=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-1614/paper_90
|storemode=property
|title=Nonlinear Dynamic Model of a Microeconomic System with Different Reciprocity and Expectations
Types of Firms: Stability and Bifurcations
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1614/paper_90.pdf
|volume=Vol-1614
|authors=Vitaliy Kobets,Alexander Weissblut
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/icteri/KobetsW16
}}
==Nonlinear Dynamic Model of a Microeconomic System with Different Reciprocity and Expectations
Types of Firms: Stability and Bifurcations==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1614/paper_90.pdf
Nonlinear Dynamic Model of a Microeconomic System
with Different Reciprocity and Expectations Types of
Firms: Stability and Bifurcations
Vitaliy Kobets1 and Alexander Weissblut1
1
Kherson State University, 27, 40 rokiv Zhovtnya st., Kherson, 73000 Ukraine
vkobets@kse.org.ua, veits@ksu.ks.ua
Abstract. This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between selfish and
reciprocity firms in the market of homogeneous product. The decisions of both
types of firms in respect of their output strategies are investigated under naive,
adaptive and generalized expectations. The standard postulate for competitive
firms’ model has been extended by the assumption that there is a share of
reciprocity firms which, unlike selfish firms, maximize both private and social
benefits as consumer surplus. It has been proved that the unique Nash
equilibrium is stable for all affordable values of parameters in the model with
adaptive expectations, and is unstable for the model with naive expectations at
sufficiently large number of firms in the market. A special desktop application
has been created for animation of model trajectory and demonstration of stable
quantity trajectories and bifurcation diagrams of firms’ output. Naive
expectations of two-thirds of firms result in a state of dynamic chaos in the
market leading to degeneration of the existing competition model between the
two types of firms. The crucial factor which ensures the stable equilibrium in
the market and the ability to predict firms’ output is the adaptive approach
which takes into account the adaptive expectations of firms planning their
product quantity.
Keywords: microeconomic system, reciprocity, naïve expectations, adaptive
expectations, consumer surplus, stability, bifurcation.
Кey Terms: DynamicSystem, DesktopApplication, NashEquilibrium,
Expectations
1 Introduction
In recent years the researchers are renouncing the assumption of perfect rationality as
unconditional basis of economic agents’ behavior. The neoclassical ‘rational man’
does not exist in reality; economic agents act according to established rules, without
being fully informed and maximizing their own utility [1].
ICTERI 2016, Kyiv, Ukraine, June 21-24, 2016
Copyright © 2016 by the paper authors
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Karl Polanyi identified the alternative economic organization where social norms
are not generated by economic self-interest of the individual. This network of
reciprocal relations is based on mutual economic cooperation of efforts and resources
between the members of non-economic network, dominated by cultural norms rather
than market laws. Under reciprocity relations the exchange donor and recipient can be
transposed. So this is a symmetrical relationship of gifts exchange between members
of horizontal social networks [2].
This relationship is not regulated by formal institutions but based on informal
commitments giving moral right to mutual help and reciprocal exchange on
sustainable basis in the long run period. But this is a relationship with minimal risk
for participants and the penalty of loss of social capital (reputation and trust) and
social isolation. Society supports the stability of the exchange to ensure their survival
during crises and wars. Reciprocity is not altruism which does not create reciprocal
obligations in quantitative, qualitative or time respects, just vague commitment (e.g.,
you give, if you can).
Actually, reciprocity relations, commodity exchange and hierarchical
subordination exist at the same time. But it is reciprocity that underlies most
decentralized corrections of diverse shortcomings and failures of markets and firms.
These relations are long-run factors of economic efficiency; they set most social
obligations of firms towards individuals without government intervention. No society
can exist without reciprocal relationship [3].
Reciprocity or social responsibility implies that the firms not only pursue their
selfish goal of increasing profits, but are also ready to sacrifice some of their own
profits for the benefit of consumers without direct compensation for it by the state [1].
Such targets can be stipulated by the firms’ desire to get stable profits in the long run
rather than maximal short-run profits. Such forward-thinking firms-reciprocators are
considered in the model of this paper. Their objective function is a weighted average
of the profits and consumer surplus of their market segment.
