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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>A Whiteheadian approach to data and knowledge</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Sebastian Siemoleit</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Heinrich Herre</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>In Mind Cloud Pte Ltd</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Munich</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Institute of Medical Informatics, Statistics and Epidemiology, University of Leipzig</institution>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Motivation: We live in the age of Big Data. Data are collected about everything which has a mode of existence; this can be objects, processes, pictures, verbal reports, and many other types of things. The final purpose of data is not to collect more data but to transform data into relevant applications. For this purpose, there is a need to transform data into knowledge which is the basis for a manifold of applications. The current situation of data overload is caused by a lack of methods for abstraction and interpretation of data, but also by an insufficient understanding of the relation between data and knowledge. The overall goal of our work, intended to be realized within a longstanding project, is to establish an ontological framework which may serve as a unifying theory of data and knowledge. We explore various philosophical sources, and ascertain whether they may contribute to the realization of this project. In the present paper we consider Whitehead's philosophy. Approach: We explore the philosophy of Whitehead, expounded in Process and Reality, with respect to its relation to a recently developed ontology of data called GFO-Data. Whitehead's Process and Reality provides a non-formal approach to the creation of data and knowledge. Results: Basic categories and relations of Whitehead's Process and Reality are analyzed and specified by axioms in FOL. We outline a representation of the informational character of a datum as a prehension. This approach needs to be completed in order to grasp the process of transforming data into knowledge in more detail. *Contact: sebastian.siemoleit@imise.uni-leipzig.de</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>
        In the current paper we present an approach, inspired by ideas of
Whitehead’s philosophy in Process and Reality, which supports the
analysis of the categories of knowledge and data. This investigation
was stimulated by the boom of Big Data and the need to gain a
deeper understanding of the relation between data and knowledge.
We believe that this boom precipitates, serious misinterpretations
about the role of data and its expected power to generate real
knowledge. From some circles of computer scientists and software
engineers, but also statisticians, emanates the idea that empirical
science and its methods are obsolete in the age of Big Data, because all
the knowledge is in the data and can be extracted by mining
algorithms and statistics
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">(Anderson 2008)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>1 Hamming (1997) "In science, if you know what you are doing, you
should not be doing it. In engineering, if you do not know what you are doing,
then you should not be doing it:”</p>
      <p>
        We hold that this view is questionable and unsettled. One may ask
whether it is possible to extract Einstein’s General Theory of
Relativity out of petabytes of physical data by methods of knowledge
mining and statistics. Another example is expressed by the
following quote of the statistician E. P. Box: “Essentially, all models are
wrong, but some are useful”
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Box 1987)</xref>
        . We disagree, and believe
that Box misunderstood the role of models and underestimates the
importance of theory formation. Our detailed analysis of this topic
will be published elsewhere.
      </p>
      <p>
        Members of other communities, notably from psychology, are
more aware of problems pertaining to the relation between data and
knowledge. In
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">(Mausfeld 2011)</xref>
        the author addresses the
fundamental problem of perception theory. Mausfeld notes that in the standard
model of perceptual psychology, which is basically used in
computer vision, occurs an explanatory gap because this model borrows
concepts, such as surfaces, shadows, boundaries or illuminations,
implicitly from the output of the perceptual system. In the spirit of
Whitehead, these concepts are localized in the realm of eternal
objects and not directly in the raw data. The remaining problem is
unsolved, namely to understand how the perceptual system integrates
the sensory input with the eternal objects to create a perceptual
object.
      </p>
      <p>
        In
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Albertazzi 2015)</xref>
        an intriguing argument is presented in favor
of the usage of a natural semantics in an advanced ecological theory
of perception. We hold that the same is valid for image processing,
too. As Albertazzi accentuates, it is necessary to express
phenomenal qualities not in an objective manner, but rather in the way they
are perceived subjectively. Whiteheadian subjective forms are the
key to represent how contemporary entities are perceived. Their
descriptive character allows applications to not only represent
appearances as dispositions, since they are capable to encode functionality
and affections. Subjective forms are the result of a sense-making
process and how visual data are perceived according to a perceiver.
