=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-1419/paper0055
|storemode=property
|title=Mimicry Signals Affiliation, but Why?
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1419/paper0055.pdf
|volume=Vol-1419
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/eapcogsci/Kavanagh15
}}
==Mimicry Signals Affiliation, but Why?==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1419/paper0055.pdf
Mimicry Signals Affiliation, but Why?
Liam C. Kavanagh (lkavanag@ucsd.edu)
Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA
Abstract somatosensory activity is caused by events within our own
cognitive system, as well as by happenings within our
The
ability
of
mimicry
to
signal
affiliation
to,
and
elicit
affiliation
from,
the
mimicked
person
has
generated
great
models. Further, many results from the “feelings-as-
interest,
but
no
definitive
account
of
these
phenomena
has
information” literature show that humans have difficulty
emerged.
While
affiliation
is
often
cited
as
the
driving
force
attributing our feelings to their true cause (Schwarz, 2011).
behind
mimicry,
I
argue
that
mimicry
results
from
an
imitative
Thus, sensations arriving via others will not be easily
learning
process
that
helps
to
produce
the
best
bodily
differentiated from those originating natively.
(including
emotional)
responses
to
social
stimuli
and
This difficulty in attributing our feelings to ourselves,
situations
by
reproducing
and
learning
bodily
and
emotional
versus others, is problematic because bodily sensations
reactions
of
models.
The
influential
“feelings
as
information”
inform our attitudes, values and actions. Thus, feelings
perspective
states
that
we
form
evaluations
of
events
and
acquired “contagiously”, but not accounted for as such by
objects
based
on
coincident
somatic
experiences
(feelings).
higher-level cognition, can be expected to have non-trivial
Mimicry
and
contagion
effects,
which
imply
“shared
feelings”
effects. Specifically, these will tend to produce convergence
can
therefore
influence
attitudes
and
evaluations.
Thus,
mimicry
of
the
wrong
person
may
be
costly.
This
perspective
of our attitudes, opinions, and beliefs with those of our
explains
why
mimicry
towards
outgroup
members
is
model. Thus, it may be best to avoid intersubjective
maladaptive,
and
why
responding
positively
to
mimicry
is
experience (and its observable corollary, mimicry) when our
adaptive
for
models.
Connections
with
related
phenomenon,
prior beliefs about others indicate that this process will lead
and
seemingly
strategic
mimicry
behavior
are
also
discussed.
to disadvantageous attributions, decisions, and motor habits.
This also means that persons who we do mimic (our
Keywords: Mimicry; Imitation; Inference, Feelings-as- models) may justifiably “infer” that we do not mind
Information convergence of feelings, attitudes and values.
Further, there is overwhelming evidence that people sort
Introduction themselves into groups that share feelings and preferences
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Preston & De
Despite intense research into imitation, intersubjectivity, Waal, 2002). Ingroup members “feelings” are highly
and their neural bases, a satisfying explanation of the informative of what our own feelings should be in a
phenomenon of human mimicry has proved to be elusive. situation or would be, if we had more experience. Thus, if
Mimicry signals feelings of affiliation towards the mimicry is greater when the model is regarded as a good
mimicked person (the model), and also causes the model to source of information about proper non-verbal (including
feel closer to the mimic (Lakin, & Chartrand, 2003). emotional) reactions, and will tend to produce convergence
Additionally, we typically are not aware when our postures, in the behaviors and attitudes, then mimicry also signals
gestures, expressions and mannerisms are actually copies of ingroup membership. Imitated actions of group members
others’ non-verbal behaviors, but we still reduce our will also tend to be repeated over time, so that imitation a
mirroring tendencies when dealing with outgroup members. key part of cultural learning (Tomasello & Kruger, 1993).
