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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Kyiv, Ukraine, June</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Importance Analysis of k-out-of-n Multi-State Systems based on Direct Partial Logic Derivatives</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Elena Zaitseva</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Miroslav Kvassay</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vitaly Levashenko</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jozef Kostolny</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Key Terms. Reliability</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Model, Approach, Methodology, Scientific Field</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>University of Zilina, Faculty of Management Science and Informatics, Department of Informatics</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Univerzitna 8215/1, 01026 Zilina</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="SK">Slovakia</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2016</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>2</volume>
      <fpage>1</fpage>
      <lpage>24</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>In this paper, analysis of k-out-of-n Multi-State Systems (MSSs) is considered. This type of systems consists of n components, and it can be in state j if and only if at least k components are in state j or greater. Investigation of such systems has been considered in several works. However, most of them have dealt only with an efficient computation of several global characteristics, such as system state probability or system availability. In this paper, we deal with importance analysis for such systems. Particularly, we focus on two commonly used importance measures - structural importance and Birnbaum's importance. Using logical differential calculus, we propose an efficient way of how to calculate these measures for a k-out-of-n MSS. The obtained results are then used to analyze an oil supply system.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd />
        <kwd>Multi-State System</kwd>
        <kwd>Structure Function</kwd>
        <kwd>Structural Importance</kwd>
        <kwd>Birnbaum's Importance</kwd>
        <kwd>Logical Differential Calculus</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        Reliability has been considered as an important characteristic of many systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ],
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Most of the systems, whose reliability has to be investigated, are
composed of more than one element (component) and, therefore, one of the principal tasks
of reliability analysis is investigation of influence of individual system components on
the proper work of the system [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Such investigation requires creation of a
mathematical model of the system. As a rule, two approaches are used in reliability analysis.
The first one is based on the assumption that the system and all its components
(system elements that are assumed to be indivisible into smaller parts) can be in one of
only two possible states – functioning (represented by number 1) and failed
(presented as number 0). These systems are known as Binary-State Systems (BSSs) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ],
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Models based on this approach are suitable for the analysis of consequences of
system failure, but they are not very appropriate for the investigation of processes that
      </p>
      <p>
        - 442
result in system failure. For this purpose, the approach based on the idea that the
system and all its components can be in one of more than two states is more suitable. In
this case, we say about Multi-State Systems (MSSs) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        One of the current issues of reliability engineering is evaluation of complex
systems. Such systems are composed of many components with very various natures [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
Typical instances of such systems are healthcare systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] containing hardware and
software components, human factor, and organizational elements, or complex
distribution networks composing of many different hardware elements [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. This
heterogeneity indicates that it can be quite difficult to model such systems as BSSs and,
therefore, MSSs are more appropriate.
      </p>
      <p>Reliability analysis of MSSs is a complex problem that includes a lot of tasks. This
paper focuses on two specific tasks: identification of situations in which component
or its state is critical for system activity, i.e. situations in which a degradation of a
component results in system degradation, and quantification of importance of
individual system components, i.e. finding components with the greatest influence on system
activity. One of the possible ways of how to perform this analysis is application of
logical differential calculus.</p>
      <p>
        Logical differential calculus has originally been developed for analysis of dynamic
properties of Multiple-Valued Logic (MVL) functions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. This tool can also be
applied in reliability analysis to identify circumstances under which a change of a state
of a system component results in a change of system state. So, it allows us to find
situations in which a degradation of a given component or its state is critical for
system degradation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. In this paper, we consider its application in importance
analysis of k-out-of-n MSSs.
      </p>
      <p>
        A k-out-of-n system is composed of n components. Based on [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ], behavior of this
system can be described as follows:
─ if at least k components are in state m -1, then the system is in state m -1,
─ else if at least k components are in state m -2 or better, then it is in state m -2,
…
─ else if at least k components are in state 1 or better, then it is in state 1,
─ else the system is in state 0.
      </p>
      <p>
        Efficient ways of how to calculate some global characteristics, e.g. system state
probability or system availability, for this kind of systems have been considered, for
example, in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. However, those papers have not considered investigation of
importance of individual system components (or their states) on system activity. This
problem is taken into account on the next pages.