      </p>
      <p>
        We defend the conception that theory is needed and should be
regulated as well as tested by practical applications.1 Conveniently,
the neuro-ecological model of the brain described in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref15 ref6">(Northoff
2016a)</xref>
        does not only withstand ontological discussion in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref15">(Northoff
2016b)</xref>
        but also an impressively successful comparison to empirical
data. This model is based on the Whiteheadian notions of subject
and object and explains how they are subsequent phases of
perceiving entities. These notions will be discussed later in this paper and
provide a foundation for this model in a formal guise. Such work
emphasizes the important role of formal ontology as it is pointed out
in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">(Martin 1999)</xref>
        , which can be summarized by: All what exists falls
prey to ontology.
2
2.1
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>APPROACH</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Basics of an Ontology of Data</title>
        <p>
          We use the top level ontology GFO as a reference ontology and
framework for our investigation
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8 ref9">(Herre 2010; Herre et al. 2007)</xref>
          . In
GFO the existence of four ontological regions, called ontological
strata, are postulated. The temporal regions include the material
stratum, the stratum of societal entities, and the psychological stratum.
The ideal region includes entities which are independent from space
and time, including mathematical objects and universals; in
Whitehead’s philosophy they correspond to the eternal objects. In GFO
the entities of the world are classified into categories and
individuals. Categories can be instantiated; individuals are not instantiable.
GFO allows for categories of higher order, i.e., there are categories
whose instances are categories themselves. Spatiotemporal
individuals, also called concrete individuals, are classified alongside two
axes: the first one explicates the individual’s relation to time and
space, and the second one uses the relation of existential dependency
between individuals.
        </p>
        <p>Spatiotemporal individuals are classified into continuants,
presentials and processes. Continuants persist through time and have a
lifetime; they correspond to ordinary objects, such as cars, balls, trees
etc. At any time-point of its life time, a continuant exhibits a
presential, which is an entity that is wholly present at that time-point.
Processes are temporally extended entities that happen in time; they can
never be wholly present at a time point. Processes have temporal
parts, which are processes themselves.</p>
        <p>
          Concerning the second axis, attributives depend on bearers which
can be objects (continuants, presentials) or processes. Situations are
parts of reality which can be comprehended as a coherent whole
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">(Barwise et al. 1983)</xref>
          . There is a variety of types of attributives,
among them qualities, roles, functions, dispositions, and structural
features. Categories the instances of which are attributives are called
properties. According to the different types of attributives (relational
roles, qualities, structural features, individual functions,
dispositions, factual, etc.) we distinguish quality properties (intrinsic
properties) and role properties (extrinsic properties). The latter are
classified into relational role properties (abr. relational properties),
social role properties (social properties).
        </p>
        <p>
          GFO includes a part that is GFO-Data, which is a top level
ontology of data
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(Herre 2016)</xref>
          . The semantics of data is captured by
properties, the instances of which need a bearer. The syntax of data uses
symbol structures and tokens, which can be saved on a material
medium, for example a hard disc. The relation between the semantics
and syntax of data is investigated in
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">(Uciteli 2011)</xref>
          . A similar
approach is presented in
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">(Ceusters 2015)</xref>
          . In the following we consider
the semantics of data only.
