<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Perfect Syllogisms and the Method of Minimal Representation</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>A. Ecthesis</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Sumanta Sarathi Sharma School of Philosophy &amp; Culture Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Jammu &amp; Kashmir 182 320</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IN">INDIA</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>17</fpage>
      <lpage>22</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>-In this paper, the Method of Minimal Representation (MMR, i.e., an alternative diagrammatic technique to test the validity of syllogisms) is employed to differentiate perfect (first figure) from imperfect syllogisms (other figures). It demonstrates that the validity of perfect syllogisms can be exhibited applying lesser number of rules, which govern the proposed method. This is also in accordance with Aristotle's dictum of ceteris paribus, which assumes the superiority of a demonstration that is derived through fewer postulates or hypotheses. This paper is divided into four sections. The first section gives a brief exposition on the historical preliminaries of perfect syllogisms. The second section elaborates the method of minimal representation. In the penultimate section, we test first figure syllogisms and contrast them with other figures by the proposed method. In the concluding section, we demonstrate the primacy of first figure among all figures.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>I. INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>Syllogism, according to Aristotle, “is [a] discourse in which,
certain things being stated, some other thing than that what is
stated follows [out] of necessity from their being so” [McKeon
1946:66]. The expressions “certain things be stated” forms the
premise(s) whereas “some other thing” refer to conclusion.
In other words, the implicit assertion(s) in the premise(s) is
made explicit through the conclusion. With reference to this
premise to conclusion transformation, he called the first figure
syllogisms, perfect.</p>
      <p>In Organon, he said, “I call that a perfect syllogism1 which
needs nothing other than what has been stated to make it
plain what necessarily follows; a syllogism is imperfect, if
it needs either one or more propositions, which are indeed
necessary consequences of the terms set down, but have not
been expressly stated as premises”[Ibid:66]. The second and
third figures are imperfect figures2.</p>
      <p>Imperfect syllogisms are not invalid syllogisms, rather
‘potential syllogisms’ where what he means by ‘potentiality’
is that the imperfect syllogisms are ‘potentially perfect
syllogisms’ [Patzig 1968:46].That is to say that an imperfect
syllogism can be transformed into a perfect syllogism. A
more-imperfect syllogism takes more steps to transform into
1In an interesting study, perfect syllogisms have been further divided into
two sets [Lehman 1972]. However, in this paper, I have not considered that
approach.</p>
      <p>2The fourth figure that was later added by Galen is also imperfect.
a perfect syllogism, whereas less-imperfect syllogism takes
fewer steps.</p>
      <p>Aristotle demonstrated the validity or invalidity of
syllogisms using three methods. They are, namely, ecthesis (also
expressed as ekthesis), reductio ad absurdum (also known
as reductio per impossible or reductio ad impossible) and
reduction. In the following subsections, I briefly explain these
methods taking some examples.</p>
      <p>The proof by ecthesis is a method of exposition with which
Aristotle validated a given syllogism. However, he has not
used this method extensively. According to Smith, the proof
by ‘ecthesis or ‘setting out methodology is used several times
by Aristotle to provide an alternative deduction schema for
completing certain syllogistic moods [Smith 1983: 224-232].
He also points, Aristotle never explains why he includes this
alternative deductions and there is some debate about what
exactly the procedure is.</p>
      <p>Let us try to understand this procedure taking the example
which Aristotle took. Let ‘P belong to all M’ and ‘S belong
to all M’. Then, ‘P belong to some S’. In order to prove this,
Aristotle introduced an element of novelty by assuming, say ‘c
(a member of the class)’ which belong to M. Then ‘c’ belongs
to P and also ‘c’ belongs to S. It means, that ‘c’ belongs to
both P and S. If ‘c’ is a common member of P and S, then
there is something common between P and S. This then entails
that P belongs to some S.</p>
      <p>Alexander maintains that the constant ‘c’ is a singular
term given by perception, and the proof by exposition
(ecthesis) consists in a sort of perceptual evidence [Lukasiewicz
1955:60]. Lukasiewicz, like any other logician of his time has
not accepted it as a proof3, as perception is not a logical proof
[Ibid 60]. In fact, he calls it a method outside the limits of the
syllogistic [Ibid 45].</p>
      <p>3Until late twentieth century, diagrammatic representations or reasoning
based on diagrams were not accepted as proofs. They were at most understood
as schemes based on heuristics.</p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>B. Reductio ad impossible</title>
        <p>It is one of the oldest4 method used in any system of
reasoning. This is performed in two steps. In the first step,
the negation of the conclusion is assumed. In the second step,
the falsity (as a result of contradiction) of this negation of the
conclusion is proved. If the negation of the original conclusion
is proved to be false, then the original conclusion is proved
true. This is called reductio ad absurdum or what Aristotle
termed it as reductio ad impossible. Roy called it reductio per
impossible [Roy 1958:].</p>
        <p>Let us take an example from third figure, ‘if R belongs to
some S, and P to all S, P must belong to some R’. Aristotle
says, that this can be shown valid using reduction, reductio ad
impossible as well as ecthesis5. Let us examine reductio here.
