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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>How Frames of Reference Prime Spatial Memory</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Elena Andonova (eandonova@nbu.bg)</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>21 Montevideo Street Sofia, 1618</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="BG">Bulgaria</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>36</fpage>
      <lpage>41</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>This study examined priming spatial memory by frames of reference. Participants verified verbal descriptions of scenes which depicted spatial relations among objects. The intrinsic and relative frames of reference were used in the descriptions with varying degrees of veridicality. Descriptions in the two reference frames could either be equally distributed in terms of validity (50:50 ratio of true vs. false description) or were biased towards one of the two spatial frames. Participants were found to be sensitive not only to the spatial frame prime at the lower level of individual descriptions but also at the more global level of overall reliability of the two descriptive schemas. These findings provide direct evidence that spatial frames of reference can influence spatial memory and that this influence depends on how frequently a frame of reference is associated with valid and reliable information.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>spatial frames of reference</kwd>
        <kwd>spatial memory</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>Spatial frames of reference (FoR) are ways of organizing
mentally and communicating verbally certain aspects of our
spatial knowledge. They represent coordinate systems used
to compute and specify the location of objects with respect
to other objects. For example, the mutual positioning of the
three objects depicted in Figure 1(a) can be described in
several ways in English depending on which object’s
location is in the focus of our mental attention and our
communicative intention, i.e., which object is the located
object, or locatum, and which other object in this visual
scene is selected as the reference object, or relatum. Such
verbal descriptions typically entail a choice of a spatial
frame of reference. For example, (i) below is a description
of the relationship between the star as the locatum and the
truck as the reference object in the intrinsic frame of
reference while (ii) is a description of the relationship in the
relative frame of reference:
(i) The star is behind the truck.
(ii) The star is to the right of the truck.</p>
      <p>An intrinsic frame of reference is object-centered while a
relative frame of reference is viewer/speaker dependent,
also construed as egocentric. There is one further possibility
— describing the relationship in an absolute frame of
reference, independent of viewing position, etc., using some
kind of fixed bearings, as in (iii) below, in this example,
cardinal directions:</p>
      <p>
        For the purposes of this study, the distinction between
intrinsic and relative frames of reference is important as
these two constitute the more common and habitual ways of
describing spatial relationships that do not involve
largescale space, both in English and in the language studied
here, Bulgarian, as well as in most other European
languages. The terminological distinction between intrinsic
and relative FoRs follows from the tri-partite typological
scheme developed by Levinson and colleagues
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">(Levinson,
2003)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        Research in the last decades has uncovered considerable
variation in the use of spatial frames of reference both
across cultures and within individuals. Languages and
cultures differ in the degree to which one, two, or all three
of these frames of reference are available as a means of
description
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(for a brief summary, see Majid et al., 2004)</xref>
        .
Spatial language processing on an individual level can be
affected by a number of features of the communicative
situation
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref15 ref2 ref6">(Schober, 1993, Goschler, Andonova, &amp; Ross,
2008, Andonova, 2010)</xref>
        , the nature of the objects in the
spatial scene and their relationship, for example whether
there is a functional component in addition to the geometric
aspects of the relationship
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref13 ref2 ref5">(Carlson-Radvansky &amp;
Radvansky, 1996, Coventry &amp; Garrod, 2004, Andonova,
Tenbrink, &amp; Coventry, 2010)</xref>
        , as well as other
considerations. Features of the objects themselves also
direct attention to the use of different reference frames, for
example, when an object has no salient axis such as a cube
or a sphere, it is not common to employ the intrinsic frame
(Landau, 1996). Whether and how others are perceived to be
interacting with the objects described can also lead to the
use of different kinds of relative reference frames (Tversky
&amp; Hard, 2009).
      </p>
      <p>
        Among the communicative features that influence choices
of frames of reference are interlocutors’ identity,
conversational roles, and previous verbal descriptions
employed by oneself or by others in the communicative
exchange
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">(Schober, 1998; Watson, Pickering &amp; Branigan,
2004)</xref>
        . Similar effects of interlocutors and their descriptive
choices are also found with spatial perspective (egocentric
vs. allocentric, route vs. survey perspective, etc.). In a series
of confederate paradigm experiments on describing routes
on schematic maps, choice of spatial perspective was
influenced by the use of perspective of the dialogic partner,
both before and after they switched perspective
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">(Andonova,
2010)</xref>
        . Perspective priming did not occur, however, when
partners used perspective inconsistently. How and why
spatial language choice is affected by previous descriptions
is still debatable, in particular, the degree to which such
effects are consistent with explanations via automatic
lowlevel priming mechanisms
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref5">(Pickering &amp; Garrod, 2004)</xref>
        vs.
alignment or coordination of representations with a stronger
strategic element
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Clark, 1996)</xref>
        , or a combination of both
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">(Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, &amp; McLean, 2010)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        Does choice or availability of frames of reference,
however, play a role in cognitive processes beyond language
use? Variation in language use of frames of reference has
been indicated to associate with, if not lead to,
crosslinguistic and cross-cultural differences in spatial reasoning
and in tasks involving memory for the spatial configuration
of objects, for motion trajectories and path-direction
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref7">(Majid
et al., 2004, Haun, Rapold, Janzen, &amp; Levinson, 2011)</xref>
        .