The real economic processes make a clear demonstration that neoclassical "rational
man" is not their subject. In real economy "optimal imperfect decisions" are taken by
simple and non-expensive calculations, well adapted to frequent repetitions, to
evolution; it is more efficient for perfectly rational firm to perform multiple
experiments with quantity to estimate the demand function rather than search for
nonrecurrent, instantaneous achieving of equilibrium. New paradigm of nonlinear
economics is a mix of qualitative theory of nonlinear dynamical system, optimal
control theory, game theory, and theory of stochastic processes [4, 5].
The evolutionary approach and analysis of the dynamics allow to explain why one
type of firm ousts another from the market, why sometimes the economic system is
stable, but in other cases is unstable [6, 7]. If the system has multiple equilibria, the
dynamics and evolution is the selection mechanism of best equilibrium according to
certain criteria [8]. The evolutionary process is analogous to social learning. An
example of its application is the pricing mechanisms for auctions that occur in agents
social networks, e-commerce and trade through the Internet [9, 10].
The study of the evolution of the markets with the strategic interaction usually uses
the following assumptions: (a) two firms or two types of similar firms operate in the
market; (b) firms produce homogeneous goods in quantities of x1 (t ) and x2 (t ) ; (c)
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no firm knows the rivals’ quantities; (d) the firms seek to predict the output of the
competitors using the adaptive scheme.
Planning of quantity for the following period firms resolve optimization problem:
MaxПi ( xi ; x ej (t 1)) , where Пi is the objective function of firm i, x ej (t 1) - expected
quantity of a competitor j ( i, j 1, 2 ).
Examples of bounded rationality of firms are: ignoring the impact of competitors'
actions on their own output (local monopoly approximation LMA), naive expectation
(assumption of unchangeable behavior of competitors for a long time and using
x j (t ) instead x ej (t 1) ). [8] Of course both decision making approaches (adaptive and
naive, bounded rational) coexist in the market with a certain probability.
Analysis of nonlinear oligopoly with heterogeneous players reveals that a higher
degree of product differentiation may destabilize the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Authors showed that a cascade of flip bifurcation may lead to periodic cycles and
chaotic motions [11]. Stability conditions of Nash equilibrium and complex dynamics
are also studied for heterogeneous duopoly with isoelastic demand function. For such
heterogeneous players a cascade of flip bifurcation leads to periodic cycles and chaos
and the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation generates attractive invariant closed curve [12].
Such scheme serves as the basis for mathematical model of this paper, which
distinguishes from the other models in that: (a) firms use more than one way of
decision-making, and combine different ones; (b) except their own selfish interests,
firms take into account social ones.
The paper goal is to consider the impact of naive, adaptive and generalized
expectations of egoist and reciprocator firms on stability of equilibrium and the
conditions of transition to dynamic chaos in the numerical experiment using a
specially designed desktop application.
The paper is organized as follows: part 2 describes two-dimensional market model
with naïve and adaptive expectations; part 3 is devoted to dynamics model in general
case; part 4 demonstrates C#-application model for numerical investigation; part 5
concludes.
2 Two-Dimensional Market Model
We consider the market of homogeneous product, which consists of n firms, including
k identical firms-reciprocators, each of them producing x units of product and n – k
identical selfish firms, each of them producing y units of product. Thus, the industry
quantity of the two types of firms is Q k x (n k ) y . Product price P in the
b
market is given by the inverse market demand function P P(Q) ( b 0 ).
Q
The objective function of a firm-egoist is profit Y ( P v) y , where v is the
firm’s costs per unit in the market. Firm-reciprocator maximizes both its own profit
X ( P v) x and consumer surplus CS of its own market segment:
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Q
CS P(q)dq PQ , where is the parameter defining the segment of the
k
market, which the reciprocator firm believes its own and optimizes it ( 0 k ),
is the minimal technologically possible quantity of product. Then
Q b b Q b Q
CS b ln Q ln 1 ln ,
k Q k k
where e . The specific choice of ε does not affect the dynamics of the model
because the objective function, as any potential, is set up to an arbitrary constant
accuracy, so further we will write ε instead of ˆ . Then the objective function of firm-
reciprocator is:
b Q
ΠX = α(P – v)x + (1 – α)CS = α(P – v)x + (1 – α) ln( ) ,
k
where is share of private interest PI (reciprocator’s profit), 1 is share of social
interest (responsibility) SR (consumer surplus from its own market segment) in the
objective function.
