=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-112/paper-12
|storemode=property
|title=A Critical Analysis of the Husserlian Phenomenology in IS Research and IS Development: The Case of Soft Systems Methodology
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-112/Probert.pdf
|volume=Vol-112
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/wspi/Probert04
}}
==A Critical Analysis of the Husserlian Phenomenology in IS Research and IS Development: The Case of Soft Systems Methodology==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-112/Probert.pdf
A Critical Analysis of Husserlian Phenomenology in IS
Research and IS Development: The Case of Soft Systems
Methodology
Stephen K. Probert1
1
Department of Information Systems, Cranfield University, RMCS Shrivenham, Swindon,
SN6 8LA, U.K.
s.k.probert@.cranfield.ac.uk
Abstract. Husserlian phenomenology has been used to provide (or perhaps
“evoke”) the rationale for the use of soft systems approaches in both
information systems (IS) research and IS development. The purpose of this
brief paper is to encourage a debate about the feasibility and coherence of such
projects. A (fairly) typical “interpretive” IS methodology (Soft Systems
Methodology) is critically analysed using Adorno’s epistemological research as
critical theory reference material [5]. It is concluded that the Adorno’s
arguments against phenomenology apply in full force to IS research and IS
development methods (and / or methodologies). Some practical guidelines, for
avoiding the problems discussed, will be provided. Finally, some suggestions
for further research are given.
1 Introduction
Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) is now often used for both IS research and IS
development [1], [2], [3], [4]. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) developed
phenomenology, which supposedly provides the foundation of SSM’s epistemology.1
Consequently, the arguments put forward in this work will be based (in part) on
Adorno’s [5] critical analysis of Husserl’s phenomenological works [6], [7], [8], [9].
An examination of the reasoning behind the relevant aspects of the SSM advocates’
stated (epistemic) position will also be undertaken. The SSM advocates’ motivations
for adopting the position that they hold will be characterised as the result of a
perceived need to attain epistemic certitude. Further considerations concerning
Husserl’s search for certitude will inform the pragmatic recommendations, which will
be discussed at this point. The practical conclusion drawn will be that, whilst not
attempting to sanction “sloppy” systems analysis, epistemic certitude is not attainable
1 “Soft systems methodology implies ... a model of social reality such as is found in the ...
(phenomenological) tradition deriving sociologically from Weber and philosophically from
Husserl.” [1] (p. 19).
- therefore the demand for it can only be counter-productive – when undertaking IS
research and (a fortiori) IS development.
2 Imaginary Altitude
Essentially, SSM advocates hold that statements about the real (i.e. objective) states
of affairs in the social world are unwarranted and untenable. Consequently, discourse
about mental states is elevated to a position of high (or higher) epistemic significance
and statements about the real world are denigrated as having a low - or even
insignificant – epistemic status [10], [11]. It is precisely this elevation (of discourse
about mental / ideal states of affairs) which constitutes the common ground between
the SSM advocates and Husserl; this (generic) approach is criticised by Adorno for
what he characterises as its imaginary altitude. Prima facie the (crude) positivists’
position is that sense-data puts us in immediate contact with external reality (although
considerable variations on this theme can be found in the writings of the so-called
positivists). At any rate, it is this (a somewhat “straw man”) version of positivist
thought that both Husserl and the SSM advocates take umbrage at. The SSM
advocates have often proffered the view that, as ideal “mental constructs”, human
activity systems (i.e., in their view, information systems) have properties,
characteristics, etc. which may be examined; whereas – on the contrary – human
activity systems as real world occurrences are strictly-speaking unknowable and
therefore they cannot be modelled. In this respect Husserl’s arguments and those of
the SSM advocates (for subjective idealism) are strikingly similar. Adorno argues that
the motivation for idealism lies within the belief that unless a thought (or a
judgement) about some aspect of experience admits the possibility of being certain
(whether true or false) then that thought is epistemically worthless, “The thesis of the
perceptibility of the purely possible as a doctrine of essential insight, or as Husserl
originally called it, categorial intuition, has become the motto of all philosophical
approaches which evoke phenomenology. The fact that the new method should
guarantee ideal states of affairs the same immediacy and infallibility as sense-data in
the received [“positivist”] view, explains the influence which Husserl exercised over
those who could no longer be satisfied with neo-Kantian systems and yet were
unwilling to blindly hand themselves over to irrationalism.” [5] (p. 200).
The “altitude” supposedly gained by taking such a view (i.e. the idealism adhered to
by both the SSM advocates and Husserl) is achieved by, as it were, “rising above” the
real world into an ideal world (or worlds) – in a search for greater epistemic security. Of
course, the “price to be paid” is in the removal (“elevation”) of oneself from the real
world within which one may be attempting to act. However, and in agreement with
Adorno, it is not being suggested here that an alternative position of naïve positivism
should be adopted, as “[C]ategorial intuition is the paradoxical apex of his [Husserl’s]
thought. It is the indifference into which the positivistic motif of intuitability and the
rationalistic one of being-in-itself of ideal-states-of-affairs should be sublated. The
movement of Husserlian thought could not tarry at this apex. Categorial intuition is no
newly discovered principle of philosophizing. It proves to be a sheer dialectical moment
of transition: imaginary altitude.” [5] (p. 201). However, it might be argued that the
SSM advocates in fact hold the position that thought is not so detached from the real
world as my characterisation (above) would imply. Indeed, the SSM texts contain many
references to an unfolding flux of ideas and events. However, it is also made clear – in
the various SSM texts (e.g. [1], [2], [4], [10], [11]) that “perceived events” are just
(precisely) subjective perceptions. Adorno cogently distinguishes between
epistemological accounts of experience given in terms of sense-data of and (ephemeral)
encounters with the real world, “In a certain way categorial intuition was devised by the
doctrine of propositions in themselves … If these are truly to be more than creations of
thought, then they cannot really be products of thought but must simply be encountered
… by it. The paradoxical demand for a merely encountering thought arises from the
claim to validity on the part of logical absolutism2. The doctrine of categorial intuition
is the result of this on the subject side.” [5] (pp. 201-202).
