=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-1419/paper0043
|storemode=property
|title=How do We Understand other Humans?
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1419/paper0043.pdf
|volume=Vol-1419
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/eapcogsci/Newen15
}}
==How do We Understand other Humans?==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1419/paper0043.pdf
How do we understand other humans?
Albert Newen (albert.newen@rub.de)
Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Universitätsstr. 150 44801 Bochum
Abstract strategy, Theory-Theory insists that the prior information
In last two decades we had an intense discussion about which
we have about others is organized as a folk-psychological
theory best describes how we understand other human beings. theory. Concerning their main claims, these accounts are not
I will argue that neither Simulation Theory nor Theory- in opposition. The opposition only becomes visible if for
Theory nor Interaction-Theory do offer us an adequate each account we consider their favoured answer to the
analysis. Despite the fact that they highlight some relevant complementary question. The classic opposition between
aspects, the generalization made by each theory cannot do ST and TT can then be described as follows: TT claims that
justice to the varieties of social understanding we can actually the epistemic strategy is to rely on theory-based inferences,
observe. Thus, we need an alternative theory. I suggest the
person model theory as an alternative and will defend it by and that the prior information is organized as a folk-
distinguishing two question which we need to distinguish in psychological theory; whiles ST claims that the epistemic
the debate: 1. which epistemic strategy do we use to register strategy is to put oneself into the other person’s shoes which
the others’ mental state: simulation, theory-based inferences, draws only on my own experience as the basis of data for
interaction or direct perception? I argue for a multiplicity simulation, leaving it open as to whether these data form a
view that we in fact to use all these strategies depending on theory.
the context (Newen 2015). But the focus of this paper is
In this paper I would like to put aside the question about the
question 2: How is prior information – that we usually rely on
when understanding others – stored and organized: in form of epistemic strategy we use to understand others and focus on
a folk psychological theory or as narratives? My answer is the question of how the prior information is organized
that we essentially rely on person models to understand which we usually rely on to understand others. I think that
others. Person models can be implicitly represented (person we can deliver a much better theory of understanding others
schema) or explicitly available (person image). A person if we focus on the organization of prior information shaping
schema is an implicitly represented unity of sensory-motor our understanding of others, especially since I argued
abilities and basic mental phenomena related to one human
being (or a group of humans). We also develop person images
elsewhere that we actually use a multiplicity of epistemic
while this is a unity of explicitly registered mental and strategies to understand others depending on the context
physical phenomena related to one human being (or a group). (Newen 2015). If the latter is true, the opposition of the
My aim is to show that the person model theory is more classical theories is no longer existent. But the new focus
powerful than the alternative candidates. has been ignored with important consequences. So far
Keywords: person model; person image; person schema; almost all examples of understanding others where
understanding others; simulation theory; Theory-Theory; described in a way that we observe another human being
interaction theory; whom we do not know and thus we do not rely on any
background knowledge of this person. But very often we
Introduction: Two central questions1 actually deal with persons we know quite well and
The question “How do we understand other human furthermore, even when we understand unknown persons
beings?” has to be divided into two subquestions, the first of we heavily rely on background information about types of
which is: What epistemic strategy do we adopt to register or persons (e.g. students, manager) we have intense experience
assess the other’s cognitive states? To reach any kind of with. None of the theories suggested so far, does take this
assessment of the other we need to obtain information dimension into account, or if so, then only marginally. The
within a concrete situation. The second question is: Once person model theory is proposed to change this situation.
obtained, how is this prior information stored and
organized? This second aspect is important, because we
always rely on prior background knowledge in our The organization of relevant background
assessments of others. One main defect of the debate thus knowledge about others
far has turns on the failure to distinguish these two Most of the time, we are interacting with people about
questions. The debate between the two classic positions whom we have a lot of background knowledge—family
simulation theory (ST) and Theory-Theory (TT) can members, colleagues, friends, etc. Furthermore, we have
roughly be described as a misunderstanding stemming from background knowledge about the general needs of human
their dealing with different questions: while ST insists that beings, the special needs of students, homeless people, etc.
the use of a simulation strategy is the standard epistemic It seems clear that we are essentially relying on this type of
knowledge when we understand others. There may be very
1
Main parts are taken form Newen 2015 while the theory will short period as a newborn baby when we start from scratch,
be developed further.
