An Eco-Cognitive Model of Ignorance Immunization Selene Arfini (selene.arfini@unich.it) Department of Philosophy, Education and Economical-quantitative Sciences, University of Chieti and Pescara Chieti-Pescara, 66013 Italy Lorenzo Magnani (lmagnani@unipv.it) Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section Computational Philosophy Laboratory, University of Pavia Pavia, 27100 Italy Abstract enough of the time to survive and prosper (Woods, 2013, pp. 86–88). In 2005, Woods described the epistemic bubble as an immu- nized state of human cognition that compromises the aware- ness of the agent about her beliefs and knowledge. The idea of In this perspective the presentation of the “right enough an immunized knower swung with the proposal advanced by human being” is referred to the study of the cognitive endow- Gabbay and Woods of constructing a practical logic and epis- ments of an “actual” agent, mostly focusing on her knowl- temology, which can actually define itself as agent-centered, goal-oriented, and resource-bound. In order to carry out this edge and cognitive skills. The “ignorant” part is basically project, in this paper we will introduce a symmetrical view on described as an innocent tendency to commit errors (even if the agent immunization, focused on the agent’s missing aware- lots of them) or treated in the light of fallacious reasoning. ness of her ignorance, also highlighting the importance of con- sidering the actual agent as cogently ignorant, too. We contend, following Proctor, that “ignorance is more than Keywords: Informal Logic; Belief-Revision; Bounded Ratio- a void” (Proctor, 2005, p. 2), it is an influential part of hu- nality; Fallibilism; Ignorance; Epistemic Autoimmunity man cognition, and affects not only our deficiencies but also the ways we adopt to fill them with beliefs and knowledge.2 Introducing Ignorance into the Naturalization Thus, aiming at furnishing a new contribution to the ambi- of Logic tious project of the naturalization of logic, we will introduce an explanation of the role played by the ignorant part of the In 2003 Gabbay and Woods officially proposed a program, “real agent”. First of all, by analyzing the state that most indi- condensed in a series of volumes called “A Practical Logic of cates the presence of ignorance in the perspective of the agent Cognitive Systems”, to the aim of constructing new logical herself, that is “the state of doubt” and, second, by showing models able to fill the gap between the logical and cognitive how this state affects the Fallibilist principles (which are the representation of human agent and its “real” – eco-cognitive base of the Abundance and the Enough Already Thesis) pro- multi-dimensioned – counterpart. The last volume of the se- posed by Woods. ries, published in 2013, was aimed at drawing an empirically “sensitive” and “aware” form of logic, able to deal with ac- The Visible Part of Ignorance: Peirce’s Irritation of tual reasoners’ cognitive performances (Woods, 2013). At the Doubt same time the volume is a collection of the logical and cog- Despite the topic of “doubt” undeniably holds a rich past in nitive studies concerning errors in reasoning and their pro- the history of philosophy, the interest around it in the last cen- ductive character.1 In this massive production, even if the fo- tury has progressively decreased mainly because of the focus cus has been on the third-way reasoning humans actually per- of analytical philosophy on the definitions of knowledge and forms, especially the exploitation of errors and downfalls, the truth. Many authors became more interested in specifying agent is always considered an enough acquainted reasoner, a the visible boundaries that characterize certainty than in di- knower, in her intents. The principles of her possibilities and rectly examining the nucleus of what is beyond it. Attention boundaries are determined by general abundance theses that has been devoted to intertwine doubt with specific arguments substantiate a form of fallibilism: such as ambiguity, vagueness, and credibility. Proposition 3.2b The Cognitive Abundance Thesis: Hu- On the contrary, the philosophical background that in- man beings have knowledge, lots of it. forms the Naturalization of Logic resorts to Peircean tra- dition: Peirce directly examined the problem of doubt and Proposition 3.2c The Error Abundance Thesis: Human tried to grasp its philosophical, epistemological, and cogni- beings make errors, lots of them. 2 Certainly fallacies and heuristics have always been considered Proposition 3.2d The Enough Already Thesis. Human the main door to step into the problem of “ignorance”, see, for in- beings are right enough about enough of the right things stance the classical (Hamblin, 1970; Walton, 1995; Woods, Irvine, & Walton, 2004) or the analysis of the so-called ignorance-preserving 1 Cf. the other volumes of the series (Gabbay & Woods, 2003, traits of abduction (Cf. (Aliseda, 2005), (Magnani, 2013) and 2005). (Gabbay & Woods, 2005)) 312 tive essence. Indeed, in Peirce’s pragmatist theory, the spe- a habit” (Peirce, 1998a, 5.397).3 Thanks to this scheme re- cific difference between doubt and belief is practical. He join and further deepen the main tenets of Woods’ fallibilism pictured the transition between the state of doubt to belief indicated in the previous subsection. in terms of action