<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>SecSy: A Security-oriented Tool for Synthesizing Process Event Logs</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Thomas Stocker?</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Rafael Accorsi</string-name>
          <email>accorsig@iig.uni-freiburg.de</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>University of Freiburg</institution>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>SecSy is a highly exible log synthesis tool, which allows users to con gure their simulation procedures in a detailed way, including control ow, data ow and organizational context of business processes. User friendly dialogs provide rich parameter adjustment and intuitive coupling of simulation components. With the possibility of integrating custom transformers, out-of-the-box functionality of SecSy can be extended to t custom needs.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Research into business process security and compliance is concerned with the
requirements formalization of security (e.g. secrecy, binding of duties) and
compliance requirements (e.g. obligations, interdependencies between activities) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]
and the development of well-founded techniques and tools for analyzing,
monitoring and auditing these requirements in business process speci cations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
Here, a particular challenge arises when it comes to testing the e ectiveness of
monitoring and auditing techniques and corresponding tools [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">2, 3</xref>
        ]. Speci cally,
to test these tools one needs controllably generated event logs that contain
process executions comprising process exibility and variability on the one hand,
and process non-compliance on the other, thereby mimicking structural
vulnerabilities, process dynamics, intentional attacks and user errors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. Such event logs
can serve as input for monitoring, auditing and mining tools, thereby allowing
developers to assess their kill-rate, i.e. the precision to identify the violation of
the designated security and compliance properties or deviations from an original
process model.
      </p>
      <p>
        The concepts for simulating business process exibility and noncompliance
employed by SecSy are novel, both in the security, compliance and business
process management communities. SecSy allows for highly-controllable simulation
output incorporating conform process behavior with respect to targeted security
properties, as well as random failures that may lead to the violation of selected
properties and incomplete/distorted process logs. Overall, the generation of
\defect" data has been applied to software process improvement in general [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], but
has never been seen in the BPM area. We rmly believe that the controlled,
? Copyright © 2014 for this paper by its authors. Copying permitted for private and
academic purposes.
push-button generation of (large) test data is a promising research direction and
application domain in business process testing and improvement.
2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Simulation Approach</title>
      <p>The overall approach for synthesizing event logs is depicted in Fig. 1. SecSy
takes a series of business process speci cations as input and generates a process
log that contains traces of these speci cations. Based upon the security and
compliance requirements, deviations from the de ned control ow are generated
with the help of transformers which encode speci c trace properties that are
either enforced or violated on a random basis. Generated logs are outputted in
MXML (a format for process mining), as well as plain text. Ongoing work adds
support to Extended Event Streams format (XES).</p>
      <p>Processes subject to simulation are considered to be executed within a
context . While the control ow of a process de nes possible execution traces,
subjects authorized to execute process activities and objects used by activities are
de ned by contexts. SecSy allows to de ne simulation runs, each relating to one
process model which are processed one after another according to the number
of desired traces for each run. This way, the engine is capable of simulating
situations in which there is an initial model for planned process behavior, but a
variant of this model was executed for some time, possibly due to the activity
of an attacker or process variation/ exibility. During the processing of a
simulation run, the engine generates valid log traces according to the control ow of
the corresponding process and context and then passes them through the trace
transformers which apply transformations in a post-processing manner. Trace
transformers can remove or add process activities (simulating skipped
activities or incomplete logging), as well as change information within traces in a
way business related properties like separation/binding of duties or
authorization constraints are enforced or violated. Information about which transformers
have been applied on which traces and if the enforcement or violation was
successful is stored in a separate simulation log which can be used to determine the
aforementioned kill-rate of detection-mechanisms.</p>
      <p>Fig. 2 depicts the con guration panel of the application. SecSy allows for
exible con guration of all required parameters and the creation and editing
of corresponding components. Depending on the simulation type (SIMPLE or
DETAILED), generated traces contain only timestamps and activity names or
additionally information about executing subjects and data items.</p>
      <p>The time generator component contains all timing related simulation
properties, including the start time for the simulation (date for rst trace), the number
of cases per day, o ce-days and -hours, as well as individual activity durations
and delays between succeeding activities. In the case of simulation type
EXTENDED, the user has to specify a context and a data container. Data containers
generate values for data items used during process execution (e.g. credit amount)
and store the values until a trace is completed. This way, the consistent usage
of attribute values along a complete trace is ensured. A context holds subjects
Run 1:
Run i:
...