Similar patterns of results are shared with emotional Because mimicry can be usefully be interpreted by
contagion (DeWaal, 2008) and automatic imitation (Heyes, models as a sign of ingroup membership, the act of mimicry
2011), suggesting that all of these are related phenomena. A acquires a second use, as a means of gaining affiliation with
final puzzling aspect of mimicry behavior is that it is models. After briefly reviewing empirical evidence
sometimes employed in a manner consistent with strategic regarding mimicry and associated phenomenon, it is further
goals, but still without explicit awareness of mimicry “as argued that the costs of mimicry help to make it credible as
such” (Thelen, 1980; Lakin & Chartrand. 1999). an affiliation signal, and that credible mechanisms for
Here I argue that, though the social signal value of strategic mimicry are compatible with the current account.
mimicry is indisputable, mimicry is an outcome of a process
that would be adaptive even without this signal value. Human Mimicry: Core Empirical Findings
Mimicry is outwardly visible evidence that the mimic’s
nervous system is structurally coupled with that of the An early demonstration of the automaticity and affiliation
model in a way that tends to produce congruent properties of mimicry was provided by Chartrand and Bargh
somatosensory states. As many have alluded to (DeWaal, (1999), who showed that subjects were unaware of their
2008; Heyes, 2010; De Vignemont, 2014), intersubjective tendency to mimic a partner that had been paired with them
states demand that one neural system “represent” two in a task. This same paper showed that mimicry can play a
bodies. That is, if we are automatically mirroring, our
352
causal role in affiliation. When participants in a second wedded at a deep level to a strategic process that produces
experiment were mimicked by a confederate, they reported a mimicry as an output.
greater quality of interaction. Interestingly, this tendency is Based on these results that the same researchers (Wang
present at a young age – even 18-month old children are and Hamilton, 2012) have proposed that mimicry is
more likely to help to pick up pencils after an experimenter Machiavellian in nature. While evidence shows that
has mimicked them (Carpenter, Uebel & Tomasello, 2008). mimicry is performed in a manner consistent with goal
Various experiments have also shown that mimicry levels pursuit, the current review argues that novel mechanisms are
are sensitive to the ingroup status of models. For example, not required for explaining unconscious strategic behavior.
subjects who write positive, as opposed to negative, written Humans may simply notice the tendency of (by definition
reports about their models show greater facial mimicry consciously available) intentional states, such as prosocial
(Likowski, Muhlberger, Seibt, Pauli and Weyers, 2008), and thoughts about the other, to be connected with successful
subjects’ implicit attitudes towards an outgroup predict their affiliation. Thus humans have an incentive to adopt these
tendency to mimic that group (Likowski, et al., 2011). states, which lead to mimicry, when interacting with those
Further, these findings cannot be explained as merely the that they would like to affiliate with. This point will be
result of attention paid to a target. For example, Lanzetta discussed in greater detail after further consideration of the
and Englis (1989) showed that subjects adopted opposite underlying mechanisms and consequences of mimicry.
facial gestures when they saw a competitor frown or smile
but produced congruent expressions while viewing The Mechanisms of Mimicry
teammates. This anti-mimicry of competitors, which clearly
requires perception of and attention towards the competitor, Reams of evidence show that observation of actions has a
happened as quickly as mimicry of teammates, showing that tendency to automatically produce similar actions. This
attitudes can moderate responses to gestures. These findings tendency to automatically imitate is not easily controlled
need not imply an “unbounded rationality” behind our consciously, but is modulated by the allocation of attention,
mimicry actions, however. Instead, humans may simply the degree of experience in performing an action, and
tend to have enough familiarity with competitive situations attitudes towards the model (see Heyes, 2011, for a review).
to develop automatic, non-imitative responses. Many of the relevant findings regarding mimicry’s basic
The tendency for mimicry to be produced in a manner that mechanics come from the “automatic imitation” literature,
is consistent with strategic affiliation goals was first shown which is built around a stimulus-response compatibility
by Jessica Lakin and Tanya Chartrand (2003). These (SRC) paradigm. This involves asking subjects to respond
investigators tested the idea that a failure to affiliate with with physical actions when they see colored stimuli (e.g.