2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Reliability Analysis of Multi-State Systems</title>
      <p>
        A MSS is a mathematical representation of a system under consideration. It allows us
to define m levels at which the system or its components can operate. These levels are
known as states of the system/component and they take values from the set {0,1,…,
m -1}. State 0 means that the system/component is completely failed, while state m -1
implies that it is perfectly functioning. A mapping that defines the dependency of
system state on the states of its components is known as structure function. For a MSS
composed of n components, this function has the following form [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]:
(x): {0,1,…, m -1}n  {0,1,…, m -1} ,
(1)
where xi is a variable defining state of the i-th system component for i = 1,2,…, n, and
x = (x1, x2,…, xn) is a vector of components states (state vector). Specially, if m = 2,
then definition (1) agrees with the structure function of a BSS. Please note that the
structure function of a MSS can also be viewed as a MVL function. In this case, xi is
known as a MVL variable and vector x can be named as a MVL vector.
      </p>
      <p>Based on the properties of the structure function, two classes of MSSs can be
defined – coherent and incoherent. A MSS is coherent if its structure function is
nondecreasing in all its arguments, i.e. there exist no circumstances under which
degradation (improvement) of a system component can result in improvement (deterioration)
of system state. In what follows, only coherent systems are considered.</p>
      <p>The structure function defines system topology. However, if we want to investigate
not only system topology but also some others characteristics, such as system state
probability, system availability, or importance of individual system components, the
state probabilities of the system components have to be known. For the i-th system
component, they will be denoted as follows:
(2)
(3)
(4)
pi,s = Pr{xi = s}, s = 0,1,…, m -1 .</p>
      <p>Pr{(x) = j}, for j  {0,1,…, m -1} ,</p>
      <p>
        Using these probabilities and the system structure function, we can compute two
basic characteristics of MSSs – system state probability [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]:
and system availability/unavailability with respect to state j of the system [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]:
      </p>
      <p>A j  Pr{ ( x)  j}, U  j  Pr{ ( x)  j}, for j {1,2,, m 1}.</p>
      <p>This definition implies that system availability (unavailability) for system state j
agrees with the probability that the system is in such state that its performance can
(cannot) satisfy a demand corresponding to state j. For illustration, let us consider a
power supply unit that can generate 30 MW, 10 MW, or 0 MW of electricity. Clearly,
the system has 3 performance levels from which level 30 MW corresponds to state 2,
level 10 MW to state 1 and level 0 MW to state 0. If there is a demand of at least 5
MW of electricity, then the unit is working if it is at least in state 1. This implies that
it is available if it is at least in state 1 and, therefore, its availability (unavailability)
should be computed with respect to state 1 for this situation.
2.1</p>
      <p>
        Importance Analysis of Multi-State Systems
System state probability and availability are important characteristics of a system.
They give us a global view on the system. On the other hand, they carry no
information about the system structure, i.e. they do not allow investigating influence of
individual system components or their states on the system. For this purpose, other
indices are used. These indices are known as Importance Measures (IMs), and some of
the most commonly known are Structural Importance (SI) and Birnbaum’s
Importance (BI). The SI investigates only system topology while the BI takes into account
also state probabilities of the system components. These two indices play a key role in
importance analysis because a lot of other measures are defined based on them [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Importance analysis of MSSs based on SI and BI has been considered in several
papers, e.g., [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ]. In those papers, several versions of these measures
have been proposed depending on whether we want to:
─ investigate influence of a given component state on a given system state/
availability level [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ],
─ analyze the total influence of a given component state on the system (not only on a
specific system state) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ],
─ inspect the total importance of a given component [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The approaches presented in the aforementioned works have been combined into
one complex framework in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. According to that work, the SI agrees with a relative
number of situations in which a given component (state) is critical for degradation of
