In several subject domains, the categorization scheme itself is part of the subject matter. In this case, experts make use of categories of categories in their accounts. This has led to a number of approaches in conceptual modeling and knowledge representation that are called multi-level modeling approaches. An early approach for multi-level modeling is the powertype pattern which introduces “power types” and “base types”. More recently, other proposals for multilevel modeling include “clabjects”, “m-objects”, which admit the existence of entities being somehow, simultaneously, types (classes) and instances (usually associated to objects). Regardless of the choice of approach to perform multi-level modelling, a question remains concerning the ontological status of “base types”, “power types” and “clabjects”. This paper aims to address this question through an ontological analysis. We use here the general term powertype to generally refer to types whose instances exhibit somehow both type-like and instance-like characteristics. We examine alternative accounts for powertype instances: (i) powertype instances as universals (abstract repeatable entities), (ii) powertype instances as mereological sums of instances of an associated type and (iii) powertype instances as variable embodiments. We conclude that the latter is the most promising account for an ontological interpretation of this phenomenon that meets the modelling desiderata for powertypes present in the literature.
In several subject domains, the categorization scheme itself
is part of the subject matter. In this case, experts make use
of categories of categories in their accounts. For instance, in
the domain of human resource management, organizations
are often staffed according to employee types (e.g.
“Engineer”, “Pilot”, “Secretary”). Managers may need to
distinguish between different kinds of employee types giving rise
to types of employee types. For instance, “Engineer” and
“Pilot” could be considered as examples of “Technical
Employee Type”, as opposed to “Secretary” which is an
example of “Administrative Employee Type”. At the same
time, managers may need to track the allocation of
personnel to specific departments (e.g. John is an engineer in the
Maintenance Department). So, within the same
conceptualization they need to represent entities belonging to different
(but nonetheless related) classification levels, such as
individual persons (“John”), employee types (“Engineer”,
“Pilot”, “Secretary”), and types of employee types (“Technical
Employee Type”, “Administrative Employee Type”). Other
examples of multiple classification levels come from
domains such as software engineering [
The need to support the representation of subject
domains dealing with multiple classification levels has given
rise to what has been referred to as multi-level modeling [
An example of an early approach for multi-level
modeling in software engineering is the powertype pattern [
Regardless of the choice of approach to perform multilevel modelling, a question remains concerning the ontological status of “base types”, “power types” and “clabjects”. We henceforth use here the general term powertype to generally refer to types of a subject domain whose instances exhibit somehow both type-like and instance-like characteristics. This paper aims at clarifying the ontological nature of powertypes by analyzing the nature of their instances. We examine alternative accounts for powertype instances innected to a particular type T then the instances of P are the explicit subtypes of T present in the model. The relation that connects T and P is a regular UML association, labeled here “is classified by”, saying that the instances of T are classified by instances of P. In the model of Fig. 1, the powertype Bird Species is connected to the type Bird by being referred to in the generalization set specializing Bird and containing the subtypes Golden Eagle and Emperor Penguin. Hence, Golden Eagle and Emperor Penguin are instances of Bird Species. Moreover, each instance of these types (e.g., Pat and Joe) is classified by some instance of Bird Species. For instance, Pat (which instantiates the type Emperor Penguin) is classified by an instance of Bird Species also named Emperor Penguin, which is supposed to be the reification of the Emperor Penguin type.
«kind» Person «kind»Bird age height
* :Bird Species Emp«esruobrkPinedn»guin Go«lsduebnkiEnda»gle
Instance of Instance of
Pat Joe ahgeiegh=t1=y6e0arcm hageiegh=t3=y3e5arcm «role» Discoverer «powertype»
Bird Species number of living instances average height 1 lmifeigeraxtpioenctpaenrcioyd
beak pattern is classified by
Instance of
Instance of
Golden Eagle number of living instances = 10.000.00 average height = 50 cm life expectancy = 5 years migration period = december until march beak pattern = ...
1
«mediation» {disjoint,complete}
Emperor Penguin number of living instances = 5.000 average height = 60 cm life expectancy = 10 years migration period = january until february beak pattern = ...
