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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>The 'Deployment of Extra Processing' Account of Attention</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Bence Nanay (bn</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>@cam.ac.uk)</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Grote Kauwenberg 18, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium Peterhouse</addr-line>
          ,
          <institution>University of Cambridge</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Cambridge CB2 1RD</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UK">UK</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Peter Fazekas</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>756</fpage>
      <lpage>761</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The paper formulates an alternative view about the core function of attention claiming that attention is not selection but the deployment of extra processing capacity. This way of thinking about attention has greater explanatory power, since it proposes a common implementation both for selection and modulatory effects, and it offers a unificatory perspective on the workings of perception and cognition.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>attention</kwd>
        <kwd>selection</kwd>
        <kwd>modulation</kwd>
        <kwd>working memory</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        In recent years, the theoretical and empirical literature on
attention has gone through an exponential growth not just in
sheer volume but also in diversity, which has lead many to
claim that attention, after all, is not a unitary mechanism but
rather a feature of “multiple perceptual and cognitive
control mechanisms”
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref6">(Chun, Golomb, &amp; Turk-Browne,
2011, p. 74)</xref>
        operating at almost all stages of the
perceptualcognitive system. From this perspective, it becomes a
crucial question whether there is a common core function of
the different forms of attention.
      </p>
      <p>
        Traditionally, the core function of attention is claimed to
be selection: attention selects the relevant ones from the
pool of concurrently present stimuli
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Broadbent, 1958)</xref>
        . This
view goes back as far as William James’s account
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">(James,
1890/1983)</xref>
        , and is the ‘received view’ in contemporary
literature
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref26">(Petersen &amp; Posner, 2012; Chun, Golomb, &amp;
Turk-Browne, 2011)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        We call this view, according to which attention is a form
of selection, the Selection View (SV). Our aim in this paper
is to challenge this traditional understanding. In what
follows we shall argue that both the selective aspect of
attention, and its modulatory effects
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28">(Reynolds &amp; Chelazzi,
2004)</xref>
        that are often claimed to realise the function of
selection, are, in fact, implemented by the same mechanism,
namely the continuous and flexible re-allocation of
processing resources, and that the features of this
mechanism are the common core characteristics of all forms
of attention. We call our approach the Deployment of Extra
Processing View (DEP). It is motivated by the ideas that
have been implicit in much of the current research in vision
science
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8 ref9">(Carrasco, 2011, 2014)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>Attention as Selection</title>
        <p>
          According to SV, the core function of attention is selection:
it functions over information processing channels and
decides which one of these can reach further processing.
This view is in the centre of the early vs. late selection
debate that dominated much of the research on attention in
the 20th century. Early selectionists claim that basic
physical features of all stimuli are detected and processed
pre-attentively, and attention selects a few of these channels
for categorical processing
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Broadbent, 1958)</xref>
          . Late
selectionists claim that all stimuli are processed
preattentively even to a categorical level, and attention makes a
few of these channels available for post-perceptual (e.g.
working memory) processing (Deutch &amp; Deutch, 1963).
        </p>
        <p>
          It needs to be acknowledged that SV is not a homogenous
position—there are many varieties, even beyond the
question of what point of perceptual processing attention
(that is, selection) presents a bottleneck. Originally, SV
pictured attention as a single mechanism dividing
perceptual-cognitive processing into a pre- and a
postattentive stage. However, theorists nowadays argue that
instead of one single or a few major stages of selection
filtering effects occur throughout the processing stream
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">(Driver, 2001)</xref>
          . Accordingly, selection mechanisms operate
at many different levels of the perceptual-cognitive system,
making it, at least, prima facie unclear what attention is
selection for. Some argue that attention selects for later
stages of perceptual processing
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">(Lavie, 1995)</xref>
          , others claim
that attention selects for working memory
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">(Knudsen, 2007)</xref>
          ,
still others talk about attention as selection for action
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Allport, 1987)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>
          These many possible stages or forms of selection are
sometimes brought under the same umbrella by the general
characterisation that attention is selection for further
processing, where the processing in question takes place
further up in the perceptual-cognitive hierarchy
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">(Chun,
Golomb, &amp; Turk-Browne, 2011)</xref>
          . However, what really
serves as the common denominator of these very different
versions of SV is that they all take attention to be a form of
selection: what attention is is selection. Further processing
of stimuli is an optional consequence that may or may not
follow attention. That is, according to SV, attention, at any
given level where it is in operation is, so to speak, a
gatekeeper—a separate mechanism controlling the flow of
information through the perceptual-cognitive system.