2.1 Dynamics Model Equations with Naive Expectations
Consider the dynamics of this two-dimensional model in discrete time t = 0, 1,...;
where xt, yt are the outputs at time t of reciprocator and egoist firm, respectively. On
the basis of these values at time t each firm finds the optimal value for its own
production quantity in the next moment t 1 , maximizing its objective function. It
distinguishes this model, in which the firm responds to changes in output of both their
and other types of firms from traditional competition models, where one type of firm
responds to changes in other types only. So each selfish firm is looking for such value
of yt 1 at which it maximizes its own profits, suggesting that SR firms and the other
n k 1 PI firms leave their quantities unchanged:
b
Y v yt 1 . (1)
yt 1 k xt (n k 1) yt
Obviously, the maximum point for yt 1 is found from the condition 0 , whence:
yt 1
v ( yt 1 kxt ( n k 1) yt ) 2 b( kxt ( n k 1) yt ) . (2)
From equation (2) we obtain the response function of the PI firm:
b
yt 1 ( kxt ( n k 1) yt kxt ( n k 1) yt . (3)
v
Similarly, firm-reciprocator finds such value of xt 1 at which the maximum value
of its objective function is:
b b x (k 1) xt (n k ) yt
ПX xt 1 vxt 1 (1 ) ln t 1
x
t 1 ( k 1) x t ( n k ) yt k (4)
.
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П X
Here the maximum point for xt 1 is found from the condition 0:
xt 1
П X b( xt 1 (k 1) xt (n k ) yt ) bxt 1 b 1
xt 1 v (1 ) 0
xt 1 ( xt 1 (k 1) xt (n k ) yt ) 2
k xt 1 (k 1) xt (n k ) yt
Further, without loss of generality, we assume here 1 , otherwise we redefine the
share of profit as . Then
(1 )
1 b
v ( xt 1 ( k 1) xt ( n k ) yt ) 2 b(( k 1) xt (n k ) yt ) ( x ( k 1) xt ( n k ) yt )
k t 1 (5)
.
Assuming z xt 1 (k 1) xt (n k ) yt , we present (5) as:
b 1 b
z2
(( k 1) xt ( n k ) yt ) z.
v vk
Hence, in view of (3), we obtain a system of dynamics equations of this model:
b 1 1 b
2
1 1 b
xt 1 ((k 1) xt (n k ) yt ) (k 1) xt (n k ) yt ,
v 2 vk 2 vk
(6)
b
yt 1 (kxt (n k 1) yt kxt (n k 1) yt .
v
2.2 Equilibrium Conditions for the Model with Naive Expectations
In the Nash equilibrium point xt+1=xt=x, yt+1 =yt=y for all t = 0, 1, … . Therefore, at
this point, by (2) and (5) we obtain:
b b 1 b
kx (n k ) y kx (n k 1) y ((k 1) x (n k ) y )
2
( kx ( n k ) y )
v v vk (7)
.
1 nk
From the last equation we obtain x y (x y ) , whence it follows that
k
2 1 1 n k
x (1 ) y , i.e. the response functions of both types of firms are
k
respectively:
k (1 ) (n k ) (2 1) k
x y, y x (8)
(2 1) k k (1 ) (n k )
To calculate the coordinates of a fixed point, we substitute the expression of y
through x in the first equation (7). Thus the following proposition is proved.
Proposition 1. There is unique Nash equilibrium point in a dynamic system (6):
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b 2 1 1 n k
x* vn 1 n 1 ,
k
(9)
y* b 2 1 1 2 1 .
vn n
However, is this point stable?
Proposition 2. For any set b , v 0 and ( 0 1 ) Nash equilibrium (9) is
unstable for sufficiently large number of firms n if k and k 3 for any
n n 4
0.
The destabilizing role of number of players n is well known for the evolution of
firms’ strategies in oligopoly games [8]. However, in this case, according to
calculations, point (9) is unstable even at n 5 .
