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      <title-group>
        <article-title>Extracting and Understanding Arguments about Motives from Stories</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Floris Bex Trevor Bench-Capon</string-name>
          <email>f.j.bex@uu.nl</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Information and Computing SystemDsepartment of Computer Science Utrecht University University of Liverpool</institution>
          <country>The Netherlands United Kingdom</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>In this paper, we discuss how Value-based Argumentation can be used as a tool in human and computer story understanding, especially where understanding the story requires understanding of the motives of its characters. It is shown how arguments about motives can be extracted from stories, and how dialogues about these arguments can aid in story understanding.</p>
      </abstract>
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  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1 Introduction</title>
      <p>
        In this paper, a short version of which was
published as
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5 ref6">(Bex and Bench-Capon, 2014)</xref>
        , we
discuss the important connections between
narratives, or stories, and argumentation. We often
persuade not by imparting facts and rules, but by
providing an interesting narrative, particularly when
trying to convince others to adopt particular
values and attitudes. Presentation of an argument as
a story engages our natural reaction to a story, to
attempt to understand it. Thus, the story form
fosters engagement, encouraging the right choices by
appealing to common values rather than by
imposing a rule that is to be followed.
      </p>
      <p>
        A central concept in the research on story
understanding is that of scripts
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">(Schank and
Abelson, 1977)</xref>
        , coherent scenarios about common
situations such as visiting a restaurant. Despite the
apparent failure of scripts to deliver the promised
advances in computational linguistics, they still
play an important part in computational and
cognitive approaches of story understanding
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">(Mueller,
2004)</xref>
        , and they are widely applied in, for
example, case-based reasoning
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(Gentner and Forbus,
2011)</xref>
        , scenario-based evidence analysis
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">(Vlek et
al., 2013)</xref>
        and narrative generation
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(Gervas et al.,
2005)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        In our opinion, purely script-based approaches
to story interpretation are not suited to
understanding persuasive stories concerning values, such as
parables. Scripts represent the way in which we
expect typical situations to play out: the more a
story adheres to a familiar script, the more
plausible a story is considered to be. However, many
memorable stories such as parables depend on a
twist in the story, something which is out of the
ordinary and which challenges conventional
attitudes
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref21">(Govier and Ayers, 2012)</xref>
        . For example,
noone expects a father to organise a feast for a son
who has spent all of his money on wild living (The
Prodigal Son1). Furthermore, the most interesting
stories are often those with conflicting attitudes
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Wilensky, 1982)</xref>
        . For example, in the Prodigal
Son, the son’s older brother wants to turn away
his sibling: why welcome a sinner? The father,
however, forgives and welcomes his son. In
models based on scripts, in which stories are rendered
only as causal sequences, these conflicts between
characters’ values remain largely implicit and
unexplained.
      </p>
      <p>For a computational model of story
understanding, we need to add a more fine-grained
psychological dimension to the causal narrative, in which
conflicts between characters’ attitudes and
challenges to common attitudes can be modelled. This
gives us an internal perspective that allows us to
represent the deliberations of the characters
involved, which allows for a much more subtle
analysis of character motive and attitude than we can
perform with the external causal perspective. This
in turn allows us to show how the relevant stories
can influence the audience’s attitudes or, in other
words, how these stories can persuade an audience
to adopt a different attitude.</p>
      <p>
        Recently, we have proposed a model for story
understanding
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5 ref6">(Bex et al., 2014a)</xref>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5 ref6">(Bex and
BenchCapon, 2014)</xref>
        , which draws from value-based
practical reasoning
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Atkinson and Bench-Capon,
2007)</xref>
        . Stories can be represented as (causal)
1Luke 15:11-32. We use the World English Bible
translation available at http://www.ebible.org/
state transition diagrams, where the transitions
represent possible actions by the characters in the
story. Character motives are represented by
indicating which values are promoted or demoted
by the actions in the story. We can then
extract practical reasoning arguments of the form I
should perform Action because it promotes Value
and I should not perform Action because it
demotes Value from the diagram. If we also have
separate arguments denoting the characters’
attitudes (value orderings), we can construct an
Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF) with
values
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Modgil, 2009)</xref>
        , a set of (possibly
conflicting) arguments representing character choices and
attitudes. Given an EAF, we can then infer
attitudes given the choices made in the story. In
section 4.1 we show how a particular story interpreted
by means of an EAF can be used as an argument in
a particular dialogical context, using
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">(Modgil and
Bench-Capon, 2008)</xref>
        ’s extended TPI-protocol for
argumentative dialogue to argue for a change in
value preferences in a dialogical setting.