Suppose, P does not belong to any R. It means, P belongs
to no R. Then, R belongs to no P. But P belongs to all S
and R belongs to some S, thus, P must belong to some R.
This makes our initial supposition false. Therefore, the given
syllogism is valid.</p>
        <p>The method of reductio was one of the prevalent methods of
reasoning during those times. Aristotle has used it in order to
show his systems coherence to the existing rationality as this
expression many a times occurs in Organon that a syllogism is
“possible to demonstrate it [or show its validity] also [using]
reductio per impossible”.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-2">
        <title>C. Reduction</title>
        <p>This refers broadly to a method of transforming the moods
of one figure to moods of another figure [Roy 1958:216]. More
precisely, the transformation of second and third figure moods
into first figure is reduction. A first figure valid syllogism is
accepted as an axiom by Aristotle. It is a necessary truth
and thus requires no further explanation. He shows that a
form is valid by showing how to deduce its conclusion from
its premises. A deduction is a series of steps leading from
the premises to the conclusion, each of which is either an
immediate inference6 from the previous step or an inference
from two previous steps.</p>
        <p>A simple question which arises at this juncture: How
Aristotle shows a given syllogism valid by transforming the
terms of the proposition? He shows them valid by changing
a syllogism of second or third figure to first figure. The next
question then will be: Why Aristotle transforms second or third
figure syllogism into first figure? It is because, the first figure
is perfect figure and the valid syllogisms of this figure are
perfect syllogisms. Hence to establish that the conclusion of a
perfect syllogism follows from the premises, one should need
to do no more than state the syllogism itself [Lear 1980:2].</p>
        <p>4It is one of the oldest, if not the oldest method used as a proof.
Presocratics have used it along with counter-example technique. However, it is
difficult to comment on their precedence.</p>
        <p>5Ecthesis is seldom used by Aristotle for proving validity of syllogisms.
6Conversion, Obversion and Contraposition (sometimes, Inversion as well)
are the immediate inferences. They play a vital role in determining the validity
of syllogisms. It is also contended that rules of immediate inferences were
principally developed to serve the purpose of validation of syllogism using
the method of reduction.</p>
        <p>Logicians theorized various overtures to understand the
nature of perfect syllogisms though there exists no exact logical
analysis of the proofs Aristotle gives to reduce the imperfect
syllogisms to the perfect [Lukasiewicz 1955:47]. Roy opines,
the dictum de omni et nullo is directly applicable to first figure
[Roy 1958:216]. Whereas, Patterson claims “this is misleading
not because Aristotle nowhere explicitly formulates the dictum
and casts it in the role of logical touchstone, but because the
dictum itself should be seen as a reflection or encapsulation of
Aristotelian convictions about the (small number of) ways in
which one item can relate predicatively to another [Patterson
1993:375].</p>
        <p>In a[nother] word[s], perfect syllogisms are ‘self-evident’
syllogism [Patzig 1968:45]. He further opines, that the defined
‘necessity’ (as per the definition of syllogism) not only occurs
but also ‘appears’ or is transparent. In an imperfect syllogism,
this defined ‘necessity’ undergoes certain operations before it
‘appears’ or becomes transparent. This observation of Patzig
also supports the claim of Kneales that Aristotle’s thought
was guided by diagrams which makes this necessity ‘appear’
evident [Kneale &amp; Kneale 1962:72]. Flannery has successfully
provided a rationale for the notion of perfect syllogisms using
diagrams [Flannery 1987:455-471].</p>
        <p>
          Another interesting remark made by Roy is that ‘reduction’
reveals the essential unity of all forms of syllogistic inference
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(Roy 1958:218)</xref>
          as all the figures get transformed into the
first figure. Flannery’s rationale, Roy’s remark along with
Kneales’ claim, points to an important fact that in order to
cognize the idea of perfect syllogisms, one requires visual
aid and clarification. Similarly, when Patzig says, that defined
necessity ‘appears’ transparent, what he means is that the line
of reasoning (in case of perfect syllogisms) creates a picture in
our mind, which our rationality grasps. Thus, in what follows, I
intend to understand this notion of perfect-ness with the help of
a new diagrammatic technique to test the validity of syllogism,
called the ‘method of minimal representation’.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>II. METHOD OF MINIMAL REPRESENTATION</title>
      <p>Method of Minimal Representation7 is an alternative
diagrammatic scheme for testing syllogisms [Sharma
2008:412415]. The purpose of developing this method is to differentiate
traditional and modern valid syllogisms. Let us in brief, revisit
the history of valid syllogism (in numbers) before explaining
the proposed method.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>A. Valid Syllogisms</title>
        <p>Aristotle discusses fourteen syllogisms belonging to the
first, second and third of the traditional figures [Patzig
1968:132] as valid. With the development of fourth figure and
considering the weakened moods8, twenty-four syllogisms are
7This method was originally presented as Method of Least Representation at
the First World Congress on the Square of Opposition, Montreux, Switzerland
(June 2007). Later, it was revised (based on the comments and suggestions),
and was named as Method of Minimal Representation. See Sharma (2008,
2012).</p>
        <p>8Weakened moods refer to those syllogisms, where we replace a universal
conclusion with its sub-altern. For e.g., if AAA-1 is valid then AAI-1 must
also be valid since I proposition is the sub-altern of A proposition.