(a given state/availability level of) the system, while the BI corresponds to the
probability that such situation occurs. (The criticality means that degradation of a given
component results in system degradation.) These definitions indicate that
identification of situations in which a given component (state) is critical for degradation of (a
given state/availability level of) the system represents the main issue in the
computation of these measures. In the considered paper, this task has been solved using a
special tool of MVL that is known as logical differential calculus [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Logical differential calculus has been developed for analysis of dynamic properties
of MVL functions. Logic derivative is a key term of this tool. There exist several
types of logic derivatives but, for the purpose of this paper, Direct Partial Logic
Derivatives (DPLDs) are the most important.</p>
      <p>
        A DPLD reveals circumstances under which a considered change of a MVL
variable results in the studied change of the analyzed MVL function. Since the formal
definition of the structure function of a MSS agrees with the definition of a MVL
function, this derivative can also be used in the analysis of MSSs. In this case, it
allows us to detect situations in which a given change of a given component state
results in the studied change of the system state. More formally, a DPLD with respect to
variable xi is defined as follows [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]:
 ( j  h)
xi (s  r)
      </p>
      <p> 10,, iofthe(rswi,ixse)  j and  (ri , x)  h,
for s,r, j, h 0,1,, m-1, s  r, j  h ,
(5)
where (ai, x) = (x1, x2,…, xi -1, a, xi +1,…, xn) for a  {s, r}.</p>
      <p>Depending on the relations between s and r and j and h in (5), four kinds of DPLDs
with different physical meaning can be used in reliability analysis of MSSs:
─ if s &gt; r and j &gt; h, then the DPLD identifies situations in which degradation of
component i from state s to r results in degradation of system from state j to h,
─ if s &lt; r and j &lt; h, then the DPLD detects circumstances under which improvement
of component i from state s to r causes improvement of system state from value j to
h,
─ if s &gt; r and j &lt; h, then the DPLD finds circumstances under which degradation of
component i from state s to r results in improvement of system state from value j to
h,
─ if s &lt; r and j &gt; h, then the DPLD reveals situations in which degradation of the
system from state j to h is caused by improvement of component i from state s to r.</p>
      <p>Clearly, situations identified by the last two kinds of DPLDs cannot occur in case
of a coherent system and, therefore, only the first two DPLDs are meaningful in the
analysis of coherent MSSs. Furthermore, in what follows, we will primarily deal with
investigation of consequences of component degradation on system activity. This
implies that only DPLDs in which s &gt; r and j &gt; h will be taken into account.</p>
      <p>Based on the meaning of DPLDs, it is clear that they allow us to find state vectors
of the form of (si, x) at which deterioration of state s of component i to state r results
in degradation of system state j to h. These state vectors are known as critical state
vectors and, clearly, they describe circumstances under which a given component
state is critical for a given degradation of system state j.</p>
      <p>
        One of the assumptions that are often used in importance analysis of MSSs is that
the system components degrade gradually state by state. This assumption is not
unrealistic because even if a component deteriorates from state m -1 to state 0, we can
assume that it stays in every state from set {1,2,…, m -2} for very short time [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. This
implies that only DPLDs of the form of  ( j  h) xi (s  s  1) have to be taken
into account if we want to investigate importance of individual system components.
      </p>
      <p>
        DPLDs give us a detailed view on the dependency between component degradation
and system degradation. However, they are not very appropriate for importance
analysis of a general MSS, i.e. a MSS in which a minor degradation (degradation by
one state) of any system component can result in degradation of the system by more
than one state. This inadequacy results from the fact that a lot of DPLDs have to be
computed in such situations, e.g., if we want to investigate consequences of a minor
degradation of state s of component i, then we have to compute DPLDs of the form of
 ( j  h) xi (s  s  1) for all h &lt; j, i.e. j -1 DPLDs. The similar fact can also be
observed if we want to use DPLDs to investigate the coincidence between component
degradation and decrease in system availability level. To avoid this problem, new
types of logic derivatives have been introduced in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. These derivatives were named
as Integrated Direct Partial Logic Derivatives (IDPLDs) because they combine
several types of DPLDs together. Depending on the combined DPLDs, three types of
IDPLDs have been defined. In this paper, only IDPLDs of type I and III are used.
