A cognitive view on cultural-historical typology Vladimir V. Glebkin (gleb1514@gmail.com) Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Prospect Vernadskogo, 82, Moscow, Russian Federation 119571; Gymnasium 1514, Krupskoi Street, 12, Moscow, Russian Federation 119311 5-8). The present paper will not address this definition in Abstract detail. I would like to focus on the only aspect that is of great importance for this article: in theoretical culture,1 The problem of cultural-historical typology is one of the most alongside the level which provides direct regulation of intriguing issues at the crossroads of psychology and cultural social life and, by and large, is consistent with the quoted theory. This paper presents a preliminary sketch of the four- definition of culture, there is also a ‘theoretical’ or ‘hy- level-cognitive-development theory to look at this issue from persocial’ level. This level is not connected directly with a new perspective. According to the model suggested, three day-to-day social practices and develops according to its cultural types are marked out: prehistoric and hunter-gatherer culture, early theoretical culture, and modern industrial cul- own logic. Euclid’s geometry is both one of the earliest ture. and one of the most influential examples of theoretical constructions on a ‘hypersocial’ level, but not the only Keywords: cultural-historical typology; cognitive develop- one. The ‘hypersocial’ level is also the basis for Newton’s ment; hunter-gatherer culture; early theoretical culture; mod- ern industrial culture. physics, the philosophical systems of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, etc. Such systems have independent Introduction structure, the acquisition of which is not directly connect- ed to the social background of a subject (for example, Cultural anthropology has had a notable influence on the Euclid’s geometry is more or less equally accessible to methodology of cognitive science over the last decades. In modern industrial European, Indian, and Chinese people). particular, a number of works in the anthropological para- So, the interchangeable use of the concepts ‘society’ digm have recently appeared which have cast doubt on the and ‘culture’ leads to additional obstacles to the use of the methodological underpinnings and experimental database of binary model ‘small scale society – industrial society’ as a psychology as a human science. First of all, Heinrich, Hei- tool to elaborate cultural-historical typology. But in par- ne, and Norenzayan (2010) should be mentioned in this con- ticular, as will be illustrated below, the first theoretical text (see also Levinson, 2012). At the same time, a positive cultures emerged later than large-scale civilizations, that program of these researches seems quite old-fashioned. leads to a notable gap between social-historical and cul- Thus, Henrich et al. pose a binary model based on the con- tural-historical typology. trast “savagery – civilization”, originating in the 18th century The remarks made above set out the methodological in the Enlightenment (e.g., in the texts of Rousseau), as an framework of this paper. The paper addresses the problem alternative to the universalistic approach that, to their minds, of cultural-historical typology from a cognitive perspec- dominates in contemporary psychology. The contrast “prim- tive; more precisely, it elaborates a model of cultural- itive or small-scale society vs. industrial or large-scale soci- historical typology premised on four basic cognitive lev- ety” is a pivot point of their coordinate system – although els: level A characterizes great apes, whereas levels B, C they acknowledge its limitations and its palliative character. and D characterize various cultural practices performed When trying to interpret this contrast, however, we en- by humans and cultural institutions connected with them. counter another problem that does not seem properly It is to be noted that these levels build on each other, but acknowledged, not only in Henrich et al. (2010) but also in do not interchange with each other: bearers of culture many other works in cultural anthropology and social psy- operating in some cases on level D, in other cases may chology: the interchangeable use of the concepts “society” perform cognitive operations on levels B, C, D, etc. and “culture”. The recent monograph by Richerson and Christiansen (2013) provides a graphic illustration of this Level A. Great apes state of affairs. The main focus of the book is supposedly the process of cultural evolution; in fact, the modelling of First of all, a further comment on methodology: research- social shifts (in particular, the shift from small-scale to ers investigating cognitive skills of animals (in particular, large-scale societies) turns out to be its bottom line. To a considerable extent, such interchangeability is connected 1 Theoretical culture is understood here as culture with devel- with the definition of culture as “the ideas, skills, attitudes, oped forms of theoretical activity, that is, forms based on special and norms that people acquire by teaching, imitation, and/or practices for their acquisition, translation and evolution which other kinds of learning from other people” (Richerson & are set apart from everyday life (see, e.g., Romanov, 2014, pp. Christiansen, 2013, p. 3; cf., e.g., Cole & Scribner, 1974, pp. 189–196; Glebkin, 2012, p. 1603). 