and reaction of the agent who feels them. The awareness of our belief state (that is, according to both The relationship of the mental state of doubt with the active Peirce and Woods, the only state that allows us “to know”) start of questioning and of the state of belief with the relief of obviously is what makes us able to define ourselves “know- the discovery of an answer is fundamental. It allows to clarify ers”. In this perspective, the tendency to knowledge indicated the profound connection between the epistemic conditions of by Woods in the proposition 3.2b is just a consequence of the the agent and her cognitive reaction to them. In accordance awareness of how much we believe we know and how much to this view, the main incentive that drives the agent to find we are able to learn. The second feature, the capacity of be- a solution of the problems that torment her is the cognitive lief to appease “the irritation of doubt” is at the basis of the and psychological state related to the doubt itself: in par- “Error Abundance” thesis, which composes the second item ticular, the known difference between the feelings that doubt of Woods’ fallibilism. Believing is a pleasurable state, a state and belief provoke. In a famous article, Peirce described the that calms the agent and gives her the cognitive resources to states of doubt and belief as antithetical (Peirce, 1998b), pre- act. It is this practical advantage that makes it preferable to cisely in consideration of this aspect. Belief is considered the doubt, no matter if it is epistemically more convenient or less. quiet state of affirming a principle (a proposition, an idea) The tendency to commit errors (and so of believing in an in- and doubt an irritating condition, which not only deprives the correct, or “fast and frugal”, statement instead of doubting agent of her certainties but, through that loss, compromises it)4 of the actual agent is exactly derived from this unfortu- her quiet. nate preference. Finally, the third condition of belief, which “involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, Thus, both doubt and belief have positive effects upon or, say for short a habit”, can be seen as the feature that seals us, though very different ones. Belief does not make us the “Enough Already Thesis”. Even intuitively, believing to act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall know something has two main consequences: a) it repels the behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises. irritation of doubt, making us sure about our own knowledge Doubt has not the least such active effect, but stimulates (sometimes compromising our ability to individuate errors in us to inquiry until it is destroyed (Peirce, 1998a, p. 114). it) and, b) since belief gives us the possibility to act in the world upon a certain circumstance, we will be inclined to What Peirce defines as the irritation of doubt is an un- rely on the same belief as a principle for solving other similar wanted state of mind caused by the loss of certainty in the circumstances. The “enough already thesis” does not affirm agent knowledge. We can consider this description as the much more than the prevalence of the occurrence for our be- easier way to see the experience of a part of ignorance. The lief to be confirmed by a personal (more or less fortunate) individual desperately wants to escape from the condition of experience. doubt (Peirce, 1998a) because, if belief is (at least) the confi- The parallel between Woods’ Fallibilist principles and the dence about having a reliable knowledge in order to act, the Peircean definition of belief allows us, first of all, to con- state of doubt implies the possibility of a blind spot in that firm the knowledge-based perspective of Woods’ analysis it- knowledge, a missing direction to move toward. Ignorance, self. The actual agent is a knower, because she is also a be- in the most visible and concrete form, appears to be just the liever. The fact she believes she knows implies the possi- formulation of specific doubts. In summary, our introduction bility of committing errors, but it does not compromise her to the problem of ignorance in the Naturalization of Logic epistemic status of knower. We contend, extending Woods’ clearly relates to the definition of doubt provided by Peirce, characterization of the actual agent, that ignorance is more which appears to play the conceptual role of a perfect medium than a simple tendency to commit errors: taking advantage of term between ignorance and knowledge. For this reason, we the description of belief in Peirce’s work we can put down the can take advantage of this Peircean definition to insert a com- equivalent three properties for doubt considering it as visible plementary proposition into the Fallibilist principles we men- ignorance. Like belief, doubt is a state we are well aware of ; tioned above. it is an unwanted and irritating state for the agent; it requires 3 For clarity, we should mention that the neat difference between Fallibilism: A Belief-Based Paradigm doubt and belief, in Peircean perspective, is grounded on and limited by the sensations and the practical awareness of the agent. It is not In order to comprehend how Peirce’s epistemology grounds in question whether we can have unconscious beliefs or doubts but, according to Peirce, how and why the ones we perceive as affecting the Naturalization of Logic we should leave for a moment the our behavior are epistemologically relevant. analysis of doubt and briefly revisit the definition of belief. 