282
armed only with certain inborn minimal mechanisms such presuppose linguistic representations, it remains highly
as neonate imitation. Even the social smile developed with questionable whether basic cases of faced-based recognition
two months is dependent on external stimulation and can be characterized as a systematically interconnected set
learning processes, and babies very quickly start to react of beliefs. The standard descriptions of face-based
selectively towards familiar and foreign individuals. They recognition of emotion (e.g., Goldman, 2006) highlight the
also expect a typical behavioural interactive pattern from the relevance of mirror neuron mechanisms and characterize the
caregiver. If a mother stops reacting intuitively through underlying mechanism as a rather basic and partially
normal facial expressions and gestures, and instead reacts independent pattern-recognition processes, and thus as not
with a “still face,” then the baby quickly starts to cry (Bertin forming a theory. A defect in recognizing fear does not
& Striano, 2006; Nagy, 2008). The baby is irritated by the automatically lead to a defect in recognizing other basic
unexpected pattern of reaction. How, then, are all these emotions like happiness or sadness. (ii) A more promising
different types of background information about the other move is to claim that the folk-psychological theory is
organized and used in social understanding? learned (Gopnik, 1993). This view is compatible with some
basic processes of understanding which do not yet form a
Are we organizing our prior knowledge in folk- theory, but are developed into one as they are integrated step
psychological theories? by step into a systematically organized body of knowledge.
The question of whether we are organizing our knowledge This is a plausible and to some extent empirically grounded
according to folk-psychological theories has received a view (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, Newen & Vogeley 2003).
number of different answers. According to TT, this is One shortcoming of this view, however, is that its
exactly what happens. In understanding others we are proponents tend to appeal to examples which have a strong
relying on folk psychological rules such as: ‘If she desires focus on general folk-psychological rules, such as: ‘All
an ice-cream and she believes that she can get one with her humans need to drink, thus if someone picks up a glass in
money at the cafeteria, then she will go to the cafeteria.’ No the kitchen, he intends to pour in some liquid to drink’. This
doubt folk psychological rules, organized according to a neglects a very important phenomenon: namely that we
belief–desire psychology, are an important instrument for mostly interact not with complete strangers but with persons
understanding others; but they are by no means the only we know at least partly and often very well. For example, if
one. Often it is sufficient to know the conventions in a Michael observes his son in the kitchen grasping a glass he
society to understand what someone is doing and will do does not appeal to the folk-psychological rule at all, since he
next, e.g., if someone is in Japan and he enters a restaurant, knows that his son—despite his education—still only drinks
he will first take off his shoes, then take a seat, and then will from a bottle when at home, and that if he takes up a glass it
be asked to order. So, seeing someone entering a restaurant is just because he wants to use it as part of his training in
who looks like a guest (and not a waiter) allows us to expect magic tricks. This already indicates that all theories
a specific conventionally regulated sequence of behaviour. canvassed thus far have a blind spot: so far it seems simply
If one has a liberal notion of folk-psychological theory, then to have been neglected that we rely extensively on
we may add such behavioural conventions into that theory. knowledge of properties of individuals, which is organized
But even then the question remains whether our as belonging to one specific individual (the son, the partner
understanding of others always relies on knowledge etc.) or to a group (e.g., students, manager). The general
organized as a folk-psychological theory. A counterexample worry concerning the organization of the knowledge
can be proposed by reference to cases of basic intuitive according to TT can also be expressed as follows: How we
understanding: e.g., the still-face reaction by the caregiver, are able to apply a general theory of typically human
instead of a typical smiling facial expression and gestural features in a specific social situation? If we want to integrate
response, makes the baby start to cry (as we saw above). our prior background knowledge of persons as individuals
There is thus an intuitive recognition of basic emotions like or as belonging to a group, e.g., a profession, then we can
fear, anger, happiness, or sadness. This may rely on inborn characterize the organization of this knowledge as person
emotion recognition mechanisms, or ones learned very models. Person models of individuals and groups are by far
early, which may be evolutionarily anchored, since the most important source of understanding others, I will
recognizing such basic emotions is essential for survival argue, and since they involve specific knowledge, they are
