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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Context-Based Security (and Safety) Meta-Policies for Pervasive Computing Environments: The Case of Smart Homes</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Pravin Shetty</string-name>
          <email>Pravin.Shetty@csse.monash.edu.au</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Seng Loke</string-name>
          <email>swloke@csse.monash.edu.au</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Monash University</institution>
          ,
          <country country="AU">Australia</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Context-based security is an approach for modeling adaptive security solutions based on the situation of use of the system. Security policies in this approach are not static as it used to be in traditional systems. The security actions to be taken are based on the knowledge of the combination of various factors such as the location of the user, the surroundings, time, temperature etc making the security policies more adaptive. The aim of this paper is to present security meta-policies based on an existing approach known as Contextual Graphs and the multilevel access model, which we presented in our previous paper. These meta-policies determine within what contexts actions in other policies should be taken - it is in this sense that we have the notion of other policies “embedded” within the meta-policy. Our approach can be easily used in various smart environments, even for context-aware safety meta-policies. The paper presents their use in a smart home scenario.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1 Introduction</title>
      <p>Computers have become more pervasive and their functionality more transparently
integrated into homes and communities. As a result, new applications have emerged
making everyday living easier for people. Context based security is an emerging
approach for more flexible security solutions. It aims at coping with the security
problems resulting from the high heterogeneity and dynamicity of ubiquitous
environments. It provides a convenient way for modeling security requirements in
complex systems.</p>
      <p>
        The paper presents context-based security policies for a smart home scenario using
contextual graphs developed by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] augmented with details about specific security
actions which relate to other security policies. Hence, we can think of the contextual
graph policy as a meta-policy. The contextual graph approach towards security
policies facilitates ease of understanding and flexibility in defining security policies.
      </p>
      <p>The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the concept
of context-based security. Section 3 discusses the need for context-based security in a
smart home environment. Section 4 describes a brief presentation of contextual graphs
that will be used to model context based security. Section 5 gives an overview of basic
security policies referred to from our meta-policy contextual graph. Section 6
develops a context based security meta-policy for a smart home. In section 7, related
work done is discussed. Section 8 concludes the paper.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2 Context Based Security</title>
      <p>
        In traditional security systems, protected resources such as documents, hardware
devices and software applications follow an On/Off access policy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. On, allows to
grant access and off for denying access [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. This access policy is static and based on
user’s identity. Due to the high mobility of the pervasive systems and the
heterogeneity of devices used, security policies must become more flexible in order to
respond to these highly dynamic computing environments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]. Thus, the security
structure should be sensitive to the varying contexts. The figure shown below gives
the idea behind context based security:
      </p>
      <p>
        As shown in the figure the pervasive
environment is initially controlled by some
security policy depending upon the initial
context at that time [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref5">5, 3</xref>
        ]. Context triggers
denote the dynamic changes that occur in the
environment in the course of time. These
changes ultimately result in the change of the
context leading to a new context. Security
context denotes this new context that has to be
considered while deploying new security
actions as a result of the change. A security
policy indicates the rules and regulations that govern who has the access and who
doesn’t in each type of situation. Thus, the security policy should be flexible enough
to accommodate changing contexts.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1 Security Context</title>
        <p>
          Kouadri and Brézillon [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ] described the security context as: “A set of information
collected from the user's environment and the application environment and that is
relevant to the security infrastructure of both the user and the application.“ Thus, a
security context can be thought of a combination of information at an instant of time
based on which the security policies take appropriate security actions to decide the
access control rights.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>2.2 Context Based Security Policies</title>
        <p>
          The role of a security policy is to recognize valuable system assets and clarify security
responsibilities [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ]. It imposes a set of requirements about the security infrastructure
and defines which kind of security mechanisms need to be implemented in the form of
security actions. Context-based security policies [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ] aim at considering context
explicitly as a guide to deduce which mechanisms to enforce in a particular situation.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3 Need For Context Based</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Environment Like Smart Homes</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Security In</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Context</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Aware</title>
      <p>Smart home is an upcoming example of ubiquitous computing. A communication
infrastructure is installed that allows the various systems and devices in the home to
communicate with each other [16]. In early stages of security, the user needed to
carry smart cards for authenticating himself. But with the introduction of advanced
biometrics with automatic sensing capabilities there is no burden of carrying these
smart cards. As each person’s retina, thumbprint or voice is unique, these features are
used to check the authenticity of the users.</p>
      <p>The design of a smart home needs to take into account not only the form of the
house itself but also the requirements, both generic and specific, of the people who
may live in and visit the house. The security system in smart homes must be adaptive
to the changing situations. The user should be given the right to formulate the security
actions based on the changing context and store it in the database. Thus, the use of
context-based security in smart homes is very important. It gives the security policy
the flexibility to adjust its security actions according to the situational information.