one person would spur subjects towards increased mimicry “open hand if red”, “close hand if blue”). Subjects are
in a second interaction with another person. Participants presented, however, with stimuli having action
were first unconsciously primed with an “affiliation goal”, characteristics in addition to the task-relevant characteristic
or with neutral words, and then took part in an online (e.g. hands that are opening or closing, and colored red or
interview session. Here, participants asked an experimental blue). It is consistently found that responses are slowed
confederate a series of scripted questions. The answers were when “task irrelevant” action characteristics of the stimuli
either friendly or unfriendly, so that the participants’ “goal” are incompatible with the required response. As might be
was either fulfilled or frustrated after this initial contact. expected, factors that modulate this effect are broadly
Finally, participants had a live interaction with a second similar to those that have been found to modulate mimicry
experimental confederate, who gave neutral answers to the in social psychology research. The SRC paradigm, however,
confederate’s questions. Among those participants who did offers far tighter experimental control.
not have an affiliation goal, the success of online An important result established by SRC tasks is that
interactions did not affect mimicry levels. However, when intentional attitudes moderate imitation, even though
participants who were primed with prosocial words “failed” imitation cannot be “turned off” by direct intentional
in their first affiliation attempts they mimicked the second intervention. That is, despite instructions to the contrary,
interaction partner more. subjects in this paradigm find themselves unable to suppress
Further evidence for strategic mimicry was produced by their tendency towards imitation (Heyes, 2010). It appears
Wang, Ramsey, and Hamilton (2011), who had participants then, that control of just what we will imitate is beyond
interact with others who were either powerful or not human means. On the other hand, moderation of automatic
powerful, and friendly or not friendly (i.e. 2x2). If mimicry imitation effects have been shown by manipulating attitudes
were solely based on rapport, one might expect friendly towards action stimuli, such as by having subjects
people to be mimicked regardless of their power. Results unscramble words related to prosociality (Leighton &
showed, however, that mimicry was greatest when subjects Heyes, 2010). This shows that our tendency to imitate
interacted with powerful, rude individuals. These results actions in general can be moderated by our attitudes towards
seem to show that mimicry is increased when the attainment the model, when experience shows that attitudes are valid
of good rapport is desirable, but difficult. Thus it seems that cues to the appropriateness of automatic imitation.
mimicry is either deployed strategically, or alternatively,
353
Imaging studies have shown that familiarity with an (criteria iv & vi). This theory usefully points out, however,
action mediates the tendency of observations of that action that the ecological rationality (i.e. adaptiveness) of models’
to result in activation of motor areas (e.g. Cross, Hamilton affiliation with mimics is complicated by mimics’
& Grafton, 2006; Haslinger et al., 2005). In the best known, incentives to exploit mimicry for Machiavellian means. The
fMRI was used to compare neural responses of Ballet current proposal holds that, like other non-verbal signals,
Dancers and Capoeira while viewing videos of mimicry is more credible if it is often truly reflective of a
performances from both of these disciplines (Calvo-Merino, disposition of the mimic. Smiles and laughter, for example,
Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005). Greater can be “faked” but the signal value of these affected
activation in classical “mirror areas” was observed while expressions derives from their similarity to true (i.e.
dancers watched their own discipline. duchenne) signals of meaningful internal states.
Another explanation is the ‘like me’ theory of Over and
Criteria that an Explanation of Mimicry Should Satisfy Carpenter (2012), which posits that mimicry arises so as to
demonstrate likeness with others, and thereby achieve
With the relevant empirical facts now reviewed, it is affiliation. As we prefer similar others, it is observed,
useful to consider some explicit criteria by which demonstrations of similar postures and expressions will in
explanations of the observed pattern of results should be turn make us more liked. Though these statements are
judged. A theory of mimicry should explain why i) mimicry broadly true, it is not clear why subtle mimicry (criteria v)
itself is adaptive “or ecologically rational” that is, it brings should be the most effective kind. It seems, rather that more
positive rewards to the mimic. It is equally important, extreme imitation would be more effective under this
however, to show that ii) models’ affiliation with the mimic proposal. Further, if mimicry does not necessarily imply
is adaptive. This is not necessarily the case if mimicry is more than surface perceptual similarity, it is not clear why
costlessly produced for Machiavellian purposes. Also, an an affiliative response to mimicry is adaptive (criteria ii).
