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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Logical Thought Based on Word Presentations</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Matthias Jakubec</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>95</fpage>
      <lpage>100</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper is about the mechanisms of logical reasoning which would fit into a cognitive architecture based on the concepts of psychoanalytic metapsychology. As the results have to be based on a bionic approach beyond neurological findings a turn back to the roots of logic is required. According to psychoanalytical theory word presentations are the base of language on the one hand and connected to that the base of rational thought on the other. The paper shows, how a functional model of logical thought can be derived from basic metapsychological insights and how based on word presentations atomic propositions emerge from simple word presentations in a psyche. Finally it sketches briefly, how reasoning rules have to be handled based on the underlying model.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>cognitive architecture</kwd>
        <kwd>SiMA</kwd>
        <kwd>word presentations</kwd>
        <kwd>reasoning</kwd>
        <kwd>logic</kwd>
        <kwd>rational thought</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>For more than 15 years now the ambitious project of
developing a human like cognitive architecture is observed
at the Institute of Computer Technology of the Vienna
University of Technology. The project called SiMA
(Simulation of Mental Apparatus and Applications)1 was set
up to enable control units of performing adequate reactions
in situations, where up to now only human beings show the
requested flexibility and the necessary understanding for
human cooperation partners, such as security control on
airports or the interworking between human workers and
robots.</p>
      <p>To reach this goal, the engineers had to develop a
functional model of the desired architecture, i.e. they had to
identify its parts and to describe their interworking. The
target to build a machine with humanoid behavior led to a
bionic approach with the human brain as the blueprint for
the design of the machine. If you want to understand the
working of a computer application like Word you would not
start investigating the computer’s hardware, its circuits and
the power supply, but rather would look for higher level
functions, and so unlike in the Human Brain Project2 the
understanding of neurological basics was not the goal of the
1 sima.ict.tuwien.ac.at, accessed 2015-02-18; up to January 2015
the name of the project had been ARS (Artificial Recognition
System).</p>
      <p>2 www.humanbrainproject.eu, accessed 2015-02-18.
project team but primarily the upper layer of the brain’s
activities, the psyche respectively the mental apparatus.</p>
      <p>
        Due to the bionic approach the team had to look for a
holistic, functional description of the psyche as the template
for their work and checking the different schools of
psychology, finally the metapschological theory of Freud3,
the theoretical results of his psychoanalytical studies, turned
out to be the only reliable scientific base for the intended
quest.4 According to metapsychology the work of the
psyche is split into two major subparts: first in the primary
process the input data (representations of the world provided
by senses and drives) get treated in a kind of “quick and
dirty” manner fully unconscious, then in the secondary
process another step of processing the data makes them
preconscious and conscious
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21 ref3">(Dietrich 2014)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        While in the past 15 years the primary process had been
elaborated down to a satisfying level of detail the secondary
process remained rather underexposed. Artificial
Intelligence research, computational intelligence studies,
theoretical informatics, and mathematical logic have made
enormous progress during the last 50 to 100 years in
working out applicable models of logical reasoning, so it is
no longer a severe problem for computer driven machines to
play chess, proof theorems or even to win Jeopardy5,6. But
there is more than justified suspense that these machines
make use of a huge number of insights of the scientists in
following their algorithms, algorithms which are not
available to the human brain. So under the condition to find
3 Metapsychology is Freud’s attempt to formulate a general,
holistic, scientific model of the design and the functioning of the
psyche, which he calls the psychic apparatus
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref12">(comp. Freud, 1915;
Freud, 1925)</xref>
        . It has to be distinguished from (a) psychoanalysis as
treatment for psychic disorder and (b) psychoanalysis as a method
for the investigation of unconscious processes and contents
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(comp.
Freud 1920)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>4 That of course doesn’t mean that other findings in the fields of
cognitive science or psychology are irrelevant, but psychoanalytic
metapsychology at the time of the beginning of the project was
identified as the only holistic theory suitable for the intended
topdown-design of a model of the human psyche. For further
arguments about psychoanalysis as base of the SiMA project see
Dietrich, D., Bruckner, D., Zucker, G., et al. (2009).</p>
      <p>5
www.research.ibm.com/cognitivecomputing/watson/index.shtml#fbid=lqOqQqGVuE0,
accessed 2015-02-18.</p>
      <p>
        6 See e.g.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">Cohen &amp; Lefebvre (2005)</xref>
        ;
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">Gerla (2001)</xref>
        ;
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">Goertzel, B.,
&amp; Pennachin, C. (2007</xref>
        );
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">Priest (2008)</xref>
        .
a model, how the brain performs logical reasoning we need
to step back again and turn to the roots. How can the human
brain think logically based on an evolution which designed
it as an optimized control unit of the human body, satisfying
drives with minimum efforts?
