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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>An Improved Transformation between HILL and Metric Conditional Pseudoentropy</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Maciej Skorski</string-name>
          <email>maciej.skorski@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Cryptology and Data Security Group, University of Warsaw</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>67</fpage>
      <lpage>77</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>HILL Entropy and Metric Entropy are generalizations of the information-theoretic notion of min-entropy to the setting where an adversary is computationally bounded. The notion of HILL Entropy appeared in the breakthrough construction of a PRG from any one-way function, and has become the most important and most widely used de nition of computational entropy. In turn, Metric Entropy which is de ned as a relaxation of HILL Entropy, has been proven to be much easier to handle, in particular in the context of computational generalizations of the Dense Model Theorem. Fortunately, Metric Entropy can be converted, with some loss in quality, to HILL Entropy as shown by Barak, Shaltiel and Wigderson. In this paper we improve their result, slightly reducing the loss in quality of entropy. Interestingly, our bound is independent of size of the probability space in comparison to the result of Barak et al. Our approach is based on the theory of convex approximation in Lp-spaces.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>1.1</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Computational Entropy</title>
        <p>The Idea of Computational Entropy. The notion of entropy, as a
measure of randomness, is a fundamental concept in information-theory. The need
for computational versions of entropy comes from the fact that security de
nitions based on classical information theoretic entropy notions are quite often too
strong for \practical" purposes, where resources of adversaries are limited. The
distribution which is not perfectly random might look random from the
computational point of view, when nding the real di erence is simply ine cient.
The metrics used to quantify the amount and quality of pseudorandomness are
commonly called computational entropies.</p>
        <p>HILL Entropy and Metric Entropy. The most popular approach of
extending information-theoretic notions of entropy into computational case, is based
on the notion of computational indistinguishability. We discuss it brie y below.</p>
        <p>Given a class of boolean functions D and a parameter we say that two n-bit
random variables X and Y are (D; )-indistinguishable if no function D from the
class D can distinguish X and Y with the advantage better than . Formally
E D(X)
If D is the class of all circuits of size at most t we slightly abbreviate this notation
and say that X and Y are (s; ) indistinguishable.</p>
        <p>
          In theoretical computer science and especially in cryptography the most
popular notion of entropy is the min-entropy (in contrast to information-theory
where one uses extensively the Shannon entropy), because it measures
randomness in terms of \hardness" of predictability. The min entropy of X given
(possibly) Z is at least 2 k if one cannot predict X given Z = z, on average1 over z,
better than with probability 2 k. Formally, for X and Z one de nes the average
min-entropy [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ] of X given Z as follows
        </p>
        <p>He1 (XjZ) &gt; k i</p>
        <p>
          E hmax Pr[X = xjZ = z]i 6 2 k:
z Z x
Based on the concept of indistinguishability and min-entropy, one de nes
computational HILL entropy [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ] of X as the maximum amount of min-entropy in
a random variable Y (taking values in the same set X) which is
indistinguishable from X. This idea was extended to the conditional case (the presence of
side information) by [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
          ]. We can state the de nition as follows:
HH1ILL;(s; ) (XjZ) &gt; k if and only if there exists Y jointly distributed with
Z of average min-entropy (given Z) at least k such that j E D(X; Z)
E D(Y; Z)j 6 for all circuits D of size at most s.
        </p>
        <p>
          Note that this captures the standard notion of pseudorandom distribution (for
k = n). By switching the order of quanti ers and restricting to deterministic
circuits one obtains a slightly weaker version, called computational metric
entropy [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref5">1, 5</xref>
          ]
        </p>
        <p>
          HM1;det[0;1];(s; ) (XjZ) &gt; k i for every deterministic [0; 1]-valued circuits
D of size at most s there exists Y jointly distributed with Z of average
min-entropy (given Z) at least k such that j E D(X; Z) E D(Y; Z)j 6 .
In both de nitions the parameters s; quantify the quality of pseudorandomness:
the bigger s and the smaller , the higher quality is. Metric entropy is known to
be equivalent to HILL entropy with the same amount and some loss in quality
parameters [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
          ]. There are very good reasons to introduce and study
metricentropy: quite often it is much easier to prove a statement for metric-entropy
and then pass to the HILL version. Actually, this strategy is unavoidable for the
standard proof technique which uses the min-max theorem to switch the order
of players in a game. Therefore, many facts on HILL entropy uses metric entropy
explicitly or implicitly [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref14 ref17 ref2 ref5 ref7">1, 2, 5, 7, 14, 17</xref>
          ]. Perhaps the most spectacular example is
the e cient version of the Dense Model Theorem [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref5">5,14</xref>
          ], being the key ingredient
of the famous result of Tao and Ziegler on primes in arithmetic progressions [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ].
