=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-1419/paper0036
|storemode=property
|title=An Interest and Belief-Based Model of Explicit Communication
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1419/paper0036.pdf
|volume=Vol-1419
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/eapcogsci/Cruciani15
}}
==An Interest and Belief-Based Model of Explicit Communication==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1419/paper0036.pdf
An interest and belief-based model of explicit communication
Marco Cruciani (cruciani@disi.unitn.it)
Dept. of Information Engineering and Computer Science
University of Trento, Italy
Abstract Corazza and Dokic, 2012; Stojnic and Lepore, 2013; Devit,
2013; Stalnaker, 2014;). There is also lively debate within
The paper outlines an inferential model of explicit the pragmatics, which contains and extends the previous
communication. The first section presents the main notions issues, for instance: mind-reading, ad hoc concepts
involved in the model, that is, the speaker’s intended meaning
construction, mutual adjustment and backward/forward
and addressee’s intended meaning. The first notion is centred
on the speaker’s interest in situation: a speaker intends the
inference, impliciture vs. explicature, inferential vs.
meaning of an utterance on the basis of a partial order of associative method, radical vs. moderate contextualism, etc.
preferences with respect to a set of contextually plausible (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 2002; Recanati, 2007, 2010,
meanings. The second notion is centred on the addressee’s 2012; Carston, 2007, 2009; Wilson, & Carston, 2007; Hall,
communicative inference, which is based on the addressee’s 2009, 2014; Bach, 2010; Mazzone, 2011; Mazzarella 2011;
belief about the speaker’s interest and on the linguistic form Wilson & Sperber 2012; Carston & Hall, 2012; Belleri,
of a sentence. In the following sections, the paper presents the 2013, 2014).
phenomenon of semantic underdeterminacy, introduces the However, for the purpose of the paper, it is relevant the
preferences partial order, and the communicative inferences.
debate concerning the nature of the “primary” pragmatic
The paper takes the notion of interest from cognitive social
theory, the notion of meaning from semantics, the notion of
processes, that are, the processes that contribute to the
explicit meaning from pragmatics, and uses the notion of recovery of the explicit meaning of a sentence1. Relevance
communicative inference for explicit meaning in partial Theory has proposed a unified inferential account of
accordance with Relevant Theory. Finally, the paper discusses primary (i.e. explicatures) and secondary (i.e. implicatures)
some examples taken from the pragmatist literature. pragmatic processes. Recanati conceives of this distinction
as correlating with two different on-line processing systems:
Keywords: states of affairs; truth-conditions; semantic for primary processes, there is a low-level associative
underdeterminacy; speaker’s interest; speaker’s intended system, which is responsible for the derivation of ‘what is
meaning; addressee’s belief; inference; addressee’s intended said’ (explicit meaning), and, for secondary processes, there
meaning; shared intended meaning; explicit communication. is a genuinely inferential system, which recovers ‘what is
implicated’.2 In short, the current debate is animated by
numerous questions. For example: what is the role of truth-
Introduction conditions in determination of the explicit meaning? What
type of non-linguistic knowledge is necessary? In what does
Communication is a phenomenon which pervades all the contribution of non-linguistic knowledge consist? How
human activity. It is studied by various disciplines from can such knowledge be obtained? And how is it used? Is it
different theoretical perspectives. Whatever the perspective the premise of a non-demonstrative inference, or does it
taken, however, studying communication involves activate a frame that associates concepts? Are the primary
investigation of a complex phenomenon which by its nature processes conscious or unconscious? Etc.
requires dialogue among disciplines. Some important
theories in philosophy, linguistics and cognitive science Speaker’s intended meaning and addressee’s
share the idea that full understanding of communication intended meaning
requires understanding the role of the non-linguistic
knowledge tied to the situation in which a sentence is The paper presents a model of explicit communication,
uttered, for instance: Récanati’s truth-conditional where the notion of shared intended meaning is based on the
pragmatics, Bach’s 'quasi-contextualism', and the speaker’s preference for a state of affairs to which a
communicative-inferential model developed by Sperber and sentence refers, and on the addressee’s communicative
Wilson). Pragmatists (i.e. contextualists and relevant
1
theorists) and semanticists (i.e. minimalists, indexicalists) Cf. Carston (2002) on the notion of explicature in Relevant
have given rise to numerous standpoints about different Theory; Récanati (2001) on ‘what is said’ in Truth-conditional
aspects related to the context-dependence of meaning (e.g. Pragmatics; Bach (2010) on impliciture in linguistics.