        </p>
        <p>According to GFO-Data, we distinguish three levels of
information: phenomenal data, factual data and propositions, whereas the
term information is used informally to cover both data and
knowledge. Data depend on bearers, and we assume that the bearers
are concrete individuals. In GFO-Data, atomic data are covered by
attributives and the corresponding properties; they are constituents
for complex data.</p>
        <p>The elementary form and the origin of phenomenal data are sense
data, but also data which can be measured by instruments. These
data correspond to qualities. With respect to the bearers, we
distinguish between object-data and processual data. Object-data are
classified into presentic object-data, and non-presentic data. At any time
point of an object’s life time, its object-data exhibits entities, being
wholly present at this time point. This means that an individual
quality of an object, say an individual red, can be wholly accessed at time
points. The composition of an object with some of its qualities
exhibits more complex data, called object-facts.</p>
        <p>The bearers of processual data are processes. Processual data are
classified into presentic and global. Presentic processual data are
associated to process boundaries. They must be wholly accessible at
time points. The isolated presentic data of process boundaries do not
need any reference to a process. They can be completely reduced to
object qualities. These are typically qualities of objects participating
in the process. An example of a non-isolated datum of a process is
the velocity of a moving body at a time-point. This datum cannot be
determined and specified without a preceding process.</p>
        <p>The global qualities of processes are the richest class of processual
qualities. A systematic classification of these qualities is in its initial
stage. Their main feature is that it does not make any sense to specify
them at a process boundary. One type of such qualities is abstracted
from time series in form of curves. Examples are
electro-cardiograms or a long term blood pressure measurement. There are many
other global qualities of a process which are not derived from time
series. Examples are the duration of a process, its temporal extension
or its occupied space. Physics provide many examples of this kind,
e.g. the average velocity of moving bodies.</p>
        <p>The non-phenomenal data open a rich field of data, from which
we select relational data only. Relational data are based on relations,
which are categories (universals), the instances of which are relators.
A relator, being a cognitive creation, is an attributive which is
composed of (relational) roles. We consider the following expression
 ∶= “ ℎ ’ 
 
”. The subterm “
” denotes a
relation, denoted by 
(
). Let 
be an instance of

(</p>
        <p>), then from this we may derive two roles, the role  1 of
the drinker, and the role  2 of the drunken. John plays the role of the
drinker and the beer plays the role of the drunken. These constituents
are composed to a complex entity, a relational fact expressed by
“ ℎ ` 
is denoted by</p>
        <p>”; the fact, denoted by this expression  ,
( ). The bearers of a relator are determined resp.
specified by the players, which play the corresponding roles. The
roles themselves occur as unary attributives, though they cannot be
separated from the relator of which they are a part of.</p>
        <p>Relators and roles are considered attributives, being more abstract
than phenomenal data, as for example qualities. These data cannot
be accessed by perception and measuring instruments. Relators can
be classified with respect to the bearers; the role players may be
objects or processes.
tional facts. Let us consider the fact  ( ), associated to the
expression  ∶= “ ℎ ’    . ” By an operation of
abstraction the mind transforms the fact  ( ) into the proposition
 ( ( )) ∶= “ ℎ     . ” The modes of
existence of  ( ) and  ( ( )) are different:  ( ) is a
part of spatiotemporal reality, whereas  ( ( )) is an
abstract entity having an indirect relation to reality, mediated by the
corresponding fact. Propositions can be satisfied or disproved,
hence, they can be true or false.</p>
        <p>We emphasize that the interface between data and knowledge
occurs at the transformation from facts to propositions. Relational
propositions are very simple expressions which can be used to
represent small pieces of knowledge. The development of a full-fledged
ontology of knowledge, which includes complex propositions,
theories and knowledge fields, is an important task for the future.
Figure 1 summarizes the basic categories of GFO-Data.
The crucial part of the ontology in Process and Reality is the
becoming of actual entities. These actual entities, being in space and time,
are the only components reality consists of from a physicalist point
of view. All other entities are abstract objects or parts of actual
entities. These parts form the inner structure of each actual entity and
determine its perceivable attributes. What Whitehead refers to as
process lies in the becoming of each actual entity and plays an
integral part in how the inner structure of such an entity is created. The
becoming is the evaluation of the sense data which an actual entity
can perceive and how the information, created out of this data, is
composed. Furthermore, this information determines how the entity
can be perceived by other entities.</p>
        <p>Whitehead refers to the cycle of perceiving and being perceived
as principle of advance. Each actual entity fulfills two tasks. Firstly,
in its role as a subject, it transforms data into knowledge and
secondly, in its role as an object, it provides this knowledge as data for
other entities. The process itself is the transformation of data into
knowledge. Data is a result of perception and no object is perceived
directly, but it is grasped by its attributes. Likewise, an actual entity
does not directly perceive other actual entities; it perceives its
surrounding world as prehensions about the actual entities the world
consists of. Therefore, each attribute will be reflected as a part of the
prehension its carrying actual entity effects. This part is the universal
the attribute instantiates.</p>
        <p>
          Whitehead calls them eternal objects as they are more than just
object-universals. Each of them is used relative to the prehending
subject, whereas an object-universal is the same for each subject. As
an example we consider the situation that a dog is prehended as
frightening; the eternal object, used by the subject to describe this
dog, is not the object-universal dog only. The corresponding eternal
object is a composition of the object-universal dog and fear as a
subjective emotional component which is another eternal object. In
Process and Reality these compositions are called subjective forms.