traditionally valid. If we leave the weakened moods, then there
are nineteen valid syllogisms. However, if we consider modern
interpretation, only fifteen of these are valid.</p>
        <p>
          The Aristotlelian methods (as discussed in the previous
section) along with mnemonics
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">(developed by Petrus Hispanus
[Keynes 1906:329])</xref>
          were used to test syllogisms. Formal
syllogistic rules, which follows the late ninteenth and early
twentieth century development in logic is widely used these
days. Nonetheless, Euler circles (for traditional valid
syllogisms) and Venn-Peirce system (for modern valid syllogisms)
also gained currency for testing syllogisms from the standpoint
of diagrams.
        </p>
        <p>However, none of the above diagrammatic technique is able
to demonstrate whether a syllogism is valid/invalid in both
traditional and modern readings9. The motivation to develop
a unified diagrammatic scheme for interpreting syllogisms in
both traditional and modern readings came from here10. In the
next subsection, I explain the method of drawing propositions
and consequently syllogisms.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>B. Drawing Propositions and Syllogisms</title>
        <p>There are two basic shapes11 that are employed in this
method. They are, namely, rectangles and right angled
triangles. These shapes act as initial tools for drawing a proposition.
Apart from these, arrows are used to show the possible location
of the shape of subject term of the proposition. We also label
the rectangles or triangles for pinpointing them. The scheme
for propositions is as under:</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>1) Universal Affirmative Proposition (A) - All S is P: Here,</title>
        <p>a small rectangle (S) is drawn from the right bottom edge of
the larger rectangle (P) containing it. The arrow shows that
the possibility of finding S is inside P only.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-4">
        <title>2) Universal Negative Proposition (E) - No S is P: Here,</title>
        <p>two disjoint rectangles (S and P), of equal areas, are drawn.
The arrow shows that the possibility of finding S is outside P
only.</p>
        <p>9It may also be noted here that no standard digrammatic technique attempts
to address the notion of perfect syllogism with its diagram.</p>
        <p>10After explaining this diagrammatic technique, I with the help of an
example clarify, how to use the same diagram for traditional and modern
interpretation.</p>
        <p>11I use ‘shape’ intentionally so as to distinguish it from ‘figure’. ‘Shape’
means a geometrical structure used in the MMR whereas ‘figure’ in syllogistic
is that which determines the position of middle term in a syllogism.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-5">
        <title>3) Particular Affirmative Proposition (I) - Some S is P:</title>
        <p>Here, a right-angled triangle (S) is drawn from the right bottom
edge of the rectangle (P) containing it. The arrows suggest that
the possibility of finding S is both inside as well as outside P.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-6">
        <title>4) Particular Negative Proposition (O) - Some S is not P:</title>
        <p>Here, a right-angled triangle (S) is drawn from the right bottom
edge of the rectangle (P) outside it. The arrows suggest that
the possibility of finding S is both inside as well as outside P.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Summarizing the above:</title>
      <p>The Universal Propositions (A and E) are represented
by a smaller rectangle inside a greater rectangle.
The Particular Propositions (I and O) are represented by a
right-angled triangle inside or outside a greater rectangle.