(Griffiths, 1997; Panksepp, 2005). There are two ways in the natural candidate to enable adequate deployment of
which the counterexample might be blocked: (i) It could be more general knowledge of human psychology in concrete
maintained that some folk-psychological theories are inborn everyday situations. It remains to be discussed, then,
(Baron-Cohen, 1995) and that intuitive understanding such whether person models have the status of a folk-
as face-based recognition of emotion already involves a psychological theory or not. To adumbrate my line of
theoretical package. The problem with this line of reasoning argument: no doubt some elaborate person models are
is that the notion of theory, stretched that far, starts to look clearly systematically interconnected sets of beliefs, but not
very implausible. A theory is a constituted by a minimal all of them have to be, because some person models only
package of systematically interconnected beliefs; and even involve very sparse and basic properties which are not
if a belief is understood in a liberal way such that it does not highly interconnected.
283
The Person Model Theory Thus, a person image is the unity of rather easily and
explicitly available information about a person, including
the person’s mental setting. Both person schemata and
Before expounding the new account, let me highlight two
person images can be developed for an individual, e.g.,
main criteria of adequacy of any plausible candidate theory
one’s mother, brother, best friend, etc., as well as for groups
and some open questions. (i) It should account for two
of people, e.g., medical doctors, homeless people, managers,
levels of understanding others, namely intuitive
etc.. Furthermore, person models are created for other
understanding and inference-based understanding. This was
people but also for oneself. In the case of modelling oneself
first clearly discussed by Gallagher (2001), while Goldman
we can speak of a self-model which we develop implicitly
(2006) described it in his distinction between low-level and
as a self schema and explicitly as a self image. Thus, we
high-level mindreading. What, we may then ask, would be
have a variety of person models.
an adequate way to establish this distinction? (ii) We
Person models are characterized here as memorized units
learned from Gallagher (2005) that we should distinguish
of person features ignoring the difference between long-
understanding others by observation from understanding by
term or short-term memorization. Person models are
interaction.
distinguished from the result of understanding in a situation,
There are also a number of open research questions that
which may be either a person impression mainly relying on
can potentially be answered when developing the alternative
person schemata, or a person judgment mainly relying on
account: (a) What is the relation between understanding
person images. Let me illustrate a clear virtue of adopting
oneself and understanding others? Here the ST claims that
the distinction between person schema and person image by
understanding oneself is the basis for all understanding of
reference to the fact that it can account for the difference
others, while TT is neutral; Carruthers, for example, has
between intuitive understanding and inference-based
famously argued that understanding others is the source of
understanding of others.
our self-understanding (Carruthers, 2009). (b) What is the
relation between understanding persons and understanding
Person schemata
objects or situations? (c) How can we best account for the
difference between understanding a well-known person, on In detail, then, what are person schemata? A person
the one hand, and a complete stranger, on the other? schema is an intuitively formed, implicit model of a person;
The alternative theory, which promises to deal with these it is a memorized unity of characteristic features of a person
open questions, is the person model theory. The central including facial features and expression, voice, moving
claim is that we organize our prior knowledge used to pattern, body posture, gestures, and other perceivable
understand others in person models, and that accounting for features of a person. The function of clustering these
our way of using person models is the most informative features is to allow us to evaluate a person very quickly in a
factor for analyzing our everyday understanding of others. A situation according to evolutionarily important aspects: is
person model is a unity of properties or features which we she familiar, dangerous, aggressive, helpful, attractive? The
represent in memory as belonging to one person or a group evaluation is either expressed in a type of interaction, or it
(resp. type) of persons. To account for the difference can simply be memorized in an implicit unitary structure for
between two types of understanding others (intuitive versus future retrieval, including recognizing the person and
inference-based understanding), I suggest that there are two activating the former evaluation. The main access to others
types of person models in use: implicit person models, in everyday life is perceiving a person and forming an
which are called person schemata; and explicit person impression (see the review by Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010).