2
indexicality, reference assignment, literal meaning, semantic According to Recanati’s framework, primary pragmatic
processes are governed by a dynamics of accessibility, constrained
underdeterminacy, semantics/pragmatics distinction, what is by semantic associations and world-knowledge structures (i.e.
said/what is implicated distinction, unarticulated ‘schemata’) (Récanati, 2010). According to Relevant theory’s
constituents, pragmatic intrusion, etc.) (Stanley, 2000; framework, utterances come with a presumption of their own
Récanati, 2004a; Bianchi, 2004; Bach 2004; Szabó, 2005; optimal relevance, which guides the derivation of explicatures,
Cappelen, 2007; Carston, 2008; Gaucker, 2012; Borg, 2012; contextual assumptions and implicatures (Wilson and Sperber,
2012).
240
inference, which involves the addressee’s belief about the the truth-conditions of a sentence, we have speaker’s
interest of speaker in the specific communicative situation. intended meaning.
The paper develops previous works of the author. The two Addressee’s intended meaning The addressee’s intended
main thesis are in the following: 1) given a set of meaning is obtained via a communicative inference (Fig. 2).
contextually plausible interpretations of a sentence, the The premise P1 consists of a sentence and the semantic
speaker’s intended meaning is determined by the speaker’s conventions associate to its linguistic form (that is, some
situational interests (Cruciani, 2010), and 2) the addressee’s semantically plausible meanings). The premise P2 consists
intended meaning is inferred by addressee on the basis of of the addressee’s belief about the speaker’s interest, more
his/her belief about the speaker’s interest (Cruciani, 2011)3. specifically about a partial ordering of speaker’s
Communication is successful when the intended speaker’s preferences.
meaning and addressee’s speaker meaning are shared, that
is, when the addressee’s inference is based on a true belief speaker’s intended meaning
about speaker’s interest in situation.
The paper takes the notion of interest from cognitive
social theory, that is, an interest is viewed as a state of
affairs preferred by a speaker because it implies the [state of affairs preferred]goal
conditions of possibility of his/her goal (this is a modified
notion originally proposed by Conte Castelfranchi, 1995).
Also, the paper takes the notion of meaning from analytic
[state of aff. 1 ≥ state of aff. 2 ≡ state of aff. n] interest
philosophy of language (semantics), that is, the sentence possibility-cond.
meaning identifies with the truth-conditions of sentence, and
the meaning of an expression identifies with its contribution
to the truth value of the sentence in which it appears (Tarski,
1944). [interpret.1 interpret. 2 interpret. n] context
Speaker’s intended meaning. The notion of speaker’s truth-cond. 1 truth-cond. 2 truth-cond. n
intended meaning of declarative sentences is founded on the
relation between the states of affairs in which a sentence is
true and the speaker’s preferences ordering in regard to the
states of affairs in which the sentence is true. A sentence can
be true with respect to different sets of truth-conditions, sentence
which correspond to different states of affairs. The state of Figure 1
affairs preferred by a speaker because it implies his/her goal
provides the truth-conditions which determine the speaker’s Fig.1 – The schema illustrates the notion of speaker’s
intended meaning in the specific situation of use. From this intended meaning as it is conceived here.
perspective, the determination of speaker’s intended
meaning is viewed as a selection of a state of affairs which P1 = Sentence (linguistic form and semantic conventions).
makes a sentence true (via truth conditions) and satisfies the
speaker’s interest in situation. Hence, the process of
determining speaker’s intended meaning can be explained in C = Addressee’s intended meaning (truth-cond. level).
terms of preferences ordering.
The schema in Figure 1 illustrates the notion of speaker’s
intended meaning as it is conceived here.4 At the bottom of
P2 = Belief (speaker’s interest).
the schema is a sentence which, given a context of use, has
some plausible interpretations. Each interpretation refers to
Fig. 2 – The schema illustrates the notion of addressee’s
a state of affairs which makes the sentence true: that is, it
intended meaning as it is conceived here.
refers to specific truth-conditions. The correspondence
between the state of affairs preferred by the speaker and one
of the states of affairs which make the sentence true An important aspect is that the validity of this kind of
determines the speaker’s intended meaning. In other words, inference (i.e. abduction) does not depend on logical
when the possibility-conditions of the goal’s speaker match relation between premises (as for instance the case of
indexical expressions, where the relation variable-content is
logical). More precisely, it is not necessary that the non-
3 linguistic knowledge used in P2 is accessible, that is
These notions are developed by the analysis of meaning
constrained, by the linguistic form of sentence. In other
negotiation processes in linguistic controversies provoked by
ambiguous clauses in contracts (Cruciani 2009a, 2012). words, P2 is composed of inarticulated constituents (cf.