This prevents any unauthorized access to the devices at home. A policy can restrict
access to information or resources based on several factors, including attributes
pertaining to the subject, the resource or the environment [16]. For example, subjects
can be classified into roles such as “resident” or “guest.” Access rights can depend on
the subject’s classification (i.e resident), as well as on his or her actual identity (i.e
parent, child etc.). Access also may be restricted based on the subject’s location, or
based on environmental factors such as the temperature or the time of day. The
sensors sense the combination of all these factors present and the security policy
generates the security action based on the rules stored in the database by the users.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>4 Basic Security Policies</title>
      <p>
        Mobile Ambients first proposed by Cardelli and Gordon [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] and then further extended
by Bugleisi [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ] and Braghin [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] are very efficient to model multilevel security issues.
These three notions are very effective in providing a full proof security solution in the
any computing scenario by stating various security steps to be taken in the
corresponding scenario. On this basis we have in all five cases that form the basic
security policies in this paper. The paper uses them in appropriate scenarios
depending on the context. Thus, the combined use of these five policies and a
contextual graph representing the contexts of use of these policies provides a context
based security solution in pervasive environments. This section briefly describes the
five policies using ambient (representing a boundary of security restrictions) notions.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-8-1">
        <title>Policy1: Authenticate returning mobile agent</title>
        <p>
          When a privileged process (agent or person) leaves the parent ambient (e.g., a host
institution) to execute some external independent activities, it relinquishes its local
privileges and authority within its bounding parent ambient and ambient community. It
exits the parent and might later return to the parent ambient. At this point an
Authentication mechanism is needed to check the authenticity of the returning
original process. Cardelli and Gordon [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8 ref9">8, 9</xref>
          ] suggest that these high-level privileges
must not be automatically restored to the returning agents/processes without first
verifying their identity. This is to preserve the security and integrity of the ambient as
well as the services and resource contained within it.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-8-2">
        <title>Policy2: Fire Wall Access</title>
        <p>So if any agent/process has to enter an ambient, it has to know the name of the
ambient and also posses the capability to enter in it. The functionality of firewall is
achieved with the help of restriction primitives and with the help of anonymity of the
ambient name. Thus without knowing the ambient name, no process or agent can go
out or enter in the parent ambient. This helps in achieving protection of the resources
from unwanted agents. The ambient name could be interpreted as a secret password.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-8-3">
        <title>Policy3: Encryption using shared keys to secure the data while communication</title>
        <p>
          Cardelli and Gordon also put forth the encryption primitives to communicate
between two ambients or between an ambient and a remote agent. These primitives
helped in maintaining the Confidentiality of the message or data. Consider a Plaintext
message M. The encryption of the plaintext message is done with the help of the
encryption key k. The Ciphertext produced is indicated as Mk. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ]. A name can
represent a shared key, as long as it is kept secret and shared only by certain parties. A
shared key can be reused multiple times, e.g., to encrypt a stream of messages. A
message encrypted under a key k can be represented as a folder that contains the
message and whose label is k. It is represented via the ambient k[&lt;M&gt;] [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-8-4">
        <title>Policy4: Security Multi-Levels</title>
        <p>In general, an enclosed ambient environment would typically contain numerous
subambients as well as active processes, agents and information resources. These
groups of subambients within an ambient may be arbitrarily nested and organised in a
hierarchical structure. Ambients and processes which are at the higher level of the
nested structure are responsible for managing resources which are more vital and
important than those which are at lower level. In such kind of multilevel
environments, it is necessary to restrict the access to the flow of information
depending upon the need and the security levels. Information can only flow from
lower levels of security to higher levels and not conversely. A policy for this assigns
levels to users and restricts information flow among the users.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-8-5">
        <title>Policy5: Movement of data and entities through different communities</title>
        <p>
          The multilevel security policy mandatory access control security in the boxed
ambients provided restricted access to information based on the various security levels
in the hierarchical levels. The access is defined by the level at which the agents are
which are predetermined based on their needs. But Braghin [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ] was of the view that
the implementation of mandatory access control security is complex as agents and
processes may move from one security level to another. The agents themselves may be
confidential or may be carrying secure/confidential information. Thus there is no way
of ensuring the agents that they will not be illegally attacked, accessed or executed by
untrustworthy entities at the lower security levels.