2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Motivating example: The Good</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Samaritan</title>
      <p>Stories can be a powerful vehicle of persuasion.
A story does not persuade by imparting explicit
rules, but by exposing a coherent narrative aimed
at changing or reinforcing attitudes, so that the
stories exemplify various group cultural norms.
Many folktales are of this type, as are parables,
both secular and biblical. As an example of a
well-known parable, we will consider The Good
Samaritan. Since we will be discussing this
parable throughout the paper, we will quote it in full.
The context is established in Luke 10:25-27:</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Behold, a certain lawyer stood up and tested him, saying, “Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?”</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>He said to him, “What is written in the law? How do you read it?”</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>He answered, “You shall love the Lord</title>
        <p>your God with all your heart, with all
your soul, with all your strength, with
all your mind, [Deuteronomy 6:5]; and
your neighbour as yourself [Leviticus
19:18].”</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>He said to him, “You have answered correctly. Do this, and you will live.”</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-5">
        <title>But he, desiring to justify himself, asked</title>
        <p>Jesus, “Who is my neighbour?”</p>
        <p>Thus the lawyer asks two questions. The first,
“what shall I do to inherit eternal life?”, receives
an answer justified by scriptural authority. But the
second, “Who is my neighbour?”, is met simply
by a story.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-6">
        <title>Jesus answered, “A certain man was go</title>
        <p>ing down from Jerusalem to Jericho,
and he fell among robbers, who both
stripped him and beat him, and departed,
leaving him half dead. By chance a
certain priest was going down that way.
When he saw him, he passed by on the
other side. In the same way a Levite
also, when he came to the place, and saw
him, passed by on the other side. But a
certain Samaritan, as he travelled, came
where he was. When he saw him, he was
moved with compassion, came to him,
and bound up his wounds, pouring on
oil and wine. He set him on his own
animal, and brought him to an inn, and took
care of him. On the next day, when he
departed, he took out two denarii, and
gave them to the host, and said to him,
’Take care of him. Whatever you spend
beyond that, I will repay you when I
return.’ Now which of these three do you
think seemed to be a neighbour to him
who fell among the robbers?”</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-7">
        <title>He said, “He who showed mercy on him.”</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-8">
        <title>Then Jesus said to him, “Go and do like</title>
        <p>wise.”</p>
        <p>This provides a very clear example of a story
being used as an argument to justify a particular
answer to a question, “Who is my neighbour?”.
However, it is not meant as a theoretical argument:
the aim is not that the lawyer should believe that
the Samaritan is his neighbour (nor, since the one
in the story is a fictional character, that all
Samaritans are his neighbour). Nor is the lawyer intended
to set out to assist wounded travellers on the road
from Jerusalem to Jericho. Unlike practical
reasoning proper, there is no specific situation, with
a specific choice of actions to resolve. Rather the
argument is intended to convince the lawyer (and
ultimately of course the reader) to become a
different person, the sort of person who will enjoy
eternal life.</p>
        <p>
          So how exactly does the story convince its
audience to change their ways? Govier and Ayers
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref21">(Govier and Ayers, 2012)</xref>
          have recently explored
this question in detail. They specifically address
the relation between parables and argument
using the Good Samaritan as one of their examples.
They reconstruct the Good Samaritan as the
following argument (italicised statements are said in
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref21">(Govier and Ayers, 2012)</xref>
          to be implicit):
1. If supposedly holy people (the priest and the
Levite) were to ignore an unknown and needy
person on a road, they would not treat that
person as a neighbour.