4
The line of interest in Figure 1 represents a partial order of Récanati. 2002).
preferences, where “≥” stands for the preference relation “at least In the following, the paper presents the phenomenon of
good as”, and “≡”stands for the preference relation “equal in value semantic underdeterminacy; it introduces the speaker’s
to”, as specified in the following of the paper.
241
preferences; it presents the communicative inferences for form of ice on the surface and if there is water in the form of
explicit meaning; and in the last section it argues in favour gas in the atmosphere. The two truth conditions correspond
of the role of the speaker’s interest and beliefs’ addressee in to different states of affairs:
the communicative inferences.
a. “There is ice on the surface of Pluto”;
Semantic underdeterminacy in semantics
and pragmatics b. “There is water vapour in the atmosphere of Pluto”.
This section illustrates the phenomenon of semantic
Hence, (1) can refer to both states of affairs. This is the case
underdeterminacy, and outlines some differences between
if we consider semantic conventions, but also if we consider
semantics and pragmatics.
the text of the sentence in which the word “water” appears
Semantic underdeterminacy occurs when the conventional
and we use encyclopaedic knowledge (e.g. physical states of
meaning of a sentence used by a speaker in a specific
water).
situation, coded by semantic conventions, underdetermines
Hence, if pragmatic processes, based on non-linguistic
the proposition explicitly expressed by the utterance (Travis, contextual information, are not sufficient to determine a
1975; Searle, 1979). The question is whether conventional unique set of truth-conditions (proposition), then, in order to
meaning (obtained by linguistic conventions and rules) is determine the explicit level of communication, we can take
sufficient to provide truth-conditions or whether other items into account the speaker’s preferences for the states of
are required as well. In other words, is it sufficient to know affairs which make a sentence true.
semantic conventions and linguistic rules or do we need to
know elements of the specific situation of use? Partial ordering of state of affairs
On a semantics view, conventional meaning and a small This section introduces the notion of preference for a state
number of contextual parameters are sufficient to determine of affairs based on the comparative notions: “better than”
the truth-conditions of a sentence (cf. Stanley, 2000; (>), “equal in value to” (≡) and “at least good as” (≥) taken
Cappelen and Lepore, 2005). On a pragmatics view, from decision theory. Using this language, it is possible to
conventional meaning is not sufficient to determine a unique express the preferences of agents for states of affairs. For
set of truth-conditions (in pragmatics, semantic instance, on writing: [(sa1)>(sa2)]Ag, we assert that an agent
underdeterminacy is considered pervasive of all language). prefers the state of affairs 1 rather than the state of affairs 2
Hence, we need information on the context of use to (see Fig. 1).5
complete the conventional meaning and to determine the Decisions theorists assume that an agent rationally
truth-conditions. This information consists of shared chooses an option if the set of options realizes certain
knowledge (encyclopaedic and local), the discourse or properties: ordering, continuity, independence (Myerson,
sentence in which an expression is used, and elements of the 1991). For the purposes of the paper, it is sufficient to
physical surroundings (cf. Récanati, 2004; Stalnaker, 2014). consider the property of ordering, which concerns
Specifically, the paper deals with the problem of intended completeness and transitivity.
meaning when a number of interpretations are all plausible Completeness for weak preference is defined as follows6:
in the same combination of contexts, and not with the
problem of whether there is a need for non-linguistic the relation ≥ is complete if and only if for any
information to fix a unique set of truth conditions, there is a elements a and b of its domain, either a ≥ b or b ≥ a.
need.
Transitivity for weak preference is defined as follows:
The example in the following can shed light on this point.
The issue is the following: the conventional meaning of a
the relation ≥ is transitive if and only if it holds for
sentence, even without indexical expressions, and structural all elements a, b and c of its domain, so that if a ≥ b
and lexical ambiguity, actually underdetermines the and b ≥ c, then a ≥ c.
proposition expressed by the sentence. And even with the
additional pragmatic contribution of relevant contextual These properties ensure that an agent is able to compare
information, it is not always possible to fix a unique some options coherently with his/her own interest.
proposition. The sentence is as follows: However, it is possible that an agent is not always able to
compare all options clearly, but this does not prevent
(1) “There is water on Pluto”. him/her from choosing coherently with his/her own interest.