1..*
cluding interpreting them as: universals (abstract repeatable
entities) [
In this section, we make use of a running example to
illustrate a number of notions that appear in the literature of
conceptual modeling associated to powertypes. In this
running example, depicted in Figure 1, we use a case of
biological species. The modeling of biological species (and
animal breeds alike) is known for exhibiting this type of
phenomenon, and is often evoked as a typical example in
the literature (see, e.g., “tree species” in [8] and “dog
breed” in [
Figure 1 uses a UML class diagram to represent our running example. In this figure, we have the type Bird that is specialized in two subtypes, namely, Emperor Penguin and Golden Eagle. According to this model, particular birds have a particular age and a particular height. Two instances of Bird in this model are Pat (a particular Emperor Penguin) and Joe (a particular Golden Eagle). This model uses the so-called powertype pattern, which is incorporated in the UML [8]. The two subtyping relations between the latter types and Bird are part of a generalization set related to the powertype1 Bird Species. If a powertype P is con1The actual stereotype «powertype» has been deprecated in the UML 2.0 version. The notion of a “type whose instances are types” itself remains in the language. We use the stereotype here in Fig. 1 merely to call attention to the type in the model that is representing this notion. It is also important to highlight that the name “powertype” is a misnomer, given that it does not have the expected properties that one would associate with a «phase» «phase» «phase» «role»
Least Concern Species Threatened Species Extinct Species Recognized Bird Species Note that instances of Bird Species have specific properties (i.e. provide specific values) for all the general properties that characterize the type Bird Species. For instance, Golden Eagle, the type, may have a number of living instances = 10.000.000, an average height = 50 centimeters, a life expectancy = 5 years, etc. Given that UML does not provide us with a means to represent these properties graphically in class diagrams, we have used the instance specification notation in Figure 1 (which is actually part of the object diagram) to make these properties explicit for Golden Eagle and Emperor Penguin as instances of Bird Species. Notice that these are not properties of particular Birds (e.g., Joe does not have an average height, or a number of living instances), but properties of each species of Birds as a whole.
Indeed, properties such as number of living instances or average height are properties of instances of Bird Species that result from properties of the instances of Bird (e.g., the average height of a particular species – Golden Eagle – is derived from individual heights of particular instances of Golden Eagle). We provisionally term these properties resultant properties of the species. powerset. We maintain the name here, however, for the sake of reference to the original UML terminology.
In contrast, properties such as beak pattern for Bird Species or maximum speed for a car model capture regularities over the instances of a particular type. For instances, when representing that the Volvo XC90 type has a maximum speed of 300 Km/h, we are capturing that all instances of such type have the particular capacity (disposition, power) of driving at most 300 km/h. To be precise, the Volvo XC90 type does not have a maximum speed at all; it has the property of having instances that have that property. In other words, it has the property of bestowing to all its instances the capacity of driving at that speed. We term here these properties regularity properties.
