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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Improving manageability of access control policies</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jasper Bogaerts</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Bert Lagaisse</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>iMinds-Distrinet, Department of Computer Science, KU Leuven Celestijnenlaan 200A, 3001 Leuven</institution>
          ,
          <country country="BE">Belgium</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Applications are continuously increasing in both complexity and number of users they serve. Moreover, the set of applications used by organizations is continuously expanding. This poses challenges, not in the least with regard to access control. More speci cally, manageability of access control policies becomes more di cult. This leads to administrative overhead and challenges in enforcing a consistent security policy. The goal of this PhD project is to increase manageability of access control by supporting re nement of application-speci c access control policies from explicitly speci ed organization-wide security policies. This paper provides an overview of the challenges and discusses the objectives we set in order to achieve it.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>Over the last years, organizations have been using an increasingly large
number of applications. The applications used by organizations span from general
applications which o er customer relationship management, sales and payroll
support to industry-speci c applications such as computer-aided design
applications. Moreover, applications are becoming more complex and organizations
are preparing their systems to serve both internal as well as external users. This
has an impact on both scale and diversity of the user base. These trends pose
challenges, not in the least for application security.</p>
      <p>One of the techniques to enforce application security is access control. Access
control regulates actions performed on objects by subjects (e.g. users). Access
control is usually considered in three parts: authentication identi es a subject,
authorization determines whether the subject is entitled to perform a certain
action and audit aims at the monitoring of the performed actions.</p>
      <p>One of the challenges of access control is manageability. Manageability of
access control includes user management and management of policies. How policies
are implemented is largely determined by the underlying access control model
and can span from simple access control matrices to lists of complex rules.</p>
      <p>
        The growing complexity and scale mentioned earlier are making
manageability of access control increasingly challenging. For example, economic analysis of
role-based access control { which is used extensively in practice [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] { suggests
that role engineering and the mapping of permissions and users to roles remain
the most signi cant adoption expenses for organizations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. Moreover, the
number of applications used by organizations is continuously expanding. This makes
it di cult to consistently specify an organization-wide security policy, as this
security policy is left scattered amongst application-speci c access control policies.
Such an organization-wide policy speci es the organization's requirements with
regard to access control on a high level. It may be implicitly or explicitly de ned.
The separated management of policies for each of the applications may lead to
inconsistencies with regard to the organization-wide policy, as the high-level rules
need to be translated manually to the policy of each of the applications.
      </p>
      <p>In the context of this PhD project, we want to improve the manageability of
access control with regard to policies and entitlements of users. To address this
challenge, we propose re ning organization-wide policies to application-speci c
policies. These organization-wide policies are explicitly speci ed, and can apply
to several applications. This paper describes both challenges as well as objectives
which will help to achieve the goal of the PhD project.</p>
      <p>The paper is organized as follows: First, we discuss the state-of-the-art and
state-of-practice in Section 2. Next, Section 3 identi es the challenges. In
Section 4, we describe the objectives of this PhD project. Section 5 discusses the
approach to achieve these objectives. In Section 6, we conclude the paper.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2 Background</title>
      <p>Access control restricts the actions of subjects on objects by means of rules.
Separating these rules from the application into policies can increase manageability.</p>
      <p>
        This extracts the access control logic from the application logic. Ideally, the
entire access control mechanism, except for the actual enforcement point, is
separated from the application [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. This o ers several bene ts. First, it enables
application developers to focus on business logic. Second, it enables security
administrators to specify access control mechanisms tailored to their needs. Third,
it facilitates fully centralized management of all policies of an organization.
      </p>
      <p>
        Besides decoupling the rules from the application they protect, manageability
is also largely in uenced by the access control model employed by the application.
Over the last decades, several access control models have been proposed [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
Examples include Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). All of these models approach
the manageability problem of security policies in a di erent manner. For
example, Role-Based Access Control [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] (RBAC) provides scalable manageability by
means of roles. A role serves as an indirection between subjects on the one hand,
and permissions on the other. RBAC also o ers support for hierarchies of roles
and separation of duty concepts.
