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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>A single proof of classical behaviour in da Costa's Cn systems</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mauricio Osorio</string-name>
          <email>osoriomauri@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>José Abel Castellanos</string-name>
          <email>jose.castellanosjo@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Universidad de las Américas, Sta. Catarina Martir</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Cholula, Puebla, 72820</addr-line>
          <country country="MX">México</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>1</fpage>
      <lpage>11</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>A strong negation in da Costa's Cn systems can be naturally extended from the strong negation (¬∗) of C1. In [1] Newton da Costa proved the conectives {→, ∧, ∨, ¬∗} in C1 satisfy all schemas and inference rules of classical logic. In the following paper we present a proof that all logics in the Cn herarchy also behave classically as C1. This result tell us the existance of a common property among the paraconsistent family of logics created by da Costa.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Paraconsistent logic</kwd>
        <kwd>Cn systems</kwd>
        <kwd>Strong negation</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        According to the authors in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] a paraconsistent logic is the underlying logic for
inconsistent but non-trivial theories. In fact, many authors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">2, 3</xref>
        ] have pointed
out paraconsistency is mainly due to the construction of a negation operator
which satisfies some properties about classical logic, but at the same time do
not hold the so called law of explosion α, ¬α ` β for arbitrary formulas α, β, as
well as others [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        A common misconception related to paraconsistent logics is the confusion
between triviality and contradiction. A theory T is trivial when any of the
sentences in the language of T can be proven. We say that a theory T is
contradictory if exists a sentence α in the language of T such that T proves α and
¬α. Finally, a theory T is explosive if and only if T is trivial in the presence of
a contradiction. We can see that contradictoriness and triviality are equivalent
if and only if for the underlying logic the law of explosion is valid [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. One of the
greatest achievements of paraconsistent logic is to provide a general framework
to the study of inconsistent theories based on the distinction of contradiction
and triviality.
      </p>
      <p>
        Paraconsistent logics were born in two different ways. In 1948, Jaskowski
gave the following conditions that any paraconsistent logic should satisfy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]:
J3. It should have an intuitive justification.
      </p>
      <p>Also, in 1963, we can find a new approach given by da Costa, who
independently defined a set of conditions that a paraconsistent logic should satisfy.</p>
      <p>These conditions are the following:
dC1. In these calculi the principle of non-contradiction, in the form ¬(α ∧ ¬α),
should not be a valid schema;
dC2. From two contradictory formulae, α and ¬α, it would not in general be
possible to deduce any arbitrary formula β;
dC3. It should be simple to extend these calculi to corresponding predicate calculi;
dC4. They should contain the most part of the schemata and rules of the classical
propositional calculus which do not interfere with the first conditions.</p>
      <p>
        Nowadays we can find paraconsistent logics applications in many fields such
as informatics, physics, medicine, etc. From Minsky’s comment we can see that
paraconsistent ideas are an approach in Artificial Intelligence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]: "But I do not
believe that consistency is necessary or even desirable in a developing intelligent
system. No one is ever completely consistent. What is important is how one
handles paradox or conflict, how one learns from mistakes, how one turns aside
from suspected inconsistencies".
      </p>
      <p>
        In physics the authors in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ] have established an approach to formalize
concepts in quantum mechanics, the so called principle of superposition, via
paraconsistent methods. In general most of scientific knowledge as theories can have
inconsistencies. Most of the time scientist do not throw away these theories if
they are successful in predicting results and describing phenomena [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        In the literature we can find many proper paraconsistent logics [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] in the
sense of da Costa. The most known paraconsistent logic is C1 which in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] the
author also introduces an increasingly weaker family/hierarchy of logics called
the Cn, 1 ≤ n ≤ ω. Also the authors mention that the strong negation defined
in the da Costa’s Cn systems has all properties of the propositional classical
negation.
      </p>
      <p>
        Finding a strong negation in the Cn herarchy is interesting because we can
collapse a fragment of these logics into classical logic, that is, we can have a
translation which provides an embedding of classical logic into any logic of this
Cn system. This fact is mentioned in many papers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref9">1, 9</xref>
        ], where the proof does
not explicitly appears. In this paper we present an inductive proof about the
relation between strong negation and classical behaviour in the Cn systems. The
proof follows from three lemmas and two theorems. From this proof we can see
that many properties in C1 can also hold in Cn, excluding the obvious ones.