The e cient version, which found many interesting applications in complexity
1 Sometimes one uses the stronger notion, called the worst-case min-entropy, when we
require the same upper bound on guessing probability for every auxiliary input z,
not only on average.
theory, was originally proved using the idea of metric computational entropy
in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ] and independently in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ]. A much simpler proof with signi cant
improvements in quality was given in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Conversions between HILL and metric entropy. The following result
states that metric and HILL computational entropy are equivalent up to some
loss in quality</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Theorem 1 (Transformation between Metric and HILL Computational</title>
        <p>
          Entropy [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ]). Let X and Z be, respectively, n-bit and m-bit correlated random
variables. Then
where s0 = O s
        </p>
        <p>HHILL;(s0; 0) (XjZ) &gt; HM;det[0;1];(s; ) (XjZ)
2=(n + m) and 0 =
+
for arbitrary
2 (0; 1).</p>
        <p>Remark 1. Since we have HHILL;(s; ) (XjZ) 6 HM;det[0;1];(s; ) (XjZ), the
conversion in the other direction is lossless.
1.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Our Contribution</title>
        <p>Our result. We improve Theorem 1 of Barak, Shaltiel and Widgerson in the
following way:</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-4">
        <title>Theorem 2 (Dimension-independent transformation between metric</title>
        <p>and HILL entropy). For any n-bit random variable X and a correlated random
variable Z we have</p>
        <p>HHILL;(s0; 0) (XjZ) &gt; HM;det[0;1];(s; ) (XjZ)
where
and</p>
        <p>2 (0; 1) is an arbitrary parameter, s0 = O s
= n k.</p>
        <p>
          In comparison to Theorem 1 we replace the factor n + m by + 1. Our result
shows that the conversion does not depended on the dimension of the domain
of X and Z but only on the entropy de ciency . While this does not o er
signi cant improvement in the asymptotic setting, it might be of some interest
in case when m is much longer than n (see for instance equivalence between
HILL and unpredictability entropy of X given Z for short X [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ]) or when the
de ciency is very small. We also remark that our result automatically improves
the best known parameters for the e cient dense model theorem by the factor
of n.
        </p>
        <p>
          Our techniques. Our results might be interesting because of the novel proof
technique: instead of using Cherno Bounds for approximating convex hulls with
uniformly small error as in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ], we show that it is enough to do the approximation
with respect to the p-th norm induced by some appropriately chosen measure,
and optimize the value of p. There is a lot of research focused on achieving
better rates of convex approximations in Lp-spaces for some restricted class of
functions. In case of the metric-to-HILL transformation (or similar result) it
might be possible to obtain some further improvements for restricting classes of
adversaries.
2=(
+ 1) , 0 =
+
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-5">
        <title>Organization of the Paper</title>
        <p>In Section 2 we explain basic notions and provide necessary de nitions. The
proof of our main technical result together with an improved Metric-to-HILL
transformation appears in Section 3. In Section 4 we demonstrate a simple
application: a slight improvement over the best known parameters for the Dense
Model Theorem.
2</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Preliminaries</title>
      <p>Probabilities, measures and integrals. By X or PX we denote the
probability mass function (distribution) of X, that is X (x) = PX (x) = Pr[X = x]
for all x. A measure on a nite set is a function : ! R+ [ f0g. For
notation convenience, we use the signs of sums and integrals interchangeably.
