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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>An Authority Degree-Based Evaluation Strategy for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Andrea Pazienza</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Floriana Esposito</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Stefano Ferilli</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Centro Interdipartimentale per la Logica e sue Applicazioni</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Dipartimento di Informatica</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Universita di Bari</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Abstract argumentation allows to determine in an easy, formal way which claims survive in a con icting dispute. It works by considering claims as abstract entities, and expressing attack relationships among them. However, this level of expressiveness prevents abstract argumentation systems from being directly applied to reasoning processes where the context is relevant. An outstanding example is when a claim is supported by appealing to authority, so that the audience assigns reliability to the claim's justi cation based on the authority's renowned experience in the domain. To handle this, we propose to enrich the classical representation used in abstract argumentation by associating arguments with weights that express their degree of authority. The weights' values de ne their strength in the given domain, which in turn should a ect the evaluation of their degree of justi cation. This paper de nes a strategy to combine these weights in order to determine which arguments withstand in a dispute concerning a given domain. Such a strategy was implemented in the ARCA system, that allows to comfortably set up argumentation problems and solve them using both traditional extension-based semantics and the proposed evaluation approach. ARCA is used to illustrate the proposed strategy by means of sample use cases.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>Argumentation is a major component of our everyday lives, in that we are
continuously faced with con icting information and associated inconsistencies.
Roughly, an argument is a bunch of information (i.e., a set of assumptions ) from
which conclusions can be drawn, based on a number of reasoning steps. The
assumptions used are called the premises of the argument, while its conclusion
(chosen from many possible ones) is called the claim of the argument. The
support of an argument provides the reason (or, equivalently, a justi cation) for the
claim of the argument. This structure simpli es understanding of the opinions
of other people and helps in the identi cation of fallacies in their reasoning.
People usually argue in turns, by providing arguments and counterarguments to
initial arguments. The winner of the argumentation is the arguer with the last
unchallenged argument.</p>
      <p>Many strategies can be found in the literature for the identi cation of the
successful arguments in an argumentation dispute context. Some such strategies
are based on the so-called Abstract Argumentation Framework, that will be
presented in the next sections. This model of argumentation takes a set of abstract
arguments, i.e., arguments whose internal structure or speci c interpretation is
ignored. The abstract nature of the arguments, and the relationship with
nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms, yield a very simple and quite general model
that allows to easily understand which sets of arguments are mutually
compatible. Unfortunately, abstract system representations are not always suitable to
depict real situations. This is because abstract systems lack of elements which
can empower the representation setting so that con icts can be automatically
identi ed or the strength of a con ict can be determined. For example, the
abstract argumentation framework does not allow to consider the weight of each
argument based on the authority of the person who claims it, which may be
relevant to the proper evaluation process of judging an argument.</p>
      <p>
        Sometimes it may be appropriate to cite an authority to support a position.
This argumentative schema is known as argument from authority, or
\argumentum ad verecundiam" [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ]. Of course, this type of argument can result in a fallacy,
especially if the authority is not really such. For instance, an appeal to authority
can be inappropriate if the person is not quali ed to have an expert opinion
on the argument. However, in general an ad verecundiam inductive argument
(i.e., an argument whose conclusion is claimed to follow not with certainty but
with probability) is not necessarily a fallacy, especially when the relevance of
the referred authority is supported by a renowned and proved experience in the
argued domain.
      </p>
      <p>This work proposes a novel approach to handle these situations, that extends
the abstract argumentation setting by allowing the association of arguments to
weights expressing their reliability. Such weights are assigned on the basis of an
authority degree which takes into account the reliability of the authority who
states the argument in the argued domain. The objective is to overcome the low
level of expressiveness that characterizes the standard abstract argumentation
framework, and to make it able to handle di erent degrees of reliability on the
arguments.</p>
      <p>This paper is organized as follows. The next section recalls useful background
information, including related works. Then, Section 3 introduces the abstract
argumentation framework along with the standard evaluation strategies used in the
process of justifying an argument leading to a conclusion. Section 4 describes the
proposed approach and how it is embedded in the standard abstract evaluation
system, and Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines future work issues.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Background and Related Work</title>
      <p>As a general, informal de nition, argumentation involves the identi cation of
applicable assumptions and conclusions for a given problem under consideration.
