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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>The Effect of Induced Processing Orientation on a Holistic-analytic Thinking Task</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Yoshimasa Majima (majima.y@hokusei.ac.jp)</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Psychology for Well-Being, Hokusei Gakuen University Oyachi-Nishi 2-3-1</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Atsubetsu-ku, Sapporo, 004-8631</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="JP">JAPAN</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>577</fpage>
      <lpage>581</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Many cross cultural studies have mentioned two distinct forms of thinking, holistic and analytic thought, and argued that one of the crucial differences between them is their attentional focus on focal object and its context. Furthermore, in face recognition studies, it has been replicated that face recognition is a configural process and is fostered by prior global processing orientation. The present study explores a possible link between global-local processing bias and holistic-analytic ways of thinking. One hundred twenty three Japanese participants completed either classification or similarity judgement tasks based on categories in which the contextual information conflicted with abstract rules, after processing orientation was manipulated by Navon stimuli. Results showed that participants preferred familyresemblance (i.e. holistic) solution to rule-based solution, and that manipulating the precedence (global, local, or mixed) Navon stimuli did not affect overall response pattern. However, prior local orientation slowed response latencies more than did global orientation. It may imply that preceding global-local processing orientation influences focus on the focal object and thus modifies our ways of reasoning.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>global-local processing bias</kwd>
        <kwd>holistic-analytic thought</kwd>
        <kwd>classification</kwd>
        <kwd>similarity judgement</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Recent theories of cognition often postulate that two distinct
cognitive processes underlie much of human mental
function
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">(e.g. Evans, 2010)</xref>
        . For example, dual process
theories of reasoning and social cognition proposed that
human thinking consisted of two types of process: a
heuristic, implicit, automatic, contextual system (System 1)
and an analytic, explicit, reflective, abstract system
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref2 ref4">(System2; e.g. Chaiken &amp; Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008;
Stanovich, 2009)</xref>
        . Furthermore, many cross-cultural studies
revealed that Westerners and Easterners are different in their
styles of cognition
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref12">(for review, see Buchtel &amp; Norenzayan,
2009; Nisbett, 2003)</xref>
        .
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">Nisbett (2003)</xref>
        argues that Westerners
are more likely to adopt an analytic cognition characterised
by detachment of objects from context, focus on attributes
of the object, and preference for using abstract rules for
classifying and explaining the object. On the contrary,
Easterners are more likely to adopt a holistic cognition that
is depicted by reliance on context in case of reasoning,
judgement and decision making. It seemed that
culturallydefined analytic and holistic styles of cognition appeared to
parallel two distinct systems of dual process theory, i.e.
System 1 and System 2. Although analytic-holistic style and
dual process thinking share some important properties, they
are still to be considered as two different conceptualisation
of our cognition. One of such common properties among
theories dissociating two types of process is their focus on
the object in a real world: context or field (in)dependence
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref17">(e.g. Buchtel &amp; Norenzayan, 2009)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>For example, in a case of rule-based reasoning,
Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, and Nisbett (2002) hypothesised
that people from Eastern societies tend to show biases
towards giving contextualised, associative thinking
compared to people from Western societies. Norenzayan et
al. (2002, Study 2) examined this hypothesis by comparing
categorisation strategies of European Americans, Asian
Americans and East Asians of Chinese and Korean ethnic
background. They revealed that participants from Eastern
societies were likely to use family resemblance (i.e. overall
similarity) than were Westerners when judging a similarity
between the target object and category members. It was
considered that holistic cognition of East Asian culture
encouraged attention to family resemblance structure rather
than focusing on a single attribute shared by category
members.</p>
      <p>
        Previous studies also showed a significant difference in
context-dependent and independent attentional focus while
processing visual stimulus.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">Navon (1977)</xref>
        proposed a global
precedence hypothesis supposing that analysis of global
structure in a visual scene comes before analysis of local
feature. Many studies replicate the global precedence effect
characterised by more reduced response times for
processing global structure than local feature, and
interference with identification of local (small) target by
global structure
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref15 ref15 ref16 ref16">(e.g. Navon, 1977, 1983; Poirel, Pineau,
Jobard, &amp; Mellet, 2008; Poirel, Pineau, &amp; Mellet, 2008)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        Furthermore, recent studies have shown that induced
global processing using
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">Navon (1977)</xref>
        stimuli improve face
recognition, whereas local processing priming impairs
recognition.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref14 ref8">(e.g. Macrae &amp; Lewis, 2002; Perfect, Dennis, &amp;
Snell, 2007; Weston &amp; Perfect, 2005)</xref>
        . Since face
recognition was considered to be a holistic process (e.g.
