=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-1158/invited
|storemode=property
|title=Du-Vote: Remote Electronic Voting with Untrusted Computers
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1158/invited.pdf
|volume=Vol-1158
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/apn/RyanGC14
}}
==Du-Vote: Remote Electronic Voting with Untrusted Computers==
<pdf width="1500px">https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1158/invited.pdf</pdf>
<pre>
 Du-Vote: Remote Electronic Voting with
          Untrusted Computers
             (Invited Talk)

Mark Ryan, Gurchetan Grewal, Michael Clarkson, and Liqun Chen

                      University of Birmingham, UK
                        m.d.ryan@cs.bham.ac.uk



 Abstract. Du-Vote is a new remote electronic voting protocol that elim-
 inates the often-required assumption that voters trust general-purpose
 computers. Trust is distributed in Du-Vote between a simple hardware
 token issued to the voter, the voters’s computer, and a server run by elec-
 tion authorities. Verifiability is guaranteed with statistically high prob-
 ability even if all these machines are controlled by the adversary, and
 privacy is guaranteed as long as at least either the voter’s computer or
 the server is not controlled by the adversary. The design of the Du-Vote
 protocol is presented in this paper. A new non-interactive zero-knowledge
 proof is employed to verify the server’s computations. The security of the
 protocol is analyzed to determine the extent to which, when components
 of the system are malicious, privacy and verifiability are maintained.

 Keywords: du-vote, electronic voting protocol

</pre>