In this activity, it often faces con icting information, which results in the need
to evaluate the justi cation for the available conclusions. This, in turn, may
involve comparing arguments, evaluating them in some aspects, and judging a
set of arguments and counterarguments to consider whether any part of them
can be considered as warranted according to some standard principle. In this
context, it can be also safely assumed that each argument has a proponent, who
is the person putting forward the argument, and that each argument has an
audience, who is the group of people reached by the argument.</p>
      <p>
        Probably the foundational and most important philosophical work for the
development of argumentation was made by Toulmin [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ]. In particular, he put
forward the widely accepted de nition for the structure of an abstract argument:
an argument has a conclusion that is inferred from available data, a warrant that
allows one to jump to conclusions, and a possible rebuttal, which is another
argument that disagrees with the original argument. This approach is structural
and, in a sense, logical. However, it does not just provide a comprehensive
account of the logic of argumentation, and furthermore, it does not address many
important questions about how to automate the construction or use of layouts
of arguments.
      </p>
      <p>
        In order to handle arguments systematically, a \formalization" of
argumentation is needed. Many professions implicitly or explicitly explore these issues
and, in facts, put the systematic use of arguments at the heart of their work.
Outstanding examples can be found in the legal, medical, and journalistic
professions. The study of formal argumentation started among critical thinking and
practical reasoning philosophers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref16">14, 16</xref>
        ]. Critical thinking is concerned with
argument identi cation and its evaluation by spotting the weak or missing points
in arguments. Practical reasoning in argumentation is a type of decision making,
in which the arguments are used to determine what is the best course of action
in practical situations, where the knowledge of the world is incomplete.
      </p>
      <p>
        However, the need to go beyond the systematic handling of arguments
motivates the search for techniques that are able to scale up and deal with
substantial and complex problems. Classical logic is appealing as a starting point
for argumentation: it provides a rich representation formalism and powerful
reasoning mechanism. Unfortunately, inconsistency causes problems in reasoning
with classical logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. And, as previously pointed out, argumentation
inherently involves con icting (i.e., inconsistent) information. If the knowledge that is
available for constructing arguments is consistent, then no con icting arguments
can be obtained, and thus no recourse to argumentation is needed.
      </p>
      <p>
        As a partial response to the issue of inconsistency arising in argumentation,
three main approaches to formalization for argumentation have been proposed
in the literature, namely: abstract systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ], defeasible systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], and
coherence systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. The rst two approaches use formalisms that are much less
expressive (as regards both the complexity of information that can be
represented and the complexity of the inferences that can be drawn) than classical
logic, thereby circumventing the problem of inconsistency as manifested by the
\ex falso sequitur quodlibet " rule. The third approach adopts a simple strategy
to improve the problem of inconsistency.
      </p>
      <p>
        In particular, abstract systems build on the seminal proposal by Dung [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. It
is based on the assumption that the structure of a set of arguments and
counterarguments can be expressed by de ning a set of arguments and a binary `attack'
relationship between pairs of arguments. The attack relationship captures the
situation of one argument undermining the credibility of another. This setting
can be represented as a graph, with each node representing an argument and
each edge representing an `attack'. Under this representation, the set of nodes
in the graph is the starting point. Given such a graph, the objective is
determining which subset(s) (called extension(s)) of its nodes (i.e., arguments) can
be accepted. Providing di erent strategies to answer this question corresponds
to de ning di erent argumentation semantics. In other words, the idea of a
semantics is, given an argumentation framework, to specify zero or more sets of
acceptable arguments. Dung also provided a number of semantics, which specify
di erent evaluation strategies ranging from the credulous to the skeptical (see
next section for more details). Also Caminada proposed new extension based
semantics approaches, which produce reasonable results in situations where Dung's
extensions have drawbacks or don't exist [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref5">5, 4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The argumentation literature emphasized the importance of considering
additional criteria, namely preferences, when evaluating arguments in a framework.