Tanaka &amp; Farah, 1993), it may be reasonable to suppose
that preceding global processing fosters a holistic facial
processing, whereas focus on local features hinders this
holistic process. It is also shown that a prior broad or narrow
focus of perceptual attention leads a comparable broad or
narrow conceptual attention, thus, promotes or hinders
creative production
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">(Friedman, Fishbach, Förster, &amp; Werth,
2003)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        These results raise an interesting question: does preceding
induction of processing orientation, i.e. global or local
processing affects other types of holistic-featural process? If
one of the key aspects of holistic-analytic thought is their
difference of attentional focus on the target object, it might
be possible that preceding manipulation of processing
orientation influences attentional focus and then modifies
reasoning strategies. Relevant to this issue,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">Kühnen and
Oyserman (2002)</xref>
        examined whether self-construal priming
affected a succeeding processing of Navon letter stimuli.
Interestingly, participants who were primed with
independent self exhibited faster response latencies to the
local letter than the global letter; on the other hand,
interdependent self-construal priming did not influence
processing speed.
      </p>
      <p>The aim of the present research is to explore a possible
link between perceptual processing orientation and
relatively higher thinking style, i.e. holistic-analytic thought.
If continuous presentation of certain kind of visual stimuli,
such as Navon letter, guides processing orientation of our
cognition as shown in studies of face recognition, this
orientation might also affect our reasoning strategies.
Specifically, prior focus on global structure may encourage
a holistic manner of categorisation, whereas focus on local
feature may foster attention to single feature and
categorisation based on this attribute (i.e. rule-based
categorisation).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Methods</title>
      <p>This experiment used a 2 (task types) × 3 (processing
orientations) design, with type and orientation as
betweensubject factors.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Participants</title>
        <p>One hundred twenty three undergraduates (33 males and 90
females, mean age = 19.8, SD = 1.02) of Hokusei Gakuen
University took part in the present experiment for either
payment or a part of course credit.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Materials and Conditions</title>
        <p>All tasks were presented on a 23-inch LCD Display
(S2340T; Dell Inc.) with full screen mode. A Windows 7
PC (Compaq Pro 6300SF; Hewlett-Packard Development
Company) and experimental software (Inquisit 4;
Millisecond Software) were used to control the presentation
of stimuli and record participants’ responses. The display
was placed on a desk approximately 60 cm away from a
participant.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Classification / Similarity Judgment Task This task was</title>
        <p>adopted from Norenzayan et al. (2002, Study 2).
Participants were presented with two category sets and one
target stimulus at a time and asked to express their
classification or similarity judgement by pressing one of two
buttons (‘F’ = Category 1, ‘J’ = Category 2). Each category
set was consisted of four exemplar objects varying in four
binary features. One of the four binary features was
deterministic and constant within category members. The
other three were non-deterministic and varied across
members, however these features together constructed a
strong family resemblance structure. The target object was
designed so as to share a deterministic feature of one
category and a family resemblance structure of the other
category. Therefore, if the target object shared the
deterministic feature of Category 1, rule-based (i.e. analytic)
solution would select Category 1 as a classification or a
similar set of the target, whereas family resemblance (i.e.
holistic) solution would select Category 2.</p>
        <p>
          Category sets and target objects adopted in this study
were the same as
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">Norenzayan et al. (2002)</xref>
          , and we used
same ten category pairs × two target objects yielding twenty
stimulus sets. At each trial, participants were scored 1 if
they chose rule-based alternative and the number of
rulebased solutions was averaged across twenty trials. Response
latency was also recorded. Half of participants were
assigned to classification condition, and the other
participants were assigned to similarity judgement condition.