4 Here, thanks to Gigerenzer’s formula, (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, Peirce describes the state of belief as having just three prop- 1996), we are in general referring to the cognitive virtues of heuris- erties: “first, it is something that we are aware of; second, it tic reasoning and fallacies, analyzed by informal logic, psychol- ogy, and cognitive science in the past forty years, cf., for exam- appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the es- ple, (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group., 1999; Woods, tablishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short 2013; Ippoliti, 2015). 313 an inferential reasoning (and the fixation of another belief) in vive and prosper, but also to bear the weight of her ignorance order to end. Two conclusions follow, one more evident than without feeling it. the other. Hence, instead of focusing on the confidence in the The most evident outcome is a definition of ignorance that “Enough Already Thesis” (that we can condense in “we are is already formulated in Woods’ theory. He defines igno- able to survive, after all”), all the added caveats demand a rance as “inferentially productive”, as a part of our cognition deeper questioning on the tendency of human beings to avoid that we can examine through fallacious but effective infer- a complete awareness of their own ignorance. It is not unrea- ential processes (Woods, 2013, p. 335). In this perspective sonable asking how and why this is functional, for instance. we can rethink the principles of knowledge and error abun- The examination of these important issues is already dis- dance adding a “doubt openness condition”. The possibility played in what Woods called the Epistemic Bubble (Woods, of doubt and of recognizing and admitting ignorance opens 2005). We can picture the Epistemic Bubble as a form of the possibility of an improvement of the agent knowledge knowledge-based immunization that inhibits the agent from and so it enforces the tendency to gain new data (Knowledge distinguishing her knowledge and her beliefs. In the next sec- Abundance). At the same time, as already said, doubt also im- tion, we will investigate the “Bubble Thesis”: this will allow plies a cognitive irritation that forces the agent to quickly ar- us to comprehend that the agent bears also a ignorance-based rive to a resolution of the problem at stake. This urgency can immunization, which compromises her ability to frame her affect the inference, performed in order to solve the problem, own ignorance and distinguish it from what she just doubts making easy for the agent to commit errors (Errors Abun- about. dance). The Bubble Thesis and the Double-Sided The second and less evident consequence of introducing the doubt as “the visible part of our ignorance” in the falli- Autoimmunity System bilist triad, is instead a sort of “negative” affirmation. Ex- The idea of the Epistemic Bubble originates from the analysis amining the epistemic status of ignorance at the conscious of both purpose and ending of the state of doubt, albeit it re- level, so addressing knowledge firstly as belief, and speaking mains focused on the analysis of the state of belief. It is based of doubt as something that we do not recognize as belong- on the assumption that the state of belief is not just pleasant, ing to our knowledge, we let the door open to the fact that but also fallible and uncertain. In its essence, Woods’ Bubble an actual agent is not “simply” ignorant of what she is aware Thesis focuses on the relation between the complex of be- she doesn’t know. Ignorance is not completely equivalent to liefs an agent has and her awareness as regard as either their doubt, it is not just a missing piece of our cognition, some- correctness or unsteadiness. This suggests that the agent’s thing that the agent knows she does not know. Doubt can be mechanism of belief formation can provide an easy way out perceived as the frame of our ignorance, but it is the simple to the Peircean irritation of doubt through a systematic as- consequence of our fallible cognition. Of course the project cription of knowledge concerning a mere belief, immunizing toward the Naturalization of Logic has already proposed to the agent from being able to spot the difference (so letting extend the field in which knowledge can be investigated, con- the agent think she knows something when she merely be- tending the importance of the examination of the errors of lieves she does). In order to utterly understand the potential- reasoning and their “positive” aspects. Something more can ities of this idea, we have to introduce two dichotomies that be said: since ignorance corresponds to something that goes, Woods indicates as substantial. The first between what we at least partially, beyond the cognitive sight of the agent, we could consider a broad definition of knowledge related to the should investigate it as the Naturalization of Logic aims at Peircean state of belief. The second concerning the important explaining the limit of our knowledge: far beyond the self- distinction between the first and third-person perspective of perspective of the actual