Hence, in order to consider an agent’s choice coherent with
I do not know whether there is water on Pluto, but I his/her interest, it is sufficient that s/he is able to determine
understand the sentence because I am able to imagine the
ways in which there might be water on Pluto: for example,
in the form of ice on the planet’s surface or in the form of 5
An agent’s preference can be also expressed via utility
gas in its atmosphere. Consequently, sentence (1) can have function. For a set of options S, a utility function f maps each
at least two interpretations (two different sets of truth- option onto R. The utility function gives rise to a preference
conditions), that is, it can be true both if there is water in the relation “>” on S. For instance, (sa1)>(sa2) if only if f(sa1)>f(sa2).
6
Analogously we can define the relations “>” and “≡”.
242
the best state of affairs among others without necessarily high humidity alongside rivers (encyclopedic knowledge),
ordering the other states of affairs. to determine the ways in which there is water on the bank.
Knowing the partial ordering is a condition required by The two possible inferences are as follows:
the speaker and the addressee because communication takes
place successfully. P1: “The bank is wet”
P2: Yesterday it rained alongside the river
Inference of explicit meaning -----------------------------------------------------------------
This section illustrates the type of communicative inferences C: “There is water on grass, etc. alongside the river”.
considered here, that is, non-demonstrative inferences7.
They are structured as follows: P1: “The bank is wet”
P2: Generally there is high humidity alongside rivers
P1: Form and semantic conventions -----------------------------------------------------------------
P2: Contextual information C: “There is high humidity alongside the river”.
--------------------------------------------
C: Explicit meaning The inferential processes involved in the determination of
meaning of (2) are those of selection of ambiguity and
Consider the following sentence: enrichment of truth-conditions. In (2) we can infer an
interpretation of the word “bank” on the basis of contextual
(2) “The bank is wet”. information directly perceived from the physical
surroundings, and consequently we can infer an
In (2) the meaning of the word “bank” is not determined, it interpretation of the word “wet” on the basis of local or
can mean a financial institute or land alongside a river. In encyclopedic knowledge.
cases of this kind, non-linguistic context provides I would stress that the validity of inference does not
information with which to select a plausible interpretation. depend on logical relations between premises, that is, it is
For example, on the one hand, if (2) is produced by a not necessary for communication that the non-linguistic
speaker close to an angler who is about to fish, then “bank” information used in the second premise be made available
plausibly refers to the land alongside a river and (2) by, or constrained to, linguistic form of expression.
plausibly means that alongside the river there is high
humidity; on the other hand, if the speaker is near to the Interest and belief in communicative inferences
doors of a financial institute, then the word “bank” plausibly
This section discusses the process of determining the
refers to the institute and (2) plausibly means that the floor
of the financial institute has just been washed. In both cases intended meaning of an utterance. It argues in favour of the
the non-linguistic information is directly perceived from role of the speaker’s interests and the addressee’s belief
physical surroundings (i.e. the angler and the financial concerning the speaker’s interests. The inference in question
institute). Hence, the meaning of (2) is obtained through an has a premise which consists of information about the form
inference composed of two premises: sentence (2) (semantic and the semantic conventions associated with the sentence
conventions applied to the linguistic form) and the (which admits to several semantically plausible
contextual information in which (2) is produced; the interpretations). The other premise consists of the content of
conclusion consists of a unique proposition. The two the addressee’s belief about the speaker’s interest in the
possible inferences are as follows: situation, i.e. it regards the state of affairs preferred by the
speaker (insofar as it exhibits the possibility conditions of
P1:“The bank is wet” his/her goal). The conclusion consists of a unique
P2: Direct perception of the financial institute proposition, the one explicitly expressed by the speaker with
------------------------------------------------------------- the utterance. Or, as in the case that follows, it consists of a
C:“The floor of the financial institute has just been washed”. part of the proposition that contributes, as the premise of
another inference, to determination of the utterance’s overall
P1: “The bank is wet” meaning. Consider the following sentence taken from the
P2: Direct perception of the angler pragmatics literature (Carston, 2007).
-------------------------------------------------------------
C: “There is high humidity alongside the river”. (3) “I’m going to the bank now to get some cash”.
Consider (2) produced by a speaker close to angler about to At first glance, here the interpretative problem consists in
fish: the word “wet” can refer to both high humidity and identifying a referent for the word “bank” (‘financial
water on grass, rocks, etc. Here the form or the way in institution’ or ‘river side’). Let us base our interpretation on
which water is on the bank is not determined. We need the approach of Récanati’s Truth-conditional pragmatics. In
further information: for instance, yesterday it rained this case it would be plausible to assume that the referent
alongside the river (local knowledge); or generally there is ‘financial institution’ is assigned to the word “bank”
7
because it is associated with the concept ‘cash’ triggered by
See Wilson and Sperber (2012) on the communicative inferences the word “cash”, or because it is associated with the
in Relevant Theory.