Navon-letter task This task was adopted to induce either
global or local processing orientation before classification or
similarity judgement. Navon-letter stimuli consisted of
black letters presented on a white background. For each
item, a global letter (approximately 3.5 cm × 3.5 cm) was
formed with 9-13 local letters (5 mm × 5 mm; sample
stimuli are shown in Figure 1). Participants were asked to
identify and say aloud the target letter (either ‘H’ or ‘L’) in
the presented stimulus. The experimenter recorded
participants’ utterances, and response latency was also
recorded by voice key feature of Inquisit 4. However,
responses from Navon-letter task were not analysed, since
this task was introduced for inducing a particular processing
orientation.
        </p>
        <p>Participants were assigned to one of three conditions
intended to induce certain perceptual styles: global, local or
mixed (control). In global orientation condition (n = 21 for
classification, n = 20 for similarity judgement), participants
were presented with either H or L global letters consisted of
small Fs, Ns, Ss, or Ts, respectively. In this condition,
participants were required to detect a target that appeared
only in global letter. In local orientation condition (n = 21
for classification, n = 20 for similarity judgement), stimuli
consisted of F, N, S or T global letters composed of small
Hs or Ls, respectively. In this condition, they needed to
detect targets appeared only in local letters. In mixed
orientation condition (n = 21 for classification, n = 20 for
similarity judgement), ‘a H consisted of Fs or Ts’, ‘a L
consisted of Fs or Ts’, ‘a F consisted of Hs or Ls’ and ‘a T
consisted of Hs or Ls’ were used, therefore participants
were required to identify a target letter that appeared in both
global and local letters. This group was introduced as a
control. In all conditions, each stimulus was presented with
six times and participants responded total of 48 trials in a
counter-balanced order.
The participants were tested individually and were randomly
assigned to one of six experimental conditions. Upon arrival,
they were told that they were expected to take part in two
separate and unrelated research projects.</p>
        <p>
          At first, participants completed a Navon-letter task. They
were required to look at series of
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">Navon (1977)</xref>
          letters and
detect target letters (H or L) that would appear in each
stimulus. They were also instructed to make a response as
quickly as possible. Before the main trial, four-trial practice
sessions were conducted. In the practice trials, participants
were instructed to identify ‘2’ or ‘4’ appeared in stimuli.
Practice stimuli were consisted of ‘a 2 consisted of 6s or 7s’,
‘a 4 consisted of 6s or 7s’, ‘a 7 consisted of 2s or 4s’, ‘a 6
consisted of 2s or 4s’. As in main trials, participants
assigned to global condition were presented with stimuli in
which target letters appeared only in global structure.
Similarly, participants of local condition were presented
with stimuli in which target letters appeared only in local
feature, and participants in mixed condition received stimuli
that target letter appeared in both global and local letters.
When participants finished the practice sessions, the
experimenter verified that the participant understood the
instructions clearly. The stimulus sets were then presented
to participants in a random order. The experiment software
automatically moved to next stimulus after a response was
made.