The integral of a function D on E with respect to a measure is de ned as
RE Dd = Px2E D(x) (x). For the integral over the entire domain we omit the
subscript E.</p>
      <p>Lp spaces. Given a nite set and a measure on one de nes the p-th norm
of a real-valued function D de ned on as kDkp = R Dd
Convex combinations. Given a set of real-valued functions C de ned on the
same domain, by convt(C) we denote the set of all convex combinations of length
at most t of members of C. That is,
Ct =
( t</p>
      <p>X
i=1</p>
      <p>i=1
Computational Entropy notions.</p>
      <p>t
iDi : X i = 1; i &gt; 0 for i = 1; : : : ; t; Di 2 C for i = 1; : : : ; t
)</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>De nition 1 (Conditional HILL Pseudoentropy [11]). Let X; Z be a joint</title>
        <p>distribution with the following property: there exists Y of conditional min-entropy
at least k given Z such that for all circuits D of size at most s we have j E D(X; Z)</p>
        <p>E D(Y; Z)j 6 . Then we say that X given Z has k bits of HILL min-entropy
of quality (s; ) and denote by HH1ILL;(s; ) (XjZ) &gt; k.</p>
        <p>
          Remark 2 (HILL entropy against di erent circuits classes). For conditional HILL
entropy all kinds of circuits: deterministic boolean, deterministic real valued and
randomized boolean (for the same size s), are equivalent [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          De nition 2 (Conditional Metric Pseudoentropy [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ]). Let X; Z be a joint
distribution with the following property: for every deterministic boolean
(respectively: deterministic real valued or boolean randomized) circuit D of size at
most s there exists Y of (conditional min entropy at least k given Z such that
j E D(X; Z; Y; Z) E D(Y; Z)j 6 . Then we say that X given Z has k bits of
deterministic (respectively: deterministic real valued or boolean randomized) metric
min-entropy of quality (s; ) and denote by HM1;detf0;1g;(s; ) (XjZ) (respectively:
HM1;det[0;1];(s; ) (XjZ) and HM1;randf0;1g;(s; ) (XjZ)).
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Main Result</title>
      <p>In this section we prove our main technical result which inmediately implies
Theorem 2.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Lemma 1 (Approximating long convex combinations with respect to high-min-entropy distributions.). Let X be an n-bit random variable, be</title>
        <p>Z be a correlated m-bit random variable, and let C be a class of [0; 1]-valued
function on f0; 1gn f0; 1gm. Let D 2 conv(C). Then for ` = 49(n + 1 k)= 2
there exists D` 2 conv`(C) such that
and simultaneously</p>
        <p>E jD(X)</p>
        <p>D`(X)j 6
E jD(X)</p>
        <p>D`(Y )j 6
for every distribution Y jointly distributed with Z such that H1(Y jZ) &gt; k.
Corollary 1. Lemma 1 implies Theorem 2
Proof (of Corollary 1). If HH1ILL;(s0; 0) (XjZ) &lt; k then for every Y satisfying
He1 (Y jZ) &gt; k we nd D of size at most s0 such that j E D(X; Z) E D(Y; Z)j &gt;
0. Replacing D by Dc of necessary we can assume that E D(X; Z) E D(Y; Z) &gt;
for some D of size s0 + 1. By applying the min-max theorem we get that there
exists a convex combination D0 of circuits of size at most s0 + 1 such that
E D(X; Z)</p>
        <p>E D(Y; Z) &gt; 0
8Y : He1 (Y jZ) &gt; k
That combination might be very long. But applying Lemma 1 we can
approximate it by a combination D0 of at most O (n + 1 k)= 2 circuits of size s0 + 1
in such a way that the expectations with respect to X; Z and Y; Z di ers at most
by =2. This way we obtain</p>
        <p>E D0(X; Z)</p>
        <p>E D0(Y; Z) &gt; 0
2
=2
8Y : He1 (Y jZ) &gt; k
which nishes the proof.</p>
        <p>Now we prove our main approximation result
Proof (of Lemma 1). Consider the space of all functions on f0; 1gn+m. We start
by the following trivial observation
Claim 1. It su ces to show that for some D0 2 conv`(C) we have R jD
d( X + Y ) 6 for all Y such that He1 (Y jZ) &gt; k.</p>
        <p>By applying the Holder Inequality, we immediately get
Claim 2. For every functions D; D0 and every p; q &gt; 1 such that p1 + 1q = 1 we
have</p>
        <p>Z
jD
(1)
(2)</p>
        <p>tu
D0j
(3)
Now we give estimates on both factors on the right hand side of Equation (3).
Claim 3. If q 2 [1; 2] then for any Y such that He1 (Y jZ) &gt; k we have
q</p>
        <p>6
6 2q 1</p>
        <p>X;Z</p>
        <p>Y;Z
q
+
q
!