Finally, a property such as being an Officially
Recognized Bird Species or being Elected the fastest Car in
Europe in 2015 are properties of yet a third kind. For
instance, being Officially Recognized Bird Species is a
property of the type Golden Eagle and not a property that any
individual instance of Golden Eagle has. We provisionally
term these properties direct properties. Direct, Resultant
and Regularity properties are frequently used in the
literature of conceptual modeling and knowledge representation
as stereotypical properties inhering in instances of
powertypes [
Now, we would like to call attention to modal issues
involving instances of powertypes which should be reflected
in an ontologically well-founded conceptual modeling and
knowledge representation approach, particularly: (i) the
existence of contingent types that classify instances of
powertypes (specializations of Bird Species in the
example) and (ii) the possibility of qualitative change happening
to instances of powertypes. These issues are representative
of problems in Conceptual Modeling, Knowledge
Representation and Ontology Engineering for modeling
powertypes. In fact, they should be taken as part of a
modeling desiderata that should be addressed if we want to
faithfully represent those domain elements that in the
literature are typically modeled by using powertypes (or
powertype-like notions such as clabjects [
Note in our running example that the type Bird Species
is instantiated by its instances necessarily (in the modal
sense), i.e., an instance of Bird Species (e.g., Golden
Eagle) is necessarily a Bird Species. These are termed in the
literature Rigid types [
In contrast with rigid types, instances of anti-rigid types can move in an out of the extension of that type without ceasing to exist. Moreover, there are anti-rigid types termed phases, whose instances move in all of their extension due to a change in one or more of its intrinsic properties. For instance, analogous to the manner in which Adolescent is defined as phase of Person characterized by the intrinsic property age (i.e., an Adolescent is a Person that falls within a certain age range), Threatened Species is a phase of a Bird Species characterized by the intrinsic property number of living instances. Furthermore, there are anti-rigid types termed roles, whose instances move in all of their extension due to a change in one or more of its relational properties. For instance, analogous to the manner in which Employee is defined as role of Person characterized by an Employment context (i.e., an Employee is a person that participates in an Employment relationship with an Employer), Recognized Species is a role of a Bird Species characterized by an official Discovery Entitlement. Finally, we have that a Discovery Entitlement is an entity that is multiply existentially dependent on both the discovered species and on the person playing the role of the discoverer of that species. Entities such as Discovery Entitlement are termed relators in the literature [15].
Languages such as UML and OWL are oblivious to
these modal notions, which are fundamental for conceptual
modeling and ontology engineering [
Understanding the relation between Emperor Penguin or Golden Eagle as subtypes of Bird (henceforth, for simplicity, Penguin-T and Eagle-T) and Emperor Penguin or Golden Eagle as instances of Bird Species (henceforth, for simplicity, Eagle-I and Penguin-I) amounts to a large extent to understanding the ontological nature of powertypes and their instances. Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said for the relation between the instantiation relation between, say, Joe and Eagle-T and the “is classified by” relation between Joe and Eagle-I. Exploring the ontological nature of these notions is the goal of following sections.
For instance, suppose that Eagle-I and Penguin-I are
universals. By universals here we mean, the so-called realist
view on universals, i.e., that universals are abstract
predicative terms that are repeatable across multiple instances.
This view includes the conception of universals as
“patterns of features that are not related to time and space”
[17], the view that complex universals are fully determined
by an axiomatic specification involving a number of other
universals representing its essential features [18], as well
as the view that universals are fully determined by the
higher-order types they instantiate [
Now, if the relation between Eagle-T and Eagle-I is one
of identity, we have that: (i) Eagle-I is an abstract universal
(a type); (ii) the relation of instantiation is identical to the
relation “is classified by”; (iii) Bird Species is a
higherorder universal, i.e., an abstract universal whose instances
are abstract universals. This interpretation seems to be the
one favored by authors such as Odell [
Higher-Order universals are controversial in philosophy.
Philosophers of the so-called Elementarist guise reject
them [19], and even those that accept their existence seem
to accept only the existence of formal higher-order
universals (as opposed to material ones). For instance, in his
classical book on the subject [
Now, even if one accepts the existence of higher-order universals, there are other reasons for rejecting that entities such as Eagle-I and Penguin-I are abstract universals at all. The reason is that we would like to represent possible changes that these entities can undergo, i.e., these entities can suffer qualitative changes and still remain the same. For instance, biological species can move to an endangered species phase (e.g., being extinct is a contingent property of dinosaurs), they can change migration periods and life expectancies. Moreover, we would like to represent that these entities can bear both essential and accidental properties and, hence, that these entities could have been different from what they are, i.e., that there can be cross-world identity for entities such as Eagle-I and Penguin-I. Finally, we would like to represent that an entity such as the species Penguin-I exists only contingently, begins to exist in a given point in time and can cease to exist. Mutatis Mutandis, we can say the same for social roles or any nominal kind for that matter.
In summary, the problem that we have with this first
interpretation is that, in the standard ontological
interpretation of universals (as repeatable abstract entities) [
In the previous section we have attempted at an interpretation instances of powertypes as abstract universals. We have concluded that it is an undesirable interpretation and that under that interpretation Eagle-I and Penguin-I cannot be identical to entities such as Eagle-T and Penguin-T, respectively. This is because, ontologically speaking, they bear incompatible ontological meta-properties. Entities of the latter kind are abstract fully determined entities and, as such, have no spatiotemporal properties, are incapable of change and, hence, incapable of being different from what they are. In contrast, entities of the former kind seem to have contingent properties. This motivates us to look for an alternative interpretation for them.
