The goal of the dialogues is to establish the various components, and the connections
between them, expressed as clearly and unambiguously as possible, which can be used
by the justices in constructing the tests that will provide arguments to resolve the case.
The following speech acts will thus need to enable such components to be proposed,
and a set of critical questions challenging the components, or seeking additional
components to be posed (see [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ] for fuller discussion).
        </p>
        <p>– Values Assertion: The following values are relevant to decide the legal question.</p>
        <p>Law Enforcement and Privacy are the values relevant to determining whether a
case falls under the automobile exception.
– Issues Assertion: The values require consideration of these issues. The issues are
whether there was sufficient exigency (so that Law Enforcement is promoted) and
insufficient expectations of privacy (so that Privacy is not demoted) to permit a
search without a warrant.
– Issues Linkage Assertion: The issues should be considered collectively as follows.</p>
        <p>The issues are related as Sufficient Exigency _ Insufficient Privacy.</p>
        <p>We then have a number of moves to introduce factors relating to the issues.
– Factors for Issue Assertion: The following factors are relevant to resolving the
issue. Vehicle Configuration and Location are relevant to resolving Sufficient
Exigency.
– Factor Linkage Assertion: The factors relevant to the issue should be considered
collectively as follows. Sufficient Exigency is resolved by considering Vehicle
Configuration ^ Location.</p>
        <p>We need a number of assertions to identify the facts relevant to the various factors:
– Facts for Factor Assertion: The following facts are relevant to determining whether
a factor is present. Wheels and Means of Propulsion are relevant to determining
Vehicle Configuration.
– Fact linkage Assertion: The facts relevant to the issue should be considered
collectively as follows. The presence of Vehicle Configuration is determined by
considering ( (Wheels ^ Engine) _ Self propulsion) _ (Vessel ^ (Motor _ Oars)).</p>
        <p>
          The structure as a whole is meant to provide a test. The test can be challenged at
all three levels to question the relevance of the components, the completeness of the
asserted components and how the components relate. There is no evidence level, as the
facts have been determined by the lower court, but whether such facts are observable
by a person applying the test in practice [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ] does need to be considered.
        </p>
        <p>In the course of the hearing the various components of the proposed tests emerge.
The dialogue is often not well structured: the challenges are not posed in any particular
order, and may be interleaved with the presentation of the proposal, so that the proposal
is modified as it is presented. None the less, the aim of each counsel is to present and
defend the components required for a test which will decide the case for their client,
and the Justices aim to get a clear statement of the various components which they can
use to build the arguments in their opinions.
4.3</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>Argument Components Tree (ACT)</title>
        <p>
          We can now organise the argument components identified in the speech acts as an
Argument Component Tree (ACT). For each dialogue in the oral hearing we form one ACT
for the counsel and one for the Justices (we do not distinguish individual Justices). Each
ACT is constructed starting from the issues. Issues may be conjunctive so that all issues
must be considered. Or they may be disjunctive so that the issues are independent, and
one positive will suffice. These are shown in the ACT using “^” and “_” respectively.
Sometimes, however, the relationship is not truth functional: like factors, all must be
considered, but none is necessary or sufficient (see [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ] for a fuller discussion of these
relationships). The non-truth functional relation is shown in the ACT using “+”.
        </p>
        <p>
          Throughout the dialogue, the participants’ ACTs are updated by the assertion of
new factors to resolve issues, or facts that indicate the presence of factors or the linkage
between them in order to construct a test. These links may also be truth functional
conjunction or disjunction, or reasons that must be considered, essentially the standard
factor/abstract relation of [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ]. These are shown in the ACT as arrows from children to
parent and the factors and facts which attracted the most attention in the dialogue are
indicated with an “R”.
        </p>
        <p>All the facts mentioned in the oral hearing are underlined. Furthermore, the ACT
distinguishes several types. Facts which are true of the current case are indicated using
an asterisk (*); facts which are not true in the current case but could be used in future
tests are indicated by a question mark (?), while an exclamation mark (!) is used for facts
which could not be used in practice, perhaps because they are not directly observable.
By the end of the dialogue, each ACT shows a complete representation of a perspective
on the components exchanged in the course of the dialogue. The next section provides
the ACTs constructed in the case study, California v Carney.
4.4</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>California v Carney: A Case Study</title>
        <p>This case is concerned with whether the exception for automobiles to the protection
against unreasonable search provided by the Fourth Amendment applies to mobile
homes, in particular motor homes in which the living area is an integral part of the
vehicle. The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A
search is considered reasonable if a warrant has been obtained.</p>
        <p>
          California v Carney has often been used in AI and Law to explore Supreme Court
oral argument (e.g. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ], [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ]), and to consider the interaction of two competing values
(e.g. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ]). In Carney, the competing values are enforceability of the law, which makes
exigency important, and citizens’ rights, which include the right to privacy [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. In the
following sections we provide an example of the construction of the ACTs in the oral
hearing dialogues of Carney.