Such studies indicate that different non-linguistic FoRs are
used to accomplish similar tasks and cognitive goals, and
that these non-linguistic FoRs align with the preferred FoR
of the language spoken by the people executing the
reasoning and spatial memory tasks. However, such
Whorfian effects and explanations have met with criticism
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">(Li &amp; Gleitman, 2002)</xref>
        and are far from being clearly
established. The question remains whether different spatial
frames of reference may exert an influence in non-linguistic
cognitive tasks and to what degree, if so.
      </p>
      <p>
        The literature on spatial memory has examined the
distinction between two frames of reference in spatial
memory
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref12">(for example, Mou &amp; McNamara, 2002, Nardini,
Burgess, Breckenridge, &amp; Atkinson, 2006)</xref>
        . One type of
representation is egocentric in that it encodes an object’s
relation to the agent/self, and the other is allocentric and
encodes a location with respect to an external frame of
reference such as would be provided by landmarks, for
example.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">Mou &amp; MacNamara (2002)</xref>
        have provided
evidence that spatial memories are organized around
intrinsic (object-derived) frames of reference, which are
selected on the basis of egocentric experience and
environmental cues. Using the array rotation paradigm,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">Nardini et al. (2006)</xref>
        traced the developmental trajectories
for use of different reference frames in spatial memory in
children between 3 and 6 years of age and found that the
viewpoint-independent recall based only on the array and its
nearby landmarks emerged relatively late at around 5 years.
Furthermore, this later-developing ability utilizing
objectreferenced (intrinsic) representations was not found to
depend on verbal encodings. All in all, studies have
underlined the role of intrinsic representations in spatial
memory.
      </p>
      <p>Less is known, however, about the relationship between
verbal descriptive choices in terms of frames of reference
and subsequent memory for the spatial relationships
described. Can the frame of reference used in naming a
spatial relationship affect memory for it? To the best of our
knowledge, the possible influence of the frames of reference
as a descriptive choice on the accuracy and/or flexibility of
spatial memory has not been examined systematically. In
fact, it is common for spatial memory studies to exclude the
influence of verbalization as an extraneous variable. On the
other hand, verbally labeling entities and relationships may
enhance subsequent memory episodes and verbalization
may occur even if not required explicitly. Spatial frames of
reference may prime memory related behaviors. This was
one of the main driving forces behind the research reported
here.</p>
      <p>A second basis for motivation of this research is related to
investigating how people make choices between two
schemes of description in a way that is not only flexible but
also sensitive to and informed by the relative probabilities
of success associated with the use of one or the other. For
that reason, we introduced diverging degrees of veridicality
associated with individual frames of reference as part of the
experimental design. Participants studied a series of visual
scenes involving three objects in a certain spatial
relationship and verified a verbal description of the visual
scene that was expressive of either an intrinsic or a relative
frame of reference. In addition, the description was either a
truthful and valid description of the scene or a false (invalid)
description within the given frame of reference. The
important manipulation here was that participants were
randomly assigned to one of three possible Bias conditions.
In all three conditions, half of the descriptions were in the
intrinsic frame of reference and the other half were in the
relative frame of reference. In the neutral or baseline
condition, each of the two frames was associated with the
same equal probability of being valid or invalid, i.e., half of
the intrinsic descriptions were valid descriptions of the
relationship in the scene, and the other half were invalid.