2. If a person who was of no special status and
did not know an unknown and needy person
on a road were to treat him with mercy and
kindness, that person would treat the needy
person as a neighbour.
        </p>
        <p>So
3. What matters about being a neighbour is not
one’s status or one’s prior knowledge of a
person.
4. What matters about being a neighbour is
treating another with mercy and kindness
when that person is needy and one
encounters him.
5. It is good to treat a needy stranger as a
neighbour if one encounters him.</p>
        <sec id="sec-3-8-1">
          <title>Therefore</title>
          <p>6. One should treat other people, when they are
in need and one encounters them, as one’s
neighbours with mercy and kindness.</p>
          <p>
            Statements 1 and 2, which both can be said to
follow from the story in some way2, lead to
conclusions 3 and 4. These two conclusions together
with the value judgement contained in 5 then lead
to the final conclusion 6. The addition of 5 and 6
is, in our opinion, somewhat contentious because
it transforms the argument into an argument with
a normative conclusion, advocating particular
behaviour. This is perhaps justified by the comment
‘Go and do likewise’ made by Jesus, since this
2It is unclear why
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref21">(Govier and Ayers, 2012)</xref>
            consider 1 to
be implicit and 2 not.
shows that the intention in telling the parable is to
affect future actions. However, we would contend
that the intention of the parable should not be of
the form in certain situations you should do this
- a norm, but rather an invitation to adopt
different attitudes, to be like the Samaritan and
recognise that duties between people arise from their
common humanity rather than any social or
religious ties (statements 3 and 4). To enable a story
to have this effect we need a detailed account of
the reasoning of the Samaritan, the Priest and the
Levite, since otherwise we cannot articulate the
differences in attitude between the three
characters, and so cannot identify the attitudes we are
being urged to abandon and adopt.
3
          </p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Understanding stories using value-based argumentation</title>
      <p>
        The computational model for story
understanding we propose is based on
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Atkinson and
BenchCapon, 2007)</xref>
        ’s framework for value-based
practical reasoning. We previously used this model
to capture abductive reasoning in which stories
served as explanations for particular evidence
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">(Bex et al., 2009)</xref>
        . The model contains three main
elements: (i) Action-Based Alternating Transition
Systems with Values (AATS+V) for encapsulating
stories; (ii) arguments based on the Practical
Reasoning Argumentation Scheme (PRAS), to
generate arguments concerning the individual choices
a story character can make; and (iii) Value-based
Argumentation Frameworks (VAF), representing
the set of arguments and counterarguments a story
character uses to make his individual choices on
the basis of his preferences and attitudes. Because
we want to be able to explicitly reason about
characters’ value orderings, we use
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Modgil, 2009)</xref>
        ’s
Extended Argumentation Frameworks (EAF)
instead of the original VAFs. Below, we will discuss
each of these elements by means of our example.
3.1
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Stories as AATS+V</title>
        <p>Structuralist accounts of narrative argue that
actions that represent transitions between states are
the basic building blocks of stories. It is for this
reason that we choose the mechanism of
Actionbased Alternating Transition Systems with Values
(AATS+V) as our basic formalization method for
stories. An AATS consists of a set of states and
transitions between them, with the transitions
labelled with joint actions, that is actions
comprising an action of each of the agents concerned. In
an AATS+V, the transitions are labelled with the
values that motivate the characters in the story. A
basic version of the parable of the Good Samaritan
can be rendered as the AATS+V in Figure 1.</p>
        <p>At the beginning of the story q0, the condition
of the traveller is wounded. In q4, the traveller’s
wounds have been bandaged and he is in a
stable condition. In addition to the actions taken by
the characters in the story (j1, j3, j6), we have
also included the hypothetical actions the
characters could have performed: for example, the Priest
could also have helped the traveller (j2). Action
choice in parables is often more or less binary
(help or :help, accept or :accept in the
Prodigal Son), so modelling these extra actions does not
require much extra information besides the
original story text. The values that are promoted by
each action are included in the AATS+V:
Religious Duty (+RD), Religious Law (+RL), National
Solidarity (+NS), Racial Solidarity (+RS),
Compassion (+C), Prudence (+P), Convenience (+Cv)
and Revenge (+R). Adding the values requires
more background knowledge. For example, we
need to know that the traveller and the Levite were
of the same race, and that Samaritans were a
common enemy for the Jewish people. Nowadays, this
background information can be gained from
Biblical texts, or from the many varied accounts on
how parables should be interpreted, but it would
have been well-known to the original audience.