        </p>
        <p>
          The Security Boundary [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ] concept put forth by Braghin guarantees absence of
information leakage. According to this concept every high-level data or process
should be encapsulated into a boundary ambient. A boundary ambient can be opened
only when it is nested into another boundary ambient. A policy for this states that the
protected information cannot be read without being contained within some safety
boundary (e.g., physically, an item cannot be viewed in the absence of a bodyguard).
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>5 Contextual Graphs</title>
      <p>
        A contextual graph (CxG)
allows a context-based
representation of a given problem
solving for operational processes
by taking into account the working
environment [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. A contextual
graph treats security actions to be
taken in context based security as a
problem solving process that
allows only safe actions to be taken
by the user as long as s/he
interacts with the devices. Unlike decision tree, contextual graph have no decision
nodes. They have “chance” nodes where a contextual element is analyzed to select the
corresponding path. Also, there are no probabilities [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. Contextual graphs are a
promising approach for the modeling of context-based policies. They give a better
understanding of the security actions to be taken in each situation. Contextual graphs
support incremental knowledge acquisition [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. The security administrator may easily
add/modify secure paths based on new detected breaches. Thus, security policy has
the capacity of evolving by accommodation and assimilation of practices [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
Minimum number of elements has to be added to the context graph whenever a new
policy is inculcated.
The approach of context graph defined in the above section can be effectively used to
model the security policies defined in section 4. Each of the contextual node of the
context graph accounts for existence or non-existence of a single valid context.
Depending upon that, various security actions that act as authentication mechanisms
are taken. The combination of such existence or non-existence of a valid context along
with the various security actions taken manifests the security policies, which in turn
decide the access to the aspired resources. Only paths that result in the access of the
resources are indicated in our approach. The unsuccessful ones depending on the
policies are omitted. This paper will explain the use of such a combination in Smart
Homes. In smart homes there should be two levels of access. First the user has to get
access into the house and then to the various smart devices. This approach will talk
about both these issues. This section is divided into three subsections. The first section
defines the security policy along with its related terms. In the second section we will
talk about how access is granted into the house based on different contextual
information. The third subsection talks about the access the devices from home as well
as from a remote area in a different community.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-9-1">
        <title>2.1 Policy Definition</title>
        <p>This section gives the various types of users associated with the smart home. It also
specifies the various types of contextual information that is going to be used for
implementing the security meta-policy. Finally the various security actions to be taken
depending upon the information received are also stated. All the users need to know the
secret code of the home network to get access to the network.</p>
        <p>Roles: Owner, Child, Other members, Guests, Maintenance staff.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-2">
        <title>Contextual information considered: Role, Location, Time.</title>
        <p>The five policies above are integrated into a contextual graph in that security
actions taken in the graph are those with respect to these policies. The approach gives
safe access to the devices. So anything which is not specified is considered as unsafe
and is denied and hence not shown.</p>
        <p>The Secret code S in the diagram can be considered as a secret name of the smart
home network, which has to be known by each and every person who, wants to enter
the house. In case of guests, the owner is responsible for producing it. This secret code
is similar to the secret name of the ambient in case of ambient terms.</p>
        <p>Security actions: These are the various techniques, which are used for authorizing
the user at the various security points. The security actions are taken in conjunction
with the security policies specified.</p>
        <p>1. SAo: This security action is taken by the security policy when a user departs
from the home network temporarily, curbing all her/his rights. The system gives a
secret password to each user so that his identity can be checked when s/he would
come back again. This security action although not given in the two figures below is
mandatory for all local entities. When they arrive back then they have to revoke their
rights by presenting their identity.</p>
        <p>2. SAi: This security action is taken by the system when a user who had
temporarily departed needs the access to the network. If the location is just outside the