Proof. We show that in dynamic system (6) at Nash equilibrium point (9) modulus
of Jacobian J is greater than 1: |det J|>1. This implies that at least one eigenvalue of
the Jacobian is greater than 1 in absolute value, which means instability of the fixed
point (9). Here, the Jacobian of the system (6):
xt 1 xt 1
yt
J xx J xy xt
J .
J yx J yy yt 1 yt 1
xt yt
b
(k 1) b
J xx v (k 1), (n k )
J xy v (n k ),
b
2 ((k 1) xt (n k ) yt d 2 b
2 ((k 1) xt (n k ) yt d 2
v v
b
(n k 1)
b J yy v (n k 1),
k b
J yx v k, 2 ((k 1) xt (n k 1) yt
v
b
2 (kxt (n k ) yt
v
1 1 b
where d , then det J J xx J yy J xy J yx
2 vk
b b
(1 n) ( v 1) ( v 1) .
b b
2 ((k 1) xt (n k ) yt d 2
2 ((k 1) xt (n k 1) yt
v v
b
But for point (9) in the denominator ((k 1) x * (n k 1) y*)
v
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2 2
b 1 k 2 1 k 1 b k 1
(1 ) (1 ) o( ) (1 ) o( ) ,
v n n n v n n
1
where o( ) 0 for n . Similarly, we obtain for the second denominator:
n
2
b b k 1
((k 1) x * (n k ) y*) d 2 (1 ) o( ) .
v v n n
k 3
But by the data at a certain 0 , which guarantees that the factors
n 4
b b
v 1 and v 1 do not equal
b b
2 ((k 1) xt (n k ) yt d 2
2 ((k 1) xt (n k 1) yt
v v
zero for all possible n, k, b, v> 0 and α (0≤α≤1), Q.E.D.
2.3 Dynamic Model Equations with Adaptive Expectations
Since all selfish firms are assumed as identical, it is natural to suggest that they have
the same planning at moment t , so their production quantities yt 1 at moment t 1
will be equal too. Given these expectations, each selfish firm is looking for such value
yt 1 at which it obtains the highest profit, suggesting that production quantity of SR
firms will remain unchanged:
b
Y v yt 1 . (10)
kxt (n k ) yt 1
Y
Obviously, the maximum point for yt 1 is found from the condition 0 , which
yt 1
gives us:
b
kxt (n k ) yt 1
2
kxt . (11)
v
b
Then kxt (n k ) yt 1 kxt , from here response function of PI firms is:
v
b
(n k ) yt 1
kxt kxt . (12)
v
Similarly, firm-reciprocator naturally expects that the quantity of production of all
these firms at moment t 1 would be the same. Based on this expectation, each firm-
reciprocator finds the value of xt 1 at which the objective function is maximal,
assuming that the output of PI firms does not change:
b b kx (n k ) yt
X xt 1 vxt 1 (1 ) ln t 1 . (13)
kxt 1 (n k ) yt k
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X
Here we can find the maximum point for xt 1 from the condition 0 , hereof:
xt 1
b b 1
(kxt 1 (n k ) yt ) 2 (n k ) yt (kxt 1 (n k ) yt ) . (14)
v v
Let z kxt 1 (n k ) yt , represent (14) as:
2 2
1 b 1 b 1 b 1
z (n k ) yt .
2 v v 2 v
1 b 1 b 1 b 1 2
Hence z (n k ) yt ( ) . Thus, in view of (12), we obtain
2 v v 2 v
a system of dynamics equations of the model, taking into account the forecast:
b 1 1 b 2 1 1 b
kxt 1 (n k ) yt ( ) (n k ) yt ,
v 2 v 2 v
. (15)
(n k ) y b kx kx .