      </p>
      <p>The organization of this document is as follows: In Section 2 we present basic
background in logic, including definitions of some basic properties (monotonicity,
cut-elimination, deduction theorem) of the paraconsistent logic Cω that we are
going to work with. In Section 3 we present a inductive proof about the classical
behavior of the strong negation defined in the Cn systems. Finally, in Section 4,
we present some conclusions about the proof presented.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Background</title>
      <p>We first introduce the syntax of logical formulas considered in this paper. Then
we present a few basic definitions of how logics can be built to interpret the
meaning of such formulas.
2.1</p>
      <p>Logic Systems
We consider a formal (propositional) language built from: an enumerable set L
of elements called atoms (denoted a, b, c, ...); the binary connectives ∧
(conjuntion), ∨ (disjunction) and → (implication); and the unary connective ¬
(negation). Formulas (denoted α, β, γ, ...) are constructed as usual by combining these
basic connectives together with the help of parentheses. We also use α ↔ β to
abbreviate (α → β) ∧ (β → α). Finally, it is useful to agree on some conventions
to avoid the use of many parenthesis when writing formulas in order to make
easier the reading of complicated expressions. First, we may omit the outer
pair of parenthesis of a formula. Second, the connectives are ordered as follows:
¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔, and parentheses are eliminated according to the rule that, first,
¬ applies to the smallest formula following it, then ∧ is to connect the smallest
formulas surrounding it, and so on.</p>
      <p>We consider a logic simply as a set of formulas that (i) is closed under Modus
Ponens (i.e. if α and α → β are in the logic, then so is β) and (ii) is closed under
substitution (i.e. if a formula α is in the logic, then any other formula obtained
by replacing all occurrences of an atom b in α with another formula β is also in
the logic). The elements of a logic are called theorems and the notation `X α is
used to state that the formula α is a theorem of X (i.e. α ∈ X). We say that a
logic X is weaker than or equal to a logic Y if X ⊆ Y , similarly we say that X
is stronger than or equal to Y if Y ⊆ X.</p>
      <p>Hilbert proof systems There are many different approaches that have been
used to specify the meaning of logic formulas or, in other words, to define
logics. In Hilbert style proof systems, also known as axiomatic systems, a logic is
specified by giving a set of axioms (which is usually assumed to be closed under
substitution). This set of axioms specifies, so to speak, the "kernel" of the logic.
The actual logic is obtained when this "kernel" is closed with respect to some
given inference rules which include Modus Ponens. The notation `X α for
provability of a logic formula α in the logic X is usually extended within Hilbert style
systems; given a theory Γ , we use Γ `X α to denote the fact that the formula
α can be derived from the axioms of the logic and the formulas contained in Γ
by a sequence of applications of the inference rules.</p>
      <p>As a example of a Hilbert style system we present next a logic that is relevant
for our work.</p>
      <p>
        Cω [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] is defined by the following set of axiom schemata:
Pos1: α → (β → α)
Pos2: (α → β) → ((α → (β → γ)) → (α → γ))
Pos3: α ∧ β → α
Pos4: α ∧ β → β
Pos5: α → (β → α ∧ β)
Pos6: α → (α ∨ β)
Pos7: β → (α ∨ β)
Pos8: (α → γ) → ((β → γ) → (α ∨ β → γ))
Cω1: α ∨ ¬α
Cω2: ¬¬α → α
      </p>
      <p>
        Note that the first 8 axiom schemata somewhat constrain the meaning of the
→, ∧ and ∨ connectives to match our usual intuitions. It is a well known result
that in any logic satisfying Pos1 and Pos2, and with Modus Ponens as its unique
inference rule, the deduction theorem holds [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Theorem 1. Let Γ and Δ be two sets of formulas. Let θ, θ1, θ2, α and ψ be
arbitrary formulas. Let ` be the deductive inference operator of Cω. Then the
following basic properties hold.