Preferences are expressed between arguments and re ect their relative strengths.
In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] a Preference-based Argumentation Framework (PAF) is built to handle
correctly critical attacks in the framework and to re ne the evaluation of
arguments.
      </p>
      <p>
        A rst introduction to weighted attack relations in an argumentation
framework can be found in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ], where a natural extension of Dung's model of
argument systems is investigated in order to propose attacks associated with a
weight indicating the relative strength of the attack. Such a model takes the
name of Weighted Argumentation Framework (WAF). This model was further
explored in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] to check how much inconsistency should be tolerated in a WAF.
This approach permits a much more ne-grained level of analysis of argument
systems than the unweighted case, and can provide useful solutions when
conventional argument systems cannot provide any. Furthermore, in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ] weights are
used for relaxing extensions in order to improve the inferential power of the
argumentation framework, while in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] the authors suggest semirings as a mean to
parametrically represent WAFs.
      </p>
      <p>
        Another early extension of Dung's proposal with weights is Value-based
Argumentation Frameworks (VAFs) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. In the VAF approach, the strength of an
argument depends on the social values that it advances, and the decision about
whether the attack of one argument on another succeeds depends on the
comparative strength of the values advanced by the involved arguments.
      </p>
      <p>
        A more general approach to extending Dung's proposal is that of Bipolar
Argumentation Frameworks (BAFs), which take into account two kinds of
interaction between arguments: a positive interaction (by which an argument can help
or support another argument) and a negative interaction (by which an argument
can attack another argument) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Abstract Argument Systems</title>
      <p>An abstract argument system or Argumentation Framework (AF for short), as
introduced by Dung, is a pair hA; Ri consisting of a set A, whose elements are
called arguments, and a binary relation R A A on A, called attack relation.
Given two arguments ; 2 A, the relation R represents an attack from
against . In general, arguments and are in con ict if argument refutes
argument or if is attacking premises supporting . More precisely, we talk
about:
{ Rebutting, when there is an explicit contradiction between conclusions ; or
{ Undercutting, when argument attacks the applicability of a rule that
supports , without necessarily denying it.</p>
      <p>An AF has a typical representation as a directed graph where nodes are
arguments and edges are drawn from attacking to attacked arguments. Representing
the structure and meaning of arguments at so high a level of abstraction allows
to better focus on properties that are independent from any speci c context, and
makes it applicable to a wide variety of domains. On the other hand, this
formalism lacks of expressiveness, which prevents its direct application in any speci c
domain. Indeed, in order to set up an AF one rst needs to build an underlying
knowledge base, along with mechanisms to generate the set of arguments from
it and determine in which ways these arguments attack each other. Then, once
the AF has been set up, a second issue is how to determine a justi cation state
for the involved arguments and, in particular, how to identify which are the
justi ed ones. Informally, an argument is considered to be justi ed if it survives to
attack relations. Therefore, the next step is to understand which argument is not
defeated from the confrontation with the others. This process, called argument
evaluation, aims at determining the justi cation state of the arguments in an
abstract argumentation system.</p>
      <p>An argumentation semantics is the formal way of determining which
arguments or statements can be considered as justi ed in the argument evaluation
process. Two main approaches to the de nition of argumentation semantics are
available in the literature: the labelling-based one and the extension-based one.