      </p>
      <p>
        RBAC has been widely adopted for access control management [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. However,
the de nition of RBAC policies can also introduce a few problems. These include
a lack of expressiveness, which results in role explosion [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Role explosion is the
rapid growth of roles related to distinct properties which are combined to obtain
disjunct sets of permissions. For example, an organization which regulates access
based on seniority and department would quickly experience these e ects. As a
result, there have been initiatives to increase management of the speci ed roles
(amongst others [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]). Also, several attempts have been made to reduce problems
related to expressiveness by means of RBAC extensions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7">6, 7</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Attribute-Based Access Control [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] (ABAC) generalizes these extensions.
ABAC is an access control mechanism in which attributes, related to subjects,
objects, actions and environment are used to limit access. These attributes can be
seen as (key, value) pairs that can be assigned to the entities by administrators
or be derived from external sources. Using attributes, ABAC can increase
expressiveness by de ning access control policies, which prevents role explosion [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
3
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Challenges</title>
      <p>An organization-wide policy speci es the organization's requirements with
regard to access control on a high level. It is present either explicitly (serving
as a guideline for application policy speci cation) or implicitly (re ected only
by the application policies) in the organization. As the number of applications
used by an organization grows, it becomes increasingly complex to manage the
organization-wide security policy, as it is left scattered amongst
applicationspeci c access control policies. This makes it harder to consistently manage
organization-wide policies. For example, consistently de ning an
organizationwide policy that requires interim personnel to be employed for at least a month
in order to be able to modify anything in any application becomes more di cult
as the number of applications increases. Also, special access control concepts
such as separation of duty over several applications can become more di cult
to specify consistently when the number of applications grows.</p>
      <p>
        As discussed previously, ABAC can enable organizations to de ne more
expressive policies. As a result, ABAC can reduce role explosion [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], which can be
a strain on access control manageability. However, it may also reduce
manageability [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. The administrative simplicity with respect to RBAC is quickly lost
when policies involve more attributes. It also becomes more di cult to inspect
the permissions of a certain subject [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Hence, there is a need for high-level abstractions over the attribute-based
policies, o ering better manageability over the security policy. These high-level
abstractions should support the de nition of a policy that spans over several
applications, such as restricting access of interim employees during the rst month.
This involves the separation of the policy from the application that enforces it.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Objectives</title>
      <p>In order to tackle the challenges described above, we propose two objectives:
exploring management possibilities through the de nition and re nement of
organization-wide policies and the mapping of these policies to applications.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1 Re nement of cross-application policies</title>
        <p>
          Abstractions over access control policies can be achieved by means of
organizationwide security policies which are organized using the organizational structure. In
order to enforce them, these policies need to be re ned to application-speci c
policies. Enterprise-wide RBAC [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ] took a similar approach for RBAC by means
of parametrized roles on an organizational level which indicate the entitlements
of users at application level. Other related work includes [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
          ], which introduced
role assignments based on business processes. However, these works focussed on
RBAC. In our work, we will support attribute-based policies.