The same 50:50 ratio applied to the alternative relative
frame of reference. However, the other two conditions were
not neutral but contained a positive bias towards one of the
frames and a negative bias towards its alternative. This was
achieved by manipulating the validity of the descriptions as
explained below in the Method section.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Method</title>
      <p>The experimental design included three independent
variables: Frame of reference for the verbal prime (Intrinsic
vs. Relative), Veridicality of the statement (True or False),
and Bias condition (No bias, Intrinsic FoR Bias and Relative
FoR bias). The two dependent variables were based on
participants’ responses to the study phase (verification
accuracy) and the test phase (placement choice) of the
experimental procedure. Placement in the test phase was in
one of two positions, a binary choice of placement
consistent either with the intrinsic FoR or with the relative
FoR, and the ratio of choosing a position with the intrinsic
FoR was used as the dependent measure (Fig. 2).</p>
      <p>Three hypotheses were derived in relation to the
experimental variables. First, the placement choices in the
test phase for individual visual scenes were expected to be
affected by the spatial frame of reference encountered for
the scenes during the study phase. Second, we reasoned that
the veridicality of description in the study phase would also
leave a trace on participants’ placement choices in that valid
descriptions in a given frame of reference during the study
phase could be more easily recalled and used in the
placement choices during the test phase than invalid ones.
Finally, we hypothesized an interaction between the frame
of reference of the prime in the study phase and bias
condition as a variable. Given that the intrinsic and relative
frames of reference were designed here to be associated
with different degrees of veridicality, the priming influence
of the specific frame of reference used could be weaker or
stronger depending on the reliability of the reference frame.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Participants</title>
      <p>28 participants (12 men and 16 women) took part in the
experiment. They were university students between the ages
of 20 and 35 years old who were volunteers and/or
participated in exchange for course credit. Their mean age
was 26.68 years. All were native speakers of Bulgarian.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Stimuli</title>
      <p>The stimuli consisted of 32 target and 5 practice items. An
item comprised a simple sentence (a verification statement)
followed by a visual scene. The statement described the
position of the locatum with respect to the reference object
(relatum) and the visual part of the stimulus depicted three
objects placed linearly in such a way that the two lateral
objects were at an equal distance from the central object.
The central object was the reference object, or relatum, and
one of the two lateral objects was the locatum whose
position relative to the relatum was in the focus of the
statement. The statements and visual scenes were shown in
a series on the screen in a slide show. For example, below
are two items each consisting of a statement followed by the
visual scene it refers to (Fig. 1).</p>
      <p>(a) The star is behind the truck.</p>
      <p>The three objects in the scenes were selected in the
following way. The central object was either an animal or an
inanimate object (vehicles, chairs, etc.) that had a clear
front-back axis asymmetry so that statements phrased in the
intrinsic FoR could be validated. The other two objects, on
the other hand, had no clear fronts, backs, or sides, i.e., for
the purposes of this study they were non-axial. They did
have a clear vertical axis which, however, was irrelevant
here. All scenes depicted the three objects as simple line
drawings in a similar style as illustrated above; the objects
had simple common names.</p>
      <p>The stimuli for the test phase were derived from the
original visual scenes from the study phase and involved
three differences. There were no objects present in the scene
except for the central object, i.e., the reference object
(relatum) which was placed with the opposite orientation,
facing in the opposite direction. The sentences lacked the
spatial terms but preserved the same objects named as in the
study phase. For example, the test phase stimuli for the
examples in Figure 1 above were those depicted in Figure 2
below.</p>
      <p>(a) The star ----- the truck.
(b) The balloon is to the left of the goat.</p>
      <p>(b) The balloon ----- the goat.</p>
      <p>For the purposes of this experimental design, twelve
stimuli lists were constructed, four for each of the three Bias
conditions. The 32 target stimuli (sentence-picture pairs)
were placed in a pseudo-randomized order in each of them
with constraints on the number of stimuli in direct
succession that had the same Prime spatial frame, the same
value for animacy, orientation of the central object, etc. No
scene was repeated within any of the lists and no locatum
object was included in the target scenes more than once.</p>
      <p>The four lists for the neutral baseline condition contained
an equal number of stimuli in each of the two frames and
degree of veridicality was even distributed across the two
frames. The lists in the Intrinsic bias condition contained 16
descriptions in the intrinsic frame 12 of which were valid
(veridical) and the remaining four were invalid (false). They
also contained 16 descriptions in the relative frame only 4 of
which were valid and the remaining 12 were invalid, thus
manifesting a positive association between the intrinsic
frame of reference and validity (veridicality) of description
and a negative association between the use of the alternative
relative frame of reference and validity of description. The
lists in the Relative bias condition were constructed with the
same ratio but in the opposite direction so as to induce a
positive bias towards the relative frame in terms of validity
of description and a negative bias against the intrinsic frame
of reference. All in all, each list contained an equal number
of valid and invalid descriptions but the valid-invalid ratio
for individual frames of reference varied across conditions.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Procedure</title>
      <p>Participants saw the stimuli one at a time in a slide show on
a laptop screen. The experimental session was preceded by a
short practice session. Responses were audio-recorded and
subsequently transcribed and coded for verification
accuracy and frame of reference of the study phase
response. After the practice trials, the 32 target trials were
presented in the study phase, in a sentence-picture
combination each. In the study phase, participants were
asked to study the stimuli, read aloud the sentence
description offered and verify verbally the validity of the
description of the scene as presented in the sentence by
saying ‘Yes’ if it was valid and “No” if it was invalid. The
study phase was followed by a distractor task where
participants counted downwards from the number
twohundred and fifty by subtracting the number seven at each
step until they reached one hundred. Following this, during
the test phase, participants saw the truncated version of the
sentence and the middle object from the original study
phase scenes and were asked to indicate verbally and by
pointing the position of the locatum with respect to the
reference object as they recalled it from the study phase.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Results</title>
      <p>Out of the twenty-eight participants, the data of one was not
included in the analyses as this participant’s statement
verification accuracy was at chance level (53% accuracy). It
was possible that she did not understand the task or was
confused for other reasons. Numbers of remaining
participants were equally distributed across the three bias
conditions, n = 9 in each.</p>
      <p>The data of the remaining twenty-seven participants were
examined in repeated measures analyses of variance with
Bias condition as a between-participant variable and Prime
(intrinsic vs. relative FoR), and veridicality (True vs. False
statement) as within-participant independent variables.