models, which are called person images. Very early in life To form a person impression, (i) we typically pick up these
we develop person schemata: a person schema is an implicit basic features by means of a quick look, even when seeing a
person model and can typically be described as a unity of person for the first time, where (ii) most features are directly
sensory-motor abilities and basic mental phenomena associated with socially relevant information, and (iii) they
realized by basic representations and associated with one are clustered at the level of perceiving the whole person. Let
human being (or a group of humans), where the schema me offer some support for all three characteristics of the
functions typically without any explicit considerations and process of forming a person impression in a situation which
is activated when directly seeing or interacting online with is memorized as a person schema:
another person. A person schema is thus the unity of (i) Quick evaluation even with parsimonious information:
implicitly available information about a person which is Evaluations of threat (which is of strong evolutionary
thus not easily accessible to report but is normally used in a relevance) can be made on the basis of an exposure to an
situation. In other words, a person schema is the basic unit unfamiliar face lasting as little as 39 ms (Bar, Neta, & Linz,
that enables a know how for dealing with another human 2006). If the exposure to the unfamiliar face lasts about 100
being relying on social perception and interaction. Person ms, we are able to evaluate likeability, trustworthiness,
schemata can be developed step by step into person images. competence, and aggressiveness with subjective reliability
A person image is a unity of explicitly represented and levels that are similar to those generated under longer
typically consciously available mental and physical viewing times (Willis & Todorov, 2006).
phenomena related to a human being (or a group of people).
284
(ii) Most features are associated with socially relevant Arabic Emirates), Germany, and the United States; and the
information: looking into the face is a very rich source of test subjects were also drawn from all three countries. With
information about a person. Between 3 and 7 months of age, the wooden puppet version, it was shown that we can
infants learn to recognize the face of the mother and to determine whether the people in the scene are nervous or
distinguish it from faces of strangers, and they start to not, as well as the dominance relation, i.e., we can see who
categorize people according to emotional expression and sex is the boss. This is an interculturally shared social
(Nelson, 2001). One important source of information which understanding of otherwise culturally variable cues of body
children use from 4 months onwards is the gaze direction of posture and gesture (since US students moved a lot while
a person, it having been shown that they can distinguish a UAE students moved rarely). We can also perceive the level
direct from an averted gaze (Vecera & Johnson, 1995). of friendliness in the interaction, although we are good at
Starting from 9 months infants learn to register the joint this only for our own culture. Furthermore, there are many
attention of the infant and an adult as directed towards an more complex culture-dependent visual features that we use
object (Cleveland & Striano, 2007). Thus, on the basis of for evaluating the other—e.g., physical attractiveness, where
gaze interaction they evaluate whether joint attention attractive people are evaluated as possessing more desirable
towards an object has been established or not, and learn to characteristics than their less attractive counterparts, a
direct the attention of the other if necessary (Tomasello, phenomenon that has been labelled the beauty-is-good
1999). Between the ages of 9 and 18 months, children start stereotype (Dion et al., 1972). These kinds of stereotypes
to use gaze information to register the goal of the action of are especially connected with racial classifications: African
the other human: they attend immediately to the eyes when Americans are stereotypically assumed to be lazy, criminal,
the intentions of an actor are ambiguous (Phillips, Baron- and uneducated, but also musical and athletic (Devine &
Cohen & Rutter, 1992). Elliot, 1995), whereas Asian Americans are considered to be
Let me now pick out some results based on studies of intelligent, industrious, conservative, and shy (Lin et al.,
adults which illustrate the informational value of single 2005). Most observers in our culture assume that people
cues. To start with the facial expression: in emotion with stylish hair and extravagant clothing are highly
recognition, highly informative features include knitted extraverted (Borkenau and Liebler 1992). We live with a lot
eyebrows for sadness, a smile for happiness, and a frown for of these deeply culturally anchored stereotypes, and they are
anger (Ekman 1972; Ekman 1999). To prevent this remark often applied without the perceivers’ intention or conscious
giving the wrong impression, I here highlight some awareness (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). This last aspect
individual features and will argue in the next step that they points towards the third aspect of person schemata. They are
are part of an integrated view at the level of persons. Salient unities of characteristic features integrated at the level of
biological visual markers allow us to easily identify the “big persons. All these singular features are integrated into
three” categories in person perception (Brewer, 1988; Fiske person models which enable us to develop detailed and
& Neuberg, 1990), i.e., sex, race, and age. In the same way, extensive expectations of behaviour.