        </p>
        <p>Participants then received a folder with instructions on a
categorical judgement task. Half of participants in each
processing orientation condition were assigned to a
classification task, and the others were assigned to a
similarity judgement task. In the classification task,
participants were asked to decide which group the target
object belonged to. In the similarity judgement task, other
participants were asked to choose which group the target
was similar to. Participants were instructed to indicate their
decision by pressing a designated button (‘F’ for Category 1,
‘J’ for Category 2). They were also instructed to take their
time while responding, but not to spend too much time on
any single item. Before the main trial, participants practiced
with two sample stimulus sets. After the practice session,
the experimenter confirmed that the participant understood
the instruction. The experiment software then presented
stimulus sets in a random order. After the participants
pressed a button, the software automatically moved to the
next set.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Results and Discussion</title>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Classification and Similarity Judgement</title>
        <p>The number of rule-based judgements for each participant
across twenty trials was averaged for each condition. As
shown in Figure 2, participants preferred
familyresemblance solution over rule-based solution in both
classification and similarity judgement tasks. In addition, it
seemed that preceding local processing result in more
rulebased solution (M = 44.7%) compared to global or mixed
processing (Ms = 38.3, 38.7%, respectively). However, a 2
(task types: classification / similarity judgement) × 3
(processing orientations: global, local, or mixed) ANOVA
failed to show any effects [a main effect of task type, F(1,
117) = 1.05, p = .31, !! = .01; a main effect of processing
orientation, F(2, 117) = 1.99, p = .14, !! = .03; a task ×
orientation interaction, F(2, 117) = 1.38, p = .26, !! = .02,
respectively; MSe = .026 in all cases].</p>
        <p>
          Previous work
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">(Norenzayan et al., 2002)</xref>
          showed that
participants overwhelmingly preferred rule-based solution in
classification task irrespective of cultural background,
whereas participants from East Asian culture preferred
family resemblance alternative to rule-based solution during
similarity judgement. Opposed to the previous study, the
present result showed an overall preference for
familyresemblance (M = 57.9%) over rule-based solution (M =
42.1%) even in classification decision. One sample t test
revealed that participants preferred family resemblance
solutions higher than the chance level, t(62) = 3.41, p = .001,
d = 0.78 1. A strong preference for family resemblance
1 We conducted an additional separate analysis with 1-factor
(processing orientation) ANOVA in each of two tasks. Results
showed that a main effect of orientation approached significance in
classification task [F(2, 117) = 2.76, MSe = 0.03, p = .067]. In this
task, preceding local orientation (M = 48.1%) tended to lead more
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        </p>
        <p>0
solution was also observed in similarity judgement [M =
60.9% vs. M = 39.1%, t(59) = 6.19, p &lt; .001, d = 1.84].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Response speed</title>
        <p>Mean response latencies by task type and processing
orientation were shown in Figure 3. The log-transformed
response latencies were submitted to a similar 2 × 3
ANOVA. Results showed that a main effect of task type
was not significant, F(1, 117) &lt; 1. However, a main effect
of processing orientation and a task × orientation interaction
approached significance, F(2, 117) = 2.88, p = .06, !! = .05,
F(2, 117) = 2.54, p = .08, !! = .04, respectively (MSe = .029
in all cases). A post-hoc Tukey-Kramer test revealed a
significant difference between global (M = 1504.4, SD =
460.0) and local orientation condition (M = 2033.3, SD =
1310.2; p = .04). Mixed condition (M = 1740.4, SD = 693.0)
fell in between, but was not significantly different from
other two conditions. Furthermore, the test of simple main
effects revealed a significant simple main effect of
orientation among participants in classification task, F(2,
117) = 5.53, p = .005, !! = .087. Specifically,
globaloriented participants classified target faster than
localoriented participants (p = .004). Additionally, classification
decision was faster than similarity judgement when
participants were oriented globally. On the contrary, a
simple main effect of orientation was not significant in
similarity judgement (F &lt; 1).</p>
        <sec id="sec-3-2-1">
          <title>Classification</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-2-2">
          <title>Similarity</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-2-3">
          <title>Global Mixed (ctrl) Local</title>
          <p>Induced processing orientation
rule-based solution than did global orientation (M = 36.4%, p
= .062). On the contrary, a main effect of orientation was not
significant in similarity judgement task (F &lt; 1).</p>
          <p>Rule</p>
          <p>Global Mixed (ctrl) Local</p>
          <p>Induced processing orientation</p>
          <p>Next, we examined the effect of induced processing
orientation differed as a function of participants’ judgement.