The values in figure 1 are a selection that the
authors have heard from a variety of sources over the
years.
3.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>Arguments based on the story</title>
        <p>The idea of arguments based on stories is that we
look for arguments that instantiate the Practical
Reasoning Argumentation Scheme (PRAS). Such
arguments are of the following form.</p>
        <sec id="sec-4-2-1">
          <title>1. In the current circumstances R</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-2-2">
          <title>2. We should perform action A</title>
          <p>3. Which will result in new circumstances S</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-2-3">
          <title>4. Which will promote some value V</title>
          <p>
            Now, given an AATS+V, we can construct these
arguments for the different characters. The
basic idea expressed in
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Atkinson and Bench-Capon,
2007)</xref>
            is that the AATS+V serves as a formal
grounding for arguments that instantiate the
Practical Reasoning Argumentation Scheme (PRAS),
as follows (where the line numbers in the above
PRAS scheme correspond to the line numbers in
the formal rendering below).
          </p>
          <p>1. In the initial state q0 = qx 2 Q
2. Agent i 2 Ag should participate in joint
action jn 2 JAg, where jni = i
3. Such that (qxjn) is qy
4. Such that for some vu 2 Avi, (qx; qy; vu) is
+</p>
          <p>Here, Q is a finite, non-empty set of states,
Ag = f1; : : : ; ng is a finite, non-empty set of
agents, i defines the set of states from which
action may be executed by agent i, is a partial
system transition function, which defines the state
(q; j) that would result from the performance of
action j in state q, Avi is a finite, non-empty set
of values for agent i and is a valuation function
which defines the status (promoted (+), demoted
(–) or neutral (=)) of a value ascribed to the
transition between two states.</p>
          <p>Given this mapping of PRAS on an AATS+V,
we can generate the arguments from the AATS+V,
noting that arguments for different actions attack
each other because the actions are mutually
exclusive, i.e., one cannot help and not help someone at
the same time. First, there are the two arguments
that might apply to the priest.</p>
          <p>A1: I should help the man because I have a
religious duty to do so. This will promote
Religious Duty (+RD)
A2: I should not help the man because I risk
uncleanliness through contact with his blood.</p>
          <p>This will promote Religious Law (+RL).</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-2-4">
          <title>The following apply to the Levite.</title>
          <p>A3: I should help the man because he is a
fellow countryman. This will promote National
Solidarity (+NS).</p>
          <p>A4: I should help the man because he is of
my race. This will promote Racial Solidarity
(+RS).</p>
          <p>None of the above arguments apply to the
Samaritan. The following arguments apply to all three
characters.</p>
          <p>q0
T wounded</p>
          <p>P arrives
j1: not help
+RL +P +Cv</p>
          <p>q1
T wounded</p>
          <p>L arrives
j2: help
+RD +C
j3: not help
+P +Cv</p>
          <p>j4: help
+C +NS +RS</p>
          <p>q3
T wounded</p>
          <p>S arrives
j6: help
+C</p>
          <p>q4</p>
          <p>T stable
j5: not help
+P +Cv +R</p>
          <p>q5
T wounded
A5: I should help the man because he is a
fellow human being. This will promote
Compassion (+C).</p>
          <p>A6: I should not help the man because it may
be trap and I may be robbed. This will
promote Prudence (+P).</p>
          <p>A7: I should not help the man because it will
interrupt my journey. This will promote
Convenience (+Cv).</p>
          <p>Finally there is an argument that applies only to
the Samaritan:</p>
          <p>A8: I should not help this man, because his
people have quarrelled with mine. This will
promote Revenge (+R).</p>
          <p>All of the arguments A1-A4 relate to duties of
one sort or another, arising from religious law or
duty, or one form or another of social relationship
(nation, race). A5-A8 all arise from natural human
instincts, unconnected with any social institution.