...</p>
      <p>Run n:
1000
500
1200
Simulation Engine #traces
run</p>
      <p>[⌦ 1, . . . , ⌦ r]
Conform Trace</p>
      <p>Transformed Trace</p>
      <p>Log Format
Context</p>
      <p>Process</p>
      <p>Log</p>
      <p>Simulation</p>
      <p>Log
and their permissions to execute activities and access data elements together
with activity data usage (attributes used by activities) information. To specify
subject permissions, the user can choose between an access control list or a role
based concept, which is particularly helpful for large contexts. Additionally, a
context allows to specify constraints on attribute values that can be added to
process activities.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Trace-Transformations</title>
      <p>Trace transformers are used to transform traces in a way speci c trace properties
are enforced or violated. Transformers operate on valid traces generated during
the simulation process and generate modi ed versions of these traces in a
postprocessing manner, before they are added to the output log le. Modi ed elds
are locked to prevent further transformers from corrupting the already enforced
properties coming from previous applications of transformers. Currently, SecSy
comprises the following trace transformers:
1. delay inserts a delay in the process execution and can be used to simulate
situations in which work is piling up and process execution is slowed down
by unusual long delays between single activities.
2. skip removes speci c activities from generated valid log traces so simulate
skipped (mandatory) activities. This transformer adjusts timestamps in a
way as if the removed activity never happened.
3. silent captures a situation in which a particular activity has not been logged
onto the le. In contrast to skip, timestamps are not adjusted.
4. authentication mimics an access control policy and its violation.
5. binding of duty (BOD) mimics the compliance with or the violation of a
binding of duty requirement.
6. separation of duties can be seen as the opposite of BOD: it states that a
particular set of activities must be performed by di erent subjects.</p>
      <p>The list of prede ned transformers shipped with SecSy can be extended with
or re ned to other domain-speci c transformers. For this, users can de ne their
own transformers (implementing speci c interfaces) and, subsequently, add them
to SecSy. The procedure of including custom transformers requires writing code
for the transformer functionality and providing a graphical frontend for
parameter setting. On startup, SecSy looks for custom transformer code and adjusts
dialogs for simulation run con guration appropriately. This method allows highly
exible transformer de nition and sharing and does not require users to compile
their own tweaked version of SecSy. Users can make their custom transformers
available in form of class- les other users can readily employ.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Availability</title>
      <p>SecSy is a standalone, extensible Java application and has been made available on
the Open-Source platform Sourceforge (http://sourceforge.net/projects/
secsy/). Downloads include a runnable jar-version, an OSX application bundle
and a sample simulation directory which can be used to get started with SecSy
on basis of precon gured simulation procedures. This directory also contains an
example of a custom trace transformer (DesignatorTransformer). A detailed user
guide explaining how to set up and use SecSy can be found on http://doku.
telematik.uni-freiburg.de/SecSy/. This website also allows users to issue
feature requests and bug reports in an interactive way.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          1.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Accorsi</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Sicherheit im prozessmanagement</article-title>
          .
          <source>digma Zeitschrift fur Datenrecht und Informationssicherheit</source>
          , (
          <volume>2</volume>
          ):
          <volume>72</volume>
          {
          <fpage>76</fpage>
          ,
          <year>2013</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          2.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Accorsi</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>T.</given-names>
            <surname>Stocker</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>On the exploitation of process mining for security audits: The conformance checking case</article-title>
          .
          <source>In ACM Symposium on Applied Computing</source>
          , pages
          <volume>1709</volume>
          {
          <fpage>1716</fpage>
          . ACM Press,
          <year>2012</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          3.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Accorsi</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>T.</given-names>
            <surname>Stocker</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>On the exploitation of process mining for security audits: The process discovery case</article-title>
          .
          <source>In ACM Symposium on Applied Computing</source>
          . ACM Press,
          <year>2013</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          4.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>T.</given-names>
            <surname>Breaux</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Anton</surname>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>E.</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Spa ord. A distributed requirements management framework for legal compliance and accountability</article-title>
          .
          <source>Computers &amp; Security</source>
          ,
          <volume>28</volume>
          (
          <issue>1- 2</issue>
          ):8{
          <fpage>17</fpage>
          ,
          <year>2009</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          5.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>L.</given-names>
            <surname>Lowis</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Accorsi</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Finding vulnerabilities in SOA-based business processes</article-title>
          .
          <source>IEEE Transactions on Service Computing</source>
          ,
          <volume>4</volume>
          (
          <issue>3</issue>
          ):
          <volume>230</volume>
          {
          <fpage>242</fpage>
          ,
          <year>August 2011</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          6.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Raninen</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>T.</given-names>
            <surname>Toroi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
            <surname>Vainio</surname>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J. J.</given-names>
            <surname>Ahonen</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Defect data analysis as input for software process improvement</article-title>
          . In O.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Dieste</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Jedlitschka</surname>
          </string-name>
          , and N. J. Juzgado, editors,
          <source>Conference on Product-Focused Software Process Improvement</source>
          , volume
          <volume>7343</volume>
          of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
          <fpage>3</fpage>
          <lpage>{</lpage>
          16. Springer,
          <year>2012</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>