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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>The CERTH-UNITN Participation @ Verifying Multimedia Use 2015</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Christina Boididou</string-name>
          <email>boididou@iti.gr</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Symeon Papadopoulos</string-name>
          <email>papadop@iti.gr</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Duc-Tien Dang-Nguyen</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Giulia Boato</string-name>
          <email>boato@disi.unitn.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Yiannis Kompatsiaris</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Information Technologies Institute</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>CERTH</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="GR">Greece</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Table 1: List of features used in the experiments. Feature set Description TB-base Baseline tweet-based TB-ext Extended tweet-based UB-base Baseline user-based UB-ext Extended user-based FOR Forensic features</institution>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2015</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>14</fpage>
      <lpage>15</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>We propose an approach that predicts whether a tweet, which is accompanied by multimedia content (image/video), is trustworthy or deceptive. We test di erent combinations of quality and trust-oriented features (tweet-based, userbased and forensics) in tandem with a standard classi cation and an agreement-retraining technique, with the goal of predicting the most likely label (fake or real) for each tweet. The experiments carried out on the Verifying Multimedia Use dataset show that the best performance is achieved when using all available features in combination with the agreement-retraining method.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>
        Since social media have gained momentum over the years
as a fast and real-time means of sharing news, a huge amount
of information is constantly owing through it, quickly
reaching massive numbers of readers. Thus, it can easily become
viral and a ect public opinion and sentiment. This has
motivated a number of malicious e orts to spread misleading
content, highlighting the need for fast veri cation. In this
setting, the goal of Verifying Multimedia Use task is to
automatically predict whether a tweet that shares multimedia
content is misleading (referred to as fake) or trustworthy
(real) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. To this end, we make use of the tweet text
content, a set of tweet- and user-based features and multimedia
forensic features for the images embedded in the tweet.
      </p>
      <p>
        In our work, we present an extension of our original
approach [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], combining di erent sets of the aforementioned
features. The conducted experiments include plain classi
cation models and an agreement-retraining method that uses
part of its own predictions as new training samples with the
goal of adapting to the new event. In the next sections, we
present in detail the adopted methodology.
2.1
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>SYSTEM OVERVIEW</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Features</title>
      <p>The approach uses three types of features: a) tweet-based
(TB), which make use of information coming from the tweet
and its metadata, b) user-based (UB), which are computed
using information and metadata about the user posting (or
retweeting) the tweet, c) multimedia forensics features, which
are computed based on the image that accompanies the
tweet. We test two variants of the rst two sets of features: i)
baseline (base), which correspond to the features shared by
the organisers, and ii) extended (ext), which include a few
new features. The forensics features include both the ones
distributed by the organisers and some additional ones.
TB-ext: We extract additional features based on the tweet
text, such as the presence of a word, symbol or external
link. We also use language-speci c binary features that
correspond to the presence of speci c terms; for languages, in
which we cannot manage to de ne such terms, we consider
the values of these features missing. We perform language
detection with a publicly available library1. We add a
feature for the number of slang words in a text, using slang
lists in English2 and Spanish3. For the number of nouns,
we use the Stanford parser4 to assign parts of speech to
each word (supported only in English). For the readability
of the text, we use the Flesch Reading Ease method5, which
computes the complexity of a piece of text as a score in the
interval [0; 100] (0: hard-to-read, 100: easy-to-read).
UB-ext: We extract user-speci c features such as the number
of media content, the account age and others that refer
to the information that the pro le shares. For example, we
check whether the user declares his/her geographic location
and whether the location can be matched to a city name
from the Geonames dataset6.</p>
      <p>Next, for both TB and UB features, we adopt trust-oriented
features for the links shared, through the tweet itself (TB) or</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>1https://code.google.com/p/language-detection/</title>
        <p>2http://onlineslangdictionary.com/word-list/0-a/
3http://www.languagerealm.com/spanish/spanishslang.php
4http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/lex-parser.shtml
5http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flesch_Reading_Ease
6http://download.geonames.org/export/dump/cities1000.zip
the user pro le (UB). The WOT metric7 is a score indicating
how trustworthy a website is, using reputation ratings by
Web users. We also include the in-degree and harmonic
centralities, rankings computed based on the links of the
web forming a graph8. Trust analysis of the links is also
done using four Web metrics provided by the Alexa API9.
