In this discussion paper, several proposals are made for potential interconnections between notions of 'shape', 'ontology', 'design' and 'creativity'. The purpose of the paper is to summarise the points made in the Shapes 3.0 presentation and to promote further discussion and consideration of some of the connections drawn. Shape is proposed as an essential embodied construct deeply anchored into our way of dealing with the world and capable of deployment for a broad range of comprehension and production processes, including creative design.
In this discussion paper, the course of the argument will start from the notion of ‘shape’
and ontology, run through some of the current discussions of ‘creativity’ – particuarly
approaches to computational creativity
Here we need to observe a continuum of more or less extended usages of the term
‘shape’. These begin with presumably unproblematic cases where material objects are
talked of having shape, but quickly move on to discussions where shape takes on a more
metaphorical flavour. Certainly aggregates of material objects can have some shape, even
though the aggregates themselves are no longer entirely physical: ontologically more
complex notions need here already to play a role
So there does not appear to be a clear ‘cut off’ that provides a boundary between what might have a shape and what might not – evidently some rather more abstract notion of what is occurring when we talk of, or use, notions of shape other than that inherent in material objects is going to be necessary. This leads to our particular focus for current Figure 1.: Watternberg’s purposes: just what is it about shape that lends itself to drawing connections of these song shapes kinds so freely?
Here we take up previous discussions, such as that of
The usual diagrammatic representation of these interrelationships is as shown in
Figure 2, drawn from
Now, this sounds promising for shape also. Each physical object definitely has its own unique shape that is its and no other’s. It may then be the case that one way of locating shape ontologically is within a corresponding physical region capturing the nature of shape. Then, quite analogously to colour, if the shape of some object changes, then its particular shape simply takes on a new value (or set of values over time). Let us pursue this further.
For a ‘cognitively’-motivated construction such as the foundational ontology DOLCE, one might expect that its quality spaces have something to do with perception. That is, it is not just ‘colour’ in the abstract that is characterised within the corresponding physical region but colour as it plays a particular role in our, i.e., human’s, dealings with colour. This is necessary because it is well known that the relationship between physically measurable properties of lightwaves, such as frequency and intensity, and phenomenologically experienced ‘colours’ is quite complex.
There are, moreover, various models of ‘colour’ as perceived, which can all be
assessed empirically according to how well and in what respects they ‘match’ our
experiences of colour. Two examples of such schemes discussed by
Regardless of which scheme one takes, however, the complexity of the relationship between these qualitative representations and the physical properties of the generally assumed carrier of colour, light, becomes particularly clear when the behaviour of the human eye is considered. Although there is general awareness of the fact that the eye contains components – the so-called ‘cones’ – that are sensitive to red, green and blue frequencies, it is less generally realised that expressing the properties involved in this way already serves to confuse somewhat the distinct levels of description involved. The actual sensitivity of the three relevant components of the human eye according to light frequency is shown in Figure I4.
Here we can see that there are no ‘pure’ receptors and that there is considerable
overlap in sensitivities. Cones with a peak receptivity to ‘red’ are also very active when
receiving ‘green’; cones with a peak receptivity to ‘blue’ also overlap with both ‘green’
and ‘red’
This differential procedure serves well to distinguish certain states of affairs rather than simply to respond to frequencies. Taken together this then begins to approximate our commonsense colour experience. There are many perceptual experiments that can be performed that produce highly non-intuitive results that rely on these differential processes of excitation and inhibition, demonstrating both their validity and their relevance for colour perception. This means that colours offer an elegant example of where the ‘physical universe’ and our perception of it lie a long way apart.
This point is emphasised further when we examine the visual make-up of several other species. There is, in fact, a broad variety in ranges both of sensitivities and of how those sensitivities are combined during ‘colour processing’. Figure 5 shows sensitivity graphs for honeybees, pigeons and house flies similar to that shown above for humans. One consequence of this is that although the overall ontological organisation proposed by DOLCE may remain, the individual internal construction of quality spaces for colour may well need to be quite different for differing species – indeed, it may well need to be different even among humans, should we wish to characterise more adequately differences in colour perception, such as colour blindness of various types. Returning to the main line of argumentation for the current paper, however, we need to address just why such differences occur and what they tell us about the role of the perceptual system.