In this second interpretation, entities such as Eagle-I and Penguin-I are considered mereological sums, and entities such as Eagle-T and Penguin-T (again) as universals. The relation between Eagle-I and Eagle-T is the following: Eagle-I is a collective defined by the mereological sum of the instances of Eagle-T, i.e., entities such as Eagle-I are the population of the extension of types such as Eagle-T.
This second interpretation seems at first to be rather intuitive. Under this view, an instance of Bird Species such as Eagle-I is an Eagle collective that has as members exactly the instances of the type Eagle-T. In fact, for each subtype S of Bird, we can have a collective C such that ∀ x(x::S ↔ memberOf(x,C)). Moreover, as discussed in depth in [20], the member of relation has a number of properties shared with the instantiation relation, namely, it is an irreflexive, asymmetric and anti-transitive relation. Additionally, resultant properties of instances of a powertype (e.g., number of living instances, average height, life expectancy) seem at first to be indeed properties of a population/collective.
This view, however, also faces some challenges. Firstly, as a mereological sum, Eagle-I has an extensional identity criterion. As a consequence, any change in its membership would create a different individual. In other words, when Joe is born or when it dies, it would create a new Golden Eagle species. This seems to be an absurd conclusion. We would not want the species Golden Eagle (Eagle-I) to necessarily change at each variation of the extension of the type Golden Eagle (Eagle-T). Of course, the population of Golden Eagles changes. But this seems to be an indication that Eagle-I (the species) is not the same as the Golden Eagle population (the collective).
Secondly, a mereological sum depends on the existence of at least one its members in order to exist. However, Eagle-I can exist in an extinct phase having the property number of living instances = 0 and having no members at all! In this case, if Eagle-I is a mereological sum of instances, it would not exist at all, instead of existing in that particular phase and having that particular property.
One way out of this situation would be to have Eagle-I to be not the sum of the extension of Eagle-T at a given world, but the sum of the union of the extension of Eagle-T in all possible worlds. In other words, Eagle-I is the sum of all possible eagles that ever existed, will ever exist and could possibly have existed or possibly will exist. As defended, for instance, by [21], our psychological conception of a type seems to account for an extension that considers all its possible instances.
This move solves the first of our previous objections: Eagle-I would not change when Joe comes into existence since, being a possible Golden Eagle, Joe is already a member of Eagle-I. This amendment, nonetheless, faces challenges of its own. In particular, it does not meet our criteria for having Eagle-I as an entity that can qualitatively change maintaining its identity and could have been different from what it is. As the sum of all possible individuals of that type, Eagle-I is (by definition) always the same in all possible worlds! Hence, it cannot go through phases; it cannot change any of its properties; it cannot exist having no living instances (i.e., it cannot exist as an extinct species).
In order to advance towards an ontological interpretation of
powertypes that meets the desiderata discussed in our
second section, we propose a slight variation of Kit Fine’s
Theory of Embodiment. This theory is described briefly in
the sequel. For a complete description of the approach, one
should refer to [
In this theory, Fine starts by recognizing that there is both a formal and a material aspect to parthood. As also put by [22], genuine objects are integral individuals and not mere mereological sums. Integral objects, but not sums, obey a unifying principle that binds all parts together, thus, individuating the whole. This unity principle is akin to what Fine calls the form of the whole. For Fine, a number of individuals “x1…xn standing on a relation R” form a Rigid Embodiment (symbolized as x1…xn/R). For instance, a set of flowers f1…fn standing on the relation of being bunched form a “bunch of flowers”. He then puts forth a number of postulates for rigid embodiments. For instance, a rigid embodiment x1…xn/R exist in world w iff R holds of the xi’s in w; if a rigid embodiment x1…xn/R exist in world w then it is located in p in w iff at least a xi is located in p in w. Moreover, two rigid embodiments x1…xn/R and x1’…xn’/R’ are the same iff xi = xi’ and R = R’, i.e., if they have the same components standing in the very same unifying relation R.