house at the door then the retina and the thumb print scanner checks the identity and
this is enough to validate the local user. If the access place is remote then the user has
to first enter the secret code of the smart home network, which is mandatory for any
user and then the secret password is given to him/her at the time of departure.</p>
        <p>3. SAf1: This security action is required in case of access for some foreign agent
into the network. It prompts the user for her/his password to authenticate her/him-self
to the system. It can either be a normal identification by the scanners when the access
point is the door or a normal password if the access point is at remote location.</p>
        <p>4. SAf2: This security action is required in case of some foreign agent entry into
the network. It helps the user to get into the network. It can be the administrator
authentication in case of door access to ensure that s/he is with the foreign user or can
be one more level of password authentication if the location is remote.</p>
        <p>5. SAe: This security action ensures that the data/information is carried in an
encrypted format. It is taken when the access point is a remote location.</p>
        <p>6. SAr: This security action prompts the users to enter their respective roles. This
is used while accessing the devices inside the house.</p>
        <p>7. SAb: In this security action the transfer of information between remote high
level entities is carried through one more high level entity in order to prevent
accidental leakage of data to the low level entities or unauthorised users.</p>
        <p>8. SAsi: The security action SAi which when taken with the help of biometric
identification tools. These tools are used for user authentication in order to have
authorized access to the valuable resources. We have many devices such as Thumb
Print scanner, Voice recognition, palm prints, hand/wrist vein patterns, retinal/iris eye
scans, hand geometry/topography, keystroke dynamics or typing rhythms, and
signature verification. In case of thumb print scanner the user presses his or her finger
against an input device for verification in order to gain access. Within seconds, access
is either granted or rejected, based upon stored fingerprints. In case of the Voice
recognition, the users voice is recorded and matched with the one stored before in the
database. The same methods apply in retina scanning but with the help of retina
properties of the users.</p>
        <p>9. SAso: The security action SAo which when taken with the help of biometrics
(Retina scan or Voice recognition) as described above.</p>
        <p>10. SAsr: The security action SAr which when taken with the help of biometrics
(Retina scan or Voice recognition) as described above.
6.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-3">
        <title>Getting Access to the Home Network</title>
        <p>Getting access to the home network is the first step in accessing the devices. The
contextual graph shown in Figure 3 gives the various scenarios in which a user is
given access to the home network. The access is given only when a particular user
satisfies the various criteria decided by the security policy. The secret password has to
be known by each and every user and is a mandatory condition if he wants the access.
1. When the owner of the house wants the access to the house, s/he has to first
enter the secret code of the home network with the help of some wireless device. If
s/he is not having the device then because s/he being the administrator of the network
is given access to the network. But for others, carrying a device is a must. If the access
point is the door then the owner is authenticated with the help of retina scanner, which
in this case serves to satisfy the requirement of the security actions, SAr and SAi
together. If s/he wants to access the network from a remote location such as his/her
office then s/he has to enter the secret code of the network, her/his role, and the secret
password that validates that s/he is a local (occupants of the home) entity. As s/he is at
the top security level s/he is not asked for more identification. S/he gets access to the
home straight away. Such kind of authentication is part of a multilevel access security
model. The retina scanner in this case makes sure that only the authenticated person
from the home community is given access. Once the owner is in the house he can
access the devices according to the policy in Figure 4.</p>
        <p>2. Children are given access to the home similar to the owner, as they are also the
local entities of the home community. Once they are inside the house they are given
access to the devices depending upon the devices and also on the presence or absence
of the owner of the house as in Figure 4. The only difference is that in their case they
are not allowed to access the devices from a distant location.</p>
        <p>3. The remaining members from the house like spouse, parents, grandparents who
are staying in the house also have to face similar kinds of authentication while
entering the home. Once inside the network they are given access according to their
predefined security level, which is needed by the security action SAr.</p>
        <p>4. Guests are treated in a different manner. They are given access to the home
network after passing through an authentication procedure in a multilevel access
model. They are given access only when their location is at the door of the house.