For this purpose, we calculated mean response latencies of
rule-based and family resemblance judgement separately for
each participant. Figure 4 showed mean response latencies
by type of judgement (rule-based vs. family resemblance)
and processing orientation. Next, we conducted two separate
2 (task) × 3 (orientation) ANOVAs for latencies of
rulebased and family resemblance solutions, respectively. These
analyses indicated a marginal main effect of orientation on
the speed of rule-based solution, F(2, 117) = 2.79, p = .065,
!! = .046. Specifically, preceding local processing led to
slower rule-based response (M = 2008.4, SD = 1204.0) than
global processing (M = 1517.7, SD = 449.6, p = .045).
Response latencies followed by mixed processing fell in
between (M = 1721.9, SD = 645.4). On the other hand, there
was no such difference for family resemblance responses.
Effects of task type and 2-factor interaction were not also
found.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>The effect of processing priming on reasoning</title>
        <p>
          Taken together, present results might suggest that
processing orientation does not affect classification /
similarity judgement itself, although classification decision
may be hindered when the processing focus is on narrow
local feature. When a perceptual processing was oriented to
local feature, response latencies of classification slowed. It
is also shown that locally oriented participants were more
likely to rely on rule-based solution than do globally
oriented participants, although the effect is weak.
Furthermore, the local processing priming appeared to
decelerate rule-based decision compared to global
processing. These results partly correspond to those of
previous research
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Kühnen &amp; Oyserman, 2002)</xref>
          , which
revealed independent self-construal priming slowed
response speed in context-dependent (i.e. global) stimuli.
However, local orientation in the present study led a
slowdown in the context-independent processing, i.e.
rulebased judgement, rather than context-dependent family
resemblance solution. The reason why prior local processing
interferes context-independent processing remains unclear,
however, it may be possible that preceding narrow focus
encourages a careful processing of each aspect of stimulus
set and, as a result, decelerates rule-based solution.
        </p>
        <p>
          On the other hand, processing orientation influenced
neither response pattern nor response speed in similarity
judgement task. This pattern of result was in line with
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">Kühnen and Oyserman (2002)</xref>
          , such that interdependent
self-focus did not affect response speed between global and
local stimuli.
        </p>
        <p>
          Present result also showed a discrepancy about
classification decision from previous results
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">(Norenzayan et
al., 2002)</xref>
          . Participants in the present study preferred
familyresemblance over rule-based solution even in classification
task. The reason why such a difference was found remains
unclear, although it might be possible that prior orientation
influences succeeding complex reasoning tasks.
        </p>
        <p>
          Certainly, the present investigation has some limitations.
A major limitation was that this study did not involve in
cross-cultural comparison. From a cross-cultural perspective,
it has been shown that the Westerner and Easterner differ in
their perceptual style. For example,
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">Masuda and Nisbett
(2001)</xref>
          presented Japanese and American students with an
animated scene of ‘aquarium’ and asked them to describe it.
Japanese participants were more likely to mention the
background, contextual information and relationship
between the focal objects and the background than were
Americans. Furthermore,
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">Chua, Boland, and Nisbett (2005</xref>
          )
used an eye-tracking methodology showing that American
participants fixated more on focal objects than did Chinese
participants while they viewed photographs. On the contrary,
Chinese gazed at the background than did the Americans.
These attentional differences between people from Western
and Eastern societies suggest that an analytic (i.e. Western)
style of cognition leads our attention primarily to focal
objects detached from their contexts, whereas a holistic
(Eastern) style encourages associating focal objects with
their contexts. These cultural differences in attentional style
should mediate the priming effect of global-local processing
orientation. We must considered this issue in the future
investigation.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>The author thanks Izumi Ishikawa and Yusuke Yokoe for
their assistance in conducting experiment.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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