These subjective forms resemble aspectual derivatives, as presented
and discussed in
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(Herre 2013)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>If an actual entity  perceives the actual entities  and  and
prehends them by means of their common attributes  only, then  and
 are perceived as a single entity n, because a cannot distinguish
them and assumes them to be the same. Whitehead calls this entity
 the nexus of  and  , justified by the subjective form  which is
the complex eternal object having all  as its parts. This nexus is not
a basic datum anymore, it is already a product of  ’s mental pole, as
well as a probably unconsciously made proposition about  and  .
The creation of such mental entities mark the first step on the way
to the creation of knowledge from data.</p>
        <p>Eternal Objects,
Universals, Properties</p>
        <p>We argue that there are similarities between the Whiteheadian
process ontology and the GFO-approach to an ontology of data and
knowledge, as sketched in section 2.1. The justification of this claim
needs a deeper analysis of the structural aspects of Whitehead’s
process ontology within the GFO-framework. In this paper, we focus
on a partial representation of those entities types only, which
Whitehead subsumes under his Category of Existence. In the future work,
we intend to give a complete description of all these types and will
define a relational structure in which they coexist to form a
continuously evolving reality.</p>
        <p>Figure 2 displays the relevant components which are associated
with the perceptual system. This can be described by using the
notion of actual entity, the relation of prehension, and eternal objects,
which correspond to attributes being universals.
3</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>FORMAL REPRESENTATION</title>
      <p>Whitehead’s Category of the Ultimate specifies the principles which
are presupposed in the three other categories, defined in Process and
Reality. The so-called Category of Existence aggregates all types of
existing entities. The subsequent Category of Explanation and
Category of Obligation describe the notion of these types and their basic
functional properties, as well as relations between their instances.
Subsequently, we summarize how actual entities, prehensions, and
eternal object must be specified to support applications in the theory
of data and knowledge.
3.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Data</title>
        <p>In the Whiteheadian approach, the basic elements of the categorical
scheme are actual entities, which form reality, and eternal objects
that provide order and definiteness to them.</p>
        <sec id="sec-3-1-1">
          <title>3.1.1 Actual Entities</title>
          <p>Actual entities are defined in two different ways, depending on
context. One context pertains to the evolution of developing entities,
where the actual entity presents an event, whereas the other refers to
an actual entity’s own process of becoming as subject.</p>
          <p>A becoming subject analyzes the data provided by the world and
gains spatiotemporal extensiveness during this process. This
extensiveness is effected by the resulting information of this analysis. The
becoming itself has no extension on its own, but results in an actual
occasion representing extensiveness. These actual occasions are a
special kind of event, consisting of one unique actual entity only.
We argue that these two entities are equivalent. If a reference is
made to an actual entity's extensiveness, i.e. its position in time or
space, we are talking about its corresponding actual occasion. Since
it has no temporal extension, we argue that each becoming
resembles an instantaneous change. An effected change is only to some
degree specific to the actual entity, because an external
determination exists.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-1-2">
          <title>3.1.2 Eternal Objects</title>
          <p>
            The determination of actual entities is provided by eternal objects.