        </p>
        <p>Figure 1 illustrates how policies can be re ned and deployed. The re
nement of organization-wide policies to application-speci c policies is done by rst
aggregating the policies for each application, mapping them to the
applicationspeci c security model and then doing the actual translation. Later, the resulting
policies can be deployed at the application if required.</p>
        <p>For example, consider the following organization-wide rule:
Access to nancial data is only permitted to employees of the nancial
department between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m.</p>
        <p>This rule is translated to the application-speci c policies of all applications
which handle nancial data. Figure 1 shows the translation for the given example.</p>
        <p>
          This introduces research problems with regard to how to map and re ne
the organization-wide policies to the application-speci c policies. In this PhD
project, we intend to develop techniques to re ne attribute-based policies
dened in the context of existing high-level concepts, such as business processes,
into application-speci c policies. Unlike related work [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref13">12, 13</xref>
          ], we will focus on
re nement of organization-wide policies to be enforced by access control
mechanisms employed by the targeted applications, as opposed to intercepting requests
or focussing on access control enforcement in general purpose programming
languages. As a consequence, the organization-wide policy may be more expressive
than the application-speci c policies. How we can maximize expressiveness in
di erent models with regard to attribute-based policies is another research topic
that will be analysed in this PhD project. By making the right high-level
abstractions to support a organization-wide security policy, we believe that policy
management can be improved.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2 Policy-to-application mapping</title>
        <p>As mentioned above, an important challenge in coping with policy abstraction is
comprehending how to map organization-wide policies onto the security models
of the targeted applications. The concepts employed in the organization-wide
policies need to be mapped to application-speci c policies. Target applications
should supply a security model to achieve this.</p>
        <p>In order to support automated re nement, these models should be
represented in a uni ed way. A meta-model which enables models to re ect
interrelation between their object types and actions needs to be developed. This
metamodel should also re ect the subject structure of the application (e.g. the roles it
provides or attributes it uses). A meta-model also enables additional techniques
that improve management in access control, such as policy gap analysis.</p>
        <p>For example, in order to determine what constitutes access to nancial data in
the previous example, the security model of a HRM application needs to specify
that it handles pay checks and that they should be classi ed under nancial data.
In order to make organization-wide policies enforceable, the security model needs
to specify which actions need to be restricted on the pay checks as well.</p>
        <p>
          Previous works focussed on modelling of access control aspects in applications
for testing purposes [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ] or for policy speci cation [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ]. However, they did not
focus on classi cation of object types based on their attributes. Also, they did
not focus on the mapping required to re ne high-level policies based on them.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5 Approach</title>
      <p>We intend to approach the objectives by rst performing case studies on (a) a
document processing platform and (b) an automated work ow platform. The
analysis of the security model of both case studies provides a useful insight into
the complexity of the application-speci c policies that we intend to abstract to.
We will leverage on this analysis to specify a generic solution which supports
abstraction over all applications.</p>
      <p>Our goals will be validated by the speci cation of organization-wide policies
which are re ned to application-speci c policies. Next, we will perform a
thorough evaluation on the result. A rst evaluation will measure the e ort that is
needed in order to reuse the organization-wide security policy for di erent
applications. This explores how much additional con guration is necessary in order to
support similar applications. Secondly, the evaluation will determine how e
ectively it increases manageability with regard to re nement. More speci cally, we
will evaluate how e ectively our solution supports translation of a
organizationwide security policy into application-speci c policies. For example, we evaluate
how organization-wide policies such as the example in Figure 1 can be de ned,
and how much application-speci c con guration (such as setting up the mapping
to the security model) this requires. As such, we can compare the
administrative overhead induced by application-speci c policy de nition with the e ort of
organization-wide security policy speci cation. This also enables us to analyse to
which extent the technique supports consistent management of security policies.</p>
      <p>As a rst step in this PhD, we have looked at how XACML policies can be
re ned to RBAC. Next, we will look at a generic way for representing the security
model of an application with regard to access control. We then investigate how
organization-wide policies can be structured to support improved management.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6 Conclusion</title>
      <p>In this paper, we motivated the requirement for an increased manageability of
access control. We introduced a series of challenges to manageability in access
control and discussed the objectives to this PhD project that will address them.
By achieving the provided objectives, we hope to improve the current
state-ofthe-art in manageability techniques. This will reduce the costs related to the
manageability of both security policy as well as user management.
Acknowledgements This research is partially funded by the Research Fund KU
Leuven, and by the EU FP7 project NESSoS. With the nancial support from
the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union
(B-CCENTRE).</p>
    </sec>
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</article>