we can illustrate the high informativeness of single features (iii) Integration of characteristic features at the level of
such as body posture: if the other is bending her head in a perceiving the whole person: Although I have presented
communicative context, this is unconsciously registered as evidence that some single features are very salient for
signalling sympathy (Frey, 1999). One important data transferring social information, there is also much evidence
source here is biological motion detection as investigated by that these features are normally combined with a variety of
point light studies. If a person has lights on hands, feet, and others to form an integrated impression of a person which I
ankles, and some other significant parts of the body, we can call a person schema. We have seen evidence for the key
videotape his bodily movement in the dark. Such artificial role of gaze detection in registering another person’s
pure biological movement information allows us to register direction of attention (see ii). But there is further evidence
social features, e.g., we can recognize emotions (Ambady & that gaze alone is not the critical information; we actually
Rosenthal, 1992) and attribute personality features seem to rely on an integrated evaluation on the basis of
(Heberlein et al. 2004) on the basis of seeing dynamic perceiving gaze, head, and body position (Frischen et al,
movements alone. Furthermore, there is evidence that social 2007). The same holds for the evaluation of the basic
information can be taken from the combination of gesture features sex, race, and age. Although isolated facial features
and body posture alone. In an intercultural study (Bente et are often sufficient to determine a person’s sex, research has
al. 2010), a real interaction between a boss and an employee indicated that sex categorization is based on the integration
(played by two students of one type of culture) was of several features (Baudoin & Humphreys, 2006; Bruce et
videotaped for a short period. From the real interaction, all al., 1993; Schyns et al., 2002). Concerning face, the best
the information was taken away except gesture and body available theory of face recognition seems to be Haxby’s
posture. The question to be addressed was, what can we account (Haxby et al., 2000), according to which there are
read from seeing body postures and gestures of idealized two distinguishable processes, one leading to face
wooden puppets representing the real interaction, abstracted identification by focussing more on invariant core features,
from facial information, speech, clothing, etc. The and the other leading to registering the facial expression by
interactions were filmed with students from UAE (United relying on varying features. Furthermore, there is evidence
285
that there are two different neural circuits for face arrangement with. We often have explicit beliefs about
perception and body perception (see the review by Macrae medical doctors, managers, secretaries, handicrafts men,
& Quadflieg, 2010), both playing a core part in registering etc., and we try to deploy these beliefs to deal with them in
face or body identity, and playing an extended part in a smooth and efficient way. When we have stored a person
registering face or body expression in a given situation. And image in memory, and are placed in a new situation in
the integration processes do not stop at this level. Since we which we see and recognize the person, there is evidence
know that information about facial and bodily features is that we immediately activate the biographical knowledge
integrated, e.g., in the evaluation of the emotional we have available. For example, when test persons had to
expression, we can therefore characterize a sequence of judge the traits of target individuals from photographs, the
integration processes as leading finally to a person test persons’ responses continue to be influenced by what
impression in a situation, which may be stored as a person they have explicitly learned about them (Uleman et al,
schema in memory. 2005). A recent neuroimaging study (Hassabis et al., 2013)
indicated that when test persons had to predict the behaviour
Person Images of persons, they relied essentially on prior knowledge of
What is a person image? A person image is a unity of personality traits, which in this study were implemented in
relatively easily and explicitly available information about a two ways, namely as agreeableness (the tendency toward