disengagement of attention consist in
management of processing resources.
the
active
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-2">
        <title>Attention as DEP</title>
        <p>
          Thinking of attention as selection has been the mainstream
view. But there is an alternative way of thinking about
attention, one that is often implicit in works of vision
scientists. It has long been known that the focus of spatial
attention is able to enhance the processing of visual stimuli
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">(Posner, 1980)</xref>
          . For example, when attention is focused on a
region of the visual field processing efficiency is increased
compared to cases when attention is distributed over larger
regions. In recent years, studying early vision, and utilising
very simple displays, Marisa Carrasco and colleagues have
shown that the increase in processing efficiency is due to
attention’s ability to affect very low level perceptual
processing like spatial resolution
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref31">(Yeshurun &amp; Carrasco,
1998)</xref>
          , contrast detection
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(Carrasco, Ling &amp; Read, 2004)</xref>
          and even saturation detection
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">(Fuller &amp; Carrasco, 2006)</xref>
          .
According to these studies, attention facilitates these low
level perceptual processes—it improves performance in
several tasks by signal enhancement, i.e. by enhancing
spatial resolution, and increasing (even apparent) contrast
and saturation.
        </p>
        <p>
          These studies suggest that attention is able to directly
affect how much processing capacity is to be allocated to
different stimuli (even right at the very entry level of the
perceptual system). From this perspective, attention is not a
gatekeeper but rather an information processing booster that
is able to modulate perceptual processing by affecting the
allocation of processing resources. This reinterpretation
resonates quite well with how Marisa Carrasco herself
summarises the moral of her research: “attention is involved
in distributing resources across the visual field”  
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">(Carrasco,
2014, p. 184)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>This is the way of thinking about attention that we call
DEP. According to this alternative account, the core
function of attention is the allocation of extra processing
capacity: when one voluntarily attends to a specific spatial
location or when a particular stimulus automatically
captures one’s attention what happens is that extra
processing resources get allocated to the specific spatial
location or particular stimulus. That is, attention increases
the allocation of processing resources to the attended region
or stimulus. It might be the case that a particular stimulus
has already been processed before a novel engagement of
attention, so a certain amount of processing capacity has
already been allocated to it. However, when attention shifts
to this stimulus extra resources get deployed facilitating the
processing of the stimulus. Similarly, when one voluntarily
withdraws one’s attention from a specific region or when
one’s attention gets automatically disengaged from a
particular stimulus the processing capacity allocated to the
region or stimulus in question decreases. That is, according
to DEP, the voluntary and automatic engagement and</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-3">
        <title>The Allocation of What Resources?</title>
        <p>
          Before moving on, a clarification is in order. So far, we
have been talking about the allocation of certain resources,
but we haven’t elucidated what resources we have in mind.
Here we propose that processing resources are best to be
understood as the natural processing capacity of the
perceptual system, i.e. representational encoding via spike
generation. Stimuli are processed through a hierarchy of
neuronal circuits that encodes stimulus-features as specific
firing patterns. Spike generation has a particular energy cost
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">(Lennie, 2003)</xref>
          , so ultimately, the resources in question are
energy resources. By allocating more resources, attention
improves the quality of the representations of the target
features. Note that this is in line with how Carrasco thinks
about the resources attention distributes. As she puts it:
“attention augments perception by optimizing our
representation of sensory input and by emphasizing relevant
details”  
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">(Carrasco, 2014, p. 208)</xref>
          .