In the former, the idea is to de ne a mapping that associates each argument to
one of a set of labels corresponding to the possible states of argumentsin the
given context. A sensible choice for the set of labels is:
{ in for the accepted arguments
{ out for the rejected arguments
{ undec for unde ned (not accepted or refused) arguments.</p>
      <p>The labeling operation can be seen as the result of the reasoning carried out by
an agent which analyzes the arguments and marks them as justi ed, rejected
or temporarily undecided. One of the bene ts derived from the use of
labellingbased semantics is the possibility of de ning a more re ned defeat-status by
introducing di erent levels of justi cation and rejection (e.g., `very acceptable',
`quite acceptable', `not acceptable').</p>
      <p>In the extension-based approach the idea is to derive, from an AF, an
`extension' E, that is a subset of A representing a set of argument which are
considered as acceptable. These semantics can assign each node to a single status
(unique-status ) or multiple statuses (multiple-status ). The di erence is in the
management of the temporarily undecided state. A multiple-status semantics
can resolve a mutual attack issue by generating two hypothetical solutions in
which the con icting arguments can be alternately assumed as acceptable.</p>
      <p>By considering the expressiveness of the two approaches to semantics, it can
be observed that any extension-based semantics can be equivalently translated in
a labelling-based one by adopting a set of two labels in and out that correspond
to extension membership. Vice versa, in general an arbitrary assignment of labels
cannot be translated in terms of extensions. This is because labellings always
include a label that corresponds to the extension membership, while other labels
are derivable from extension membership and the attack relation. Consequently,
equivalent extension-based de nitions of labelling-based semantics are in general
applicable. This is the reason why extension-based semantics are more widely
exploited in the literature.</p>
      <p>A basic requirement for any extension E is derived from its interpretation as
a set of arguments which can survive together. In other words, if an argument
attacks another argument , one reasonably does not expect to have them
together in the same extension. This corresponds to the concept of con ict-free
that is at the basis of all extension-based semantics.</p>
      <p>De nition 3.1 (con ict-free) Given an Argumentation Framework
AF = hA; Ri, a set S A is con ict-free i @ ; 2 S s.t. R ( attacks ).</p>
      <p>A second requirement corresponds to the need of a set of arguments to resist
the attacks it receives from other arguments by counterattacking them. This
feature is based on the notions of acceptable argument and admissible set.
De nition 3.2 (acceptability) Given an Argumentation Framework AF =
hA; Ri, an argument 2 A is acceptable wrt a set S A i 8 2 A : R )
9 2 S s.t. R ( is defended by S).</p>
      <p>De nition 3.3 (admissibility) Given an Argumentation Framework AF =
hA; Ri, a set S A is admissible i S is con ict-free and 8 2 S is
acceptable wrt S.</p>
      <p>Now suppose that the attackers of an argument are all attacked by an
extension E. Then the attack su ered by is canceled because E is `defending'
, and is reinstated because it should belong to E. This property takes the
name of reinstatement and leads to the following principle:</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>De nition 3.4 (reinstatement principle) Given an Argumentation Frame</title>
        <p>work AF = hA; Ri, a semantics satis es the reinstatement principle i for all
extensions E A it holds that
if is acceptable w.r.t E then
2 E.
Since semantics provide the basis for evaluating the justi cation state of
arguments, one may rst require that the evaluation basis of an AF is not empty.