explanation of mimicry should iii) explain observed Under the current proposal, mimicry arises as a visible
ingroup-outgroup differences and strategic mimicry, and iv) consequence of the internalization of others’ non-verbal
be compatible with the idea that imitation is often a means information, so that the production of the signal is not
of learning (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993), with past necessarily the end of mimicry, but rather an outcome of an
imitated behaviors being more likely in the future. A theory adaptive learning process. The current proposal posits that
should also v) explain why subtle and automatic imitation is the learning aspect of imitation implies a cost, and likely a
more effective in affiliation than perfect mimicry (Chartrand convergence between the mimic and her model on socially
& Van Baaren, 2009). Finally a theory should be vi) meaningful dimensions. To set up a discussion of the costs
consistent with the notion that much of non-verbal behavior, of mimicry, which is a distinguishing characteristic of the
though not well understood at an explicit level by humans current theory, we now briefly turn to evidence on the
(even researchers), is actually meaningful. Humans weigh relationship of postures and expressions to mental states.
non-verbal behavior greatly in their judgments of others
(e.g. Tsay 2013). If the weight we give to this behavior is Postures and Gestures Affect Intentional States
adaptive, then it is a merit of a theory if it treats this
behavior as meaningful. As we all have heard, and as has been demonstrated
experimentally, adoption of a smile expression seems to
Extant Accounts of Mimicry play a causal role in increasing our feelings of happiness
(Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989). A growing body of
An early and appealingly simple explanation of mimicry, evidence generalizes such “feedback effects” to adopted
proposed by Chartrand and Bargh (1999), is that mimicry postures. This evidence is important to consider in
results from simple ideomotor mechanisms, whereby connection to human mimicry, because like evidence
perception of actions simply primes the production of the showing that emotions can be judged from postural cues
same action. Though intuitively appealing, this proposal has (Dael, Mortillaro, & Scherer, 2012), it shows that the bodily
received less attention as key empirical results, such as anti- actions “shared” during mimicry can be indicative of real
mimicry of outgroup members and strategic mimicry changes in mental states.
(criteria iii, above), have cast doubt on the idea that In an example directly relevant to intentional behavior,
attention alone moderates mimicry levels. Riskind and Gotay (1982) had participants adopt either a
A far more sophisticated decision process is posited by slumped or upright posture, and then measured their
the Machiavellian mimicry theory of Wang and Hamilton persistence in trying to solve an impossible task.
(2012). These authors believe that mimicry is strategically Participants in the upright posture condition persisted
and flexibly employed to achieve goals. As alluded to longer, thus confirming that posture is bi-directionally
earlier, this theory conflicts with the criteria ii) in that it linked to intentional behavior. Leaning forward while
does not state an adaptive reason for affiliating with mimics. looking at a stimulus has also been shown to affect neural
Also, it does not engage with evidence of the role of responses in a manner consistent with increased desire.
mimicry in learning and the value of non-verbal behavior Harmon-Jones and Peterson (2009) had participants either
354
sit upright or lean forward while looking at pictures of perceived as an act of mimicry. In fact, Ramanathan and
desserts, and found greater left frontal activity, which is McGill (2007) have produced results consistent with this
consistent with approach behavior. The same investigators idea. Subjects viewed a video program in a room either
showed that subjects who received insulting feedback while while seated alone, next to a person that they could not see,
in a reclined position showed less neural activity consistent or next to a person that they could see. Attitudes towards the
with anger than those who were sitting upright. video program converged more when subjects could see
As fMRI studies of mirror areas show, congruent their partner, and a follow-up analysis showed that this
somatosensory activation may also be produced by simply effect was mediated by mimicry.
watching other’s actions without any outwardly observable Thus, there is cause to believe that the structural coupling
behavior (Calvo-Merino et al, 2005). The extent to which of others’ bodily experience to our own affects our thoughts,
emotions coincident with mimicry are due to feedback attitudes, and actions. Mimicry should be engaged in when
effects from physical actions, versus neural “mirror activity” we have prior beliefs that attendant “feelings” constitute
that precedes mimicry is unknown. In any case, feedback “desirable information”. However this process should be
effects give cause to believe that mimicked postures (and disengaged when prior beliefs indicate that it will introduce
even covert “simulation”) are associated with meaningful “undesirable information” into the cognitive system.
internal states. What general characteristics will determine when it is
advantageous to “share feelings” with others? As noted,
Why Mimicry is Selectively Employed there is a great deal of evidence that humans form groups
around similarities in values, beliefs, and priorities (e.g.