These objects are able to describe actual entities and thus, the
analysis of a becoming subject results in information as a composite
eternal object. The existence of such complex objects implies an
ordering between all eternal objects enabling actual entities to evaluate
their analysis regarding the relevance of the results. Whitehead
presupposes the existence of a unique actual entity which is final; it
exists initially and its internal structure implies a binary relation on
the set of all eternal objects. We argue that this relation is a partial
ordering; it resembles the ordering between concepts, introduced
and investigated in
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">(Herre 2007)</xref>
            . The system of eternal objects,
together with a binary relation ≤, is called ontology structure, and is
presented by the pair  = ( , ≤). We stipulate the
following axioms.
(1)
(2)
(3)
∀ ( ≤  )
∀ ,  ,  ( ≤  ∧  ≤  →  ≤  )
∀ ,  ( ≤  ∧  ≤  →  =  )
          </p>
          <p>For each actual entity  there is a unique eternal object, called its
subjective aim. This aim helps  to choose valuable data during its
becoming by providing the abstraction of an ideal outcome. In
addition, this aim determines which eternal object  is selected as a
subjective form by  to give meaning to a datum, i.e. another entity  ’.
The eventual assignment of  to  ’ is called objectification of  ’ and,
thus, establishes a subject-object-relationship between  and  ’. This
relation characterizes  as subject and  ’ as object.  provides a
potential representation of  ’ in the internal structure of  , as well as a
valuation of  ’, regarding the subjective aim of  . Thus, a subjective
form is a possible composition of eternal objects, representing an
objectified entity and its value for a specific subject. Since each
composition of eternal objects is an eternal object, a subjective form
 is a complex eternal object.  ’s role of being a subjective form
existentially depends on an actual entity  playing the role of a
subject, and another entity  playing the role of an objectified entity.
This relation is a basic relation, which is denoted by
 ℎ ( ,  ,  ).</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-1-3">
          <title>3.2.2 Prehensions</title>
          <p>Informally, a prehension is an act of grasping something either by
means of sense or mind. During the process of becoming, an actual
entity creates composite entities forming its internal structure. Each
of these entities is a reaction to other actual entities and to the eternal
objects characterizing this reaction.</p>
          <p>We introduce a first-order structure  =
( ,  ,  ,  ,  ), called knowledge structure,
because it aggregates the main components taken from Whitehead’s
philosophy, which are crucial for the elucidation of data and
knowledge. Here,  denotes the universe, consisting of
spatiotemporal entities, which include the set actual entities  and the
prehensions,  is an ontology structure as introduced above and
 ,  ,  are binary relations to be explained later.
Prehensions are a special form of composite entities.</p>
          <p>The earlier mentioned subject-object-form-relationship is crucial
to the definition of prehensions. A subject objectifies a datum by
assigning a subjective form to it. In this context, objectification
means making a datum graspable by assigning abstract universals
and emotions to it. Prehensions encode such objectifications, i.e.
how entities generate information out of data. In the following we
focus on those entities described in Process and Reality, which are
relevant for the analysis of data; these are prehensions of actual
entities, and eternal objects. These types are sufficient to describe the
acquisition of data, the evaluation by the subject, and to outline the
mental operations realizing the creation of data and knowledge.
∀ (
ℎ
( ) ∶↔ ∃ ,  ,  (
( ,  ) ∧ 
( ,  ) ∧
( ,  )))
According to the type of its datum, we distinguish between physical
and conceptual prehensions. Both of them have different sources.
Physical prehensions emerge from actual sense data and can be seen
as raw data, whereas conceptual prehensions are products of an
actual entity’s mental pole which represents mental data.
( ): ↔ ∃ (
( ,  ) ∧</p>
          <p>( )))
( ): ↔ ∃ (
( ,  ) ∧ 
( )))
All other prehensions are called impure, because they integrate
mental and sense data. The question arises how it is possible to ac-quire
mental data. According to Whitehead’s ontological principle, every
datum has to be derived from an actual entity. Thus, there is a
connection between the ontology structure  and the actual entities.
The answer is given by the Category of Conceptual Evaluation
because it states that every conceptual prehension is a reproduction of
the evaluation of its corresponding physical prehension.