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Comparing Explanatory Power</title>
      <p>One might wonder at this point whether the difference
between SV and DEP is merely verbal. We believe that the
two views are substantially different: they have different
explanatory power (see this section), and integrative
potential (see next section). On these grounds, we argue that
DEP is preferable to SV.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Selection or Modulation?</title>
        <p>
          As it has become increasingly evident in recent years, the
modulatory effect of attention on neural activity is a general
phenomenon. As it is sometimes put, nowadays it is
“overwhelmingly apparent” that attention modulates
neuronal responses across many stages of the
perceptualcognitive system
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28 ref29">(Squire, Noudoost, Schafer &amp; Moore,
2013, p. 452; see also Reynolds &amp; Chelazzi, 2004)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>That is, the ability to modulate neural activity seems to be
a key feature of attention—a mark of the operation of
attention that, arguably, is just as widespread and
fundamental as selection itself. It seems as though
modulation was just as common and just as core a function
of the many different forms of attention as selection is often
argued to be.</p>
        <p>
          Note, however, that SV sees modulation and selection as
two distinct features of attention that require two distinct
independent explanations. As some of the proponents of SV
explicitly acknowledge
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref6">(Chun, Golomb, &amp; Turk-Browne,
2011, p. 75)</xref>
          , it is not a necessary feature of attention that a
selected stimulus must be processed in an enhanced, or in an
any way modulated manner. Following the gatekeeper
analogy, it very well might be the case that attention selects
certain information processing channels by simply blocking
competing channels, without affecting in any way the
working of the processing channel left intact. Consequently,
for SV—that puts selection effects into the centre of
thinking about attention—modulation requires additional
explanation
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref6">(Chun, Golomb, &amp; Turk-Browne, 2011, p. 76)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>Here we propose that DEP is preferable over SV because
contrary to the latter the former is able to account for both
selection and modulation on the basis of a single
mechanism, namely the eponymous active management of
processing resources.</p>
        <p>As we have seen, DEP is motivated by the modulatory
effects of attention, and therefore accounting for modulation
within this framework is quite straightforward. If what
attention is is the deployment of extra processing capacity,
then the processing of attended information is enhanced,
compared to the baseline level of processing preceding the
allocation of attention. Similarly, if the disengagement of
attention consists in a drop of the available processing
capacity, then the processing of newly unattended
information diminishes compared to the pre-disengagement
level. That is, attention as the deployment of extra
processing directly affects the neural activity relevant for
the encoding of quality representations.</p>
        <p>According to DEP, selection is also a consequence of the
active management of processing resources. In fact, within
this new framework there is a gradual shift between
modulation and selection, with modulatory effects coming
in various degrees and (full-blown) selection being at the far
end of the same continuum.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Selection and DEP</title>
        <p>
          It is a fundamental characteristic of attention that it is not
possible to attend to too many things at once or to distribute
attention over a large region of the visual field without a
decrement in processing efficiency. That is, selection seems
to be inevitable. And indeed, given our understanding of
processing resources, selection is a consequence of the
allocation of processing capacity, since energy resources
required for spike generation and representational encoding
are very limited.
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">Lennie (2003)</xref>
          argues that the cost of
spikes in the brain is high compared to the known energy
consumption of the cortex, which severely constrains the
activity that can occur concurrently. Lennie concludes that
due to this limit in the energy resources available, the
energy resources need to be flexibly re-allocated again and
again in accordance with actual task demand.