      </p>
      <p>An IDPLD of type I is defined as follows:
xi(s( j)r)  hj01 xi((sj  hr))  10,, iofthe(rswi,ixse)  j and  (ri , x)  j,
for s, r  0,1,, m-1, s  r, j  1,2,, m-1,
(6)
and it allows us to find situations in which a given degradation of state s of system
component i results in a deterioration of system state j. Quantification of these
situations allows us to estimate influence of the considered component degradation on
system state j.</p>
      <p>An IDPLD of type III has the following form:
(xhi(js  hr) j )  hmu1j hdj10x(ih(us  hrd) )  10,, iofthe(rswi,isxe)  j and  (ri , x)  j,
(7)
for s, r  0,1,, m-1, s  r, j  1,2,, m-1,
where notation h≥j (h&lt;j) means that all system states that are greater than or equal to
(less than) j are taken into account. Please note, this definition implies that IDPLDs of
type III can be used to find state vectors at which a degradation of a given component
state causes degradation of a given level of system availability and, therefore, they
can be used to quantify consequences of a given deterioration of state s of component
i on level j of system availability.</p>
      <p>
        It has been mentioned in the previous paragraphs that quantification of situations in
which an IDPLD of type I or III takes nonzero value allows us to estimate influence
of degradation a given component state on system state/availability level. This
quantification can be done in two ways [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. Firstly, we can compute truth density (a
relative count of situations in which a function with a Boolean-valued output takes
nonzero value) of the considered IDPLD. Result of this computation agrees with the
relative number of situations in which a considered degradation of a given component
state results in degradation of a given system state/availability level. If we assume that
the system components degrade gradually state by state, then this number corresponds
to SI of a given component state for a given system state/availability level [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. This
measure does not take the components states probabilities into account and, therefore,
it investigates only topological importance of a given component state.
      </p>
      <p>
        Another possibility is to calculate the probability that the considered IDPLD is
nonzero. This agrees with the probability that the studied degradation of a given
component state causes decrease in a given state/availability level of the system. If we
assume that only minor degradations of the system components can occur, then this
number agrees with BI of a given component state for a given system
state/availability level [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. Unlike the SI, the BI provides more information because
it considers not only system topology but also state probabilities of the components.
      </p>
      <p>
        The previously mentioned versions of SI and BI deals with importance of a given
component state for a given state/availability level of the system. It has been shown in
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] that these measures can also be used to investigate:
─ the total importance of a given component state,
─ the total importance of a component for a given system state/availability level,
─ the total importance of a given component.
      </p>
      <p>The SI measures that can be used for these purposes are presented in Table 1. The
similar table can be shown for the BI measures, but the only difference will be in
replacement of the truth density notation with the probability that the IDPLD takes
nonzero value. Please note that complex importance analysis of a MSS can be
performed by computation of all types of SI or BI measures. Based on the formulae
presented in Table 1, the SI (BI) measures investigating all possible dependencies
between component degradation and system deterioration can be expressed in the form
of Table 2 (IMs concerning with system state) or Table 3 (IMs focusing on system
availability level).</p>
      <p>The SI of a given SIi,s  m1SIij,s
wAhrieclhatisvtaetenusmobfercoomfpsiotnueantitonisriencomponent state j1 sults in system degradation.
A relative number of situations in
gTcivhoeemnSpsIoynoseftenamtgfoisvtraeatne SIij  m1 1 ms11SIij,s scwyahusitsceehms .ddeeggrraaddaattiioonn ooff sctoamtepjonoefntthei
The SI of a given A relative number of situations in
cogmivpeonnseynsttefomr a SIi j  m1 1 ms11SIi,sj cwahuiscehs ddeeggraraddaatitoionnofofcolmevpeolnejntofi
availability level system availability.</p>
      <p>The total SI of a SIi  1 m1SIi,s wAhrieclhatdiveegrnaudamtiboenr ooff csoitmuaptoionnesntini
given component m  1 s1 results in system degradation.
*note: TD(.) – truth density of the argument interpreted as a function with a Boolean-valued output
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Importance Analysis of k-out-of-n Multi-State Systems</title>
      <p>Let us consider a k-out-of-n MSS. According to Table 1 – Table 3, the most important
thing in computation of the IMs considered above is efficient identification of
nonzero elements of IDPLDs. For example, in case of computing SIij,s , this agrees with
finding all state vectors (.i, x) = (x1, x2,…, xi -1, xi +1,…, xn) for which IDPLD
 ( j ) xi (s  s  1) takes nonzero value. Now, let us find IDPLDs of which form
can be nonzero. Firstly, let us assume that j &gt; s. Such derivative cannot be nonzero
because the k-out-of-n MSS can be in state j if and only if at least k components are in
state j or greater. This implies that degradation of a component that is in a state less
than j cannot result in degradation of system state j because system state is not
determined by this component. Secondly, let us assume that j &lt; s. This derivative
cannot also take nonzero values because the system can be in state j if and only if not
more than k -1 components are in a state greater than j. It follows that a minor
degradation of a component that is in a state greater than system state j does not result in
violation of this condition and, therefore, there exist no circumstances under which
degradation of this component from state s to state s -1 can result in degradation of
the system if the system is in state j such that j &lt; s. Finally, let us consider an IDPLD
of the form of  ( j ) xi ( j  j 1) . This derivative identifies situations in which a
minor degradation of state j of component i results in degradation of system state j.