One should notice that an entity such as a Golden Eagle collective in the previous discussion can be seen as a rigid embodiment in Fine’s sense. At any given world w, it is composed of exactly the instances of the type Golden Eagle at w. In other words, the Golden Eagle population at w is the sum of the entities that stand in the relation of being an instance of the Golden Eagle type (Eagle-T) at w. If at any world, the extension of the latter changes, we have a different rigid embodiment (collective, population). However, differently from a mere mereological sum, a Golden Eagle population starts to exist as soon as instances of the type Golden Eagle exist. Moreover, these collectives are unified by a genuine unifying principle, namely, by the closure system defined by the instantiation relation to the type S, i.e., ∀ x,w(x::wS ↔ memberOf(x,C,w)), where C is the collective – e.g., the population of Golden Eagle, S is the appropriate subtype of Bird - e-g., Eagle-T - and x::wS symbolizes that x is an instance of S in w).
In addition to rigid embodiments, Fine proposes the notion of Variable Embodiments. He explains this notion by using the following simple analogy: “We may talk of ‘the water in a river.’ But this phrase may be understood in two rather different ways. On the one hand, it may be taken to signify that given quantity of water that is, at a given time, the water in the river. In this sense of the phrase, the water in the river at one time is rarely, if ever, the same as the water at another time. On the other hand, the phrase may signify a variable quantity of water—that water, whatever it is, that is in the river. It is in this sense of the phrase that we may say that the water in the river is rising, since it is the very same thing that was once relatively low and now is relatively high. I take it that the water in the river in the second sense—what we may call the variable water—is now constituted by one quantity of water and now by another. But what is the variable water? Clearly, it is not any one of the quantities of water that is in the river at any one time. Nor is it the aggregate of all such quantities… In the case of the variable water, there is a function, or “principle,” that determines which quantity of water constitutes the variable water at any given time.”
For Fine, a variable embodiment is thus an individual f that at each world w picks up a particular rigid embodiment according to a given principle F (the rigid embodiment is in this case termed the manifestation of f at w). Fine also defines a number of postulates for variable embodiments, including: a variable embodiment f is present at w iff it has a manifestation at w; if f is present at w then it has the location of its manifestation at w. Furthermore, Fine defines what he calls a transfer principle recognizing that there are a number of properties of the variable embodiment that hold in virtue of the properties possessed by its manifestation at that time.
In the remainder of this paper, we defend the view that instances of powertypes should be interpreted as variable embodiments of particular kind. However, before we do that, one should notice that, under this interpretation, an instance of Bird Species is a genuine endurant, obeying a determinate principle of identity. As an endurant, an instance of Bird Species only contingently exists, it can have essential and accidental properties, it could have been different from what it is. For instance, it is a regularity property of a Bird Species that it has feathers of a certain kind. This is trait of the species itself (that it bestows to the entities it classifies) not a property of its rigid embodiment (the sum of its members in that world). The same can be said for the direct property of being a recognized Bird Species. In contrast, there are resultant properties of the species that are transferred from properties of its rigid embodiments (e.g., average height, number of living instances).
Furthermore, in line with Fine’s theory, a variable embodiment can also fail to be manifested in a given world w. Like we can refer to Aristotle now, although he is not present now (he is not manifested by a sum of parts standing a particular set of complex relations), we can refer to the Dinosaurs now (and state that they have zero living members now) although they are not manifested now.
For a variable embodiment f, Fine calls the principle F selecting the manifestation of f at w the principle of variable embodiment. In our view, this principle should be thought as a principle of individuation and principle of identity supplied by the kind that f instantiates. In other words, deciding what changes an individual can undergo (i.e., its possible different manifestations) while remaining numerically the same individual is exactly the purpose of a principle of identity [23]. This idea is in line with the postulate of identity put forth by Fine for variable embodiments: two variable embodiments f and g are the same iff the principle F (of f) is the same as G (of g). This is in line with the view formalized in [23], with the difference that in the latter there is an explicit acknowledgement that principles such as F and G must be sortal-supplied.