3 Subjective Certitude and Epistemological Rigour
The question that will now be asked is: why should so much emphasis be placed on (the
possibility of) subjective certitude in such formulations of the epistemological problem
of knowledge-discovery? According to Adorno, the answer is to be found in the actual
circumstances in which academics find themselves, i.e. middlemen. Interestingly, this
argument would appear to hold a fortiori for the likes of SSM practitioners, consultants,
etc. The demand for subjective certitude – inherent in the epistemology proffered by the
SSM advocates – would prima facie seem to generate immediate problems for the use
of SSM’s epistemology in practical endeavours. One might think that practical IS
development work should – minimally – be more concerned with getting a practical
working knowledge of a situation in order to take positive action – rather than getting
embroiled in “epistemologically purist” issues and concerns. Of course, to take this
literally would be to proceed uncritically. In order to operate in a critically aware
manner, epistemological considerations will be important – but it is argued here that
“epistemological purism” is not the best way to proceed. Further discussion of an
appropriate epistemological framework with which to undertake critical systems
analysis lies outside the scope of this paper (which is not to suggest that it is
unimportant).
At any rate the source of the subjective idealism - inherent in the SSM advocates
epistemological accounts – may be found in practice rather than in theory. The accounts
of epistemology given in the SSM texts are supposedly based on (or supported by) the
practical experiences of using systems ideas in organisations. In all such accounts
(encountered by the author at any rate), the Soft Systems Practitioner does not claim to
be the owner of the system. Indeed, the impression one gets is usually of the SSM
practitioner being rather unceremoniously “dumped” into a conflict-ridden and
potentially hostile social situation of which he or she has little prior knowledge. From a
2 The term ‘logical absolutism’ is introduced by Adorno to connote Husserl’s view of logical
statements as being in no way dependent on events occurring in the real world for their truth-
values; this is an important aspect of Husserl’s conception of eidetic sciences.
critical perspective, this is significant, because Adorno’s critique of Husserlian
phenomenology does not depend on (the success of) a purely rational critical exercise.
Rather, it depends on the reinterpretation of epistemological categories as the products
of social conditions – particularly those where power / violence / intimidation / etc. is
exercised. Jarvis explains Adorno’s metacritique project thus, “It was in the work
towards the Husserl book [5] … that the mature form of Adorno’s thought began
decisively to emerge. This was Adorno’s most extensive attempt to date to justify in
detail his belief that even those philosophical texts which were apparently most abstract
necessarily contained sedimented within them the traces of the social experience which
had made them possible.. In particular, it is in this study that Adorno begins to put into
practice the idea of a metacritique. Whereas epistemological critique asks what
experiences make experience possible, metacritique asks what experiences make the
epistemological categories possible.” [12] (p. 12). Might the social conditions (alluded
to above) explain the perceived need for, or the motivation for seeking, certitude?
Adorno makes the following comments about subjective idealists (in general) in the
introduction to his Against Epistemology – A Metacritique3[5], “The open or secret
pomp and the totally unobvious need for absolute spiritual security – for why, indeed,
should the playful luck of spirit be diminished by the risk of error? – are the reflex to
real powerlessness and insecurity. They are the self-deafening roar through positivity of
those who neither contribute to the real reproduction of life nor actually participate in its
real mastery. As middlemen, they only commend and sell to the master his means of
lordship, spirit objectified … into method [or methodology, for that matter]… They use
their subjectivity to subtract the subject from truth and their idea of objectivity is as a
residue.” [5] (p. 15). The practical problems generated in IS research and IS
development are unlikely to be solved by the adoption of an impractical epistemological
standpoint.
4 Conclusion
It is concluded that – whatever the motivations for desiring it – epistemic certitude is not
attainable - therefore the demand for it can only be counter-productive – when
undertaking IS research and IS development. Our understanding of the real world in
which IS research and IS development must take place may often be partial, confused
and even bigoted. Essentially, critically-minded vigilance will provide some defence
against the latter – as will an openness to the critical comments and suggestions of
others. For the former – the epistemological problems – we had best learn to make do
with whatever understanding of the problem situation can be obtained, given the time
and resources available. This is not to sanction sloppy analysis! The alternative - only to
sanction (unattainable) epistemological rigour - can only force us to withdraw our
attention from the real world and into our (subjective) selves. Few practical problems
3 The title of this book is somewhat misleading, as – in it - Adorno is conducting a critical
analysis of subjective idealist epistemology as a (sort of) groundwork for an alternative
epistemology, “Criticizing epistemology also means … retaining it.” [5] (p. 27 [N.B. the three
dots are included in the original text]). Some aspects of what such an alternative epistemology
might look like are discussed by Guzzoni [13].
are amenable to solution solely by introspection - although this is not to deny the value
and importance of critical reflection. It should be noted that Husserl’s epistemological
arguments, and Adorno’s critique of these arguments, are both extremely difficult
topics; further research is warranted here. At any rate, the uses (or abuses!) of such
complex arguments to legitimate approaches to IS research or IS development are
fraught with difficulties – especially when the practical consequences of these
approaches have not been adequately considered. There is a need for more critical
research here also, including metacritical research – as has been carried out above.
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