3.3</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>Constructing an Argumentation</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>Framework</title>
        <p>
          From these arguments, we can construct a
Valuebased Argumentation Framework (VAF). A VAF
is based on
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">(Dung, 1995)</xref>
          ’s standard
Argumentation Frameworks. An Argumentation Framework
AF = (Args; R), where Args is a set of
arguments, and R (Args Args) is a binary attack
relation between pair of arguments. The attack
relations between arguments A1-A8 are
straightforward: arguments concluding help attack and are
attacked by those concluding do not help. A VAF
also contains a set of values, and a mapping that
associates a value with each argument.
Furthermore, a VAF has associated audiences, each of
which represents a total ordering of these values.
        </p>
        <p>The purpose of building a VAF is to find a
subset of the arguments which is at once conflict free
(i.e. no two arguments in the subset attack one
another), and collectively able to defend itself (i.e.
any attacker of an argument in the subset is itself
attacked by an argument in the subset). The
maximal such subset is called a preferred extension,
and represents a maximal consistent position given
the arguments presented. The key feature of VAFs
is that they allow a distinction to be made between
successful attacks (defeats) and unsuccessful
attacks, on the basis of the values associated with
the arguments: attacks succeed only if the value
associated with the attacking argument is ranked
by the audience as equal to, or higher than, the
argument it attacks. The VAF thus accounts for
elements of subjectivity in that the arguments that
are acceptable are dependent upon the audience’s
ranking of the values involved in the scenario.</p>
        <p>We now attempt to explain the actions of the
three characters by considering different value
orderings, different audiences. Suppose that the
Priest puts religion before all else (i.e., Religious
Duty and Religious Law are preferred to
Convenience, Compassion and Prudence). He then has a
conflict between A1, which argues he should help
to promote RD, and A2, which argues he should
not help to promote RL. In the story, he chooses
to observe of the law, which applies specifically to
himself because of his special role, over the vaguer
practical obligation to serve others. This ranking
of strict observance of the law over more human
concerns is criticised elsewhere in the Gospels,
e.g. Mark 2:27 (Then Jesus said to them, “The
Sabbath was made to meet the needs of people,
and not people to meet the requirements of the
Sabbath.”).</p>
        <p>The Levite must be supposed to act on either A6
or A7, overriding the specific duties of A3 and A4
as well as A5. But because we can assume to have
a type of a morally respectable man, it must be
assumed that we are being invited to conclude that
these preferences are acceptable in the eyes of the
current moral climate: that it is morally acceptable
for prudence and/or personal convenience to
override obligations arising from country or race, let
alone from natural feelings of compassion.</p>
        <p>The Samaritan, in contrast has no duties
prompting him help the man, and must balance
his compassion against the other natural human
instincts. That he helps the man (A5), can only be
explained in terms of him putting compassion
before all other values, individually and in
combination, and this is what we are invited to conclude is
what being a neighbour really is. The context
supplied in the coda quoted above invites the hearer to
adopt these value preferences, to become a person
who places compassion above creed, country and
convenience and to act in accordance with these
priorities in future.
4</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Stories as arguments in a dialogical context</title>
      <p>In the previous section, we discussed how stories,
the characters in them and these characters’
motivations can be understood using VAFs. We can
now use the story as an argument, using exactly
this interpretation of the story. The conclusion the
audience is invited to draw from the story depends
on the context in which the story is told. In the
case of Good Samaritan, this context is provided
by the exchange between Jesus and the lawyer,
and specifically the lawyer’s question “Who is my
neighbour?”. As we have argued in section 2, the
actual question is something like “what does it
mean to love your neighbour like yourself?”, and
the answer is not the literal “The Samaritan is my
neigbour” but rather an understanding of why the
Samaritan acts as he does, which encourages one
to adopt similar attitudes to the Samaritan.