agent. the agent. The “negative” affirmation permits us to have an “Enough As already mentioned, belief in Woods’ theory corre- Already Thesis”, less indulgent with respect to the agent’s sponds to the Peircean definition: it is the sole state that solves actual status. As we have already said, the psychological and the irritation of doubt and brings peace to the cognitive un- emotional component of doubt makes its experience repul- steadiness of the agent; fundamentally, it is a state that calms sive for the agent. So, if even the visible part of ignorance is the agent’s mind. Knowledge, instead, is defined as a “kind of hard to be managed by the agent, the part of ignorance that case-making. One knows that P only if one has one’s disposal falls beyond her control (or her will) must be extremely dif- a case of requisite strength to make for P” (Woods, 2005, p. ficult to reach. The “Enough Already Thesis” displays the 735). The distinction between belief and knowledge, how- capacity of human beings to be right enough about enough ever, is not evident for the agent who knows and believes. of the right things enough of the time to survive and prosper Indeed, the achievement of knowledge always entails a state (Woods, 2013, pp. 86–88). Now we should add: “despite” of belief in the agent, even if the attainment of a belief does how much the agent ignores, how much she does not want not directly imply the gain of knowledge. to admit she ignores and the repulsion for being in a state of The entanglement between knowledge and belief drives doubt the agent appears to be not just “able enough” to sur- our argumentation to the difference between the first and the 314 third-person perspective. Indeed, for the agent is kind of could not be sure about what she thinks she knows, she could easy to say if someone else knows or thinks she knows some- not take any decision and she would be constantly in a state thing. That is to say, from the third-person perspective one of doubt and struggle. The autoimmune mechanism helps her can tell the difference between a belief that stands for an ac- out from the freezing state of doubt but does not provide a tual knowledge attainment and a belief that just brings about safe exit from it. some cognitive relief to an irritating state of doubt. The agent As we can see, the epistemic bubble as an autoimmune can judge if someone else’s is either effective knowledge or mechanism concerns the limits of the attainment of knowl- mere confidence. From the first-person perspective, the dif- edge, its entanglement with the state of belief, and the un- ference is instead blurred, due to the fact a belief state entails apparent distinction between the two in the first-person per- the occurrence of knowledge. This is an entanglement indeed spective. As we have said in the case of the original Fallibilist recognized as the focus for the asymmetry between first and principles mentioned in the previous section, the idea of epis- third-person perspective. Whenever the agent knows some- temic bubble is profoundly connected with the definition of thing, she is compelled to believe she knows it. But, since belief offered by Peirce. Using a similar connection, in order the attainment of knowledge is different from the establish- to shift the focus on the limits of ignorance-recognition, we ment of a belief, she can believe she knows something even must reconsider Peirce’s doubt in the light of the autoimmune when she does not. This distinction between knowledge and mechanism described above. its mere ascription is visible only in a third-person perspec- tive. Doubt and the Missing-Ascription of Ignorance Hence, while in the first-person perspective a reliable be- Given the fact belief and knowledge are connected in the first- lief is always claimed as knowledge, in the third-person per- person perspective, but way far from each other in the third- spective the proposition can be judged as potentially verified person view, we can formulate the same consideration in the or erroneous. Thus, in the case of the first-person perspective case of doubt and ignorance. The “negative” affirmation in there is not a clear distinction between knowing and believing the Fallibilist principles is oriented to highlight the distinc- in something, even if it is pretty clear in the case of the agent’s tion between doubt and ignorance, but this separation is man- third-person perspective. At the same time, in the case of the ifest only in a third-person perspective. In the third-person first-person perspective the state of belief represents not only perspective, doubt presents the character of being a state of the way the agent can experience some relief from the irrita- irritation for the subject, a push for inferential reasoning, and, tion of doubt, but also the unique possibility for the agent of mainly, a state she is aware of : it is a frame of the ignorance attaining any sort of knowledge. This idea is better expressed of the subject in those limits. The proper ignorance of the in Woods terms in the Proposition 6: agent is beyond the frame of her doubts. It is something the agent cannot consider in first-person perspective. At the same (The Downside of Belief). Belief is both a condition of time, the only “visible part of ignorance” for the first-person knowledge and an impediment to its attainment. perspective can entirely