Across analyses, veridicality did not exhibit any main
effects and did not engage in interactions with other factors.
Therefore, the data were collapsed to allow for the analyses
of effects and interactions of the two main experimental
variables, i.e., Bias condition and Prime FoR. The results of
these analyses are reported here on mean participant values.</p>
      <p>First, the statement verification responses of participants
were subjected to a repeated measures analysis of variance
with prime (intrinsic vs. relative) as a within-participant
variable and bias condition (neutral, intrinsic bias, and
relative bias) as a between-participant variable. Verification
accuracy ranged from 88.88% for the neutral condition after
a relative prime to 96.53% for the relative bias condition
after an intrinsic prime. However, there were no reliable
effects and no interactions emerged from this analysis.</p>
      <p>Next, a repeated measures analysis of variance with prime
(intrinsic vs. relative) as a within-participant variable and
bias condition (neutral, intrinsic bias, and relative bias) as a
between-participant variable was conducted for the main
dependent variable in the memory part of the study – the
mean percent choice of intrinsic placement of the locatum
with respect to the relatum. As a reminder here, the
orientation of the central object in the visual scenes was
reversed from study to test phase. For example, if
participants saw the goat in Fig. 1b facing to the right during
the study phase, in the test phase they saw the goat facing
left and were asked to indicate where the locatum (here, the
balloon) was positioned in the scene they saw during the
study phase. If participants indicated that the balloon was
left of or in front of the goat, this was coded as an intrinsic
response, as it retained the intrinsic FoR relationship
between locatum and relatum while violating the relative
(viewing position) FoR of the participant. Alternatively, if
participants indicated that the balloon was to the right of or
behind the goat, this response was coded as retaining the
relative FoR and it was in violation of the intrinsic FoR for
the original scene. On this basis, a unitary dependent
variable was calculated which reflected the proportion of
Intrinsic FoR placement responses out of all responses made
by participants. The memory test phase responses were
included in the analyses only for those trials on which a
correct verification response had been produced in the first
study phase of the experiment (excluding seventy-three
individual trials across all participants).</p>
      <p>The repeated measures analysis on the mean percent of
intrinsic placement responses revealed no effect of Bias
condition, a significant main effect of prime FoR, (F (1, 24) =
16.99, p &lt; .001, ηp2 = .415) and a significant prime FoR by
Bias condition interaction, (F (1, 24) = 5.87, p = .008, ηp2 =
.328). The mean percent values for each of the six
conditions are listed in Table 1 below.