        </p>
        <p>So when the capacity limit is reached and all the resources
are allocated then any novel act of voluntarily attending or
episode of automatic attentional capture must necessarily
co-occur with a withdrawal of some processing capacity
from unattended regions. That is, the active management of
processing resources, when operating near limit, consists in
the joint allocation and withdrawal of resources: shifting
attention is shifting the allocation of (i.e. re-allocating)
processing capacity. Allocating extra resources to a
particular stimulus decreases the amount of processing
capacity that can be deployed elsewhere—this is how the
particular stimulus in question gets selected and why
unattended stimuli ‘fade away’.</p>
        <p>
          Note that although in the case of near-limit operation all
novel instances of allocating extra processing resources to
certain stimuli co-occur with the withdrawal of some
processing capacity from other stimuli, this does not
necessarily mean the full withdrawal of attention from
unattended stimuli (i.e. full-blown selection). There very
well might be cases where only part of the processing
capacity already allocated to some stimuli gets withdrawn
with a novel engagement of attention at another location. In
these cases some (residual or excess) processing resources
remain allocated to the original (now unattended) stimuli
due to which these stimuli are still processed to a certain
degree. These are the cases of partial or distributed attention
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">(Cohen, Cavanagh. Chun &amp; Nakayama, 2012)</xref>
          with
incomplete or inefficient attentional selection
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">(Benoni &amp;
Tsal, 2013)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>Full-blown selection (i.e. the total blocking of the
processing of unattended stimuli) only happens if all
processing resources are consumed by a single stimulus (or
a single set of stimuli—the attended one) and thus no
processing capacity could be allocated to other stimuli.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Is Selection Necessary?</title>
        <p>According to DEP, thus, the core function of attention is the
amplification of representational encoding of salient or task
relevant stimuli via the allocation of extra processing
resources. Selection effects are only by-products of this
amplification and especially the corresponding attenuation
of the representational encoding of inconspicuous or
irrelevant stimuli that results from the fact that processing
resources are of limited capacity.</p>
        <p>Note that according this view, selection is far from being
the core function of attention—it is not even a necessary
consequence of the mechanisms underlying the allocation of
attention. In systems without resource-limits, or (more
realistically) in systems operating far from their limits, there
can be spare capacity at the system’s disposal to be
allocated to new stimuli. In these cases, though attention—
as the deployment of extra processing resources—is very
much in operation, no selection effects occur, since no
processing capacity needs to be withdrawn from unattended
stimuli.</p>
        <p>
          This way of thinking about selection, however, might be
called into doubt by the very low level studies that have
originally motivated DEP. In a series of studies, Carrasco
and colleagues show that even in the case of very simple,
non-cluttered displays with only two stimuli, when attention
facilitates contrast sensitivity and acuity at the attended
location, trade-offs (decreased contrast sensitivity and
acuity—compared to the baseline) appear at the
nonattended location
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">(Pestilli &amp; Carrasco, 2005)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>On the face of it, this finding is in tension with the idea
that selection effects occur only when the system operates
near limit (i.e. when perceptual resources are fully
allocated). The problem is this: in the experimental
paradigms used in the studies above, the displays, typically
containing only two Gabor-patches, are so simple that their
capacity requirement in the baseline condition could hardly
exceed, or even get close to, the capacity limit. So when one
attends to the location of one of the stimuli extra processing
capacity could very well be deployed without the necessary
withdrawal of processing resources from other locations.
That is, this finding seems to show that selection effects can
occur even if the full processing capacity is only partly
allocated.</p>
        <p>We, however, think that these results are, in fact, perfectly
compatible with DEP. What they suggest, is that the limited
processing capacity (at least of early visual processing, see
below) is always fully allocated. That is, we interpret the
Carrasco studies in question as indicators that early visual
processing always operates near limit. The low levels of the
visual processing stream seem to be unable to reserve spare
(unallocated) processing capacity that could be deployed
without any occurrent cost. Therefore, processing capacity
is fully allocated even when subjects are faced with the
simple displays in the Carrasco studies. When attention is
captured at a certain location overlapping with one of the
stimuli, and extra resources get allocated to the processing
of this stimulus, then resources from other locations must be
withdrawn.</p>
        <p>
          The claim that the limited processing capacity of low
level visual perception is always fully allocated finds plenty
of support in the literature. For example,
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref30">Treisman (1969)</xref>
          suggests that  “we tend to use our perceptual capacity to the
full on whatever sense data reach the receptors”
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref30">(Treisman,
1969, p. 296)</xref>
          . The idea here might be that active inhibition
is unavailable for low level perception, so “the nervous
system is forced to use whatever discriminative system it
has available, unless these are already fully occupied with
other tests or inputs”
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">(Lavie, 1995, pp. 452-453)</xref>
          . Indirect
evidence might further be provided by