Such situations can occur if and only if component i is in state j and exactly k -1 from
the remaining components are in state j or greater than j. These situations correspond
to state vectors of the form of ( ji , ru j,(1) , ru j,(2) ,, rukj1,(k1) , rv j,(1) , rv j,(2) ,, rvnjk,(nk ) )
1 2 1 2
where u1, u2,…, uk -1 are components that are in states greater than or equal to j; v1,
v2,…, vn-k are components that are in states less than j; ru j,(t) , for t = 1,2,…, k -1,
det
notes state of component ut (this state is greater than or equal to j); and rvt j,(t) , for t =
1,2,…, n - k, means that component vt is in a state less than j. It can be simply shown
that  n  1m  jk1 j nk such state vectors exist. It follows that integrated
deriva k  1</p>
      <p>
         kn 11m  jk1 j nk nonzero elements. Since every
tives  ( j ) xi ( j  j 1) has 
IDPLD and DPLD has mn -1 elements [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ], the truth density of integrated
derivative  ( j ) xi ( j  j 1) can be computed in the following way:
      </p>
      <p>  ( j )   n 1 m  j k1 j nk
TD xi ( j  j 1)    k 1 mn1</p>
      <p>Based on the results obtained in the previous paragraph and information presented
in Table 1, SIij,s can be computed for a k-out-of-n MSS using the following formula:
SIij,s  TD xi (s (j s)1)    kn 11 m  mj nk11 j nk
0,
, if s  j</p>
      <p>.
otherwise</p>
      <p>Above, we have shown that only IDPLDs of the form of  ( j ) xi ( j  j 1)
are nonzero in case of a k-out-of-n MSS. Since this IDPLD is nonzero if and only if
states of the system components are characterized by state vectors of the form of
( ji , ru j,(1) , ru j,(2) ,, rukj1,(k1) , rv j,(1) , rv j,(2) ,, rvnjk,(nk ) ) , then degradation of component
1 2 1 2
i from state j to j -1 has to result in degradation of system state from j to j -1. This
implies that the nonzero elements of this derivative agrees with the nonzero elements
of DPLD  ( j  j 1) xi ( j  j 1) . It follows that only such DPLDs are nonzero
in case of a k-out-of-n MSS. Using this fact and definitions (6) and (7) of IDPLDs, the
next formula can be proved simply for k-out-of-n MSSs:</p>
      <p> ( j )
xi (s  s  1)

 (h j  h j )   ( j  j  1)
xi (s  s  1)
xi (s  s  1)
  ( j  j  1)

  xi ( j  j  1)
0,
, if s  j
otherwise
.</p>
      <p>(10)</p>
      <p>This formula implies that the k-out-of-n MSS represents a special type of MSSs in
which a minor degradation of a system component can result only in a minor
degradation of system state. Furthermore, it follows that the following relationships exist
between SI measures presented in Table 1:
(8)
(9)</p>
      <p>Finally, the total topological importance of component i for the activity of the
kout-of-n MSS can be computed using the following formula:</p>
      <p>All these formulae imply that there is no sense to distinguish between the SI
measures investigating topological properties of the k-out-of-n MSS with respect to system
state (Table 2) and with respect to system availability level (Table 3):</p>
      <p>Now, let us consider the BI measures. These measures can also be computed using
IDPLDs I or III. However, as has been shown in (10), these IDPLDs computed with
respect to system state/availability level j agree with  ( j  j 1) xi (s  s 1) in
case of k-out-of-n MSSs and, therefore, the following relationships will hold between
BI measures calculated with respect to system state and with respect to system
availability level:
(11)
(12)
otherwise
(13)
   ( j  j  1)
Pr
BIij,s  BIi,sj    xi ( j  j 1)</p>
      <p>
 1, if s  j ,
BIij  BIi j 
BIi,s  BIis,s ,
BIi 
1 m1</p>
      <p> BIij,j .
m 1 j1
0,</p>
      <p>1
m 1</p>
      <p>BIij,j ,</p>
      <p>
        This implies that only problem in computation of the BI measures is calculation of
the probability that DPLD  ( j  j 1) xi ( j  j 1) takes nonzero value.