4.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>Extended Argumentation about Values</title>
        <p>
          In our model, the audience of the story should
identify the value-based arguments in the story
and then reason about which values will explain
the behaviour of the Samaritan. In
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Atkinson and
Bench-Capon, 2007)</xref>
          the value orderings
themselves cannot be reasoned with or about, as they
are not represented in the object language. We
therefore use the machinery of
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Modgil, 2009)</xref>
          to
represent statements about value orderings as
arguments in an Extended Argumentation
Framework (EAF). In addition to a set of arguments
Args and attacks between arguments R, EAFs
also contain a set D (Args R) of attacks on
attacks. The idea is that arguments about
preferences attack some attack between arguments and
thus influence the preferred extension. For
example, if argument A attacks argument B and vice
versa, there are normally two preferred extensions,
fAg and fBg. However, if we add the argument
A &gt; B (expressing that A is preferred to B),
which attacks and defeats the attack from B on
A, there is only one preferred extension namely
fA; A &gt; Bg.
        </p>
        <p>In the EAF for the Samaritan there potentially
two value-preference arguments for each pair of
values, for example:</p>
        <p>AV1 Prudence is preferred to Compassion
(P &gt; C).</p>
        <p>AV2 Compassion is preferred to Prudence
(C &gt; P ).</p>
        <p>These pairs will mutually attack, but more
importantly they will attack the attack from the
argument motivated by the less preferred value on
arguments motivated by the other value. The
complete EAF for the parable will now contain all
the base arguments A1-A8 and a value
preference argument for each attack between these
original arguments. Furthermore, we introduce
arguments for the various characters: AC1 (Character
is a priest), AC2 (Character is a Levite) and AC3
(Character is a Samaritan). This will enable us to
eliminate arguments which do not apply to
particular characters from consideration: thus AC1 will
attack A3, A4 and A8, AC2 will attack A1, A2
and A8, and AC3 will attack A1, A2, A3 and A4.
Adding AC3 to the AF that contains all characters’
arguments A1 - A8 then produces the EAF
applicable to just the Samaritan, as shown in Figure 2.
Similarly, we can introduce AC2 to get the EAF
applicable to the Levite and AC1 to get the EAF
applicable to the priest.</p>
        <p>A7
not help
+Cv</p>
        <p>AV3
C &gt; Cv</p>
        <p>AV4
Cv &gt; C</p>
        <p>AV6
R &gt; C</p>
        <p>A8
not help
+R
A5
help
+C</p>
        <p>
          AV5
C &gt; R
Now that we have established appropriate EAFs
for the various characters, we need to evaluate
them to explain the choices they make in the story.
Thus, in the case of the Samaritan, we need to
construct an admissible set containing an argument to
justify helping the traveller, and then to consider
what value preferences it contains. One method of
constructing admissible sets from Dung style AFs
is to use a dialogue game, such as the TPI (Two
Party Immediate Response) Game of
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">(Dunne and
Bench-Capon, 2003)</xref>
          . As was shown in
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">(Modgil
and Bench-Capon, 2008)</xref>
          this can be adapted to
EAFs as follows. First, we rewrite the object level
arguments of the EAF as meta level statements.
This is a purely mechanical process: each pair of
arguments in an attack relation is replaced by four
arguments and their attack relations. Thus, for
example,A6 attacks A5 is rewritten as: A5 holds,
which is attacked by A6 defeats A5, which is
attacked by A6 does not hold which is attacked by
A6 holds. Note that A5 holds and A6 holds do
not directly attack one another, and so are not in
conflict. Where A5 and A6 are value based
arguments, we can reject A6 defeats A5 not only
because we reject A6, but also because we prefer the
value of A5 to the value of A6. Thus A6 defeats
A5 is attacked by (in our example) compassion is
preferred to prudence, which is itself attacked by
prudence is preferred to compassion. Each pair of
attacking arguments is thus rewritten as a regular
AF; figure 3 shows the new, regular AF, structure
for the pair of arguments A5 and A6.