∀ ,  ,  ( ℎ
∃ (
( ,  ) ∧</p>
          <p>( ,  )))
( ) ∧ 
( ,  ) ∧ 
( ,  ) →
Let us consider an observer  and a loudspeaker  facing him.  ’s
emission of a soundwave  is an attributive and observable as a
phenomenal datum by  . Furthermore, assume a second loudspeaker  ′
next to  which emits the same sound wave as  . According to the
stereo effect,  will recognize the emission of a unique sound wave
 ′ as phenomenal datum.  is unable to distinguish between the
soundwaves of  and  ’, but, because he faces them directly, he may
distinguish these concrete individuals visually, by grasping further
phenomenal data provided by the loudspeakers. Applying the
formalism, we define  ,  and  ′ as actual entities and  has a
prehensions  and  ′ corresponding to the respective loudspeakers.</p>
          <p>In Process and Reality this situation would be modelled far more
complex, because each soundwave is composed of actual entities,
and the eternal objects would resemble the laws of physics.
However, we believe that the following simplification is expressive
enough for most use cases. Assume the existence of the eternal
objects  ,  ′ and  representing the conceptualization of both
loudspeakers and the soundwave they are emitting. Figure 3 shows both
physical prehensions  is perceiving.  ;  and  ’;  denote the
subjective forms of  and  ’. It holds  ≤  ;  ,  ≤  ;  ,  ′ ≤  ′;  and
 ≤  ′;  . Depending on  and the subjective aim of  the subjective
form of the conceptual evaluation of  ;  and  ’;  can be determined
and define the conceptual prehensions of  .</p>
          <p>There are some striking parallels between GFO-Data and Process
and Reality. The physical prehension  resembles the bundle  of
all phenomenal data inhered by  , i.e. a set of object facts, and
thereby each quality  is able to perceive from them.  ’s subjective
form  ;  is the fusion of all categories instantiated by the elements
of  as an eternal object. To perceive an individual quality of  , 
has to divide  into atomic parts to create more granular prehensions.
The prehensions  1,  2, … ,   of  are inherited by  as  1′,  2′, … ,  ′
with modified subjective forms. There has to be a prehension   in 
that is inherited by  that effects its sound emission instantiating the
universal   corresponding to  . Thus,  ’ ’s
subjective form has  as a part. Let us extend the inheritance to contain a
historical way from the loudspeaker over the ears and cochlear
nerves up to  ’s brain, which is able to prehend sound emissions
consciously. An analysis of   and this historical way will enable us
to analyze the principles of perception further. We plan to embed
this procedural concept into GFO-Data to show how phenomenal
data is acquired similar to the process shown in Figure 2.
3.2</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Knowledge</title>
        <p>If we want to capture the notion of knowledge, we have to bear in
mind that knowledge is represented in prehensions whose objects
are propositions. Since we have seen that data is the direct sensing
of another actual entity resp. its conceptual evaluation, propositions
are what we called impure prehensions. Knowledge arises if mental
and sense data are mixed to create propositions about the
contemporary world of a subject.</p>
        <p>Let us reconsider the example of the observer and the two
loudspeakers and take away the light.  is able to perceive the sound
emission such that the perceivable attributives of  and  ’ are the
same. The activity of perceiving two concrete individuals as one
entity yields a special type instantiated by the abstract individual  ’ that
exists for  ′ only as shown in Figure 4. In Process and Reality,
individuals like  ′ are called nexūs which are similar to relators in
GFO. Their purpose is to provide an abstraction from an exhaustive
granularity or express missing differentiation between individuals.
To formalize this notion, we need an alternative axiomatization of
knowledge structures with the following axiom allowing us to define
nexūs. An extended signature needs to contain the binary relation ∈
denoting that an actual entity is included in a nexus. Nexūs are used
to describe the mereological fusion of a set of actual entities to a
complex entity, according to their common prehensions. The
complex eternal object, which is the common part of the subjective forms
of these prehensions, is called the common element of form.
∀ ,  ,  ,  ,  (
( ) ∧ 
( ,  ) ∧ 
( ,  ) ∧
Nexūs are the logical objects of propositions, and provide an
abstraction from the atomic view at the expense of accuracy.