According to the results presented in the previous paragraphs, this DPLD takes nonzero
values for all state vectors of the structure function that have the form of
( ji , ru j,(1) , ru j,(2) ,, rukj1,(k1) , rv j,(1) , rv j,(2) ,, rvnjk,(nk ) ) . Since a DPLD computed with
1 2 1 2
respect to variable xi does not depend on this variable [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], the nonzero elements of
the DPLD agree with the state vectors that have the following form:
(.i , ru1 j,(1) , ru2 j,(2) ,, rukj1,(k1) , rv1 j,(1) , rv2 j,(2) ,, rvnjk,(nk ) ) . Therefore, the probability that
the DPLD is nonzero can be computed simply as the probability that the system
components are in states corresponding to state vectors of this form.
4
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Case Study: Oil Supply System</title>
      <p>
        For illustration of our approach, let us consider a modified oil supply system proposed
in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] and considered in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. This system is depicted in Fig. 1. There are 4 pipelines
that deliver oil from the oil source to 3 oil stations. The system and every pipeline
have 4 possible states. The system state is defined by the number of oil stations to
which oil can be delivered through the pipelines (Table 4). The state of a pipeline
identifies which oil stations can be supplied through the pipeline (Table 4). Next, let
us assume that the oil source is perfectly functioning and an oil station is working if at
least k pipelines are able to deliver oil to it. This description implies that only relevant
components that determine system state are 4 pipelines. So, we obtain a k-out-of-4
MSS in which m = 4 and k  {1,2,3,4}.
      </p>
      <p>Firstly, let us investigate topological properties of this system. This can be done
simply using SI measures shown in Table 1 and formulae (11) and (12). For pipeline
1 and individual values of k, these results are presented in Table 5. According to the
results presented in the form of formulae (11) and (12), the SI measures computed in
these tables investigate topological properties of the system not only with respect to
system state but also with respect to system availability level. As we can see (the
lower right corner of sub-tables), degradation of component 1 has the greatest
influence on system activity if k  {2,3} and the least if k  {1,4}. Next, in the bottom
parts of the sub-tables, we can see that, in case of k  {1,2}, the most important state
te 1
a
t
s
em 2
t
s
yS 3
te 1
a
t
s
em 2
t
s
yS 3
0
0
0
0
of the component is state 3, while the least important is state 1. On the other hand, if
k  {3,4}, then the situation is completely different, i.e. the state with the greatest
topological influence on system degradation is state 1, while state 3 has the least
influence. Similarly, using the information presented in the right columns of the
subtales, we can state if k  {1,2}, then pipeline 1 has the greatest influence on system
state/availability level 3 and the least on system state/availability level 1; while if
k  {3,4}, then pipeline 1 has the greatest influence on system state/availability level
1 and the least on system state/availability level 3. Clearly, the same results can be
obtained for the remaining pipelines since formulae (11) and (12) imply that all
components (or components states) have the same topological influence in case of
k-outof-n systems and fixed values of k and n.</p>
      <p>
        Now, let us calculate the BI measures for this system. These measures take into
account not only system topology but also state probabilities of the pipelines. In this
case, we use numbers presented in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] (Table 6).
      </p>
      <p>The BI measures for the oil supply system can be computed using formulae (13).
According to these formulae, the most important part in computation of these
measures is calculating the probability that DPLD  ( j  j 1) xi ( j  j 1) , for
j = 1,2,3 and i = 1,2,3,4, takes nonzero value. This can be done simply by identifying
the state vectors of the form of (.i , ru1 j,(1) , ru2 j,(2) ,, rukj1,(k1) , rv1 j,(1) , rv2 j,(2) ,, rvnjk,(nk ) )
for specific values of j and k. For example, if we want to compute the probability that
DPLD  (1  0) x1 (1  0) is nonzero for k = 1, then its nonzero elements agree
with the state vectors of the form of (., r 1, r 1, r 1 ) . Only one state vector has this
form, i.e. state vector (.,0,0,0); therefore, the probability that the DPLD takes nonzero
value is computed as follows:</p>
      <p>  (2  1)
Pr
 x1 (2  1)</p>
      <p>
 1  Pr{(.1 ,x)  (.,0,0,0)}  p2,0 p3,0 p4,0

where relation “≤” between state vectors (.i, x) = (x1, x2,…, xi -1, xi +1,…, xn) and
(.i, y) = (y1, y2,…, yi -1, yi +1,…, yn) means that xk ≤ yk for k = 1,2,…, i -1, i +1,…, n. So,
the DPLD is nonzero with the following probability:</p>
      <p>  (2  1)
Pr
 x1 (2  1)</p>
      <p>
 1  Pr{(.1 ,x)  (.,1,1,1)}  ( p2,0  p2,1 )( p3,0  p3,1 )( p4,0  p4,1 )

(15)</p>
      <p>Finally, the probability of DPLD  (3  2) x1 (3  2) being nonzero for k = 1
agrees with the probability that state vector (.1, x) has the form of (., r 3 , r 3 , r 3 ) .