243
stereotypical representation ‘getting money from a bank’ (or
with both). This association is made possible by the In interpretation of (3), the shared knowledge of the
discourse (or linguistic) context, i.e. the part of the sentence speaker’s interest enables determination of the meaning of
in which the expression “to get some cash” appears, and by the expression “to get some cash” (‘sell fish’) which then
the shared encyclopaedic knowledge that, in general, money allows assign of the reference for the word “bank” (‘river
is withdrawn from banks.8 But this is not necessarily the side’). Hence, the interest (via enrichment) has determined
intended interpretation, even though it is the most (i) the contribution of the expression “to get some cash” to
immediate one. the truth-conditions of the sentence, and accordingly (ii) the
Consider the case in which (3) is uttered by an angler who is relevant linguistic context for disambiguation of “bank” in
going fishing and who intends to sell the fish that he the specific situation.
catches. In this case, the encyclopaedic knowledge that Finally, an important characterization of the
money is withdrawn from banks is not relevant, but nor is communication model is as follows. If we believe that
the local knowledge that the speaker is a ‘professional’ knowledge of the speaker’s interests is used in the premise
fisherman able to disambiguate the word “bank” (because of the addressee’s inference, then we admit that the meta-
also fishermen go to the bank). Instead, if we know the representational capacities have a role in explicit
speaker’s interests – for example, that he intends to sell the communication (i.e. in the determination of propositional
fish that he catches in order to earn money, or that he content). We therefore assume that, although this process
intends to withdraw money in order to go shopping – then often is automatic, it is conscious. Hence, in principle, the
we are able to identify the intended referent in both the addressee can at any time justify, with respect to (3), the
former and the latter case. We are able to do so on the basis assignment of reference to the word “bank” or
of the knowledge shared between speaker and addressee determination of modes in which “to get some cash.”
about the speaker’s interest, and not on the basis of
conceptual associations produced by the addressee. If this is Conclusion
how matters stand, then it is plausible that the speaker’s The paper has outlined a model of explicit communication
interests and goals render the communicative models more for declarative sentences. Its elements are: the meaning as
flexible and generalizable, and therefore preferable to truth-conditions, inferential process, the speaker’s interest as
‘mechanistic’ models – or at least to more rigid ones based a state of affairs preferred by the speaker because it implies
on conceptual frames and schemata activated by the his/her goal; the partial ordering of states of affairs; and the
addressee and presumed shared assumptions. addressee’s belief about speaker’s interest. Its arguments
Presented below is the scheme of the inferential process are: the communicative intentions that trigger the
whereby the addressee determines the meaning of (3): information of the pragmatic context often are not sufficient
to select the speaker’s intended meaning among some
“I’m going to the bank1,2 now to get some cash”. contextually plausible meanings (pars destruens), and thus
it is necessary to take into account the partial order of
preferences to determine the speaker’s intended meaning
I’m going to the bank1,2 now to get some cash [fishing and selling (pars consrtuens). Its related notions are: ‘what is said’,
fish]”. which refers to the explicit level of communication and is
based on truth-theoretic machinery which delivers truth-
conditions (Récanati, 2010). Nevertheless, the model differs
Speaker’s interest:
from the Truth-conditional Pragmatics because it comprises
‘fishing and selling fish’. the communicative inferences also for explicit meaning, and
“I’m going to the river side now to get some cash it considers very relevant the active role of addressee in
fishing and selling fish”. communication, as the case of explicature in Relevant
Theory (Wilson and Sperber, 2012).9
In summary, the speaker intends the meaning that
maximizes his/her interest in situation, and the addressee
Linguistic context: ‘to get some cash [fishing and selling fish]’. infers the meaning on the basis of his/her belief about the
speaker’s partial order of preferences. When the addressee
Figure 3 – Inferential steps in determination of the meaning has a true belief about the partial order of preferences, we
of (3). have shared intended meaning, that is, a real
8
communication.
Following the same interpretation procedure, if at the beginning
of utterance (3) the word “bank” is understood by the addressee in Acknowledgements
the sense of ‘river side’, because for some reason the latter concept
Very special thanks to Sonia Guglielminetti.
is more activated and available to the addressee than ‘financial
institution’, it is likely that the word “cash” in the continuation of
the sentence will trigger the concept ‘cash’, which is associated
9
with the concept of ‘financial institution’, thus aligning the Rècanati uses “ascertaining” rather than "determination" with
communication with the speaker’s intentions (accessibility shift) regard to the role of addressee in the process of determination of
(see Recanati 2004a; Carston 2007). meaning.
244
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