        </p>
        <p>Dialogue One - Petitioner Oral Hearing In this dialogue the petitioner states that the
exigency is sufficient in Carney regardless of any expectations of privacy. This position
was based on the inherent mobility of the motor home, together with its location
offering ready access to the highway, as the factors satisfying the automobile exception, as
illustrated in the petitioner ACT of Figure 1.</p>
        <p>For the Justices privacy is also an issue that needs consideration. As the vehicle
was not actually moving on the road, they suggest tests give a bright line (BL) for
applying the automobile exception to parked vehicles. They propose certain facts to
test the privacy degree including the type of the parking lot and attachment to home
utilities (water /electricity) relating to the expectations of people living in a mobile
home. Furthermore, the Justices challenge the sufficiency of the mobility factor for
exigency by considering the vehicle license type (which is different for motor homes
and regular cars) and discussing other mobile things such as tents, suitcases, trailers
with wheels, houseboats and regular automobiles.</p>
        <p>In response to these challenges, the petitioner maintained that exigency is the sole
issue and it overrides any expectation of privacy. The petitioner indicates that mobility
involves any vehicle, wagon, ship or motorboat but not a mobile item such as a tent,
suitcase or trailer, stressing the importance of self-propulsion for the automobile
exception. This position thus stresses the significance of the vehicle’s configuration and
its ability to move quickly on a public highway, which is not true of any of the other
mobile objects.</p>
        <p>The petitioner accepts the need to consider parking location claiming that if a
vehicle is in a residential location (such as a mobile home park) and/or attached to home
utilities such as (water/electricity) it might not be considered inherently mobile,
whereupon issues of privacy would become relevant, but claims that a vehicle in a regular
parking lot can always be considered inherently mobile. Figure 1 also presents these
components and the relation between them in the petitioner ACT.</p>
        <p>Dialogue Two - Respondent Oral Hearing The respondent in contrast insists that
both exigency and privacy issues need to be considered. The respondent accepts that
the exigency is indicated by mobility, but says that this mobility is limited to vehicles
that are actually moving on the highway: thus the exigency was insufficient in Carney
because the mobile home was inoperable (because there was no driver and the curtains
were drawn). Moreover, it was parked not far from a courthouse so obtaining a warrant
was possible.</p>
        <p>Furthermore, the respondent claims that the mobile home attracts sufficient
expectations of privacy. He states that such expectations can be indicated through the
configuration of the mobile home which involves a living compartment that contains furniture
such as bed, refrigerator and other attributes indicating a residence. Moreover a separate
class of vehicle known as a house car is recognised and defined in the California
vehicle regulation code. In addition, the respondent states that privacy interests of a mobile
home arise from its use for the storage and transportation of personal effects, and so it
should be respected as much as a suitcase, which had previously been held to attract
Fourth Amendment protection (see US v Chadwick). Figure 2 shows the respondent’s
ACT.</p>
        <p>The Justices defend the petitioner exigency factors, i.e. parking location and vehicle
configuration to insist that the vehicle was able to move quickly and thus falls within the
automobile exception, giving an example of a crashed car (Cady v Dombrowski). The
Justices do consider the privacy of home attributes and personal effects, but argue that
it is not possible to determine these factors from outside the vehicle, so that no bright
line test is given.</p>
        <p>Dialogue Three - Petitioner Rebuttal Towards the end of the oral hearing, the
petitioner attempts to maintain his position and rebut the elements introduced by the
respondent by showing the inapplicability of the tests to prove sufficient privacy.</p>
        <p>According to the respondent test above, the fact that the living quarters are an
integral part a vehicle should attract sufficient privacy expectations. The petitioner claims,
however, that it is not possible to determine the required residential facts, and anyway in
Carney there was no evidence of food or personal items inside the motor home (except
marijuana!) as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, the petitioner states that the definition of
“house car” is not used to indicate a dwelling like a house, but to permit the regulation
of this type of automobile, as shown by the same definition applied to burglary, aligning
house cars with vehicles rather than houses. The new components are used to update
the petitioner ACT.
4.5</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-5">
        <title>Relating the Oral Hearing to the Opinions</title>
        <p>After the oral hearing, there are four ACTs. These will set out the available facts, factors
and issues, and possible linkages between them. The task now is to merge these
alternatives to produce an answer for the current case, and a test applicable to future cases. This
is the role of the Justices’ conference stage, and, given the (competing) ACTs, could be
done by proceeding top down, choosing the desired elements, and evaluating the
resulting structure using the facts of the case. Thus while all four trees identify privacy and
exigency as issues, all three ways of linking them are available, and must be chosen
between. Having identified exigency as an issue, a selection from the proposed factors
must be made, and so on. Different Justices may make different choices, which may
lead Justices to write individual opinions, either dissenting from the majority, or
expressing a different view of the appropriate tests. For example, the Justices must decide
upon the role that the factor ‘parking location’ plays. In the petitioner ACT it affects
mobility, since the location determines how readily the vehicle can become mobile on
the highway, whereas in the respondent ACT it affects privacy by indicating the current
use of the vehicle.</p>
        <p>From the analysis of Carney’s opinion, we find that the opinions offer different
navigations through the components that have been presented in the oral hearing ACTs:
all the components used in the opinions can be found in the ACTs. Some elements form
the basis of the court opinion tests. Some of the remaining facts, although not true of
Carney, are mentioned as potentially pertinent, and so may still provide tests in future
cases.
5</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>In this paper we have provided an overview about the problem concerning the
development of a deliberative reasoning framework through the investigation of the dialogue
interactions in the Supreme Court oral hearings. In particular, we have focused on the
analyses of the social values of the legal arguments from different perspectives in
order to find the relation between the Court opinion and the components constructed in
the Court oral hearings. Throughout the paper, we have presented the main aims of
the research in defining a proper representation of the Oral hearing, developing a
dialogue system for constructing this representation, analysing the opinion by navigating
through the tree representation and validating the application of the dialogue using
selected cases from various courts. Furthermore, we have presented the reasoning model
and show how we moved from the oral hearing transcripts to ACTs, through the use of
a set of defined speech acts. Now that we have established a framework for conducting
this analysis task, the next step will be to move towards automation.</p>
      <p>
        Acknowledgement Some parts of this work was previously reported in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] and [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]
in collaboration with my supervisors Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon, with
thanks.
      </p>
    </sec>
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