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Functional Model of SiMA</title>
      <p>
        The SiMA project (Simulation of Mental Apparatus and
Applications) was introduced under the name of ARS
(Artificial Recognition System) by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref9">Dietrich, Fodor, Zucker,
&amp; Bruckner (2009</xref>
        ). You can find brief discussions in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">Schaat, Wendt, Jakubec, et al. (2014</xref>
        ) and Schaat, &amp;
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">Dietrich (2014)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>As explained above, the SiMA model intends to provide a
functional description of the psyche. The design process
followed a top-down methodology. On the highest level
(level 5) the psyche is described as the control unit of the
human organism. In level 4 differentiations are made
according to Freud’s 2nd topological model: There are the
functions of the Id, where bodily needs are treated.
Competing with them Freud identified the Super-Ego which
handles internalized social demands. Finally the Ego
functions have to mediate between the different requests.
Mind, that all this happens totally unconscious in the
psyche. You usually are not aware in scenarios like the
following, that you do not like a certain person because she
reminds you of your sister which you have experienced to
be a major competitor of yours in early days of childhood,
and that this results in the reaction, to be especially kind
towards this person. Only in the end of the process, a
permitted subset of possible actions get presented to the
psyche in a preconscious and conscious way by the Ego
functions, so that they become part of rational decision
making.
body, i.e. instructions for muscles and glands. There are
four different input tracks. Two are signaling drives, i.e.
sexual drives and self preservation drives, two more provide
environment perception and body perception.</p>
      <p>The input becomes psychical content if it gets cathected,
that is some quota of affect is assigned to it, or to say it
simple: the presented content is of interest for the psyche.
Drives get represented by drive meshes and perceived
contents get represented by thing presentation meshes7. The
processing of drives and perception is mainly a task of
subfunctions of the Id.</p>
      <p>Before the psychic content can be forwarded to a rational
treatment in the secondary process it needs to be filtered
according to the question, whether it shows permitted
thought or would be absolutely inacceptable for an
individual as a member of a society. This filter task is
performed by an interworking of Super-Ego functions,
which provide super-ego rules according to which defense
mechanisms have to handle the questioned thoughts, and
some Ego functions which finally make decisions about
permitted versus rejected content8.</p>
      <p>The contents which pass this filter, will then be
transformed into preconscious thought by adding word
presentations (WP, word presentation meshes in technical
terms) to them (transformation track). Now they can be part
of rational thought and planning in the reasoning track, and
at the end a certain action gets selected which results in
signals towards the actuators. Imaginary actions, whether
actually executed or just fantasized, are fed back to the
primary process to cause further associations and thus
awake more psychic content (cathect it with some quota of
affect).</p>
      <p>An important factor throughout the whole process is the
various measures of valuation. In principle they all are
based on the quota of affect which always reflects some
drive tension. Concerning the active psychical contents
there is the tension between the current and the desired state
of the individual. Concerning memories the reduction of
tension which had been the result of an action or a tile
which played a role in it is stored with them. A significant
amount of the sexual drive tension gets desexualized and
that way under the term neutralized intensity is made
available as a sort of fuel for secondary process activities.
The state of the individual also gets rated by emotions,
which directly may lead to bodily reactions (sweating,
shortness of breath etc.) and thus is visible for others but the
individual itself only can register it by observing these body
reactions or does not detect its emotions at all. Finally the
individual has feelings, i.e. emotions which get connected
with word presentations and so become preconscious and if
they are important enough also become conscious. So the
individual is aware of its feelings, the others are not, if the
individual does not talk about them.</p>
      <p>Besides the input data two more categories of data play an
important role: there is the huge mesh of memories, thing
presentations and word presentations associated with each
other, and a number of sub-functions make use of what we
call personal factors. These personal factors are
abbreviations of sets of memories or specific bodily
reactions which result in certain behavior typical for the
individual, such as the rate of sexual drive tension turned
into neutralized intensity within a certain time span.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Word Presentations, Consciousness, Language, and</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Rational Thought</title>
        <p>There is significant evidence that the following thesis is
true:</p>
        <p>Logical thought is always conscious.</p>
        <p>
          Of course there are severe counter arguments about
people who dream about the results of mathematical
problems. Or let’s think of the mathematician S. Ramanujan
who came to a number of his results obviously merely by
intuition
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">(Ranganathan, 1967)</xref>
          . But a lot of Ramanujan’s
results didn’t hold. You wouldn’t trust a logical result as
long as you haven’t checked it in full consciousness.