frame the ignorance of the agent. In so saying, we can see that the traditional approach This relation is clear when we think about the possibility to knowledge is defective. It rightly insists on the in- of describing how we ignore something. The only method dispensability of belief for knowledge, but it ignores, or that we can apply is to frame our ignorance, speaking about downplays, its impedimental role (Woods, 2005, p. 739). the propositions we doubt to be true, the situations we are not certain about, and the collection of data we are not sure So, albeit the fact that there is a solid difference between if they are reliable or not. But these data are just what we the epistemological status of belief and knowledge, the agent consider part of our ignorance. They cannot be even close cannot be aware of this distinction when she has to deal with to the propositions we are not informed of, the situations out her own cognition. Hence, in its essence, the epistemic bub- of our sight, and the collection of data we are not aware of. ble is configured as a first-person knowledge-ascription, per- These data are part of our ignorance, but we cannot reach formed by the knowing agent, to whom the difference be- them through our doubts. At the same time, doubt is the only tween knowing something and thinking she knows that same cognitive tool that permits us to grasp pieces of ignorance and thing is unapparent – and the tension that may arise is always let us admit that there is something out of our reach. solved in favor of the former (Woods, 2005). This mechanism So, exactly as in the epistemic bubble, albeit the fact that always provides – more or less heavily – an illusion about the there is a solid difference between the epistemological sta- truthfulness of the knowledge of the agent’s first-person per- tuses of doubt and ignorance, the agent cannot be aware of spective. this distinction when she has to deal with her own cognition. Woods describes the epistemic bubble as an autoimmune Consequently, we can describe the ignorance-based bubble as mechanism of the agent. The naiveness of the agent about a missing-ascription of ignorance, performed by the agent, to her own cognition is directed by the same system that at the whom the difference between ignoring something and doubt- same time permits her to attain any type of knowledge. Be- ing is unapparent. lief, as a cognitive structure, is in primis a tool that gives her This structure is also an autoimmune mechanism of the the possibility of taking action into the world. If the agent agent. Doubt, the only tool that permits the agent to inves- 315 tigate a part of her ignorance, makes also impossible for the trated using the Freudian metaphor of the iceberg: the por- agent to distinguish the amount of actual ignorance she pos- tion apparent to the subject is just a small piece with respect sesses from what she is just able to recognize. At the same to the whole structure. For this reason the missing-ascription time, without this autoimmune system we would never leave of ignorance plays a role analogous to that of the epistemic the state of doubt. The ignorance-based autoimmune mecha- bubble in the mechanism of creation and revision of beliefs. nism illustrates the ignorance about one’s own ignorance as It assures a cognitive status of certainty about the agent ig- the only possible condition for the attainment of any kind of norance that permits the agent to be confident in her choices knowledge in more or less uneasy condition. The immuniza- and knowledge. The agent, not being able to see how much tion to ignorance is an indefeasible mechanism of human cog- she ignores, considers the attainment of answers concerning nition as well it is the epistemic bubble. They simply define her doubts a concrete way to remove her ignorance piece by the borders of possibility for first-person perspective agents piece. to modify their own epistemological status. The role of confidence is part of the autoimmune mecha- By considering the cognitive state of doubt, we can extend nism as much as the proper ignorance embubblement. The our analysis also considering Woods’ thesis about truth. As embubblement allows the agent to consider what is part of we will better illustrate, the analysis of the epistemic bubble her doubts as the entire amount of her ignorance and her pur- leads to the affirmation that the truth, for the first-person per- pose will be to remove it as much as possible. In this sense, spective, is a fugitive property. In brief, the difficulty for the the role of the missing-ascription of ignorance is fully moti- agent to distinguish the difference between what she knows vational. But the more effective consequence in the agent’s and what she believes, impairs her possibility to reach and cognition is the self-representation that the agent constructs recognize truth. Using the same association in the case of in first-person perspective: indeed, there is a tendency to con- the analysis of the agent’s immunity to her own ignorance we sider the knowing or ignorant self as a controllable part. The can arrive to a similar consideration regarding her capacity to agent is fully aware of both the state of belief and of doubt, reach and recognize the entireness of ignorance beyond the which are the only vehicles for her attainment of proposi- frame of her doubts. tional/sentential