738 primates) often highlight the capacity of some animals to change of a task for social cooperation blocks an actual- perform high-level cognitive operations, right up to discov- ization of these skills (Tomasello 2008, pp. 39–41, 52–53; ering the ‘theory of mind’ (e.g., Byrne, 1995; Heyes, 1998). Tomasello 2009, pp. 16–17, 31–33). Also, the capacities More precise analysis, however, establishes that such infer- to estimate a location and interpret intentions of conspe- ences are based on an incorrect use of the concept ‘mind’, cifics, as well as situational competences are connected in where a ‘psychological’ approach is confused with a ‘philo- apes with a superficial level of perception, which ignores, sophical’ one (for criticisms of such works see Tomasello et for example, reasons for intentions or possible alterna- al., 2003; Tomasello & Call, 2011). Therefore, in order to tives. In other words, great apes act in an ego-perspective, avoid incorrect interpretation a researcher has to choose perceiving the intentions of their conspecifics as similar, investigations in this field with great care, focusing on those in the great scheme of things, to the solidity of stone or where the results are represented with a maximum of detail the elasticity of certain kinds of wood, i.e., a characteristic and without short-hand generalizations. The works of Mi- of the environment that can be used in one’s interests. If chael Tomasello and colleagues seem to correspond to these this is so, the claims of some researchers that great apes demands. can change ego-perspective to you-perspective or even The cognitive skills of great apes (i.e., capacities s/he-perspective seem far-fetched (Tomasello, 2009, pp. providing for cognitive operations on the level A) can be 31–33, 67–68). described as follows: The unique feature of human beings that distin- 1. Skills in the physical domain. guishes them from other primates is, for Tomasello and 1.1. The skills to remember an object’s location and to his colleagues, their capacity for cooperation and sharing choose a shortcut to an object of interest in a nearby space; interests in a wide range of situations (common activity, in other words, the skills of cognitive mapping of the region learning, etc.), in shared intentionality, connected with the of everyday activity (for a review of experimental research emergence of special milieu, described by the word ‘cul- see in Tomasello, Call 1997, pp. 27–28, 34), and also other ture’. Cooperation for human beings as a biological spe- skills of spatial cognition (e.g., searching for hidden objects cies turned out to be the most effective means to respond or food in small spaces, based on the understanding that the to the challenge of their environment, and it intensively object of interest does not disappear behind an opaque ob- developed in evolution, prompted by the positive feed- stacle, and furthermore that it can change its location while back system (Tomasello, 2009, pp. X–XV; Tomasello, hidden, performing both rotational and forward motion 2009а). (ibid., pp. 36–46). It is worth noting that Tomasello with colleagues 1.2. The skills to estimate number and size of objects look at mankind as a single biological species with a set and to compare different quantities (ibid., pp. 136–161). of specific features, and they do not address the problem 1.3. In a number of situations, the skills to exploit tools of the development of human cognitive capacities in the ‘deliberately’ (e.g., by necessity exchanging a thick stick for wake of cultural evolution, despite the fact that a majority a thin one, a short stick for a long one, etc., in order to grasp of their experiments has been provided with children from an object); the understanding of simple causal links between WEIRD people families. Meanwhile, few comparative objects (ibid., pp. 57–99). researches in this field support the thesis of the universali- 2. Skills in the social domain. ty of human beings, at least, for basic communicative and 2.1. The capacity to understand and to take into account cognitive skills (understanding intentions and attention; in actions peculiarities of perception of conspecifics in the sharing intentions and attention; corresponding and using process of direct communication (e.g., understanding what symbols): all these skills emerge in a wide range of cul- conspecifics can and cannot see, what is for them a physical tures given some differences in the time of their emer- obstacle to gaining the object of interest, etc.; see Tomasello gence (e.g., Callaghan et al., 2011). et al., 2003; Tomasello, 2008, pp. 47–48). Taken the theory of the universality of human beings 2.2. The capacity to understand and to take into account beyond any discussion it is worthwhile to note that some in actions peculiarities of perceptive information, which levels of cognitive operations may be marked out in hu- conspecifics obtained in the recent past (Tomasello et al., mans in order to create the basis for constructing a cultur- 2003). al-historical typology. Let us move on to their description. 