person including her mind set. On the basis of typically altruism, cooperation, and the valuing of harmony in
implicit person schemata, young children learn to develop interpersonal relationships as opposed to antisocial and
explicit person images. These are models of individual exploitative behaviours) and as extraversion (in contrast to
subjects or groups. In the case of individual subjects, they introversion). The test person became acquainted with four
may include names, descriptions, stories, whole biographies, types of personalities which result from the combinations of
and visual images highlighting both mental and physical high and low versions of agreeableness, on the one hand,
dispositions as well as episodes. Person images are and high and low versions of extraversion, on the other. In
essentially developed not only by observations but also by the test situation they had to predict the behaviour of four
telling, exchanging, and creating stories (or ‘narratives’).2 specific persons who were exemplars of the four personality
Person images presuppose the capacity to explicitly types. The authors report that the predictions of the
distinguish the representation of my own mental and behaviour are mainly based on the personality traits and that
physical phenomena from the representation of someone the latter had also rather clear neural correlates: by using
else’s mental and physical phenomena. This ability develops fMRI the authors showed that there is a neural correlate for
gradually, reaching a major and important stage when recognizing (and imagining) high agreeableness (in contrast
children acquire the so-called explicit theory-of-mind ability to low), namely left LTC and dorsal mPFC, as well as for
(operationalized by the false-belief task, see Wimmer & recognizing (and imagining) high extraversion (in contrast
Perner, 1983). Then they are able to construct explicit to low), namely pCC; in addition the recognition (and
person images by characterizing a person such that they imagination) of one of the four personality types was
attribute a biography to an individual. There is strong folk- correlated with four distinctive patterns in the anterior
psychological evidence that we have explicit person models medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). In line with my proposal,
of the people we deal with extensively, e.g., family the authors of the fMRI study wrote: Different patterns of
members, and people about whom we tend to have a lot of activation in the anterior mPFC could reliably distinguish
explicit knowledge. The same is true for relevant groups of between the different people whose behavior was being
persons we deal with often. Even in professional contexts imagined. It is hypothesized that this region is responsible
this leads to judgments which can be inadequate: wearing for assembling and updating personality models (Hassabis
revealing clothes, a signal of apparent immodesty and et al., 2013). Since the study was based on explicit
promiscuity, has been shown to cause not only laypeople evaluation of personality features or types, I take this to be
but also police officers and judges to hold victims of rape to support for the existence of person images.
be responsible for their having been assaulted (Lennon,
Johnson, & Schulz, 1999). It is an essential part of Person Models and Object Files
becoming an adult to learn to interact socially with other Further support is coming with the idea that person models
humans, by developing sophisticated and explicit person are just a special case of memorized and reactivated objects
images of the groups of professions we have to find an files, i.e. object files of human beings. We have an extended
literature on object files (e.g. Noles et al., 2005) and it is
2 very plausible that we do not change our recognition system
This is the aspect of the narrative approach to if we change from object recognition to person recognition,
understanding other minds (e.g., Hutto, 2008). But e.g. my evaluation of an object can be adjusted as the object
narratives are only one method for establishing a person looms closer as expressed in the familiar phrase, “It’s a bird!
model. Representatives of a pure narrative approach It’s a plane! Superman!” (Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs,
underestimate the importance of other sources, such as 1992). This will be unfolded.
perceptions, feelings, interactions, etc., which often do not
involve narratives.
286
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