t 1
v
t t
2.4 Equilibrium Conditions for the Model with Adaptive Expectations
In the Nash equilibrium point xt+1=xt=x, yt+1=yt=y for all t 0,1,... . Therefore, at this
point in view of (11) and (14) we get:
b b b 1
(kx (n k ) y ) 2 kx (n k ) y (kx (n k ) y ) . (16)
v v v
1 nk 1
From the second equation we get x x (1 ) y , whence
k
response functions for selfish and reciprocator firms are, respectively:
k (1 ) n k (1 )
y x x y (17)
n k (1 ) k (1 )
To calculate the coordinates of the fixed point, we substitute this expression y in
terms of x at first equation (16):
2 (1 ) b
2
k (1 ) b
kx (n k ) x kx kx 1 kx
n k (1 ) v (1 ) v
Hence, we obtain:
Proposition 3. There is unique Nash equilibrium point in the dynamic system (15)
with adaptive expectations:
b (1 ) 2
x vk ( 2
) ,
. (18a)
y b 2 ((1 ) ) 2
.
v(n k ) (2 ) 2
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As before, without loss of generality, let 1 , otherwise we can override the share
of profit as . At 1 system (18) takes the form:
(1 )
b 1 2
x vk ( 2 ) ,
. (18b)
y b 2 1 b 1 1
(1 ).
v(n k ) (2 ) 2 v(n k ) 2 2
Proposition 4. The equilibrium point (18) is stable for all possible values of the
parameters.
Proof. To prove the stability of dynamic system (15) in Nash equilibrium point
(18) it is necessary and sufficient to demonstrate that for Jacobian J of this system in
(18) the following conditions named after Shur were satisfied:
1 tr J det J 0,
1 tr J det J 0,
1 det J 0.
Here, the Jacobian of system (15)
xt 1
xt 1
J xx J xy xt
yt
J ,
J yx J yy yt 1
yt 1
xt
yt
obviously, J xx J yy 0 where trJ J xx J yy 0 . Thus, to test Shur conditions it is
b 2 ((1 ) ) 2
sufficient to establish that det J 1 . But at point (18) y*
v(n k ) (2 ) 2
and therefore
b
(n k )
v nk
kJ xy (n k ) (n k ) 0
b
2 (n k ) y d 2 2
2
v 4 2
Consequently, det J J xx J yy J xy J yx 0 , Q.E.D.
The price of product P in the market is given by the inverse market demand
b
function P P(Q ) ( b 0 ), and the price is not less than a cent, i.e. P 0.01 .
Q
100b
Therefore, the product quantity of each firm-reciprocator is x . Similarly, the
k
100b
product quantity of each selfish firm is y .
nk
Corollary. The trajectories of the dynamical system (15) converge to a Nash
100b 100b
equilibrium (18) for any initial values x0 , y0 .
k nk
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3 Dynamic Model Equations in a General Case
Suppose that in planning under the given market model adaptive expectations are
used with probability p , naïve ones - with probability q 1 p . Then the profit
function for a typical (representative) firm-egoist has the form:
b
Y v yt 1 , (19)
yt 1 kxt p(n k 1) yt 1 q(n k 1) yt
and the objective function for the representative firm-reciprocator
b
X xt 1 vxt 1 ,
x
t 1 p ( k 1) xt 1 q ( k 1) xt ( n k ) yt (20)
b xt 1 p(k 1) xt 1 q (k 1) xt (n k ) yt
(1 ) ln( ).
k
Obviously, for p 0 ( q 1 ) objective functions Y and X are consistent with the
results of naive model (1) and (4), for p 1 ( q 0 ), they are consistent with the
results of the adaptive model (10) and (13) respectively. Let us assume
z X yt 1 kxt (n k 1)( pyt 1 qyt ) z X xt 1 (n k ) yt (k 1)( pxt 1 qxt )
b b b
In this notation Y v yt 1 ; X xt 1 vxt 1 (1 ) ln z X .
z z k
X X
Then the point yt 1 of maximum profit function X is found from the condition
X
0 , here
yt 1
b
z2X (kxt q (n k 1) yt (21)
v
whence
b
yt 1 (1 p(n k 1))
(kxt q(n k 1) yt k xt 1 (n k 1) q yt (22)
v
The maximum point xt 1 for the objective function X is found from the first order
X
condition 0 . Forth without loss of generality we assume here 1 ,
xt 1
otherwise as above we redefine the share of profit as . Then
(1 )
b 1 b(1 p(k 1))
z2 X
((n k ) yt (k 1) qxt ) z X (23)
v vk
Thus, in view of (22), we obtain the dynamics model of equations system of in the
general case:
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b
(1 p(k 1)) xt 1 wx d 2 wx d ,
v
(24)
(1 p(n k 1)) y b w w ,
t 1
v
y y
wx q (k 1) xt (n k ) yt ,
where
wy kxt q(n k 1) yt .
