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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Behavior Change Support Systems for Privacy and Security</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Roeland H.P. Kegel</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Roel J. Wieringa</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>University of Twente</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Enschede</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="NL">The Netherlands</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2015</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>51</fpage>
      <lpage>55</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>This article proposes to use Behavior Change Support Systems (BCSSs) to improve the security of IT applications and the privacy of its users. We discuss challenges specific to BCSSs applied to information security, list research questions to be answered in order to meet these challenges, and propose an architecture for the Personal Information Security Assistant (PISA), a software framework designed to improve the privacy-related behaviors of end-users.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Based on previous discussions with experts in Risk Assessment, as well as
established end-user security literature such as [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], we define two challenges in the
1 http://scs.ewi.utwente.nl/projects/pisa/
field of end-user security. We then associate these challenges with corresponding
goals that we think have the potential to meet them.
      </p>
      <p>
        Challenge: Motivation and change type The Elaboration Likelihood
Model (ELM)[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] defines the constructs user ability and motivation, which
influence what type of communication will be effective. We assume that both ability
and motivation to improve IT security and privacy are low among the general
public, and so a BCSS for security and privacy needs to employ persuasive
techniques that require little intervention or thought from the user. Such a
communication strategy relies on the ELM’s peripheral route, where users use heuristics
and peripheral cues to make their decisions. However, directly conflicting with
this strategy is the type of change that PISA needs to achieve: sustained
behavioral and attitudinal change is needed to raise security awareness[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. This type
of change is best realised through education and intervention. Such a strategy
corresponds to the ELM’s central route, relying on careful thought and
consideration from the user. This conflict in route choice leads us to define the following
goal:
Goal: Personalisation A BCSS for security and privacy needs to personalise
the interaction with its users, allowing for the maximum of education and
interaction that users are comfortable with, based on their motivation and ability.
Personalisation also allows dialogue to evolve over time as user’s attitudes and
abilities change. A BCSS can do this by observing the user’s actions and behavior
when interacting with digital systems and services. Based on this information,
the BCSS should be able to estimate the user’s risk appetite and security
preferences.
      </p>
      <p>Challenge: Dynamic threats Security and privacy can be compromised by
a vast range of threats. Most of these threats require sophisticated technology
and expertise to address. In addition, these threats are dynamic and change over
time, which means countermeasures will need constant maintenance. A
be-allend-all system for security, then, is not feasible. This leads to the second goal
for a security- and privacy-enhancing BCSS:
Goal: An extensible software framework Since privacy cannot be protected
by a single system, a different approach is needed. Using a software framework
that can integrate multiple extensions to protect against different threats can be
an answer to this problem. Using different extensions for different threat
categories, education and motivation regarding privacy can still be achieved using a
single system. This way, a BCSS can offer a robust platform for sharing system
information, user activity and a single channel for communicating with a user.
This allows for a better user experience, minimizing redundant communciation
between protective systems and the user. Additionally, such a framework can
form the basis for an ecosystem of protective measures developed by different
parties, distributing the development and maintenance cost of a comprehensive
security solution.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Research Questions</title>
      <p>The goals defined in the previous section lead us to the following research
questions specific to a BCSS as applied to information security and privacy:
Q1: How can user ability and motivation regarding information security be
measured by observing human computer interactions? The answer to this question
is needed to address the personalisation goal: to structure the message in a clear
and persuasive manner, both constructs need to be taken into account.
Q2: What user-characterising factors can and should influence how a BCSS takes
action and informs the user? The answer to this question is also needed for the
personalisation goal: beyond motivation and ability, many factors can influence
how a person responds to information presented by the BCSS. Identifying and
incorporating them will enhance the system’s persuasive ability.
Q3: How can enterprise risk assessment methodologies be adapted for and
applied by end-users to enhance the security of the IT systems they use, and/or
their own privacy? The answer to this question well help us structure
educational content for effecting behavioral change in security and privacy: a wealth
of risk assessment methodologies exist for an enterprise context. If a way can be
found to adapt this to an end-user context, the message itself can be improved,
heightening effectiveness as well as credibility of the BCSS.</p>
      <p>Q4: How can a user’s personal and system security status be visualised?
Implementing the answer to this question will improve the persuasive power of the
BCSS: without an effective way to communicate a user’s status, it becomes hard
to motivate users to change their behavior.</p>
      <p>Q5: What techniques can be used to maintain the privacy of a user’s data while
allowing cross-extension communication? This question needs to be answered in
order to prevent a security and privacy BCSS from becoming a risk of its own:
consolidating a wealth of intelligence on a person risks making the BCSS a single
point of failure in security.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>PISA Architecture</title>
      <p>
        The goal of the PISA is to enhance user privacy by persuading the user to
change their behavior in accordance with their privacy risk appetite. Previously,
we have used the Persuasive Systems Design (PSD) model by Oinas-Kukkonen[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]
to identify requirements and persuasive elements of the second PISA prototype
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. After developing two prototypes, we have converged on the architecture
shown in Figure 1.
      </p>
      <p>The PISA Client: A program running on a user’s device. Interacts with the
user and uses information gathered from sensors in PISA extensions to keep a
user profile up to date. Based on this user profile and a database of rules, PISA
protects the user when an event takes place. It does this through advice to the
user and by using actuators in PISA extensions.
PISA Extensions: Plugins that can integrate with PISA, protecting the user
based on a set of event-response rules associated with the PISA Extension.
Sensors are programs that can monitor aspects of the user’s system (such as
browsing activity or typing speed) while Actuators are programs that can take specific
actions within a user’s system (such as starting a virus scanner). The Logic
component is a program that communicates between different parts of the extension
and the PISA client.</p>
      <p>The PISA Update Server: A centralized database of plugins and
eventresponse rules that the PISA Client can use to update itself.</p>
      <p>Extension</p>
      <p>Logic
Sensors &amp;
actuators</p>
      <p>User device
PISA Client</p>
      <p>Central server</p>
      <p>PISA Update Server
User
profile</p>
      <p>Client-specific event response
rule database</p>
      <p>Extension
database</p>
      <p>Complete event
response rule database</p>
      <p>As a proof of concept, our second prototype used a browser plugin as a PISA
extension to detect when a user was entering his password on a non-HTTPS
protected site. It then informed the user and prevented him from entering his
password on what could potentially be a phishing site.
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Planned Work</title>
      <p>This architecture will be used as a guideline for implementing a series of
prototypes that we will test in laboratory conditions (using students and researchers
as subjects), using feedback from each iteration to improve the next. The
immediate research question that these prototypes will aim to answer is how to assess
a user’s skill and motivation based on observation (Q1 and Q2). When
personalisation is possible, advice and educative content and human-computer dialogue
will be structured using enterprise risk assessment methods (Q3). Once
sufficient extensions exist, a test involving a tiered reporting structure, aggregating
sensor data into categories, will be used to visualise the observed risk appetite
of the user (Q4). Existing literature on privacy preserving techniques will be
consulted throughout the development of the extension API (Q5). Finally, a test
of the efficacy and persuasive elements of the prototype will be carried out in a
real world context with our project partners, which include an internet service
provider and a telecom service provider.</p>
      <p>Acknowledgments The PISA project is sponsored by NWO and KPN under
contract 628.001.001.</p>
    </sec>
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