For instance, consider E (e.g., the variable embodiment Eagle-I) an instance of a powertype BS (e.g., Bird Species). Consider that E is associated with a type E’ (e.g., Eagle-T), we have that the principle of variable embodiment F (i.e., the principle of identity) for E is the principle of application of E’, which is in turn the principle of individuation and unity for the rigid embodiments picked up by E in different worlds. For instance, take the type Eagle-T. Associated with this type there is a unique instance of Bird Species that is the variable embodiment associated to Eagle-T, namely, Eagle-I. In each world w, Eagle-I is constituted by a unique rigid embodiment EPi (instance of Bird Species Population) such that EPi is the unique individual constituted by exactly those elements that are instances of Eagle-T in w. Eagle-I, in turn, remains the same individual as long as it picks up rigid embodiments that are constituted exactly by instances of Eagle-T.
One should notice that the type Bird Species in the interpretation defended here truly represents a substance sortal, i.e., a rigid type that provides a uniform principle of identity for its instances [15, 23]. As previously mentioned, two Bird Species are the same iff they have the same principle F of variable embodiment (i.e., the principle of application of the unique type to which they are associated). Moreover, Bird Species is indeed a substantial universal in the sense that its instances are endurants. The advantage of modeling powertypes as substantial universals is that now we can use all the well known and proven design patterns for representing substantial universals [15] for modeling powertypes as well. In particular, instances of these types can instantiate both sortal and mixin types as well as rigid and anti-rigid types (e.g., phases and roles) [15]. As illustrated in figure 1, a particular Bird Species can instantiate different phases in different worlds and can play roles while participating in genuine material relations. The isClassifiedBy Relation If we take this interpretation of instances of powertypes as variable embodiments, then what would be the nature of the isClassifiedBy relation between an individual golden eagle (e.g., Joe) and a variable embodiment such as EagleI? Some of the formal meta-properties of this relation relation can be derived from the particular type of nonstandard “parthood” invoked by Fine in his theory. Fine defines a notion of temporal part of variable embodiment at w derived from the timeless parts of its manifestations at w. For instance, he states that a car x at w is manifested by a sum of car parts standing in a proper automotive relation at w. All parts of the rigid embodiment y, which is the manifestation of x at w, are temporal parts of x at w. It is important to notice that the notion of parthood employed by Fine in this construction does not allow for unrestricted transitivity of parthood. For instance, since the parts of a rigid embodiment must be bound by the unifying relation R (the so-called principle of rigid embodiment), it is not the case that all parts of y at w are parts of x at w, only those parts that are also selected by relation R. In [20], we have shown a similar construction using the notion of integral objects and their unifying relations. In a nutshell, if we have an entity x unified by relationship R that has as parts an entity y unified by relationship R’, then, the parts of y are only parts of x if being unified by R’ implies being unified by R.
Now, let us take the case of species and the materialization relation. Let us suppose that x isClassifiedBy a species X in w, which in turn isClassifiedBy a species X’ in w. For instance, we have Joe, which isClassifiedBy Eagle-I in w, which in turn isClassifiedBy the variable embodiment Bird Species-I in w (constituted in w by the Bird Species that exist in w). Notice that: (i) Joe isClassifiedBy Eagle-I in w iff it is part of the Golden Eagle population in w; (ii) Joe is part of the Golden Eagle population in w iff Joe::Eagle-T; (iii) Eagle-I isClassifiedBy Bird Species-I in w iff it is part of the Bird Species population in w; (iv) Eagle-I is part of the Bird Species population in w iff Eagle-I::Bird Species. Therefore, we have that Joe would be classified by Bird Species-I in w iff Joe::Bird Species. However, this can never be the case because being selected by the principle of application of Eagle implies not being selected by the principle of application of Bird Species, i.e., it is not the case that the unifying principle R of Eagle-I implies the unifying principle R’ of Bird Species-I. Actually, R implies not R’! For this reason, we have that the isClassifiedBy relation is an anti-transitive relation.