1. Γ ` α → α (identity theorem)
2. Γ ` α implies Γ ∪ Δ ` α (monotonicity)
3. Γ ` α and Δ, α ` ψ then Γ ∪ Δ ` ψ (cut)
4. Γ, θ ` α if and only if Γ ` θ → α (deduction theorem)
5. Γ ` θ1 ∧ θ2 if and only if Γ ` θ1 and Γ ` θ2 (∧ - rules)
6. Γ, θ ` α and Γ, ¬θ ` α if and only if Γ ` α (strong proof by cases)
3</p>
      <p>Strong negation in Cn systems
We will start giving some basic definitions in order to understand concepts
needed in the Cn hierarchy.</p>
      <p>
        Definition 1. ( [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]) αo =def ¬(α ∧ ¬α). We will refer to (o) as the consistency
operator.
      </p>
      <p>In fact αo can be seen as a modal operator to the formula α that captures
the idea of consistency/well - behavior in C1.</p>
      <p>
        Definition 2. ( [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]) We recursively define αn, 0 ≤ n &lt; ω as follows:
(i) α0 =def α
(ii) αn+1 =def (αn)o
(i) α(1) =def α1
(ii) α(n+1) =def α(n) ∧ αn+1
Definition 3. ( [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]) We recursively define α(n), 1 ≤ n &lt; ω as follows:
      </p>
      <p>For the careful reader should not confuse α0 with αo. Basically αn
represents n applications of the consistency operator (o) to the formula α, and α(n)
represents a conjunction of α1, . . . , αn.</p>
      <p>
        Definition 4. ( [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]) We define Cn as an extension of Cω which also includes
the following axiom schemas:
Cn1 : β(n) → ((α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α)
Cn2 : (α(n) ∧ β(n)) → ((α → β)(n) ∧ (α ∨ β)(n) ∧ (α ∧ β)(n))
      </p>
      <p>Also, we can see that in Cn, the axiom Cn1 can be replaced by the axiom
schema (β ∧ ¬β ∧ β(n)) → α. Intuitively from Cn2 we see that α(n) propagates
the what we call n-consisteny in Cn. Finally we define a strong negation in both
C1 and Cn.</p>
      <p>
        Definition 5. ( [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]) The strong negations for C1 and Cn are defined as:
(i) For C1: ¬∗α =def ¬α ∧ αo
(ii) For Cn: ¬(n)α =def ¬α ∧ α(n)
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Lemma 1. For all n ∈ N we have that ¬(αn) `Cω α</title>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-1">
          <title>Proof. By induction on n.</title>
          <p>Base case (n = 1). By Definition 2 we have that `Cω ¬(α1) ↔ ¬(αo). Also
by Definition 1, `Cω ¬(αo) ↔ ¬(¬(α ∧ ¬α)), we can expand the last formula
to `Cω ¬(α1) ↔ ¬(¬(α ∧ ¬α)). We can use axiom schema ¬¬α → α to prove
`Cω ¬(α1) → α ∧ ¬α, which is by axiom schema Pos3 we have `Cω ¬(α1) → α.
From this we apply deduction theorem to obtain ¬(α1) `Cω α as desired.</p>
          <p>Inductive step. We assume by induction hypothesis that ¬(αn) `Cω α holds.
Accordingly to Definition 2 we have that `Cω ¬(αn+1) ↔ ¬(αn)o, which in fact
is `Cω ¬(αn)o ↔ ¬¬(αn ∧ ¬(αn)). From this is easy to prove that ¬(αn+1) `Cω
¬(αn), and with the inductive hypothesis we have that ¬(αn+1) `Cω α. tu</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Lemma 2. For all n ∈ N we have that `Cω α ∨ αn</title>
        <p>Proof. We can see that αn `Cω α ∨ αn. On the other hand, due to Lemma 1 we
have that ¬(αn) `Cω α, therefore ¬(αn) `Cω α ∨ αn. Applying strong proof by
cases we have that `Cω α ∨ αn. tu</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Lemma 3. For all n ∈ N we have that `Cω α ∨ α(n)</title>
        <p>1.</p>
        <p>Proof. By induction on n.</p>
        <p>Base case (n = 1). From Lemma 1 we have that `Cω α ∨ αo holds when n =
Inductive step. We assume by induction hypothesis that `Cω α ∨ α(n) holds.