2.3. The capacity to understand and to take into account in actions whether conspecifics perform consciously or not, Level В. Prehistoric culture and hunter- to allow for a direction of their focus of attention (To- gatherer culture masello, 2008, pp. 45–46). Given the lack of written sources and the extreme scarcity 2.4. The capacity to hide from conspecifics intentions of archaeological data, any hypothesis on the structure of and information obtained (Tomasello, 2008, pp. 45–46). prehistoric culture is fated to be speculation. Theories of Data from comparative experiments show that scores prehistoric culture based on radically different underpin- for physical-domain skills among great apes are around the nings confirm this point (e.g., Eliade, 1959; Renfrew, same level as those for 2.5-year-old children from industri- 2008; Rossano, 2010). At the same time, the problem of al-nation families (Herrmann et al., 2007). Meanwhile, skills establishing basic characteristics of prehistoric culture is in the social domain for great apes are limited by rivalry; a 739 too important not to attempt the elaboration of a theoretical either any operations in ‘theoretical’ domains or any view model, given the understanding of its hypothetical character. on such activity from a ‘theoretical’ perspective.This Some assumptions then are needed. In the last decade a leads to the following consequences: a) the lack of capaci- number of papers have been published which tackle this ty to apply an abstract criterion to single out an excess issue. They are premised on quite sophisticated assump- object in a group of objects, to determine limits of a con- tions: working-memory capacity (Haidle 2009, 2010), ana- cept (‘complex thinking’: see Luria, 1976, pp. 48–100; logical thinking (Beaune de, 2009), etc. However, it would Vygotsky, 1986, pp. 113–127); b) an inability to under- be a mistake to underestimate an approach with a long back- stand the structure of syllogisms (or to repeat them cor- story, which looks both more transparent and more convinc- rectly); a failure to solve syllogisms (Luria, 1976, pp. ing. This approach focus on the cognitive likeness of pre- 101–135; Cole, Gay, Glick and Sharp, 1971, pp. 184–197; historic culture to hunter-gatherer culture (or foraging cul- Cole & Scribner, 1974: 160–168; Tulviste, 1991, pp. 176– ture), based on the likeness of everyday activities (e.g., Ro- 195; cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983); c) an inability to solve manov, 1991, pp. 6–10)2. To some extent, indirect evidence ‘counterfactual’ problems (i.e., problems which contradict for this can also be found in the cultures of Ancient Egypt everyday experience), despite having the capacity to solve and Ancient Babylonia (Glebkin, 2011). similar problems that are consistent with everyday experi- The analysis of cognitive skills in hunter-gatherer (or ence (Luria, 1976, pp. 101–134); d) a lack of capacity to foraging) cultures gives, therefore, an ‘upper level’ for a characterize one’s merits and demerits, to ‘tell one’s au- description of prehistoric culture: people belonging to pre- tobiography’, i.e., a lack of any ‘introspective level’ of historic culture perform cognitive operations on level A, at consciousness (Luria, 1976, pp. 144–160; Romanov, the same time gradually elaborating level B. 2014, pp. 176–183; Röttger-Rössler, 1993); e) a lack of A traditional argument against typological resemblance ‘curiosity’, i.e., a lack of interest in things and events be- of prehistoric culture and hunter-gatherer culture concerns yond day-to-day experience (Luria, 1976, pp. 135–143). the impossibility of discovering a ‘clear case’: almost all These points have raised a lot of objections, but these such cultures that exist now have had more-or-less intensive have been based mainly on misunderstandings (e.g., Cole, contact with modern industrial culture, which significantly 1996, pp. 146–177). In order to avoid such misunder- decreases the validity of the experiment. However, this is standings, at least three specifications are needed. not so for ethnographical data from the end of the 19th and Firstly, the point is not that people belonging to the first half of the 20th century. These data are more authen- hunter-gatherer cultures fail to solve syllogisms and per- tic, so we will address mainly them. form abstract operations as a matter of principle; it is ra- The major cognitive skills on level B can be described ther that their mode of life does not lead to the necessity as follows: