Intentionality in action Chairperson Cristina Becchio (cristina.becchio@unito.it) Department of Psychology, University of Turin, and Department of Robotics, Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Italian Institute of Technology, Italy Speakers Andrea Cavallo (andrea.cavallo@unito.it) Department of Psychology, University of Turin, Italy Antonia Hamilton (a.hamilton@ucl.ac.uk) Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, UK Dimitrios Kourtis (Dimitrios.Kourtis@UGent.be) Department of Experimental psychology, Ghent University, Belgium Sasha Ondobaka (s.ondobaka@ucl.ac.uk) Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging and Sobell Department of Motor Neuroscience and Movement Disorders, University College London University College London, UK The ability to interpret and predict the behavior of other Decoding intentions from kinematics: when people hinges crucially on judgments about the ‘hidden’ mental states become visible intentionality of their actions – whether they act purposefully (with intent) or not – as well as on judgments Andrea Cavallo about the specific intentions guiding their actions – whether they performed a given action with an individual, a social, When we perform actions in daily life, these actions are or a communicative intent. Until recently, direct usually driven by a prior intention. Current accounts, based investigation of these skills has been rare (Baldwin and on a one-to-many assumption, hypothesize that the same Baird, 2001). One obstacle to such investigation has been intention can be achieved with different movements, and the framing of the problem of intention understanding as a more problematically, that the same movement can be used problem of access to mental states which are hidden away in for different goals and intentions (Csibra 2007; Kilner et al. the other person’s mind and therefore inaccessible to 2007; Jacob 2013). However, by means of the study of perception. The supposition has been that intentions are not kinematics involved in reach-to-grasp movements, here I “things that can be seen” (Gallagher, 2008). introduce how and the extent to which intentions are Recent findings challenge this perspective by positing that encoded in kinematics. In other words, I show that from intentions shape movement and are thus specified at a early phases of actions, intentions behind an action play a tangible and quantifiable level in the movement kinematics trivial role in influencing response properties and shaping (Ansuini et al., 2015; Becchio et al. 2010). This raises the movement kinematics during movement execution. Then, intriguing possibility that covert mental state dispositions by taking the ‘action execution’ as a starting point, the may become ‘visible’ in a person’s overt motor behavior inevitable questions is: Is it possible to understand the (Runeson and Frykholm 1983). intentions of others by merely observing their movements? The purpose of this symposium is to consider whether and Do visual kinematics provide a sufficient basis for to what extent our cognitive system has the ability to use discriminating intentions? To answer these questions we intention-from-movement information to understand others’ asked participants to observe video clips depicting reach to behavior. Speakers from neuroscience, psychology, and grasp movements and discriminate between different movement sciences will present their latest findings, intentions. Since they could rely only on kinematic providing a state-of-the-art view of action and intention information to perform the task, we demonstrate that understanding to the audience of the EAP Cogsci 2015 observers are sensitive to early differences in visual Conference. kinematics and can use them to discriminate between movements performed with different intentions. 17 The Joint action modulates the sensorimotor The role of interoceptive and proprioceptive representation of another person’s action: inference in Theory of Mind Evidence from EEG studies Sasha Ondobaka Dimitrios Kourtis Inferring the intentions and beliefs of another is an ability Previous research has shown that the sensorimotor that is fundamental for social and affiliative interactions. A representation of another person’s action may take place substantial amount of empirical evidence suggests that before the onset of the action and may depend on the motor making sense of another’s intentional and belief states (i.e. abilities of the observer and on “social factors” such as the theory of mind) relies on exteroceptive (e.g. visual and bodily and face orientation of the actor. I will discuss EEG auditory) and proprioceptive (i.e. motor) signals. Yet, (electroencephalography) findings from two studies where I despite its pivotal role in the guidance of behaviour, the role investigated triadic social interactions and examined of the observer’s interoceptive (visceral) processing in whether the sensorimotor representation of another person’s understanding another’s internal states remains unexplored. action depends on occasional present and past interactions Predicting and keeping track of interoceptive bodily states – between the actor and the observer, and also on the which inform intentions and beliefs that guide behaviour – distribution of the joint task between two interaction is one of the fundamental purposes of the human brain. In partners. The analysis of 10-Hz mu oscillations showed that this talk, I will focus on the role of interoceptive and observation of an individual action of an interaction partner proprioceptive predictions, prescribed by the free-energy induces greater activation of sensorimotor areas compared principle, in making sense of internal states that cause to observation of the same action of a person performing another’s behaviour. We will discuss how multimodal only individual actions, unless this person had interacted expectations induced at deep (high) hierarchical levels – that with the observer in the recent past. In addition, it is likely necessarily entail interoceptive predictions – contribute to that an observer simulates in advance the action onset of an inference about others that is at the heart of theory of mind. individual action of an interaction partner, but only when the partner is the one who initiates the joint action. These results demonstrate that action representation can be References enhanced by present and past interactions between an actor Baldwin, D. A., & Baird, J. A. (2001). Discerning intentions and an observer and that is influenced by the way a joint in dynamic human action. Trends in cognitive sciences, 5, task is distributed between interaction partners. 171-178. Becchio, C., Sartori, L., & Castiello, U. (2010). Toward you: the social side of actions. Current Directions in Mechanisms of imitation: insights from typical Psychological Science, 19, 183-188 and autistic cognition Gallagher, S. (2008). Direct perception in the intersubjective Antonia Hamilton context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 535-543 Kilner, J. M., Friston, K. J., & Frith, C. D. (2007). Imitation is a ubiquitous human behaviour which provides a Predictive coding: An account of the Mirror Neuron useful model of nonverbal social interaction. Though system. Cognitive Processing, 8, 159-166. imitation is easy to recognise, the cognitive processes Jacob, P. (2013). How from action-mirroring to intention- underlying it are very complex. Here I describe studies of ascription? Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 1132-1141. when and why people chose to copy some actions but not Runeson, S., & Frykholm, G. (1983). Kinematic others. This includes studies of children, adults and people specification of dynamics as an informational basis for with autism. I make a key distinction between imitation of person-and-action perception: expectation, gender action goals (emulation) and imitation of action forms recognition, and deceptive intention. Journal of (mimicry), and suggest that there are different cognitive and Experimental Psychology: General, 112, 585-615. neural mechanisms involved in each. In particular, mimicry seems to be strongly driven by social demands and controlled by brain regions linked to social cognition. I present a neurocognitive model which can account for these findings. Finally, I will present new data on how people imitate and recognise imitation in virtual reality, and will consider how human-avatar interactions can help in the study of social neuroscience. 18