Some (labelling- or extension-based) semantics may allow many alternative
justi cation states for the arguments. Two main alternatives may be considered for
the notion of justi cation state:
{ skeptical justi cation requires that an argument is accepted in all semantics;
{ credulous justi cation requires that an argument is accepted in at least one
semantics.</p>
        <p>Of course in a unique-status approach credulous and skeptical justi cations
coincide, but in multiple-status approaches typically the credulous justi cation
includes the skeptical justi cation.</p>
        <p>Let us now consider some approaches to determine argumentation semantics
proposed in the literature.</p>
        <p>Complete semantics The notion of complete extension is based on the
principles of admissibility and reinstatement. It is a set which is able to defend itself
and includes all arguments it defends.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>De nition 3.5 (complete extension) Given an Argumentation Framework</title>
        <p>AF = hA; Ri, a set S A is complete extension i S is admissible and @
2 A such that:
{
{
is acceptable wrt S
2= S</p>
        <p>The following semantics build their own extensions referring to the complete
extensions.</p>
        <p>Ground semantics For each AF there exists only one ground extension which
corresponds to the set of arguments that satis es the conditions of admissibility
and that is minimal with respect to the inclusion relation between the
admissible sets of AF. Compared to complete extensions, the ground is the complete
minimal one with respect to set inclusion.</p>
        <p>De nition 3.6 (ground extension) Given an Argumentation Framework AF
= hA; Ri, a set S A is a ground extension i S is admissible and S is a
minimal subset of A.</p>
        <p>Preferred semantics A preferred extension S of an AF is the admissible set
of AF which is maximal with respect to set inclusion. For each admissible set E
of AF there exists at least one preferred extension S such that E S (it can be
also the empty set). Compared to complete extensions, the preferred extension
is the complete maximal one with respect to set inclusion.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>De nition 3.7 (preferred extension) Given an Argumentation Framework</title>
        <p>AF = hA; Ri, a set S A is a preferred extension i S is admissible and S is
a -maximal subset of A.</p>
        <p>Stable semantics A stable extension of an AF is a complete extension which
attacks all arguments that are not its members. Any stable extension is also a
maximal con ict-free set of AF.</p>
        <p>De nition 3.8 (stable extension) Given an Argumentation Framework AF
= hA; Ri, a set S A is a stable extension i
{ S is a complete extension
{ S [ Sdefeated = A
where Sdefeated = f 2 A j
2 E ^</p>
        <p>
          R g
Semi-stable semantics A semi-stable extension [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ] S of an AF is a complete
extension which relies on the idea of maximizing not only the arguments
belonging the extension but also those attacked by it. Any semi-stable extension S is
also a set with maximal range with respect to the inclusion set.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>De nition 3.9 (semi-stable extension) Given an Argumentation Framework</title>
        <p>AF = hA; Ri, a set S A is a stable extension i
{ S is a complete extension
{ S [ Sdefeated is maximal wrt A
where Sdefeated = f 2 A j
2 E ^</p>
        <p>R g
Ideal semantics An extension of an AF is called ideal if it corresponds to the
largest admissible set that is a subset of each preferred extension.
De nition 3.10 (ideal extension) Given an Argumentation Framework AF
= hA; Ri, a set S A is an ideal extension i S is the admissible -maximal
subset of A such that 8Spreferred : S Spreferred.</p>
        <p>Eager semantics An eager extension of an AF corresponds to the largest
admissible set that is a subset of each semi-stable extension. It relies on a concept
that is similar to the ideal semantics, with the restriction that the admissible set
must be in the intersection of semi-stable extensions.</p>
        <p>De nition 3.11 (eager extension) Given an Argumentation Framework AF
= hA; Ri, a set S A is an eager extension i S is the admissible -maximal
subset of A such that 8Ssemi stable : S Ssemi stable.</p>
        <p>
          An ordering relationship exists among the semantics described above [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ].