        </p>
        <p>A TPI game proceeds by the proposer playing
an argument, the opponent playing an attacker, the
proposer playing an attacker of that argument and
so on, until one player cannot move. At this point a
player can back up to a choice point and play a
different attacker. This continues until no moves are
possible (note that arguments under attack cannot
be played). At this point we will have an
admissible set containing the arguments played by the
last player to move. If this was the proposer is will
contain the original argument and this will have
been shown to be acceptable. Because it is the
Samaritan’s preference we are trying to determine,
we use the EAF in figure 2, rewritten as a regular
AF. The dialogue then proceeds as follows:
Samaritan: A5 holds. This is an argument
justifying what the Samaritan did in the story:
current position is {A5 holds}.</p>
        <p>Opponent: A6 defeats A5.
chooses a way to attack A5.</p>
        <p>Opponent
Samaritan: AV2 C &gt; P. The preference
argument is played: the alternative would
eventually require A5 holds to be played, but this is
under attack. Current position is {A5 holds,
C &gt; P}.</p>
        <p>Opponent: A7 defeats A5. Opponent cannot
play P &gt; C, because it is under attack, and so
backs up and chooses another line of attack.
Samaritan: AV3 C &gt; Cv. Current position is
{A5 holds, C &gt; P, C &gt; Cv}.</p>
        <p>Opponent: A8 defeats A5. Again the
opponent must back up since Cv &gt; C is under
attack.</p>
        <p>A5
holds
+C</p>
        <p>A6
defeats</p>
        <p>A5</p>
        <p>A5
does not
hold</p>
        <p>A6
does not
hold</p>
        <p>A5
defeats</p>
        <p>A6</p>
        <p>A6
holds
+P</p>
        <p>At this point the opponent must stop, since there
are no further lines of attack. The Samaritan’s
position, fAC3; A5; AV2; AV3; AV5g, comprises an
argument justifying his action A5, and the three
value preferences required to defend that argument
AV2, AV3 and AV5. It is exactly this position that
the audience is being urged to adopt, since it
provides the answer to the lawyer’s question “what
does it mean to love your neighbour like
yourself?”.</p>
        <p>
          In our opinion, the argument that the story of the
Good Samaritan presents is accurately captured
by the above dialogue. In contrast to
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref21">(Govier and
Ayers, 2012)</xref>
          ’s traditional, more syllogistic
analysis of the argument presented by the story (section
2), in the case of the dialogue no explicit norm or
course of action is being advocated. This is exactly
the way it should be: instead of advocating norms,
stories (especially parables) convince by having
the audience consider a character’s motives by, as
it were, engaging in an internal dialogue with the
character.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>5 Implementing our model</title>
      <p>Generating arguments from stories and
presenting the different possible extensions based on the
value orderings allows one to gain insight into the
point of the story: why did the characters act as
they did, and which attitudes are advocated in the
story? Whilst this is interesting as a theoretical
exercise, one additional aim is to implement a system
that allows people to explore the stories and
character motives in an interactive and intuitive way.
One option is to allow humans to engage in a
dialogue akin to the ones in section 4.2, thus allowing
users to for example, interrogate an agent
representing the Samaritan about his motives, and thus
gain a better understanding of the story. This can
then be used for educational purposes, for
example, schoolchildren learning about values through
stories.</p>
      <p>For such a system, the following separate
elements need to be implemented.</p>
      <p>1. Construct initial AATS+V on the basis of a
story.
2. Include additional hypothetical transitions:
‘what could the characters have done and
why?’.
3. Generate a VAF of arguments and critiques
based on AATS+V.
4. Execute a dialogue based on the VAF.</p>
      <p>
        Elements 1 and 2 have been done manually for a
few stories: the fable of the Ant and the
Grasshopper and the Parables of the Prodigal Son and the
Good Samaritan. Ideally part of this process is
automated if we want to build a more substantial
corpus. For element 1, we can first automatically
extract the characters and events from stories,
especially from fairly short and simple stories such
as fables. This is certainly not trivial but very
well possible (see e.g.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">(Hogenboom et al., 2011)</xref>
        ).