Y;Z
q
q
6
=
=</p>
        <p>Z
Z
Z</p>
        <p>Z</p>
        <p>Y ;Z
q</p>
        <p>d
YZ=z</p>
        <p>U
q
d U</p>
        <p>d Z
2(q 1)(n H1 (Y jZ=z) d Z
= 2(q 1)n Z 2 (q 1) H1 (Y jZ=z)d Z
Y;Z
q
q</p>
        <p>Z
6 2(q 1)n
2 H1 (Y jZ=z)d Z</p>
        <p>q 1
6 2(q 1)n 2 He1 (Y jZ) q 1 = 2(q 1)(n k)</p>
        <p>X;Z
q
&lt;</p>
        <p>Z
1d
= 2
To bound the second term note that the functional
q
convex as a function of Y;Z (being a composition of an a ne function and
the p-th norm). Therefore, the maximum among all distributions Y; Z satisfying
He1 (Y jZ) &gt; k, which form a convex set, is attained at an extreme point. This
means that the maximum is attained for a distribution (Y ; Z) such that the
distribution Y jZ=z is at for every z and the conditional min-entropy of Y given
Z is exactly k. Since (x; z) = U (x) Z (z) and Y ;Z (x; z) = Y jZ=z (x) Z (z)
we obtain
Y;Z !</p>
        <p>X;Z+ Y;Z
We shall estimate two terms in Equation (4) separately. Since
X;Z (x; z) + U;Z (x; z) = (x; z) for all x; z we have
X;Z (x; z) &lt;
By applying the Jensen Inequality to the function u ! uq 1 (which is concave
by the assumption on q) we get
(4)
(5)
(6)</p>
        <p>is
(7)
Plugin Equation (7) and Equation (6) into Equation (5) yields
6 2q 1 2 + 2(q 1)(n k)</p>
        <p>= 2q + 2(q 1)(n+1 k):
Claim 4. Suppose that p &gt; 2. Then for any D 2 conv(C) and ` &gt; 1 there exists
D` 2 conv`(D) such that kD D`kp &lt; 1:74pp=`.</p>
        <p>
          Proof. The proof relies on the following approximation result on rates of convex
approximation, which generalizes the famous Maurey-Johnes-Barron Theorem.
Lemma 2 (Convex approximation in Lp spaces [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ]). Let E be an Lp space
with 1 6 p &lt; +1. Suppose that S E, f 2 conv(S) and let K &gt; 0 be such that
for all g 2 S we have kg f kp 6 K. Then for any ` we have
        </p>
        <p>min
s2conv`(S) k
f
skp 6</p>
        <p>KCp
`1 1t
where t = min(2; p) and Cp = 1 if 1 6 p 6 2, Cp = p2[ ((p + 1)=2)=p ]1=p for
2 &lt; p &lt; +1.</p>
        <p>
          Remark 3. The constant Cp can be estimated using the following approximation
for the gamma function [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ], valid for x &gt; 1:
p (x=e)xp2x + 0:33 &lt;
        </p>
        <p>(x + 1) &lt; p (x=e)xp2x + 0:36
From this we nd that Cp &lt; 0:87pp for all p &gt; 2.</p>
        <p>The claim follows by setting E to be the space of [0; 1]-valued functions on
f0; 1gn f0; 1gm and K = R 1d = 2. tu
By Claim 3 and Claim 4 combined with Claim 2 and Claim 1 it su ces to nd
p &gt; 2 (which automatically ensures q 2 [1; 2]) and ` such that
If k &gt; n 1 then we put p = q = 2. Then it su ces to ensure that 1:74p2=`(22 +
22)1=2 6 which is equivalent to 6:96p` 6 . Suppose that k 6 n 1. By the
inequality (a+b)r 6 ar +br valid for a; b &gt; 0 and 0 &lt; r 6 1, we see that it su ces
if 1:74pp=` 2 + 2(n+1 k)=p) 6 . For p = n + 1 k we obtain 6:96p` 6 . This
nishes the proof.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Application to the Dense Model Theorem</title>
      <p>
        Dense Model Theorem. Given a pair of two distributions W and V over the
same nite domain we say that W is -dense in V if and only if Pr[W = x] 6
Pr[V = x]= 2. The dense model theorem [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ], specialized to the boolean case,
can be formulated as follows:
Theorem 3 (Dense Model Theorem.). Let D0 be a class of n-bit boolean
functions, R be uniform over f0; 1gn, X be an n-bit random variable and let X0 be
-dense in X. If X and R are (D; )-indistinguishable then there exists a
distribution R0 which is -dense in R such that X0 and R0 are (D0; 0)-indistinguishable,
where 0 = ( = )O(1) and D consists of all functions of the form g(D1; : : : ; D`)
where Di 2 D0, ` = poly(1= ; 1= ) and g is some function.