The ground, preferred, ideal, eager, semi-stable and stable extensions can be all
obtained starting from complete extensions. In particular, each stable extension
is also semi-stable and each semi-stable extension is also a preferred one. Finally,
by de nition, a preferred extension is a complete extension too.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Authority Degree</title>
      <p>The semantics shown above neglect information that, in some cases, may turn
out to be of crucial importance to the argumentation. For instance, the Abstract
Argumentation Framework does not distinguish between rebuttal and
undercutting attacks, in order to provide more e cient computation of extensions. Also,
in some cases, it would be advisable to evaluate the set of reliable arguments
by taking into account the context in which the sentences are claimed, and
speci cally the trustworthiness of those who claim them. Adding quantitative
information becomes of crucial importance when arguments have di erent levels
of strength. Hence, adding a weight to arguments allows to give them the right
strength, so as to represent real dialogues.</p>
      <p>A rst re nement to deal with this scenario could be to distinguish
utterances made by domain experts from those made by novices or by outsiders of
the domain of the argumentation. By domain we mean a context in which a
person is skilled. The more con dent a person within a domain, the higher his
authority in that domain. For example, in a wine and food context, the opinion
or contradiction of a mathematician has a minor signi cance compared to that
of a winemaker of unquestionable professionalism. Conversely, in a mathematical
context the winemaker level of reliability should be less than that of the
mathematician. This degree of reliability might be captured in an Argumentation
Framework by introducing an authority degree associated to nodes, such that
two nodes reporting utterances made by experts in di erent domains will have
di erent weights into attacking the same node. Thus, arguments are partitioned
in domains which re ect the area of expertise of each arguer.</p>
      <p>A second re nement might be to consider the number of attackers and
defenders for a node in the graph. In abstract argumentation terms, the larger the
number of attackers of a node, the more likely it is that it should be defeated,
and, conversely, the larger number of defenders (i.e., of reinstatements) it has,
the more likely it is that it may be admissible.</p>
      <p>
        In general, our proposal is to associate a `social ' weight to attack relations,
preferring large admissible sets which attack external nodes and at the same time
defend their members, rather smaller sets of isolated admissible nodes. In this
setting, the domain-based authority degree works as `normalizer ': it rebalances
weights with the aim of avoiding over-defended conclusions. Another novelty of
our approach is that the authority degree may di er depending on the intended
domain. This is di erent than in PAFs [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], where preferences are taken into
account at the semantics level. That is, instead of modifying the inputs of Dung's
framework, PAFs extend semantics with preferences.
4.1
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Authority Function</title>
        <p>The setting we propose is de ned through a number of functions to be used in
the evaluation strategy of justi cation. In the following, hA; Ri will indicate an
argumentation framework and the authority degree for an argument 2 A
in its domain . A domain function allows us to focus on the most represented
domains in the framework rather than on niche domains:</p>
        <sec id="sec-4-1-1">
          <title>De nition 4.1 (domain function) : A ! R s.t. 8 2 A :</title>
          <p>( ) =</p>
          <p>N
A
j j
with N number of arguments having domain
.</p>
          <p>The domain function acts as a moderator to balance the weights of the
attacking nodes within the argued context. In fact, this ensures that the arguments
in support of the discussed domain have more relevance.</p>
          <p>In the following, we propose three functions which allow to consider the
strength of a group of persons involved in the same domain.</p>
          <p>An attacking function returns the number of attacks launched by an
argument towards other nodes.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-1-2">
          <title>De nition 4.2 (attacking function) fa : A ! N s.t. 8 2 A :</title>
          <p>fa( ) = jU ( )j; where U ( ) = f 2 A j R ^
( )
g</p>
          <p>A defeating function returns the number of attacks an argument su ers from
other nodes.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-1-3">
          <title>De nition 4.3 (defeating function) fd : A ! N s.t. 8 2 A :</title>
          <p>fd( ) = jE( )j; where E( ) = f 2 A j R ^
&lt;
( )g</p>
          <p>A defending function returns the number of attacks su ered by an argument
that are not defended by other su ciently reliable arguments.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-1-4">
          <title>De nition 4.4 (defending function) fr : A ! N s.t. 8 2 A :</title>
          <p>fr( ) = jD( )j; where D( ) = f 2 A j R
^ 9 2 A s:t: R ^
( )
g</p>
          <p>In the last three functions described above, the domain function serves to
support the attacking node in order to contextualize the weight of the attack
compared to the weight of the attacked node.</p>
          <p>Now, let call us each argument 2 A as authority-node wrt an argument
2 A, that argument which launches attacks towards other nodes 2 A such
that ( ) . An authority function measures the degree of an argument
2 A based on the number of attacks launched as authority-node wrt 2 A
and the number of attacks su ered by other arguments being authority-nodes
against it.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-1-5">
          <title>De nition 4.5 (authority function) Let fauthority : N ! N be a function s.t.</title>
          <p>fauthority( ) = fa( ) fd( ) + fr( )
The more attacks launched by 2 A as an authority-node wrt 2 A, the higher
its fauthority; the more attacks it su ers by arguments which are authority-nodes
against it, the lower its fauthority. Intuitively, if the attacks su ered by a node
are defended by other authority-nodes, then its authority degree will depend
only on its successful attacks (i.e. attacks towards less reliable nodes). Indeed,
the su ered attacks, which decrease the value of its authority, are balanced by
the number of attacks from which it is defended by authority-nodes. Hence, the
authority function is used to select the `stronger' admissible set: namely the
most reliable set will be the one with the lower number of nodes such that their
authority function value is maximum. In this setting, none of the classical Dung's
extensions are considered, but only the collection of admissible sets, ordered
according to the value of their fauthority. Then, the smallest admissible set with
highest value of the authority function is chosen as more reliable justi ed set.