knowledge and her partial awareness of ig- norance. In the following subsection we will show that these The Fugitivity of Truth (and Ignorance) partial recognitions drive the agent to formulate a sort of Ho- munculus Fallacy, when she tries to depict her epistemologi- The autoimmune system of the epistemic bubble makes the cal state. attainment of truth a relatively impossible task from the first- person perspective, adding a veil of skepticism to the cogni- Cognitive Autoimmunity: The Homunculus Fallacy tive analysis. This is clearly stated in Proposition 15, stating In the case of the first-person perspective we have illustrated the Fugitivity of Truth: “Within epistemic bubbles, truth is above the epistemic bubble provides two main illusions. The a fugitive property. That is, one can never attain it without first illusion is strictly related to the epistemic dimension of thinking that one has done so; but thinking that one has at- the bubble: it provides the belief-based ascription of knowl- tained it is not attaining it” (Woods, 2005, p. 745). At this edge even when that knowledge is not entirely attained. The point it is interesting to note we can apply a similar argument second illusion is related to the cognitive and emotional out- when considering ignorance. The missing-ignorance ascrip- come of the bubble: it makes the agent convinced of being tion in the first-person perspective makes the idea of igno- aware of the knowledge she possesses, even when she should rance a “fugitive property” because every time the agent tries not. to define what she ignores, she is reaching just the limits of The same deceptive double effect also emerges from the her doubts. Hence, we can describe the mechanism of epis- missing-ascription of ignorance. On the one hand, it provides temic embubblement taking advantage of a two-sided defini- the agent the conviction that she is ignoring just a specific tion: a) the impossibility – from the first-person perspective sort of data, categorizable in the framework of her first-person – of a clear distinction between knowledge and belief and perspective. On the other hand it gives the agent the illusion b) the certainty of the agent to have a fully achieved knowl- of being able to have a clear view of her own ignorance. In edge about something even without the actual attainment of both cases the agent is naively assured about her cognition. it; we can find a similar two-sided definition in the case of She thinks herself able to see her knowledge and her igno- the ignorance-based bubble: a) the impossibility – for the rance as they were, respectively, sets of attained or missing first-person perspective – of a clear distinction between doubt propositions. The agent is deluded into being, absurdly, in and ignorance and b) the certainty of the agent to have fully an indifferent position about her own ignorance/knowledge framed her ignorance trough her doubt, even if she cannot do structure. This effect can be pictured as a sort of Homunculus it. Fallacy. The subject thinks herself almost as a double being: As we have already mentioned, the ignorance that the one part of her knows and ignores and another part can spot agent can perceive is just defined through her doubts, and her how much she knows and how much she ignores. doubts can picture just a small portion of her ignorance. The The fairly hidden Homunculus Fallacy is clear: the autoim- disparity between the two parts of her ignorance can be illus- mune mechanism suggests that the agent can judge about the 316 attainment of knowledge or the perception of ignorance, as of knowledge and the impediment of its attainment” (Woods, if the judgment belonged to a distinct part, which directly 2005), doubt is the requirement that permits the emerging of knows or ignores. This illusory distinction allows us to also uncertainness while preventing the integral cognition of the consider the property of just apparent corrigibility of the bub- agent’s ignorance. Hopefully further research concerning the bles: “Since each of us is in his own epistemic bubble, the dis- immunized and ignorant part of human cognition will provide tinction between merely apparent correction and genuinely interesting new insights able to enhance the newborn field of successful correction exceeds the agent’s command. [. . . ] the naturalization of logic, as much as the study of “errors of Within an epistemic bubble the distinction between belief- reasoning” has had so far. change and belief-correction is also “resolved” in favor of the latter” (Woods, 2005, p. 741). When the agent realizes References that the belief she had was incorrect, or the knowledge she Aliseda, A. (2005). The logic of abduction in the light of thought she had was illusory, the change of mind does not Peirce’s pragmatism. Semiotica, 1/4(153), 363-374. break the mechanism of the bubbles. Since she has to replace Gabbay, D. M., & Woods, J. (2003). Agenda relevance: A an information with another one and the only way to do it study in formal pragmatics (Vol. 1). Amsterdam: North is to believe she gain a correct one, she simply shift from a Holland: Elsevier. bubble to another, maintaining the autoimmune mechanism Gabbay, D. M., & Woods, J. (2005). The reach of abduction: unbroken. The bubble was not corrected, it just changed. 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