Further as per case 2 they have to pass two authentication levels necessitated by the
security actions SAf1 and SAf2. For SAf1, they have to first validate themselves with
the help of retina scan. For SAf2, they are given access only if they are with the owner
of the house. The retina scanner first validates them and then the owner. Thus, the
validation of owner helps in getting the guest in the home network. If this is not
satisfied then the guest is not given the access. Once inside the owner need not be with
them all the time, and can access the devices in the home based on their predefined
security levels as dictated by Figure 4.</p>
        <p>5. The maintenance staff is the one from which the security package is purchased
from. They are required to monitor the performance of the smart devices. They can
(but need not) come every weekend at a particular time to have an overall check up.
They are also considered as foreign entities like guests. The retina scanner first
validates them and then they have to enter a password given to them, which will help
them to enter the home network. But a situation might also happen when there is an
emergency. Emergency can be when an unauthorized person is trying to access a
particular device in the house. In such situations, the staff might have to enter the
house not necessarily at the specified time. They can get access to the network in such
cases from any location. They can enter the home network after validating twice: first
by entering the password given to them, and then using an emergency code that they
are also given that will get them into the network. The difference from the owner in
such access is that it just allows them to disconnect all the smart home facilities. In
such cases, the owner is contacted and then the necessary actions are taken based on
the owners’ consent.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-4">
        <title>6.3 Accessing the devices</title>
        <p>The following section indicates how the security policy provides controlled access to
the devices in the home network. The following approach when used in conjunction
with the approach in the previous section can be effectively used to implement stern
security policies
The above approach shows how Context based security is implemented in smart
homes. The following subsection describes the various security actions taken by the
security policy in appropriate situations. Let’s have a look at the various valid
scenarios in which the smart devices in the home can be accessed after passing
through various authentication levels.</p>
        <sec id="sec-9-4-1">
          <title>Scenario 1. There are two different contexts in this scenario.</title>
          <p>Context 1: Role= User, location= home; Context 2: Role= User, location=
outside.</p>
          <p>If the user is the owner of the house, s/he is considered at the topmost security
level. If s/he is in the house s/he can access the device by just entering his/her role in
case of manual authentication. If the process is automatic then either the thumb print
scanner or retina scanner authenticates him.</p>
          <p>If the owner is not at home and wants to communicate with his/her PC then s/he has
to go through the three authentication levels that depict the security actions deployed
by the model as shown in Figure 4. Once s/he gets in the network s/he has to enter
his/her role, which will prove that s/he is the administrator. After this the most
important security action taken by the policy is encryption of the further information,
which is communicated between the device and the user.</p>
          <p>Further, in order to prevent the accidental leakage of data to high-level or
unauthorised entities, the messages are first sent to the server which is kept at the
security company which checks whether the communicating entities are at the same
level or not. The security action SAb accounts for this checking.</p>
          <p>Scenario 2. There is just one valid context in this case. Valid context is that in which
the access to the device is granted.</p>
          <p>Context: Role= Children, location= home &amp; with parent</p>
          <p>If the users are the children in the house, they are given access to the devices only
when the owner is with them. Further the access is granted only when they are at home
and is based on their security levels.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-9-4-2">
          <title>Scenario 3. In this case also there is just one valid context.</title>
          <p>Context: Role= Guest, location= home</p>
          <p>Guests in this model are the owner’s friends, relatives or colleagues. If the guests
want to access the devices they have to first get inside the house using the part of the
policy defined in the first contextual graph. They can only do that when the owner of
the house is with them. After getting in they can access the devices as per their
predefined security levels by either entering their usernames/passwords which will
decide their security level based on the predefined one’s or by normal biometrics in
case of an advanced scenario.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-9-4-3">
          <title>Scenario 4. There are two different valid contexts in this scenario.</title>
          <p>Context 1: Role= other members of the house, location= house.</p>
          <p>Context 2: Role= other members of the house, location= outside.</p>
          <p>Other members are spouse, parents of the owner. The security policy behaves in a
similar fashion as in the case of the owner. If the members of the house other than the
owner want to access the devices then they are given access after performing two
different sequences of security actions in two different contexts. If they are within the
house then they are given access based on their security level as predefined. The
biometrics devices sense their role. The security action SAsr takes care of that. When
the access point is a remote location they have to first get in the home network with
the help of the first policy (Figure 3). Then they can access the resources based on
their role/security level by manually entering their username/role through some remote
devices. Beyond this as the information transfer is between two remote devices the
communication has to be secured. Our security policy prompts the necessary security
action (SAe) to be taken to account for that. This is Policy3, which provides an
encrypted communication between the remote place and the local devices. SAb
assures that there is no leakage of data in the process of communication.