Further, we analyzed whether participants’ placement
responses differed for each of the three experimental bias
conditions on the proportion intrinsic placements as a
function of the frame of reference the prime was in (intrinsic
in front of or behind vs. relative left or right). A series of
paired samples t-tests were performed with prime FoR as a
within-participant independent variable and mean percent
intrinsic placement during the test phase as the dependent
variable. These analyses revealed that there were significant
differences in placement between intrinsic and relative
prime trials in the neutral no-bias condition (t (8) = 2.80, p =
.023) and in the intrinsic bias condition (t (8) = 4.65, p =
.002) but none in the relative bias condition.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Discussion</title>
      <p>One of the main objectives of this study was to establish
if prior descriptions of spatial relations in visual scenes via
specific spatial frames of reference could affect the memory
for these relations in a test phase. The findings reveal that
this was indeed the case. Overall during recall, participants
chose placements in the intrinsic object-centered frame
more frequently if they had read and verified a description
of the relationship in that frame when studying the visual
scenes than if they had read and verified descriptions in the
alternative relative frame of reference. The priming effect
was to the magnitude of a 15% difference between intrinsic
prime trials and relative prime trials in the neutral no-bias
condition where the two frames of reference were associated
equally with success or failure. Thus, importantly, the
priming effect of prior verbal FoR description was found in
the baseline condition and may generalize to a broader range
of phenomena.</p>
      <p>
        Furthermore, in this design differences among the frames
of reference were introduced in terms of the degree of their
association with veridicality of description, or in other
words, on the validity and reliability of descriptions in the
intrinsic and in the relative frames, respectively, resulting in
two conditions with a bias. The hypothesized interaction
between condition bias and frame of reference prime on
subsequent spatial memory choices was confirmed in the
analysis of data. The spatial description priming effect was
shown to differ across bias conditions. The fifteen percent
difference in the baseline was increased to a 23% priming
magnitude in the Intrinsic bias condition in line with
expectations that the intrinsic FoR would be experienced as
more reliable in that condition than the relative FoR. The
opposite was the case in the relative bias condition—the
priming effect dissipated and participants’ memory was
unaffected by the verbal prime’s frame of reference. If we
consider that choices in the baseline (default) no-bias
condition were under the influence of the prime, these
results indicate that the intrinsic FoR was inhibited in the
relative bias condition while it was not, or even, as a whole,
it was boosted in the intrinsic bias condition. These
differences across conditions reveal that participants were
sensitive to the level of reliability of the two frames of
reference used in the descriptions even though they were not
explicit in any way, and the distribution of validity varied
across the two frames only implicitly in terms of the overall
composition of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (valid and invalid description)
trials during the verification/study phase of the experiment.
Participants were able to acquire this kind of statistical
information during study inadvertently, a form of statistical
learning
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">(Saffran, Aslin, &amp; Newport, 1996)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>The third hypothesis that veridicality (validity) of the
description in interaction with primes would also lead to
differences in placement choices was not confirmed in this
analysis. If it had any influence at all, it must have been too
subtle to make an impact on participants’ behavior,
especially in view of the combined influence of prime frame
of reference and bias condition. The role of veridicality of
specific descriptions, however, was not lost entirely, as it
was manifested indirectly in the differences across bias
conditions with their variation in terms of FoR reliability. In
this sense, its role emerged not locally at the level of
individual trial descriptions but globally at the level of
entire frames of reference being more or less trustworthy as
successful descriptive choices.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>In sum, this study examined the role of spatial frames of
reference used with different degrees of reliability in the
description of spatial relations between two objects in
memory. The effect of spatial frame of reference priming
we found shows that alternative verbal descriptions can
produce rather different memories of the same simple visual
scene.</p>
      <p>Studies of spatial memory have shown inter-cultural and
intra-cultural variability in the use of spatial frames of
reference and associated performance in non-linguistic
tasks. To the best of our knowledge, however, previous
research has not examined directly the effects of
verbalization of spatial relations via specific FoR terms on
subsequent memory for the relations. Whether such effects
can be established is, however, a pertinent question for
several reasons. One clear avenue of research is the possible
role of language for performance in non-linguistic tasks, and
in particular, in memory. While such tasks can occasionally
be executed without recourse to language, verbal strategies
may facilitate memory performance. Future research may
explore whether prior descriptions with spatial frames of
reference can affect memories where recall is not required,
i.e., in recognition tasks. The lack of verbalization in the test
phase in such recognition memory tasks may reduce the
effects of FoRs. However, if priming occurs in recognition
tests as well, then verbal descriptions can be seen as priming
frames of reference on a conceptual rather than verbal level.</p>
      <p>Importantly, the findings here provide direct evidence that
spatial frames of reference can influence spatial memory
and that this influence depends on how frequently a frame
of reference is associated with valid and reliable
information. This finding has a much more general
relevance for understanding cognitive mechanisms, for
example, if a given conceptual scheme or structure becomes
associated with less reliability as an information source, it
may also be less favored in subsequent cognitive processes.</p>
      <p>Reliability of descriptive schema is indeed a promising
characteristic to explore in future research. It is remarkable
that participants in the study appeared to be sensitive to the
probabilities of validity associated with the different frames
of reference even within the limited duration of the
experiment and the limited number of instances that were
required to produce a bias of expectation towards a given
more reliable frame of reference. To what extent such
induced variation in reliability can be examined with respect
to more ecologically valid field studies is a matter of future
research endeavor.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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