        </p>
        <p>Psychoanalytical metapsychology shows, that
consciousness and language belong together. Psychic
content represented by thing presentations becomes
preconscious in that moment when an associated word
presentation gets activated. If the cathexis of the word
presentation is strong enough, the content becomes
conscious.</p>
        <p>According to Freud a word presentation is the
representation of a word of a natural language in the psyche.
He has illustrated his idea about it in a famous sketch
(figure 2). In his drawing things are represented by visual,
acoustic and tactile associations and there is a strong
association between the visual representation of the object
and the sound-image of the word. There are other images of
words as well, and they together build the word
presentation.</p>
        <p>TPs
WP</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>A Functional Model of Logical Thought</title>
      <p>According to the research program of SiMA in the
following the functions needed to model logical thought will
be developed step by step.</p>
      <p>So the psychoanalytical finding is that rational thought,
language and consciousness belong together. If we talk
about language than usually its purpose for communication
is seen in the first place, but that is not correct. There is no
doubt that spoken language starts with the utterance of
noises. We do this simply because it causes pleasure by
itself. Just observe a baby when it starts experimenting with
its first controlled sounds. She or he obviously enjoys the
pleasure produced by the feelings around its oral areas. That
explains, why we are speaking, but it doesn’t explain why
speech is used as language. What happens is that individuals
who live in social compounds make the experience, how
certain utterances they make can have meaning to others in
their group. They can also have meaning for themselves.
One thing, the vocal utterance, can stand for another. It
becomes a symbol. This is possible not only for acoustic
objects but also for gestures or for external settings
(writing). Today we understand that nearly everything might
be a symbol, a representative, for something else. So
Freud’s drawing cannot be taken in its narrow sense.
Otherwise it would mean that deaf people could not have
word presentations (as they for sure have no sound-images
of words) and thus would not have consciousness. This
would be mere nonsense. What counts is that the object gets
a semantic function which means its presentation in the
psyche is associated with something else for which it is a
representative. It has a meaning. The system of meanings is
produced within a general social system (natural language).</p>
      <p>Only the word presentations can get into relations with
each other where they fulfil specific roles and thus build up
a structure which forms a language. It is this ability to
produce syntactical interdependencies which makes a set of
words being a language which can be used as material for
modelling the world. The first purpose of word
presentations is to provide structures and orders between the
things they denote, a capability which thing presentations
alone do not have as they only stand in associative relations
with each other, relations of the kind, “if I think of the one
thing also the other comes into my mind”. This primary
characteristic of word presentations, the ability to build
structure, is a result of the development of language as a
social act, but the usability of language for communication
purpose in that light appears as a second place feature
behind its ability of bringing logical structure into the world.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Atomic Propositions</title>
        <p>What is this magical step which enables word presentations
to build up meaningful structures, while thing presentations
only are connected via stronger or less strong associations
with each other? Before we can perform any logical
operations we need descriptions of the world, we need
propositions as a foundation of any logic. The simplest
propositions have the structure of a predicate expressed
about an object. This is the structure of a pair, where the two
constituents each play a specific role. Atomic propositions
are ordered pairs.</p>
        <p>
          The objection was made that you do not need ordered
pairs for an axiomatic foundation of logical systems, as you
can declare ordered pairs by a simple combination of
unordered pairs (
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">Gödel, 1931</xref>
          ):
        </p>
        <p>(a,b) = {{a},{a,b}}
But this objection overlooks, that the definition of the
unordered pair itself makes use of the element relation, i.e.