to perform such operations. As Luria’s results clearly 1. Skills in the physical domain. show, if such people live in a context where skills of ab- 1.1. The use of language to conceptualize the environ- stract reasoning are demanded (e.g., studying in boarding ment; the emergence of fine-grained classification schemas schools), they are rather successful in acquiring them. (e.g., in the field of ‘folk biology’; see Bailenson et al., Secondly, followers of cultural psychology are often 2002, pp. 37–41) based on language. reproached with the unnatural conditions of their experi- 1.2. The constructing and systematic use of special ments. However, similar inferences can be made from an tools obtained from objects in the environment. analysis of oral texts created by hunter-gatherer peoples 1.3. The planning of everyday activity within a produc- on their own. In particular, when people of a hunter- tion cycle over a long time, taking into account specificity gatherer culture try to acquire a story from a theoretical of season work. culture, they tend to lose in their exposition logical links 2. Skills in the social domain. between the particular parts, which is consistent with their 2.1. The understanding and the conscious following of failure to repeat a syllogism while saving its logical norms of social stratification, rules regulating kinship rela- frame. tions, etc., as formed in the social domain. Thirdly, some of the points posited above correlate, 2.2. The participation in various forms of social com- at first sight, with data from experiments that establish a munication, such as shared production activity, ‘rites of pas- difference between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ models of sage’, etc. reasoning. Thus, a number of studies (e.g., Norenzayan et 2.3. The production of various (mythological, ritual, al., 2002; Kitayama et al., 2007) discovered that educated folk) oral texts based on day-to-day experience. people from China, Japan and South Korea, in compari- It is of the same importance, however, to describe son with similarly educated people from the USA or which actions cannot be performed on the level B. Cogni- Western Europe, are more oriented to context and less tive skills on this level are characterized by strict links with focused on formal schemas when performing various in- the domain of day-to-day activity, and they do not assume tellectual operations (in particular, solving syllogisms). This seems consistent with results for the people of 2 Such a likeness is supposed by default in the concept ‘primitive hunter-gatherer cultures. However, there is a crucial dif- culture’, which may mean both ‘prehistoric culture’ and ‘hunter- ference between variation in percentage scores in per- gatherer culture’. forming a cognitive operation and total rejection of per- 740 forming it. Of no less importance is the difference in the there is clear evidence against this. For example, the anal- perception of experimental procedures between people of ysis of Ancient Greek mathematical texts (e.g., Euclid’s modern ‘Eastern’ cultures and, say, Luria’s Dehkans. In “Elements”) and Ancient Greek historiography (e.g., trea- Luria’s experiments the Dehkan people understood the ex- tises of Herodotus and Thucydides) brings out the crucial periment as a part of their everyday life, something like ta- role of visual experience in the approaches used. In math- ble-talk; they did not see it as a special procedure, distanced ematics, this leads, in particular, to visual (‘geometric’) from their day-to-day experience (cf. Romanov, 2014, pp. images of numbers and to a lack of abstract symbols as 157–163). On the contrary, the modern-society Chinese, signs of mathematical objects; this brings about a certain Japanese and South Korean participants clearly recognized ‘bulkiness’ of proofs and radically limits the potential for limits to the experimental situation. To generalize this point, development of Ancient Greek mathematics (see, e.g., there is a radical difference in cognitive skills between Waerden, 1954, pp. 82–202). In historiography, the analy- hunter-gatherer people and ‘Eastern’ people. We will return sis of Herodotus’s and Thucydides’s scientific styles to the contrast ‘Eastern cultures vs. Western cultures’ later gives some evidence that is consistent with this. The bulk on. of Herodotus’s “Histories” is made up of ‘cinematic’ scenes based on visual perception; meanwhile, Thucydi- Level C. Early theoretical cultures des represents key ideas in the form of imaginary speech- First of all, it is worth noting that the emergence of the es of characters, and the description bears a strong resem- first large-scale civilizations (Ancient Egypt, Ancient Baby- blance to Euripides’ tragedies (Glebkin, 2012). lon, etc.) did not bring about the complete acquisition of Consistent with these features is the lack of the no- cognitive level C by these peoples. Evidence for this can be tion of Self as modern people have grown used to under- found in