If mimicry is part of process by which we internalize McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Some obvious
others' meaningful bodily information, this helps to explain cases when convergent emotional states and opinions and
why it is selectively employed, despite its tendency to help tastes will be useful are when one needs to share an opinion
make friends, influence people, and receive their aid. with another, such as a plan of action, to decide how to
Mimicry and contagion processes inevitably create somatic allocate shared resources. When we decide collectively what
sensations, which, as the outcomes of an automatic process, to build, what to eat, where to go, how to spend scarce
are not easily recognized as being caused by the model. money, or whether to engage in a relaxed or very active
Rather, higher-level attribution processes may tend to view activity, shared feelings are important. Thus the
sensations as originating internally. characteristics that mark someone as a member of an
A striking example, which many will have encountered in “ingroup” are much the same as the conditions under which
daily life, is finding oneself genuinely laughing at a joke it is advantageous to share feelings.
even though one didn’t hear the punch line. At these points
it is made obvious to us that mirth is contagious. But in fact, Revisiting Mimicry as an Affiliation Signal
the presence of others, especially close others, often causes
us to laugh more (Provine, 2001), and when we do so we It is worth revisiting the question of why mimicry signals
will likely decide that the joke is funnier (Bush, Barr, affiliation, in light of the reviewed theory and findings. If
McHugo, & Lanzetta, 1989). It is just not obvious, when we mimicry and intersubjective experience are most
know the punch line, that others “cause” our mirth. In fact, advantageous to the mimic when convergence with her
according to now-classical theories of misattribution, model is desirable, in terms of reactions, tastes, attitudes and
confusion about the source of feelings is commonplace. interests, then, as an observable action, mimicry is a valid
The classic demonstrations of misattribution show that cue that the mimic sees the model as a good source from
arousal caused by fear-inducing stimuli, such as a rickety which to learn bodily actions and emotional responses (i.e.
bridge (Dutton & Aron, 1979), can be misattributed to the feelings). As mentioned, ingroup members are exactly the
attractiveness of an experimenter. More recently, the people from whom we can most profitably learn adaptive
feelings-as-information approach (Schwarz, 2011) has non-verbal behavior. Thus, if this socio-cultural learning
extended this idea to somatic experience generally. That is, motive is the major reason for mimicry, then models should
feelings are interpreted and explained by higher-level tend to respond positively to mimicry, as it is a true signal
cognition using whatever information is available. Given of similarity, or a desire for similarity, in attitudes, values,
that the true source of mimicked actions is routinely not and so on – a similarity which, in turn, signals the likelihood
recognized (i.e. mimicry is unconscious), feelings-as- of high-quality personality interaction.
information theory predicts that the possibility of However, if models respond to mimicry positively, by
“misattributions” is heightened. affiliating with the mimic, then the anticipation of this
As an example, consider the following situation -- if you response creates further incentive to mimic others in order
are looking at a product with another customer and they to gain their affiliation rather than for the socio-cultural
smile, automatic mimicry would result in you feeling learning purposes described previously. If “Machiavellian”
positively while looking at the product. Thus you might motives for seeking affiliation are strong enough then we
attribute your affect to the product itself. This attribution is might expect mimicry in the absence of socio-cultural
all the more likely because our smile is not consciously learning motives, or even despite cost associated with
355
“learning” bad non-verbal habits. From the standpoint of The next challenge for this perspective is to explain
ecological rationality, models’ tendency to respond strategic mimicry. If mimicry is the result of a commitment
positively to mimicry should increase with the likelihood to a form of perception that is automatic and whose affects
that the mimic sees model as a good source of emotional on the perceiver are not easily monitored, then by what
information (i.e. as an ingroup member). means is it used strategically? One possible answer starts
Thus, an “ecologically rational” actor who has been with the fact that there is a statistical dependence between
selected as a model for mimicry should seek a priori reasons adoption of intersubjective perception (which results in
for believing that either Machiavellian or socio-cultural mimicry) and the success of social affiliation attempts. It is
learning motives are driving his mimic. If there is good also the case that intentionally available information, such
cause to believe that mimicry is advantageous from a socio- as the prosocial words unscrambled by participants
cultural learning perspective, then the model should respond (Leighton & Heyes, 2010) can increase imitation. This
positively, but if there is cause to believe that Machiavellian being the case, it would seem that internally generated
motives for mimicry predominate, then models should attitudes could also produce embodied processing and
respond less positively. If there is no specific information mimicry. In other words, an effective means of gaining
about an individual’s interests, then the model will likely affiliation with another is simply the adoption of prosocial
rely on information known about a population, or sub- attitudes towards that person.