In a Universal Affirmative Proposition (A), a rectangle
is drawn from the right bottom edge approximately
less than one-fourth of the area of greater rectangle
containing it.</p>
      <p>In a Universal Negative Proposition (E), two disjoint
rectangles, of around equal areas, are drawn.</p>
      <p>In a Particular Affirmative Proposition (I), a
rightangled triangle is drawn from the right bottom edge
approximately less than one-fourth of the area of greater
rectangle containing it.</p>
      <p>In a Particular Negative Proposition (O), a right-angled
triangle is drawn from the right bottom edge
approximately less than one-fourth of the area of greater
rectangle outside it.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>C. Additional Parameters</title>
        <p>Apart from the above rules, certain additional conventions
are also followed while drawing the propositions and
eventually syllogisms. In these propositions, the subject class
(smaller rectangle or right-angled triangle) is represented in
the predicate class (greater rectangle) with less than
onefourth occupation. The prescription for drawing rectangles
or right-angled triangles approximately less than one-fourth
of the area of greater rectangle needs to be elucidated here.
This convention has been included to nullify the possibility
of any unnecessary overlapping of basic figures. This is the
case because while representing syllogisms we may require
drawing basic shapes (rectangles/right-angled triangles) inside
a rectangle. Furthermore, to avoid any needless overlapping,
we always draw the second premise in the syllogism from
another edge of the greater rectangle. Let us take the following
example:</p>
        <p>Suppose, we have to draw All P is M and All S is M in a
syllogism, then this is drawn as:</p>
        <p>Fig. 5. All P is M and All S is M</p>
        <p>Similarly, arrows become important for validating
syllogisms as given under with the following example. Suppose,
we have to draw No P is M and No S is M in a syllogism,
then this is drawn as three disjoint rectangles as given below:</p>
        <p>If the conclusion says that No S is P, then it seems from the
above that it holds. However, the arrows (s and p) depicts that
S or P can be anywhere except inside M. Thus, S and P can
be overlapping or can fully be contained inside. Therefore, we
cannot conclude No S is P, and the given syllogism is invalid.
In the next subsection, I discuss the inference rules briefly.</p>
        <p>Fig. 6. No P is M and No S is M</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>D. Inference Rules</title>
        <p>Let us take an example to show how this method can test
the validity of a syllogism in both traditional and modern
understanding. Darapti i.e., AAI-3 has the following structure:
All P is M
All S is M
Therefore, Some S is P.</p>
        <p>We first draw a small rectangle M inside the greater rectangle
P along with arrows. Similarly, keeping the small rectangle M
there, we draw another greater rectangle S as shown below:</p>
        <p>Fig. 7. All P is M and All S is M</p>
        <p>In the traditional interpretation, we need to find that there
shall be a part common part between S and P. In the diagram,
it is portrayed by M. Therefore, AAA-3 is valid in the
traditional interpretation. However, in the modern viewpoint,
we need to have a right-angled triangle S inside rectangle P. If
we examine the diagram In the next section, we test syllogisms
with MMR in each first, second and third figure.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>III. MMR AND PERFECT SYLLOGISMS In this section, we take three examples from each figure to demonstrate the simplicity of first figure and the relative complexities associated with second and third figures.</title>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>A. MMR and the First Figure</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Let us take AAA-1: All M is P All S is M Therefore, all S is P.</title>
      <p>We first draw the rectangle M inside the largest rectangle P
as given in the first premise. We then draw rectangle S inside
the larger rectangle M. We label the diagram appropriately
and draw the arrows as per rules.
order to tacle this difficulty, we draw the minor premise first13.
Nonetheless, if we draw the minor premise first, then also
it requires suitable accommodation (of inference rules and
additional parameters) to integrate the major premise after that
in this diagram. After taking all these into consideration, the
given syllogism can be drawn in the following fashion:</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>B. MMR and the Second Figure</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Let us take AOO-2: All P is M Some S is not M Therefore, some S is not P.</title>
      <p>In this, we first draw the smaller rectangle P inside greater
rectangle M. The minor premise i.e., some S is not M poses
a problem (to be integrated) in this diagram. In order to avoid
any intersection, so as to preserve the conventions of minimal
representation, we draw it in the following way:</p>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>C. MMR and the Third Figure</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Considering OAO-2:</title>
      <p>Some M is not P
All M is S
Therefore, some S is not P
The problem it (this syllogism) poses first is that which
premise may be drawn first. If we draw the major premise
first, we find it difficult to integrate the minor premise12. In
12In fact, it is not only difficult but impossible to draw the minor premise
later, if we draw the major premise before.</p>
      <p>Fig. 10. Some M is not P and All M is S</p>
      <p>Though, we draw the above diagram, putting the arrows in
the right positions is also difficult. However, the above diagram
can be drawn for the given syllogism using MMR considering
the inference rules and additional parameters.</p>
      <p>The above examples, show that the second and third figure14
poses problems (as they are tangled) while drawing with the
help of MMR.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>IV. CONCLUSION</title>
      <p>This article shows that the syllogisms of first figure are
simple15 (or easier) to draw using the proposed method. In
the first figure, we use only the rules prescribed in
Drawing Propositions and Syllogisms. However, the second and
third figures are relatively complex and thus require (apart
from the above rules) the usage of Additional parameters.