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">Lennie (2003)</xref>
          who
claims that the sensory cortex is “among the most active
metabolically”  
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">(Lennie, 2003, p. 496)</xref>
          , i.e. it seems to be
much more active than other parts of the cortex with
comparable number of neurons. A possible source of further
support might be the observation that even in no stimulus
conditions the spontaneous activity of the primary visual
cortex is very strong and coordinated, resembling stimulus
(natural scene) evoked activity
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">(Berkes, Orbán, Lengyel, &amp;
Fiser, 2011)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>To sum up, selection effects do not necessarily follow
from the deployment of extra processing, but whenever a
(sub-)system operates near its capacity limit selection
effects will always occur. As the Carrasco studies, energy
considerations, or observations related to spontaneous
activity suggest, early vision might very well be such a
subsystem. If so, then shifts in attention are always
accompanied by the re-distribution of the limited processing
capacity of low level visual perception—it will be fully
allocated all the time, but slightly differently: the actually
attended location will receive more resources, the actually
unattended locations will receive less resources.</p>
        <p>
          Finally, note that this picture is compatible with the active
inhibition of unattended stimuli
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(Cerf, Thiruvengadam,
Mormann, Kraskov, Quiroga, Koch, &amp; Fried, 2010)</xref>
          , since
active inhibition is, in fact, a tool for resource withdrawal.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-4">
        <title>DEP, Modulation, and Selection: an Overview</title>
        <p>According to DEP, attention is the deployment of extra
processing capacity. Since the processing capacity in
question is, in fact, the set of available energy resources
required for spike generation, the deployment of extra
processing capacity results in enhanced representational
encoding. Enhanced representational encoding is a form of
modulation, so modulatory effects straightforwardly follow
from the deployment of extra processing capacity.</p>
        <p>If the system operates near limit (i.e. if the resources are
always fully allocated), then the deployment of extra
processing capacity will lead to the withdrawal of
processing capacity from unattended stimuli (via, say, active
inhibition). The withdrawal of some processing capacity
from unattended stimuli decreases the quality of the
representational encoding of these stimuli. Diminished
representational encoding of unattended stimuli is equally a
form of modulation, but it is also a form of selection: it is
what is called partial (or incomplete, or inefficient)
selection.</p>
        <p>Finally, if the attended stimulus consumes all processing
capacity then there is no residual capacity that could spill
out to unattended stimuli, so unattended stimuli are not
processed at all. They are stopped being representationally
encoded. This is the case of full-blown selection.</p>
        <p>In other words, if we accept DEP and the further
assumption about the near-limit operation of at least certain
perceptual sub-systems, then we become able to explain
both the modulatory effects and the selective nature of
attention. Therefore, since SV fails to explain why attention
entails the modulation of signal processing, DEP is
preferable because of its greater explanatory scope.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Perception and Cognition in the Light of DEP</title>
      <p>
        In this section, we would like to point out that attention, as
defined by DEP, is a natural ally of modern approaches to
higher cognitive processes, especially the functioning of
working memory. Working memory is generally thought of
as the site where information conveyed by the senses and
processed by the perceptual system is brought together and
gets evaluated in accordance with the needs of ongoing
tasks
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">(Baddeley, 2003)</xref>
        . Within this context, attention is
often seen as the gateway to this site—as the set of
mechanisms responsible for selecting which bits of
information can gain access to working memory
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">(Knudsen,
2007)</xref>
        . Moreover, it has recently been argued that there is a
significant overlap between attentional and working
memory functions
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18 ref2">(Awh, Vogel &amp; Oh, 2006; Gazzaley &amp;
Nobre, 2012)</xref>
        . In the light of these results, it is timely to
reconsider whether the way we think about attention
matches our most up-to-date accounts of working memory.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Slot vs. Resource Models of Working Memory</title>
        <p>
          Perhaps the most characteristic feature of working memory
functions is that they are of limited capacity. In recent years,
the nature of this limited capacity has hotly been debated
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23 ref24">(Luck &amp; Vogel, 2013; Ma, Husain &amp; Bays, 2014)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>
          Classically, the limited capacity of working memory is
interpreted as a limit in the number of discrete
representations that can actively be maintained to serve the
needs of ongoing tasks. The observations according to
which working memory is able to hold only 3-7 items at
once
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">(Cowan, 2001)</xref>
          is typically modelled by a slot-based
account: working memory has a fixed number of slots that
can store object or feature representations such that when an
object representation gets into a slot the object will be
remembered, and when it does not the object will not be
remembered at all
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">(Luck &amp; Vogel, 2013)</xref>
          . That is, if the
number of items in the input is greater than the fixed
number of slots then no information will be stored in
working memory about the items that do not get into one of
the slots.