that an object is an element of a set or a class respectively,
which already is expressed by ordered pairs.</p>
        <p>a ∈ {a}
{a} ∈ {{a},{a,b}}
That is, you cannot declare any kind of formal relation
without at least one kind of asymmetric relation, and thus it
makes sense to use the ordered pair as a starting point from
where you can derive any other kind of structure.</p>
        <p>In Jakubec, Dönz, &amp; Bruckner (2013) the fundamental
role of ordered pairs in the light of psychoanalytic
metapsychology as the constitutive structural element of the
secondary process is described. Only in the secondary
process there is
1. time dependent order
2. language
3. rational thought
where 3 needs 1 and 2 as preconditions. It must be observed
as a real strange tradition, that formal logic distinguishes
between the object-predicate relation (predicate-argument
relation) on the one hand and the element-set (or -class)
relation on the other. From an object oriented point of view
both relations represent the same circumstances, that certain
objects are instances of a certain class. The object in
question belongs to the class of objects with exactly the
predicate as defining property. There is no need to remain
with this differentiation any longer and we can treat both
kind of relations as one and the same.</p>
        <p>There is a Boolean affinity between the propositional
calculus and set algebra, where the implication corresponds
with the subset relation:</p>
        <p>
          ((x ∈ A) → (x ∈ B)) ⇔ (A ⊆ B)
Wang presents ‘→’ as the symbol for the inheritance
relation
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">(Wang, 2007)</xref>
          , which means that if A → B, A is a
subcategory of B (e.g. raven → bird) and he reads it the
way that A is a subject with the predicate B, which normally
would be expressed by A ∈ B. It is obvious that the subset
relation and the element relation are not the same but …
        </p>
        <p>Big ‘but’! Let’s consider the following. An artificial agent
Adam (e.g. based on the SiMA architecture) perceives his
environment, where he, based on his memories, identifies
several objects and among them another agent. (May his
name be Bodo.) We now could model this situation in the
way that there is a word presentation with the logical
meaning of an object constant representing Bodo. If Adam
now turns around he will lose perceptions of Bodo and if he
then turns back again, he will again identify an object as
Bodo. But can he really be sure, that both perceived objects
are the same. The only thing what Adam could be sure
about is, that there was an object with all the
Bodoattributes and seconds later, there again was such an object.
Even if Adam does not lose contact with Bodo interim,
there is no guarantee that the object identified in a certain
moment is the same as the one in the next moment. The
object continuity is a mere construction of the brain. (That’s
why we identify a jumping point of light on the screen as
one and the same point jumping rather than different points
highlighted consecutively.) But this would mean that there
is no constant on object level. Instead of
(predicate P holds for Object O), we rather would write</p>
        <p>O(x) ∧ P(x)
(there is an object x which fits into the predicates O and P).
If there are no object constants, we will end up with the
following: if predicate P holds for an object O then the fact
of an x being O implies that x fulfils P,</p>
        <p>(O ∈ P) ⇔ (O(x) → P(x))</p>
        <p>
          So we face tight relationship if not to say equivalency
between the concepts of predicate, subset and implication. 8
of the 16 binary operations of propositional logic are
commutative. 4 select either the left or the right argument or
their negation respectively, which means, that the respective
other argument has no influence on the result but gets totally
ignored. The remaining 4 are the implication operations
(a → b, b → a) and their negations, where the order in the
argument pair matters. Even though the implication itself is
a static operation (as any other logical operation as well) it
has a severe dynamical foundation: As soon as we have
proofed the condition, we can assure the conclusion. In our
imagination we handle it ‘first a, then b’. In general we need
time dependency to identify order, as time is the one
Anschauungsform (form of intuition, Kant) which is
directed. Any order is based on the asymmetry between first
and next
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">(Jakubec, Dönz, &amp; Bruckner, 2013)</xref>
          . It is our
ability to recognise this directedness in the secondary
process, the ability to handle temporal order, which also
enables us to deal with object-predicate relations, the subset
and element concepts, and implications.
        </p>
        <p>
          What we need to do is to identify functions in the
beginning of secondary process where atomic propositions
are composed in the agent’s psyche. In the transformation
track (see figure 1) we can distinguish exactly three
different relevant functions
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21 ref3">(Dietrich et al., 2014)</xref>
          :
1. F21: Transformation to secondary process
(perception) which activates word presentations (WPs)
for perceived objects.