First and foremost, such biological results provide strong evidence that
perception is functional in the sense of being rather precisely targeted at the capabilities
that species require to survive. As
Now, it has been suggested above and by
We have asked questions of colour concerning the behaviours that experienced colour differentiation affords for its perceivers. So, crucially, if shape is going to be seen as a quality region, there is very little reason to consider our perception and use of shape differently to the situation for colour. This means we will need to capture just what it is that shape does for us in various contexts of physical interaction with the environment. One source of relevant behaviour here is going to be found in very early interaction as we develop the skills necessary to support more complex abilities – that is, in interaction of the kind suggested in Figure 8.2 Figure 8.: Acquiring the
The quality region for shape may thus be similar to that suggested above for the perception of shape?
physical region for colour, but we still have very little idea of just what dimensions of
variation are going to be necessary for its classification. Indeed, it may turn out to be
a quality space far more like a pigeon’s or housefly’s complex versions of colours than
like simpler 3D Euclidean space or colour wheels. Considering perception as situated
embodied action, as
Here we see a range of dimensions of interaction with physical objects, each of which gives potentially useful information concerning the object in the world being encountered. It is likely that there are considerably more such dimensions, all encoding various parameters that might be found beneficial for low-level body motion and manipulation. Relevant bodies of research for taking such a consideration further would, therefore, include neuroimaging and related techniques exploring just how the brain is making sense of the world it interacts with physically and directly on a close personal scale.
Such categorisations may also play a role for grounding aspects of linguistic
behaviour and descriptions of shapes. This is suggested in Figure 10, which overlays
sev2Image taken from URL: http://www.parentsareimportant.com/2010/05/benefits-of-blocks.html.
eral regions and corresponding labels over the dimensions suggested in the first figure.
Note that the subregions as well as the naming here is purely suggestive of how such
a procedure might unfold; the particular labels and regions identified are not intended
as hypotheses in their own right. The analogy being drawn here is that with the use of
colours in the original figure concerning DOLCE above (Figure 2), i.e., particular
subregions of the space are picked out by a culture for specific labelling. It is to be
assumed, here following
We also need to remark, if only in passing, that there are other kinds of shape-related
interactions that will be relevant. For example, drawing further on
If ‘shape’ ties into rich collections of affordances of these kinds, all physically embodied,
then we can see some of the reasons why the notion of shape’ is so productive. Assigning
some entity a shape is a powerful way of characterising what can be done with that
object in terms of manipulations of various kinds. Similarly, assigning some shape to
our environment tells us much of our potential for action in that environment. There is
potentially much to draw on from the nature of such perceptual spaces themselves. The
idea that such spaces are anchored not only in perception but in embodied perception then
opens a further significant line of contact with the growing body of research concerning
image schemas as one foundation for explaining not only flexible action and interaction
with the world but also our construction of complex conceptual understandings of that
world
Accounts of image schemas providing links grounding conceptual organisation in
embodied experience of the physical world are growing in popularity and power. An
introduction and suggestive formalisation in terms of families of theories is discussed by
Assuming such a level of deep representation that may participate in image schemas
and combinations of image schemas, as characterised in terms of blending
For example, it becomes more straightforward to imagine the motivation for
previously challenging effects such as shape’s evident cross-modality as discussed, for
example, by
We can also see the role of this embodied anchoring of ‘shape’ in higher level
conceptual and linguistic behaviour. Consider, for example, a description offered of one of
his own works by Paul Klee, an artist who was particularly concerned with ‘cross-medial’
effects and who proposed ‘polyphonic painting’ as exhibiting many properties of music,
‘made spatial’. The work in question is shown in Figure 11; his description is as follows:
“A wide span from pole to pole lends space to breathe in and out deeply, which
can even turn into a wheezing struggle for air. A lesser span muffles the breath to
a sotto voce. Around about the grey area, it is only possible to whisper. Either you
raise yourself above this position to the violins or sink below it to the violoncellos.”