        </p>
        <p>
          Contrary to this, resource models conceptualise working
memory as a limited resource that can flexibly be
distributed between all the items in the input
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Bays &amp;
Husain, 2008)</xref>
          . The more resource is allocated to a particular
item, the better the quality of the working memory
representation of the item will be. That is, resource models
shift the emphasis from the number of items that can be
stored in working memory to the quality or precision of the
memory trace of the items in question. The flexibility of
resource allocation makes it possible to store enhanced
quality representations of prioritised items while
maintaining low quality representations of other items
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24 ref4">(Bays
&amp; Husain, 2008; Ma, Husain &amp; Bays, 2014)</xref>
          .
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Attention and Working Memory</title>
        <p>Note that SV with its item-based attentional shifts is a quite
good match for classical slot-based accounts of working
memory. Attention, according to SV, operates over
information processing channels that process characteristics
of individual physical features or objects. In this context,
selecting a channel and blocking others amounts to passing
on information about certain features or objects while
filtering out others—providing ideal input for the fixed slots
of working memory. The feature or object the information
of which can get through the bottleneck will be represented
in working memory, whereas those that are screened off will
not be remembered. Similarly, shifting attention from one
feature to another means that the filtering mechanism gets
repositioned to the corresponding information processing
channel passing on information about a new feature and
blocking others—providing just the right sort of input to fill
up another slot of working memory. That is, slot-based
accounts of working memory and attention as defined
within SV are natural allies. Attention as it is jumping in
shifts from one feature or object to another delivers exactly
that kind of information that is going to end up in working
memory. Slots store what attention selects.</p>
        <p>
          Resource models of working memory break with the
notion of all-or-nothing representational encoding. They
claim that working memory can and often does maintain
partial (low quality) information about items that are not
necessarily given priority in accordance with actual task
demand. Note that by making this claim, and especially by
anchoring the notion of the limit of working memory to
resources required for creating quality representations,
resource models of working memory commit themselves to
the very same principles that underly DEP. Also note that
the emphasis of DEP on the continuous and flexible
reallocation of these resources is also shared by the resource
models of working memory. In fact, it seems that the very
mechanism that DEP points out as the implementation of all
attentional effects, is also able to implement the functioning
of the working memory as recent resource models describe
it. Reported overlap between attentional and working
memory functions
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18 ref2">(Awh, Vogel &amp; Oh, 2006; Gazzaley &amp;
Nobre, 2012)</xref>
          thus might very well be due to a common
mechanism responsible for the implementation of both sets
of functions: as attention enhances the quality of
representational encoding of certain features via the
allocation of extra processing capacity, it becomes possible
for working memory to maintain more detailed and less
noisy representations of these features, which, then, results
that they can be recalled with more precision.
        </p>
        <p>That is, whereas SV complements slot-based accounts of
working memory quite well, it doesn’t really match modern
resource models. However, DEP re-conceptualises attention
in a way that makes it a perfect fit for this latter approach to
working memory that has become increasingly dominant in
recent years.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Attention, Perception, Cognition</title>
        <p>Finally, let’s step back and take a bird-eye-view of what has
been argued for so far. Seeing the re-allocation of
processing capacity as the fundamental mechanism
implementing attentional effects re-defines the relationship
between attention, perception, and cognition.</p>
        <p>First, it is an essential feature of perceptual processing
that its resources get continuously re-allocated. In the course
of this re-allocation the processing of certain stimuli receive
extra capacity making these stimuli the attended ones.
Attention, thus, is not an extra mechanism working on top
of perception (as the traditional SV claimed it to be), but
rather an aspect or a result of how perception itself works.
That is, attentional effects are just aspects of the natural
unfolding of how the perceptual system does what it does.</p>
        <p>Second, recent approaches to working memory teach us
that even higher cognitive functions share the common
characteristic of flexibly allocating processing resources. It
seems, thus, that the fundamental principles our proposal
points out underlie a broad range of mental processes from
attention through perception to cognition.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This work was supported by the FWO Postdoctoral
Fellowship 12B3914N and the DFF - EU MCA - COFUND
Mobilex grant 1321-00165 (PF), and the EU FP7 CIG grant
PCIG09-GA-2011–293818 and the FWO Odysseus grant
G.0020.12 (BN).</p>
    </sec>
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