Scenario 5. The maintenance staffs are allowed to access the devices only at
weekends and at a particular time. If they arrive at the specific time then they can
access the particular device according to their predefined security levels, which is
sensed by the sensor at each of the devices. This is done in the security action denoted
by SAsr. If not approved, then they are not allowed to access any devices. They are
limited in what they do with the system – they can only turn off the working of all the
devices and then take the necessary steps depending upon the cause of the
unauthorized access. A red node in the figure 4 denotes this. This special denotation is
used to make things clear in emergency situations and is very much in lines with the
definition of the context graph in respect of the number of outputs.</p>
          <p>In this way the security meta-policy proposed would take appropriate security
actions based on the context at that moment and will give controlled access to the
resources. The contextual graphs shown above can be expanded to include more
possibilities as and when the need arises.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>7 Related Work</title>
      <p>
        This section briefly highlights the existing projects and technologies that have
influenced my work in using ambient calculus in context based security and how my
model is different than those existing ones. Although the concept of contextual graph
was first explored by Mostefaoui et al. (2004) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], there have been few more people
who tried their hands on context based security solutions using other methods.
AlMuhtadi et al. (2000) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] talked about security is smart homes. They invented a
component called Tiny SESAME that can be easily ported to any distributed
computing devices that adapts to the environment with changing resources. The
combination of Tiny SESAME and Jini can be used to create a dynamic, secure
environment of distributed computing devices. Covington et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] focused on the
design of security services that incorporate the use of security-relevant “context” to
provide flexible access control and policy enforcement. Based on their security policy
they provided a generalized role based access control model that provided more
flexible access control and a security subsystem that can adapt itself based on current
conditions in the environment. Mostefaoui et al. (2004) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] put forth the concept of
contextual graph for modeling security in context aware environments. They present a
new model for policy specification based on the new approach. The security policy
based on such an approach depends on the contextual information of the user and the
environment. Contextual graph proved to be very effective approach in modeling a
complex situation. Brezillon et al. (2004) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] also talks about how contextual graphs
are used to model security in a context aware environments. In their paper they gave
an example of how context based security is used in a hospital scenario. This paper
also extends the work of Mostefaoui et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] by using contextual graphs for
modeling security meta-policies in context aware application like smart home. A
difference between their work and ours lies in the use of various security actions
grounded in other policies, i.e. we refer to other policies from within our
(meta)policy. Also a contribution of our work is the exploration of policies for a smart
home.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>7 Conclusion</title>
      <p>Due to ubiquitous nature of the today’s computing world security is of utmost
important. The traditional static authentication techniques are no longer valid and
justified. This situation is due to the lack of consideration for context in existing
security systems. Context based security helps the security policy to adapt to the new
threats as it comes. It aims at providing flexible security models for distributed
infrastructures, where the user’s and application environments are continually
changing. In this paper, we have presented an approach that helps in context based
security for a smart home. The type and nature of the authentications that are
demanded by the security policy depend on the information that is collected from the
environment. Further, contextual graph approach helps to add/modify secure paths
based on the newly detected contexts that need to be inculcated for security. The
model presented although explained in a smart home environment is a generalised
model, which can be used, in any context aware environment or enterprise, from the
office to factories. There is a fine line between context-aware security to
contextaware safety (e.g., children cannot operate the stove unless in the company of an adult
– as determined by location sensors), and one can transition from one to another with
an analysis as exemplified in this paper.</p>
    </sec>
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