Representations may be iconic, symbolic or indexical depending upon their role in reasoning with signs in specific contexts of work. According to the traditional view representations are iconic when they resemble the things they represent.” (Morales &
Saracho 2013, 118) The notion of iconicity, and its contrast with ‘indexes’ and ‘symbols’ of course goes back to the semiotics of Peirce, and it is then useful to pick this up again with more of the Peircean background explicitly included.
The implications of Peirce’s categorisations are often still less than fully appreciated
and there is much to make use of. Particularly relevant here is the fact that Peirce’s
conception of ‘resemblance’, or likeness, that serves as the basis for iconic signs, is by
no means to be limited to purely visual resemblance. Examples given in the literature
readily focus on visual cases because these are far simpler to illustrate – but, in general,
iconicity can range across any senses and combination of senses. This applies equally
to the three subcases of iconic signs that Peirce distinguishes
Finally, let us readdress some of the notions of creativity touched upon above and
design – particularly the role of aesthetics in design.
It is useful and suggestive to run through Everaert-Desmedt’s (2006) steps in artistic creation in slightly more detail and then to construe these simultaneously in relation to design and to shape. First, then: “At the outset, the artist is in an unsettled state, not due to a surprising fact, but to an unsettling feeling. [He or she] is plunged into firstness, into a chaos of ‘qualities of feelings’ (Peirce, 1931-1935, 1.43): a feeling arises that seems appropriate, but there is no object to which it is appropriate.” Subsequent to this, the process of semiosis steps in, as always for Peirce driven primarily by abduction: “The artist begins creating the work of art by using abduction. But while scientific abduction consists in hypothesizing a solution to a conceptual problem, artistic abduction or hypothesis consists in trying to express the problem, in letting qualities of feelings arise, in trying to capture them, in ‘thinking’ them, and considering them as appropriate.” Here we can consider the particular spin and flavour given to this account when ‘thinking them’ is seen in terms of embodied action and shape. The creation process then becomes one of ‘thinking shape’.
This is a very different perspective to that pursued in the interest of scientific
modelling, or even of constructing ontologies. One common position adopted when
considering ontology is that of Varzi, quoted below, where it is emphasised that one needs to
start from a deeper consideration and understanding of what is the case, rather than how
it may or may not be described in language:
“There is, in fact, no way of telling what sorts of things there are given the sorts of
things we say. But neither is there a complete gap between our words and the world
out there. It’s just that that bridge must be built from below, as it were: ontology
comes first, and depending on what we think there is, we must attach a meaning to
what we say. Going the other way around is wishful thinking.”
This can involve creating ‘purposively shaped’ artefacts – not only for manipulations in personal space but also to ‘inhabit’. The former naturally overlaps with the area of product design, the latter closely with issues in architectural design. Particularly in architectural design the role and effects of ‘shape’ have long been a central concern. In Figure 13, we see a particularly finely articulated ‘shape’ of empty space. Again, much of what makes this (and other cases) effective (or not) is the transferral of embodied experience across the diverse scales of experience. Further formalisations and experiments vFiiegwu:reCh1u3rc.:h Inotfertihoer in this direction are then clearly of considerable importance for gaining more theoretical Gesu`, Palermo, Sicily. and practical control of the notion of ‘shape’.
In this purely exploratory paper several lines of thought and literature have been brought together in order to suggest that shape may need anchoring in a more encompassing view of embodied perception and then, with the functionalities this affords, may go on to help characterise a variety of processes of creative thought and design.
This anchoring of shape would naturally support the extremely broad application of ‘shape’ in a variety of discourses that is readily observed, providing more technical detail to the commonsense notion that something ‘shapelike’ may be metaphorically extended to apply in domains ranging from mathematics to music to argument and so on. The nature of this metaphor can be connected directly both to Peirce’s particular view of ‘metaphor’ as a form of iconicity and its foundational role in reasoning and knowledge on the one hand, and to currently developing notions and formalisations of blending and its centrality for creative thinking on the other.
From the perspective sketched here, it does not become too far a stretch to consider creative design as essentially a process of shaping, of forming shapes that have not been formed before, for new purposes and in new domains – an interrelationship and process summed up graphically as a final picture in Figure 14.