We must emphasize, however, that what really characterizes the isClassifiedBy relation is its special purpose in connecting base types, their subtypes and their instances, with powertypes and their instances: if a type T is a base type of a powertype X then we have that: (i) for every subtype T’ of T, there is a unique instance T’X of X such that T’X is associated with T’; (ii) for all elements x, we have that x instantiates T’ iff x isClassifiedBy T’X.
We should highlight that the view that takes entities such
as Eagle-I to be concrete individuals is in line with the
conception of universals as concrete resemblance
structures in the literature of formal ontology [
In the same spirit, in an ontology that allows for the existence of tropes, an individual such as Joe can be considered as a variable embodiment that is manifested by different bundles of tropes (rigid embodiments) in different worlds. As such, the type Eagle itself can be defined as a resemblance structure that is constituted in each world by resembling Eagle-bundles.
We also believe that this move could be repeated for a
level above the level of types such as Red or Golden Eagle.
For instance, in our running example, we certainly could
consider that Eagle-I (the instance of the type Bird
Species-T) materializes Bird Species-I (a instance of
Biological Taxon) that is itself a variable embodiment manifested
by sums of existing species in a given point in time. This
move is the basis to account for cascaded powertypes and
multi-level approaches based on clabjects [
Since the late 1980s, there has been a growing interest in the use of foundational ontologies to provide a sound theoretical basis for the disciplines of conceptual modeling and knowledge representation. This has led to the development of ontology-based conceptual modeling techniques whose modeling primitives reflect the conceptual categories defined in a foundational ontology. Despite the advances in ontology-based conceptual modeling, an ontological account for what we have termed here powertypes (i.e., types whose instances exhibit both type-like and instance-like properties) in multi-level modeling was still lacking. This paper has addressed this gap by proposing that instances of powertypes can be understood using the ontological notion of variable embodiment.
There are two possible considerations that could be made regarding the analysis conducted here. Firstly, one could object that the view of universals referred to in the third section of the paper is a particular view of universals, and that there exist conceptions of universals in which universals are concrete entities that can qualitative change, etc. To the first objection, we would respond that one such a view is the view that interprets universals as concrete resemblance structures. In this view, the primary ontological entities are these resemblance structures; types become ontologically secondary, being mere abstractions extracted from these structures. In our running example, the type Eagle-T represents the principle of application extracted from the ontologically primitive resemblance structure Eagle-I, which, in turn, is unified by a complex notion of resemblance between Golden Eagle trope bundles.
A second possible objection could be one against our statement that mereological sums obey an extensional principle of identity pointing to the existence of nonclassical mereologies. To the second objection, we would respond that one such non-classical mereology is Fine’s theory of embodiments.
In summary, we here outline a view that allows for having types as abstract predicative terms but consider that they do not suffice to capture all aspects of a universal as concrete variable embodiments. Moreover, we consider that these universals have parts, but as variable embodiments they are subject to a non-classical mereology.
Finally, we should mention that our arguments against interpreting powertypes instances as higher-order universals do not necessarily amount to argument against the use of Higher-Order Logics (HOLs) to represent the relations between powertypes, their instances and the instances of their instances. Given that we do not assume a one-to-one correspondence between universals in reality and predicates in our language, the acceptance of higher-order predicates (either representing formal universals or as abstract predicative terms extracted from resemblance structures) does not imply the acceptance of higher-order abstract universals. However, given the challenges imposed by standard semantics of HOL (e.g., non-decidability and the lost of properties such as completeness, compactness and holding of the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem) and the careful work needed for developing alternative semantics, it is not uncommon that one would consider alternative formulations that would include instances of powertypes as reified individuals in the domain of quantification [7]. The approach presented here provides an ontological interpretation for these concrete individuals, which exist in time, can bear modal properties and can qualitatively change while remaining numerically the same.
Acknowledgements. This research is funded by the Brazilian Research Funding Agencies CNPq (grants number 311313/20140, 485368/2013-7 and 461777/2014-2) and CAPES/CNPq (402991/2012-5). Victorio A. Carvalho is funded by CAPES.
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