3.1 Equilibrium Conditions in a General Case
Since Nash equilibrium point is xt+1=xt=x, yt+1=yt=y for all t 0,1,... , then at this
point in view of (21) and (23) we obtain:
b b
z Y z X (kx (n k ) y ) 2 (kx q (n k 1) y ) ((k 1)qx (n k ) y )
v v
(25)
1 b(1 p (k 1))
(kx (n k ) y )
vk
From the second equation we get:
1 1 p(k 1) 1 1 p(k 1)
y (n k ) (n k ) q(n k 1) x k (k 1)q k
k k
Thus,
nk 1 n k 2 1
yp q(1 ) x (1 p(k 1)) ,
k
where response function in this case
nk
p (n k ) q( (1 ) )
x k (26)
G .
y (2 1)(1 p(k 1))
To calculate the coordinates of the fixed point we substitute from (26) expression for
x b
in the first equation of (25) y 2 (kG (n k ))2 y (kG q(n k 1)) . Hence
y v
Proposition 5. There is unique Nash equilibrium point in a general dynamical system
(24):
b b
(kG q(n k 1)) (k q (1/ G )(n k 1))
y* v x * Gy * v (27)
(kG (n k )) 2 (k (1/ G )(n k )) 2
where the function G G ( p, q, n, k , ) is given in (26).
Proposition 6. For p 0 ( q 1 ) the equilibrium point ( x*; y*) coincides with point
(9) of a dynamic system with naive expectations. When p 1 ( q 0 ) the
equilibrium point coincides with point (18b) of the dynamic system with adaptive
expectations.
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4 C# - Application Model for Numerical Investigation
C# window application Model has been created specifically for the numerical
investigation of the model of this paper, using a graphical interface of C# system
libraries System.Drawing and System.Windows.Forms. Note that all the calculations
associated with the model, are localized in the method calc of the application Model
that makes it easy to modify the equations of the model and use the Model to study
the other two-dimensional dynamical systems. Fig. 1 shows the application window.
Fig. 1. Application Model for two-dimensional model
The right side presents 6 kinds of graphs displayed by the application; their
examples are set forth in the paper. Selected switch indicates that here the graph of
trajectory x(t) is selected. On the left side counters allow us to specify the parameters
of the model and the initial values of the trajectory. After their setting the calculation
results of the iterations’ coordinates below and their image in the center of the
window. This displays an animation of a selected path, the number of iterations been
set on the scroll bar above. Pressing the button Model view left displays information
about the model, its equations and parameter information.
4.1 Numerical Experiment: from Stability to Chaos with Increasing
of Naive Expectations
With the increasing probability of naive expectations q, that is with decreasing p,
the market becomes unstable, evolving from simple dynamics (15) with a single
stable equilibrium point to the unpredictable behavior of system (6). From the proof
of Proposition 2 it follows that the market volatility is proportional to the number n of
firms in the market. Therefore, for fixed q market instability increases with increasing
n. Thus, model (24) has two parameters: the number of firms n and the probability of
a naive approach q, whose growth leads to instability. The transition from stability to
chaos is the same in both cases. Consider this transition for parameter q.
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Fig. 2. Quantity trajectory of selfish firm under probability of naive expectations q 0.5
Let n n=20, k=6, b=200, v=2, α=0.9, q=0.5. The trajectory of the dynamical system
(24) with the following parameters and the initial point x0=0.1, y0=0.1 is shown in the
following figures 2 and 3. In Fig. 2 on the x-axis of the system are given iterations of
system (24) from m = 1 to m = 100, on the y-axis – corresponding quantity product of
selfish firm ym.
As we can see from the graph, the path quickly converges to the equilibrium value
y*≈2.488. The graph for the trajectory of firm-reciprocator xm on y-axis is similar.