2. F20: Composition of feelings which creates feelings
from current emotions and activates WPs for these
feelings.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3. F8: Transformation to secondary process (drive</title>
        <p>wishes) which identifies the wishes the agent wants to
get satisfied currently and names them by activating
associated WPs.</p>
        <p>The result of F21 will be a list of propositions describing
the agent’s current perception. E.g. if the agent sees a
Schnitzel and the thing presentation representing the
Schnitzel is associated with the word presentation
“Schnitzel” (it might be associated with other WPs as well,
but these other associations are weaker) there will be the
proposition Schnitzel(x), which simply means “there is
something which is a Schnitzel”. As stated above, there are
no constant identifiers on object level, thus a WP for a
variable gets activated for the perceived object. In natural
language this would be something like “something” (which
replaced “dada” in a late state of language acquisition). Our
artificial agent may use predicate calculus as his natural
language where “x” could be a valid WP for what he
perceives.</p>
        <p>At this point it has to be stated, that Hurford comes to the
result that higher developed animals have some kind of
proto-predicates at their disposal which they apply on object
variables rather than on constant representations of objects.
He gives</p>
        <p>
          “LIONbaboon(x) &amp; CROUCHbaboon(x) &amp; ROCKbaboon(y)”
as an example for a possible representation of a situation
with a crouching lion and a rock in an animal brain, where
the index ‘baboon’ means that these are the corresponding
predicates of a baboon and not of a human
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">(Hurford, 2007)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>The result of F20 is a list of propositions, (one for each
detected feeling) stating the word presentation of the feeling
about the agent himself as the object (e.g. sad(Adam)). It
might make sense, that in these cases the proposition’s
argument should be a constant identifier of the agent instead
of a variable, so that the WP representing the agent would
be the only constant WP on object level. But this question
needs further investigation.</p>
        <p>Finally F8 produces propositions in a similar way as F20,
this time declaring the agents drive-wishes instead of his
feelings (e.g. wants_to_eat(Adam)).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Reasoning Rules</title>
        <p>Reasoning rules are ordered pairs of word presentation
sequences. The first element contains a text (resp.
corresponding WPs) which has to be replaced by the second
element, if it occurs in the current thought (resp. the
corresponding WPs). As we can see, also this element of
rational thought relies on the fundamental role of ordered
pairs and again they reflect a temporary order, a dynamic
process: replace a currently available WP sequence by
another one which then will be active at least in the step(s)
of immediate future. There are a lot of open questions in
how far such rules can be rule schemata instead, which have
to be adapted in each concrete situation or whether such
adaptation itself is part of the execution of an action plan.
We expect more results concerning this in near future.</p>
        <p>In the SiMA model two functions are identified in the
action selection track (figure 1) to do the work. In F26:
Decision making it is decided among other criteria based
on the feelings identified in F20, which goal has to be
reached next and at the same time which reasoning rules
could be satisfactory if applied to the current thought. For
selection such reasoning rules are available which are
associated strongly enough with the currently active word
presentations or word presentation sequences. In F52:</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Generation of imaginary actions the possible reasoning</title>
        <p>rules get tested, that is they get checked, in how far the to be
replaced word presentation sequence appears in the active
WP sequence – an activity which is performed in the lower
layers of the model based on our innate ability of pattern
recognition – and if a rule matches it gets applied, and the
result is checked, whether it leads closer towards the desired
goal.</p>
        <p>The result of the function always has to be an action as its
name indicates, an action for the immediate next step. That
means in word presentations it is an imperative for the agent
himself. In form of a proposition – as the result of a logical
derivation can only be a proposition (whether atomic or
combined) – it is a predicate expressing that the agent is
expected to do something9. Nevertheless the requested
action can also be to do more reasoning in the next steps of
processing and not to do anything else at the moment.10</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>What Remains to be done</title>
      <p>Besides the open points already mentioned above the most
important question is of course the content and quality of
the agent’s memory database. Which word presentations
and reasoning rules are associated with which perceived
situations? The contents of this database can be attained in
two different ways. They can be designed by hand or they
can be the result of learning processes. Currently learning is
too wide a field as to expect substantial results concerning
our problem, thus for the moment our choice was for the
first option. Step by step the agent’s memory has to get
extended by relevant knowledge about the world. Later on,
when the principles are understood well enough, there might
be tools to acquire more information automatically from the
internet as already sketched in Jakubec, Dönz, &amp; Bruckner
(2013).</p>
      <p>A closer problem and current topic of the research is the
adequate embedding of the abstract concepts of logic in the
agent’s memory which is radically based on bodily
experiences. In this question we again expect some useful
support from psychoanalysis and its know-how at grounding
adult behaviour in suppressed early childhood experiences.
Research in this direction is continued.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
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