FOR: For each image, the additional forensics features are
extracted from the provided BAG feature based on the maps
obtained from AJPG and NAJPG. First, a binary map is created
by thresholding the AJPG map (we use 0.6 as the threshold),
then the largest region is selected as object and the rest of the
map is considered as the background. For both regions, seven
descriptive statistics (maximum, minimum, mean, median,
most frequent value, standard deviation, and variance) are
computed from the BAG values and concatenated to a
14dimensional vector. We apply the same process on the NAJPG
map to obtain a second feature vector.
2.2</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Agreement-based retraining method</title>
      <p>
        The main extension of this system compared to [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]
includes an agreement-based retraining step in order to
improve the prediction accuracy for unseen events. This is
motivated by a similar approach implemented in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] (for the
problem of polarity classi cation). Figure 1 illustrates the
adopted process. In step (a), we build two classi ers CL1,
CL2 based on the training set, each classi er built on
different types of features, and we combine their outputs in a
Semi-Supervised Learning (SSL) fashion. We compare the
two predictions for each sample of the test set, and
depending on their agreement, we divide the test set in two subsets,
the agreed and disagreed samples. These two subsets are
treated di erently by the classi cation framework.
      </p>
      <p>Assuming that the agreed predictions are correct with</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>7https://www.mywot.com/</title>
        <p>8http://wwwranking.webdatacommons.org/more.html
9http://data.alexa.com/data?cli=10&amp;dat=snbamz&amp;url=
google.gr
RUN-1
RUN-2
RUN-3
RUN-4
RUN-5
high likelihood, we use them as training samples to build
a new classi er for classifying the disagreed samples. To
this end, in step (b), we add the agreed samples to the best
performing of the two initial models, CL1, CL2 (comparing
them on the basis of their performance when doing
crossvalidation on the training set). The goal of this method is
to retrain the initial model and make it adaptable to any
speci c characteristics of the new event. In that way, the
model can predict more accurately the values of the samples
for which CL1, CL2 did not agree in the rst step.
2.3</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Bagging</title>
      <p>Due to the unequal number of fake and real tweets, we
exploit only a part of the data while building a model. In
order to take advantage of the whole training dataset, we use
bagging that tends to improve the accuracy of the method,
as it produces predictions using the average result of
numerous predictors. Bagging creates m di erent subsets of
the training set, including equal number of samples for each
class (some samples may appear in multiple subsets),
leading to the creation of m instances of CL1 and CL2 classi ers
(m = 9). The nal prediction for each of the testing samples
is calculated using the majority vote of the m predictions.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>3. SUBMITTED RUNS AND RESULTS</title>
      <p>The ve runs submitted explore di erent combinations
of features and the use of a standard supervised learning
scheme (SL) versus the newly proposed agreement-based
retraining (SSL-AR). The speci c run con gurations are
speci ed in Table 2.</p>
      <p>RUN-1, RUN-2 and RUN-4 are built using a plain classi
cation model. RUN-3 and RUN-5 are built with the
agreementbased retraining technique, in which we build CL1 and CL2
(Figure 1) by using the sets of features speci ed in Table 2.
All models use a Random Forest classi er from the Weka
implementation.</p>
      <p>Table 3 presents the performance of each run. In terms
of F-score, which is the primary evaluation metric of the
task, RUN-5 achieved the best score when using the ext and
the FOR features with the SSL-AR technique. As we observe,
RUN-2 in which the FOR features are added, performed quite
better than RUN-1, which uses just the TB-base features.
Comparing RUN-4 and RUN-5, one may observe the
considerable performance bene t stemming from the use of the
SSL-AR approach, as it is the only di erence between the
two runs (the same sets of features are used). Additionally,
it is important to note the contribution of the ext features,
as RUN-5 (ext) performs better than RUN-3 (base).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</title>
      <p>This work is supported by the REVEAL project, partially
funded by the European Commission (FP7-610928).</p>
    </sec>
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