The equilibrium value of x* is about 6.72. Let us consider the graph of the trajectory
for the same parameters except q. Now q = 0.55 (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Quantity trajectory of selfish firm under probability of naive expectations q 0.55
It still has stable Nash equilibrium, but 100 iterations does not suffice for
convergence. Further, let q = 0.6 (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. Bifurcation quantity trajectory of selfish firm under probability of naive expectations
q 0.6
As we can see, bifurcation occurred, and instead of equilibrium point there was a
steady cycle, where values of ym are approaching the point of y*≈4 for even m and the
point of y*≈1 for odd m. By doubling the lag between iterations only even or only
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odd iterations will be considered, and thus either point y*≈4, or y*≈1 respectively
would be the equilibrium steady state.
Stable cycle has four cycles for q=0.64 (fig. 5). There was a new cycle doubling
bifurcation. Calculations show that with increasing parameter q doubling bifurcation
cycle continues, following Sharkovskii’s scale. According to this scale, when q≈0.675
there is the state of dynamic chaos (fig. 6). Similarly, the graph of product xm on y-
axis by firm-reciprocator looks like trajectory of a selfish firm.
Fig. 5. Doubling bifurcation cycle of quantity by selfish firm under probability of naive
expectations q 0.64
Fig. 6. The state of dynamic chaos of quantity by selfish firms under probability of naive
expectations q 0.675
Note that the ratio between the quantity of output by selfish firms and reciprocators
remains almost unchanged. It is demonstrated in the graph of fig. 9, where each
iteration on x-axis shows the value of output by firms-reciprocators xm, and the
vertical axis - the appropriate output of quantity ym of selfish firms (fig. 7.).
Fig. 7. The ratio between the quantity of product of selfish firms (horizontal axis) and
reciprocator ones (vertical axis)
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4.2 Bifurcation diagram
In detail the process of loss of stability and transition to chaos of dynamic system (24)
can be presented in the following bifurcation diagram (fig. 8).
Fig. 8. The bifurcation diagram of dependence quantity product of selfish firm ( y ) on the
probability of naive expectations ( q ) in a general dynamical system
Here the horizontal axis represents the parameter value of q multiplied by 10. The
ordinate values quantity volumes of selfish firm on stable cycle, multiplied by 0.3.
This rescaling is done for the sake of clarity. The values of the other parameters are
the same as above. The bifurcation diagram, where on vertical axis are placed the
values of output of firms-reciprocators xm looks similar.
As noted in numerical simulations, the bifurcation may be interpreted as separation
of equilibrium into several ways, one of which is selected by the market due to
evolution of firms’ strategies, such as repeated interactions and adaptations.
Numerical experiments with n firms as the variable parameter are analogous to those
described above.
5 Conclusion
Thus, we have designed the strategic model of cooperation between the two types of
firms in the market of homogeneous product, where reciprocator and selfish firms
plan their output using the adaptive approach with probability p and naïve (bounded
rationality) one with a probability of q = 1-p, which distinguishes this model from
existing analogues, where each type of firm adheres to one strategy rather than their
combination and maximizes only its own profit rather than social welfare.
Desktop C# application Model using a graphical interface to animate the model
trajectories has been created specifically for the numerical investigation of the model.
It has been proved that in the model with adaptive expectations the unique Nash
equilibrium in a dynamic system is stable for all possible values of the parameters.
The trajectories of the dynamical system converge to the fixed point for any possible
initial values. In the model with naive expectations the unique Nash equilibrium is
unstable for sufficiently large values of n for all possible values of other parameters.
According to the calculations, this point is unstable even at n ≥ 5.
- 517 -
As a result of numerical experiment we have found that bifurcations of cycle
doubling occur with an increase in naive expectations. This bifurcation can be
interpreted as separation of equilibrium state into several ways, one of which is
selected by the market in the evolution of firms’ strategies. If two-thirds of firms use
naive expectation (q≈0.675), then in accordance with the Sharkovskii scale there
appears the state of dynamic chaos in the market, leading to degeneration of the
existing competition model between two types of firms.
Thus, the crucial factor, which ensures sustainable equilibrium in the market and
the ability to predict the product quantity of firms, is the adaptive approach, i.e. the
one taking into account adaptive expectations of the firms when they plan their
production.
Similar results are obtained if instead of q we use parameter n - number of firms in
the market, where system also moves from stability to chaos if n increases.
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