Using the notation “≤”, this can be calculated as follows:</p>
      <p>  (3  2)
Pr
 x1 (3  2)</p>
      <p>
 1  Pr{(.1 ,x)  (.,2,2,2)}

 ( p2,0  p2,1  p2,2 )( p3,0  p3,1  p3,2 )( p4,0  p4,1  p4,2 )
values of BI1j,j and BI1, jj , it allows us to investigate importance of degradation of
state j of pipeline 1 on state/availability level j of the oil supply system. Since all other
BI measures investigating importance of a degradation of a component on system
(14)
(16)
state/availability level are equal to 0 (formulae (13)), these values can be used to
investigate importance of a given component state for the system, or total importance of
pipeline 1 for a specific system state/availability level, or total importance of pipeline
1 for the entire system. All these numbers are presented in the upper left sub-table of
Table 7. Clearly, the same results can be obtained if we investigate importance of
component 2, since state probabilities for these components are same.</p>
      <p>
        Using the similar procedure as has been presented above, the BI measures of all
system components can be obtained (upper left sub-tables of Table 7 and Table 8).
Furthermore, if we repeat this procedure for other values of k, i.e. for k = 2,3,4, we
can investigate importance of individual pipelines for all versions of the oil supply
system (the remaining parts of Table 7 and Table 8). (Please note that we obtain the
same results for components 1 and 2 and for components 3 and 4 since their state
probabilities have the same values.) According to the data presented in Table 7 and
Table 8, we can state that pipelines 1 and 2 have less influence on the activity of the
oil supply system than pipelines 3 and 4 if k = 1,2,3 but greater if k = 4. Another
interesting fact that can be noticed based on Table 7 and Table 8 is that all system
components have greater influence on greater states of the system in case of k  {1,2,3},
(e.g., if k = 1, then degradation of component 1 results in degradation of system state
3 with the probability 0.0016 while in degradation of system state 1 with the
probability 0.00002. However, in case of k = 4, all pipelines are more important for lower
states of the system (e.g., a degradation of pipeline 1 causes degradation of system
state 1 with the probability 0.2980 and degradation of system state 3 with the
probability 0.1885). The similar facts can be observed for the BI measures investigating
the total importance of individual states of the pipelines for the oil supply system (the
bottom rows in sub-tables of Table 7 and Table 8). All these results imply that
importance of individual system components in case of k-out-of-n systems largely depends
on mutual values of k and n.
In this paper, importance analysis of a k-out-of-n MSS was considered. We
summarized some results from the qualitative and quantitative analysis of MSSs and
proposed the method for calculation of all range of the SI and BI measures. Furthermore,
we showed that a k-out-of-n MSS is a special type of MSSs in which a minor
degradation of any system component can result only in a minor degradation of system
state. Because of that, it is not important to distinguish between IMs focusing on
system state and IMs dealing with system availability level. Next, using logical
differential calculus, we found closed-form expressions for calculation of the SI measures for
a k-out-of-n MSS. All these results were used in the analysis of the oil supply system
considered in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] and [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. Based on our approach, we identified topological
importance of individual system components for different values of k and identified which
components of the oil supply system were the most important if the state probabilities
of individual system components were known. Finally, we would like to mention that
the results presented in this paper could also be applied in the analysis of other types
of systems such as medical and temporal database systems studied in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ] and [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ].
Furthermore, they could also be used in other research fields, such as data mining,
where they can be used to find key attributes in a dataset [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Acknowledgment</title>
      <p>This work was supported by grants VEGA 1/0498/14 and VEGA 1/0038/16.</p>
    </sec>
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