Moreover, the syllogisms of second and third figures need
careful considerations (to suitably incorporate both the major
and minor premises along with the positioning of arrows) for
its final diagram to be drawn. MMR depicts the clarity and
simplicity of first figure and its line of reasoning. The clarity
and simplicity of first figure makes it perfect.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENT</title>
      <p>I thank Dr. James Burton (University of Brighton) and Dr.
Lopamudra Choudhury (Jadavpur University) for organizing
this workshop on Diagrammatic Logic and Cognition and
providing me with an oppurtunity to present this work. I am
grateful to the anonymous reviewers, for their valuable
comments and suggestions, which helped immensely to improve
13It may further be noted that drawing the minor premise first and then the
major premise, is to use additional parameters as explained in Section II-C.</p>
      <p>14I have not considered fourth figure syllogisms in this paper, in order
to keep Aristotelian notion of figures intact. Nonetheless, we face similar
difficulties (as in second and third figure) while drawing the fourth figure
syllogisms as well.</p>
      <p>15
this paper. I also thank Dr. Ranjan Mukhopadhay
(Vishwabharati University) for Patzig and Mr. Varun K. Paliwal (SMVD
University) for helping me with LATEX preparation.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          [1]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.J.</given-names>
            <surname>Flannery</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>A Rationale for Aristotle's Notion of Perfect Syllogisms</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic</source>
          ,
          <volume>28</volume>
          , no.
          <issue>3</issue>
          ,
          <year>1987</year>
          :
          <fpage>455</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>471</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          [2]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.N.</given-names>
            <surname>Keynes</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic, London:MacMillan and Co.,
          <year>1906</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          [3]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>W.</given-names>
            <surname>Kneale</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Kneale</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>The Development of Logic</source>
          , Oxford:Clarendon Press,
          <year>1962</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          [4]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Lear</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Aristotle and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Logical</given-names>
            <surname>Theory</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,
          <year>1980</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          [5]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Lehman</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Two sets of Perfect Syllogisms,
          <source>Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic</source>
          ,
          <year>1972</year>
          :
          <fpage>425</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>429</lpage>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          [6]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Lukasiewicz</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic</article-title>
          , Oxford: Clarendon Press,
          <year>1972</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          [7]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>McKeon</surname>
          </string-name>
          , ed.
          <source>The Basic Works of Aristotle</source>
          , New York: Random House,
          <year>1941</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          [8]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Patterson</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Aristotle's Perfect Syllogisms, Predication and</article-title>
          the Dictum De Omni, Synthese,
          <volume>96</volume>
          ,
          <year>1993</year>
          :
          <fpage>359</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>378</lpage>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          [9]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
            <surname>Patzig</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>Aristotle's Theory of Syllogism</source>
          , Dodrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
          <year>1968</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          [10]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B.N.</given-names>
            <surname>Roy</surname>
          </string-name>
          , A Textbook of Deductive Logic, Calcutta: Sarkar and Sons,
          <year>1958</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          [11]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.S.</given-names>
            <surname>Sharma</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Interpreting Squares of Opposition with the help of Diagrams, In Square of Opposition: A General Framework</article-title>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>by J.Y.</given-names>
            <surname>Beziau</surname>
          </string-name>
          and G. Payette,
          <volume>175</volume>
          -
          <fpage>194</fpage>
          . Bern: Peter Lang Publishing House,
          <year>2012</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          [12]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.S.</given-names>
            <surname>Sharma</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>Method of Minimal Representation: An Alternative Diagrammatic Technique to Test the Validity of Categorical Syllogisms, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence</source>
          ,
          <year>2008</year>
          :
          <fpage>412</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>414</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          [13]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Smith</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>Completeness of an Ecthetic Syllogistic, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic</source>
          ,
          <year>1983</year>
          :
          <fpage>224</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>232</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>