a general examination of both the ‘scientific’ and standing it, i.e., as a person with the capacity for deep ‘artistic’ views which characterize these cultural traditions introspection. Ancient Greek man contemplates intently (see, e.g., Diakonoff, 1982, pp. 61–62, 68, 81–83), as well the world around him, rather than his own soul (e.g., as in the analysis of particular texts. Thus, mathematical Vernant, 1991, pp. 56–59). problems in the Babylonian tradition are strictly connected A new level of abstraction in cognitive operations with a concrete production context; Babylonian mathemat- emerges in the wake of the emergence of the world reli- ics has no special terminology or abstract domains to which gions. The idea of a transcendental God, the basic idea of such terminology might correspond (e.g., Waerden, 1954, Islam and an important one for Christianity (represented pp. 15–81; Frieberg, 2007, pp. 1–11). Also the Babylonian for example in the concept of apophatic theology), paves legislative text ‘The Code of Hammurabi’, which according the way for much more abstract systems of theoretical to its social function should be expected to have a robust, knowledge (in particular, a comparison of Plotinus’s and formal structure, turns out to implement a complex type of Augustine’s views brings out radical transformations in thinking, which characterizes people of hunter-gatherer cul- the concept of ‘number’; see Glebkin, 2009); similar re- tures (Glebkin, 2011). sults are yielded by a comparison of Christian and An- In fact, level C first emerges in early theoretical cul- cient Greek historiography (Glebkin, 2012). Although tures, such as Ancient Greece, Ancient China, and Ancient arising in the Early Middle Ages, these possibilities are India. This level is connected with a developed written lan- actualized in full measure in Modern European culture. guage, and a literature which is based on this language and has no direct links with practical (magical, etc.) tasks. It cаn Level D. Modernity in Europe, modern in- also be characterized by the emergence of special theoretical dustrial cultures domains, some of them providing theoretical analysis of In order to characterize level D one can make use of the social processes (e.g., historiography – Herodotus, Thucydi- model originated by J. Piaget and R. Garcia in another des, Sima Qian, etc.; social theory – Plato, Aristotle, Confu- context: if conceptual structures on level C are forms of cius, Laozi, etc.), and others distant from everyday life, ex- objects from the natural/social world, then on level D the- isting as self-sufficient theoretical systems (e.g., mathemat- se forms are already objects, and new theoretical struc- ics – Euclid’s “Elements”, “Jiuzhang suanshu”, etc.; linguis- tures turn out to be forms of forms (Piaget, Garcia, 1976, tics – Pāṇini’s “Ashtadhyayi”, etc.; philosophy – Plato, Ar- pp. 270–271). Such structures characterize modern math- istotle, “Lüshi chunqiu”, Vedanta, etc.; literary theory – ematics (non-Euclidean geometry, infinite-dimensional Aristotle’s “Poetics”, etc.). These domains give rise to spe- spaces, etc.), but their use in general is much wider. Theo- cial institutions, systematizing and passing on theoretical retical mechanics, originated by Lagrange, Laplace and knowledge, and also to complex forms of social behaviour, others in the 17th and 18th centuries, can be seen as the providing for the application of this knowledge in everyday first structure of this type. experience. Another sign of more complex conceptual structures Given this, some researchers take for granted the lack and the loss of direct links with physical and social set- of qualitative difference between early theoretical cultures tings is the high level of introspection that is an important (e.g., that of Ancient Greece) and modern ones, and refer to trait of the epoch of Modernity in Europe, and more or them as the same (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001). Nevertheless, less of modern industrial cultures in the East. This trait is 741 represented, in particular, in the deep psychologism of the general scheme, in other words, to unify the model de- European and world literature of Modernity, and also in the scribed. A thorough discussion of this problem would fill emergence of various psychological theories that focus on a at least one further paper; however, a preliminary remark scrupulous description of inner states of human beings. can be made here. Vygotsky, with reference to Levin, In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is worth noting and, independently, Witkin, elaborate the concept of con- that cognitive operations on level D are performed by only a tingency with the psychological field (Samuhin, Biren- limited part of the people of modern cultures. However, baum, and Vygotsky, 1981), and field-dependent cogni- addressing even such specific theoretic structures as func- tive style (Witkin, 1967; cf. 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