Applying a more skeptical semantics may limit the aim of this paper because
we would lose the sense of the domain's weight associated to nodes. In general,
an attack is considered valid if the attacker's authority (decreased by a
domaindependent factor) is higher than the attacked authority.</p>
          <p>Fig. 1 shows an example of a graph depicting an AF. Node labels indicate
the level of authority. Nodes in gray belong to domain 0 and those in white
to domain 00. Due to space constraints, we will determine in the following the
authority degree for node only, using the above functions.</p>
          <p>8
3</p>
          <p>7
4</p>
          <p>9</p>
          <p>Let consider the node , it's domain value for domain 0 is ( ) = 52 = 0:4;
fa( ) = 0 because 3 0.4 = 1.2 s.t. 1.2 8 and 1.2 9;
fd( ) = 1 because 3 &lt; 8 0.6 = 4.8;
fr( ) = 0 because node su ers no attack;
fauthority( ) = 0 - 1 + 0 = -1.</p>
          <p>The authority functions for the remaining nodes are calculated in the same
way. Then, the smallest admissible set, having the maximum sum of authority
functions values for its members, is chosen as the most reliable justi ed subset
of arguments.
4.2</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>ARCA</title>
        <p>The proposed strategy was implemented in the ARCA system (acronym for
Abstract Resolution of Con icts in Argumentation ). ARCA includes a logic
program core which can compute both the classical extension based semantics
and the proposed authority degree-based evaluation of arguments. On top of it,
ARCA provides a graphic tool (see Fig. 2) to enter and display arguments and
attacks in an AF, and to associate to each claim a domain of origin and a degree
of experience in that domain. It also allows to associate and display utterances
associated to arguments and to show nodes with di erent colors denoting their
acceptability according to the di erent semantics. This allows one to easily see
con icts and observe the di erences between di erent semantic extensions.
Let us now show the various features of ARCA using a sample scenario in which
some professionals olive growers are arguing about the most useful criterion of
olive trees pruning. In mature trees, pruning is mainly required to renew the
fruiting surface of the tree and achieve high yields, maintain vegetative growth
of sprouts, maintain the skeleton structure, contain tree size, favor light
penetration and air circulation inside the canopy, permit control of pests and diseases,
prevent aging of the canopy, and eliminate dead wood.</p>
        <p>Three novice croppers, Albert, John and Jack, are expressing their point of
view, according their own (limited) experience:
1. Albert: \When in doubt, less pruning is better."
2. John: \Not all trees in a grove need to be pruned every year."
3. Jack: \Pruning should be rapid and simple."</p>
        <p>Samuel, a renowned expert olive grower, counterargues all three statements
according to his large experience: \The type of pruning must be adjusted in
relation to plant age, training system, crop load, product use, environmental
conditions, soil fertility, and farm structure." Thus, Samuel's opinion has more
relevance than those of the three novice growers. Hence, his authority degree
is such that the attacks he is su ering have no e ect in the argumentation. In
fact, Fig. 3 shows that, among all admissible subsets, the one with higher rank
is precisely the set containing Samuel's (winning) argument.</p>
        <p>Now, suppose Julian, an agronomist, takes part in the discussion. As a person
with special knowledge in soil management and eld-crop production, he explains
in which direction new techniques in this domain are going and, therefore, which
strategy is better to accomplish all aims: \Current tendency is to prune olive
trees as little as possible, so as to reduce costs substantially and simplify
pruning management." This sentence attacks Samuel's claim and generates circular
con icts between Julian's claim and the novice growers' statements. Since
Julian has less practical experience in pruning olive trees, his claim has less weight
in the argumentation. In this situation, the evaluation of extension-based
semantics and the ARCA solution are quite di erent. In skeptical extension-based
semantics such as Semi-Stable and Stable extensions (Fig. 4 (a)), the
admissible undefeated set of arguments includes both the claims of novice growers,
and the agronomist's one. In the ARCA solution (see Fig. 4 (b)), the weight of
the agronomist in the argumentation is such that his argument is undefeated,
despite his weight is lower than Samuel's one in the argued domain.</p>
        <p>Suppose now that Samuel counterattacks also Julian's claim with another
argument: \Pruning should be more severe on old trees and trees of low vigor
than on young plants, or on trees growing in irrigated conditions and in fertile
soils. The authority weight of Samuel's last argument determines the winning
arguments in the ARCA solution. Indeed, in Fig. 5 the two arguments expressed
by Samuel are a subset of admissible elements which has a higher rank in the
ARCA solution.</p>
        <p>This sample scenario clearly shows how the weighted evaluation strategy
of justi ed arguments may lead to more reliable and sensible results when the
context domain is relevant.
5</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Conclusions and Future Work</title>
      <p>Abstract Argumentation is a formal approach to de ne which claims withstand
in a dispute, in which the only expressed property is a binary `attack' relation
representing the rebuttal of an argument to another. The aim is determining an
evaluation strategy that allows to justify con icting arguments. While several
such strategies have been de ned, not always they are useful or sensible. This is
due to the low level of expressiveness of abstract systems which doesn't allow to
represent all relevant contextual situations. E.g., using an appeal to authority,
claims may have di erent weights in the discourse, and justi cations might be
evaluated di erently. In turn, the weight of a claim depends on the degree of
experience (i.e., the authority) of the person expressing it in a particular domain.
This work proposed a novel evaluation strategy which may take into account
the authority degree of arguments in a given domain in order to understand
which arguments survive in a debate. It was implemented in the ARCA
system, that allows easily to set up abstract argumentation frameworks and solve
justi ed arguments with both classical extension-based semantics and the
proposed authority-weighted approach. A sample scenario is used to illustrate how
ARCA works and how the proposed strategy is useful to best handle a real-world
argumentation problem in which the reliability of claims is signi cant.</p>
      <p>As future work, we will investigate the adoption of modal logics depending
on the actor's domain membership. E.g., deontic logic in legal eld or
temporal logic in historical-literary eld. We would also like to implement
(semi)automatic analysis of arguments expressed in natural language, so as to help
the users of ARCA in setting up their argumentation frameworks. Speci cally
concerning the use of weights, we would like to extend the abstract model with
the use of Value-based Argumentation Frameworks in which the justi cation of
an argument depends on the social values that it advances, and the process of
justi cation of one argument depends on the strength of the values involved in
the argumentation. Also the extension to Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks
will be considered, so as to distinguish the sense of `support' to an argument
from the sense of `defense' of an argument.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This work was partially funded by the Italian PON 2007-2013 project
PON02 00563 3489339 `Puglia@Service'.</p>
    </sec>
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