We know from Lemma 2 that `Cω α ∨ αn+1. Thus `Cω (α ∨ α(n)) ∧ (α ∨ αn+1).
Applying the distributive law to the last formula we have that `Cω α ∨ (αn+1 ∧
α(n)), which in fact it is by definition `Cω α ∨ α(n+1). tu
Theorem 2 (Excluded Middle). In Cω, we have that `Cω α ∨ ¬(n)α</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-1">
          <title>Proof. In Cω we have the following:</title>
          <p>`Cω (α ∨ ¬(n)α) ↔ (α ∨ (α ∧ α(n)))
`Cω (α ∨ ¬((nn))αα)) ↔↔ (αα∨∨α¬(nα)) ∧ (α ∨ α(n))
`Cω (α ∨ ¬
Therefore it is only necessary to check that α ∨ α(n) holds, but accordingly to
the Lemma 3 this is true.
tu</p>
          <p>
            The next two theorems follows from a similar proof in [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
            ] where the author
proved the same theorems in C1.
          </p>
          <p>Theorem 3 (Reductio Ad Absurdum). In Cn we have that:</p>
          <p>(Γ ∪ {α} `Cn β), (Γ ∪ {α} `Cn ¬β), (Γ ∪ {α} `Cn β(n)) ⇒ Γ `Cn ¬α
Proof. Using Deduction Theorem we can prove the following from the hypothesis
given: Γ `Cn α → β(n), Γ `Cn α → β and Γ `Cn α → ¬β. By the transitive
rule and the axiom schema `Cn β(n) → ((α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α)) we
have that Γ `Cn α → ((α → β) → ((α → ¬β) → ¬α)). By the application of
Modus Ponens twice we have that Γ `Cn α → ¬α. From this, using theorem
`Cn ¬α → ¬α (as an instance of Identity theorem), and axiom schemas `Cn
α ∨ ¬α and `Cn (α → ¬α) → ((¬α → ¬α) → ((α ∨ ¬α) → ¬α)) we can conclude
that Γ `Cn ¬α. tu
Theorem 4 (Explosive Principle). In Cn we have that:</p>
          <p>`Cn α → (¬(n)α → β)
Proof. According to the strong negation definition we have that: α, ¬(n)α, ¬β `Cn
¬α ∧ α(n), therefore α, ¬(n)α, ¬β `Cn ¬α and α, ¬(n)α, ¬β `Cn α(n). Also
we have that α, ¬(n)α, ¬β `Cn α. By the theorem 3 is easy to prove that
α, ¬(n)α `Cn ¬¬β. Cn contains the axiom schemata ¬¬α → α, which it let
us prove that α, ¬(n)α `Cn β. Finally, applying two times deduction theorem to
the last formula we have that `Cn α → (¬(n)α → β). tu
Theorem 5. The connectives {→, ∧, ∨, ¬(n)} in Cn satisfy all the axiom schemata
and inference rules in classical propositional calculus.</p>
          <p>
            Proof. Any logic in Cn extends the positive logic axioms from Cω. Then, it is
only necessary observe that the following axiom (¬(n)α → ¬(n)β) → (β → α)
holds in Cn
1. ¬(n)α → ¬(n)β
2. β
3. β → (¬(n)β → α)
4. ¬(n)β → α
5. ¬(n)α → α
6. α → α
7. (α → α) → ((¬(n)α → α) → ((α ∨ ¬(n)α) → α))
8. (¬(n)α → α) → ((α ∨ ¬(n)α) → α)
9. (α ∨ ¬(n)α) → α
10. α ∨ ¬(n)α
11. α
12. (¬(n)α → ¬(n)β), β `Cn α
13. (¬(n)α → ¬(n)β)(n`)Cβn) β→→(βα→ α)
14. `Cn (¬(n)α → ¬
The presented work gives general ideas how to possibly extend a property in C1
to Cn, mainly using inductive proofs. We know that all logics in the Cn system
are strictly weaker than C1 [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
            ], perhaps many of them share many things in
common as a strong negation. In the future should be interesting to investigate
how much these logics are related each other among relevant properties.
          </p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
  </body>
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</article>