      </p>
      <p>Informally, this statement reads as follows: if a distribution X0 is dense in
a pseudorandom distribution X, then X0 must be indistinguishable from a
distribution dense in the uniform distribution. Note that the indistinguishability
parameters for X0 are worse than for X: to achieve (D0; 0)-indistinguishably we
need to start with smaller than 0 and a class D su ciently more complicated
than D0. Note also that for the statement to be computationally meaningful we
need g to be e cient.</p>
      <p>
        Applications of the Dense Model Theorem. E cient versions of the
Dense Model Theorem have found applications in di erential privacy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ],
pseudoentropy and leakage-resilient cryptography [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5">2, 5</xref>
        ], graph decompositions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ],
and further applications in additive combinatorics [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. We refer the reader to [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ]
for a survey.
      </p>
      <p>
        Comparison of different formulations. Below we compare the di erent
versions of the Dense Model Theorem. Note that an equivalent statement in
language of pseudoentropy was given in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
Below we show how to derive from our Lemma 1 a version of the Dense Model
Theorem where n was replaced by log(1= ), which is typically much smaller.
Corollary 2. Dense Model Theorem (Theorem 3) holds with 0 = O( = ), g
being a linear threshold and ` = O(log(1= )=( = )2.
2 The term \ -dense" comes from the fact that V can be written as a convex
combination of W with weight and some other distribution with weight 1
Proof. We show how to reduce the formulation of the Dense Model Theorem to
the statement about HILL entropy. We start by the following observation:
Claim 5. X0 is -dense in X if and only if X0 can be written as XjA for some
event A of probability .
      </p>
      <p>
        Proof. of Claim Consider a random variable A 2 f0; 1g jointly distributed with
X as follows: Pr[X = x; A = 1] = Pr[X0]. By the assumption on X and X0
we have Pr[X = x; A = 1] 6 1 and thus this distribution is well de ned, in
particular we have Pr[A = 1] = and Pr[XjA = 1] = Pr[X0]. In the other hand
if we have X0 =d XjA then Pr[X0 = x] = Pr[X = x; A]= Pr[A] 6 Pr[X = x] 6
Pr[X = x]= Pr[A] and hence X0 is Pr[A]-dense in X.
tu
The second fact we need is the so called leakage lemma for metric-entropy
Lemma 3 ( [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], reformulated). Let X be a random variable, A be an event
of probability , and let D be a class of [0; 1]-valued functions. Suppose that
there exists D such that E D(XjA) E D(Y ) &gt; 0 for all Y of min-entropy at
least k log(1= Pr[A]) and 0 = = Pr[A]. Then there exists a a function D0 being
a threshold of some D 2 D (or its complement) such that E D0(X) E D0(Y ) &gt; .
The name \leakage lemma" is due to the fact that this implies
HM1;det[0;1];s; ) (XjA) &gt; HM1;D;s0 = Pr[A]) (X) log(1= Pr[A]) for s0 s. Now we
are ready to give the proof. Suppose contrary, that the Dense Model Theorem is
not true with the claimed parameters. Then for some event A of probability ,
some 0 and every distribution Y of min-entropy n log(1= ) (which is equivalent
to be -dense in the uniform distribution) there exists D 2 D or D 2 1 D 2 D
such that
      </p>
      <p>E D(XjA)</p>
      <p>E D(Y ) &gt; 0
By applying a min-max theorem we get that there exists a long convex
combination D of functions from D [ (1 D) such that</p>
      <p>E D(XjA)</p>
      <p>E D(Y ) &gt; 0</p>
      <p>8Y : H1 (Y ) &gt; n log(1= ):
Now we use our Lemma 1, with the class D [ (1 D) and replaced by 0=3
to approximate D by a convex combination D0 of length ` = O log(1= )= 02 .
Then we get</p>
      <p>E D0(XjA)</p>
      <p>E D0(Y ) &gt; 0</p>
      <p>8Y : H1 (Y ) &gt; n log(1= ):
Note that D0 is a linear threshold of ` functions from D. By Lemma 3 we replace
D0 by D00 which is again a linear threshold of ` functions from D and satis es
E D00(X)</p>
      <p>E D00(Y ) &gt; 0
8Y : H1 (Y ) &gt; n:
Hence, we get a contradiction.
tu</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>In this paper we improve the transformation between conditional Metric and
HILL entropy by replacing the dimension factor by the entropy de ciency. This
result immediately translates into a slightly improved version of the Dense Model
Theorem. An interesting question is the problem of nding complexity lower
bounds for that transformation.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          1.
          <string-name>
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