However, as was discussed earlier, the values
expressed by the story depend on the cultural
background of the reader: the same story may have
different interpretations. Furthermore, element 2 is
also hard to fully automate as additional
hypothetical transitions are often implicit in the stories, so
for elements 1 and 2 human annotation will have
to be used, based on skeleton AATS+V’s that are
constructed using event extraction.
      </p>
      <p>
        For element 3, currently, Prolog and PHP
implementations3 exist
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">(Wyner et al., 2012)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">(Wardeh
et al., 2013)</xref>
        . The PHP tool is based on
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Atkinson
3The PHP application can be used at
http://cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk/ maya/ACT/. A Prolog program
that represents the AATS in Figure 1 and systematically
generates the full suite of arguments and objections based on
that structure is included in Appendix A.
and Bench-Capon, 2007)</xref>
        and so does not include
arguments based on look ahead.
      </p>
      <p>
        Once the arguments are available, it becomes
possible to reason with them in a dialogue.
Recently a dialogue game for arguing about the
motives found in fables and parables was proposed
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5 ref6">(Bex and Bench-Capon, 2014)</xref>
        . This protocol can
be implemented in a dialogue game execution
engine
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref5 ref6">(Bex et al., 2014b)</xref>
        , which allows for mixed
initiative dialogues between software agents and
humans through a simple interface (see
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Bex et
al., 2013)</xref>
        ), making it possible to reason with the
agents in a story in a similar way as shown in
section 4.2. Furthermore, users can input new,
valuebased arguments about what they think the
characters’ choices in the story were. These arguments
can then relatively easily be inserted as a new
transition in the AATS+V (cf.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">(Reed et al., 2010)</xref>
        ),
using the mapping given in this article. Thus, the
interface may also serve as a knowledge ellicitation
tool to find different interpretations of the stories.
6
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>In this paper we have shown two important
connections between computational models of
narrative and computational models of argumentation:
how argumentation can be used to understand
stories, in terms of the motives and attitudes of the
characters, and how stories can themselves be used
to present arguments, especially arguments
designed to persuade the audience to adopt
particular attitudes. We have argued that parables can
be interpreted as arguments of this sort, and
illustrated our views with the famous parable of the
Good Samaritan. We have identified several
advantages of using stories in this way.</p>
      <p>Using stories enables the consideration of
hypothetical choices, so that the choice can be made
clear and memorable, allowing us to benefit from
the vividness of the concrete, without needing to
have had any particular experience. Moreover
using stories excludes irrelevant considerations: we
need not consider facts and actions not mentioned
in the story; this simplifies the construction of the
AATS, and disbars irrelevant counter arguments,
allowing for focus to be kept on the main point at
issue. Stories are intended to reinforce or change
attitudes: this is preferred to presenting a specific
set of norms, since attitudes tend to produce an
instinctive, and hence more immediate, response
and can be applied to numerous, as yet
unforeseen, situations. Moreover, they go deeper and so
are more to be relied on. This is why soldiers are
taught the history of their regiments: the tales of
heroism and derring-do can inspire the loyalty and
camaraderie required to bind them into an
effective unit in a way in which standing orders cannot
hope to do. Often there is no objective argument
for an attitude or a norm, and so we need to rely on
an emotional reaction, which is more easily
produced by a story, especially one which allows the
hearers to draw the conclusion for themselves (as
does the good Samaritan parable, where the
conclusion is stated by the addressee, not in the
parable itself).</p>
      <p>Engaging in a dialogue about a story further
draws out the message of the story, and thus
dialogue can act as an aid for story understanding.
Our model, when combined with an application
for argumentative dialogue, makes these dialogues
about stories possible. Users can engage in
meaningful discussions about a story not just with each
other but also with the characters in a story which,
when asked, will explain their motives and thus
clarify the point of the story. In this way, our
model comprises not just a theoretical discussion
of understanding and arguing with stories, but also
provides a first step towards a promising
applications that can be used in, for example, educational
settings.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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