population that the mimic is perceived to be part of. Such If social actors are able to learn this dependency, then
subtlety of response can be likely be implemented by simply they should adopt intentional states that lead to unconscious
forming expectations of levels of mimicry, based on what mimicry. Thus mimicry may be the proximate means by
we know about an interaction partner, and then taking the which affiliation is achieved, and participants may not be
degree of consistency with these expectations into account aware of mimicry, but nevertheless this dynamic may be a
when responding. That is, if our prior knowledge about a straightforward consequence of intentional states. This
mimic (e.g. he is a member of an outgroup, or is antisocial) explanation has the attractive feature of relying solely on
leads us to expect low levels of mimicry, but in fact we see already established mechanisms, requiring no
high mimicry, then our suspicion may be aroused. “multiplication of entities”. Intentional states can
A final question that some readers might have regarding indisputably be adopted strategically, and mimicry has been
affiliation is why seemingly inconsequential gestures shown to follow from intentional states.
produce affiliation. It might seem, for example, that
mimicry of leg crossing does not have the potential to “cost” Conclusion
the mimic much. That is, by crossing one’s leg, one does not
seem to risk altering one’s feelings in a greatly
It has been proposed that mimicry emerges from the
inappropriate, or maladaptive way. A first response to this
imitative, intersubjective learning of non-verbal, including
concern is that our puzzlement over mimicry is, itself,
emotional, information from conspecifics, and that the
evidence that our explicit understanding of nonverbal
conditions under which automatic internalization of such
behaviors is often lacking. This should caution us against
information is adaptive are virtually synonymous with the
great faith in our subjective estimates of the
conditions determining ingroup membership. The
consequentiality of non-verbal behavior. Secondly, all
mechanisms proposed to explain empirical results in the
intersubjective processes seem to be moderated by similar
mimicry literature require no new cognitive capabilities or
factors (Heyes, 2011; Preston & de Waal, 2002), which
modules, but rather follow as a consequence of the
implies that imitation of leg crossing is a good indicator that
simultaneous truth of several empirically well-grounded
other, more consequential forms of intersubjective linkage
notions.
and contagion are likely to be engaged in, and that a
It is indisputable that humans imitate skillfully and
judgment of social closeness has been arrived at. Thirdly, It
automatically, and it seems certain that imitated actions will
is unlikely that behaviors are mimicked based on a
tend to be repeated by mimics in the future, even in the
thorough, behavior-specific evaluation of costs or benefits,
absence of the model. Though the import of some mimicked
rather it seems that imitative tendencies as a whole are
behaviors is hard to establish, intersubjective processes
moderated by our intentional states (Heyes, 2011). If this
seem to be moderated by similar factors, so that evidence of
were so, it should be possible for participants to avoid
one act of mimicry is evidence of emotional contagion.
automatic imitation effects when given incentives. In fact,
Thus, mimicry entails meaningful future actions or reactions
explicit incentives for non-imitation have no effect (Belot,
– our friend’s “contagious enthusiasm” for the works of
Crawford, & Heyes, 2013). Thus, some inconsequential
Bach may stay with us, even if our friend moves away.
behaviors will be mimicked as part of a process that is, as a
Ingroup membership can be defined in terms of shared
whole, quite consequential.
values, opinions, and goals, all of which imply shared
feelings about events, practices, and people. Thus mimicry,
How Mimicry is Used Strategically
as a signal of the “sharing of feelings”, is a signal that the
mimic believes that she is likely to have beneficial social
interactions with her model. Though this signal is, just like a
356
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