Propositions are statements about groups of entities abstracted to a nexūs.
They consist of two parts, the earlier mentioned logical subject and
a logical predicate. This predicate is a subjective evaluation about
the logical subject and hence a complex eternal object. Some of the
created knowledge is chosen to constitute the internal structure of
this entity, since not every conceivable piece of knowledge is correct
or consistent with other propositions. In order to reach this
distinction, an actual entity distinguishes positive and negative
prehensions. The datum of a negative prehensions has no relevance for the
subject, while the datum of a positive prehension resp. feeling has
relevance.</p>
        <p>The set of propositions of every actual entity in  is its
judgement about data in  . This implies that the truth of each proposition
depends on its prehending subject, i.e. if it is a feeling, i.e. true for
the actual entity creating it, but this does not imply universal truth.
To describe this relation, an extended interpretation of the concepts
as theories approach, described in GFO-Data, has to be applied
because this approach makes the same assumption about truth of
propositions. We intend to evaluate these Whiteheadian notions of
knowledge, i.e. nexus and proposition, regarding a usage in GFO.
Fig. 4 An observer  with two loudspeakers  and  ’ facing him. The emission
of the equivalent soundwaves  is perceived as the singular soundwave  ’.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>RELATED WORK</title>
      <p>The process-ontological ideas of Whitehead’s Process and Reality
are well-recognized by many scientists of various disciplines
beyond philosophy. To the best of our knowledge, there are not many
applications of it in computer science. Additionally, none of these
are similar to the work presented here.</p>
      <p>
        The work in (
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">Palomäki et al. 2010</xref>
        ) copes with the application of
Whiteheadian philosophy in software engineering. The proposed
process ontology is a framework that will augment existing models
by embedding them into it. In contrast to our work, they use
connectivity of events as a causal relation between them. Our approach
considered prehensions, which are the foundation of each becoming
event. In later works, we plan to define our own definition of
causality based on events and temporality. Without considering
prehensions, the becoming of entities is limited to the final result and no
temporal relations can be derived formally.
      </p>
      <p>
        The extensive abstraction of events is the foundation of
Whitehead’s point-free geometry. This kind of geometry is highly
influential in the research area of Qualitative Spatial Reasoning. An
extension of these approaches is investigated in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">(Vakarelov 2010)</xref>
        .
Vakarelov creates a dynamic mereotopology by incorporating the
epochal theory of time into contact algebras. In contrast to a mere
consideration of the spatiotemporal representation of reality, our
work used an interpretation of actual events, how they obtain
prehensions as well as their final concrescence which forms reality.
      </p>
      <p>A use case to apply an ontology of perception is given in (Galton
et al. 2015). They emphasize the processual nature of relations
inherent in the processing of histological images. The reduction of
information immanent in these processes allows a qualitative
conceptualization of data items. This reduction closely resembles how
nexūs are created to abstract from exhaustive granularity. Although
the terminology is rather technical, their ontological layers can be
mapped easily to layers of perception as shown in Figure 2.
However, we argue that a formal ontology can be regarded as foundation
of computer vision and image processing only if is based on human
perception rather than a technical substitute.
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>CONCLUSION</title>
      <p>In this paper we investigated interrelations between GFO-Data and
Whitehead’s philosophy, expounded in Process and Reality. This
investigation is intended to gain a deeper insight in the categories of
data and knowledge, and how they occur in the network of actual
entities. It turns out that the relation of prehension is a basic relation,
the ontology of which is compatible with the integrative realism, as
introduced in the top level ontology GFO.</p>
      <p>Furthermore, we presented an axiomatization of various binary
relations and classes of basic entities, occurring in Process and
Reality. These axioms are specified by formulas in First Order Logic,
and they exhibit the first version of a formal ontology associated
with Whitehead’s philosophy. In further studies, we want to
investigate in more detail the relation of prehension, and ascertain
whether these ideas can be applied to various fields, in particular in
the field of computer vision and cognitive psychology.</p>
      <p>
        The next step of our work is the design of a detailed research
program aiming at an ontologically-based unifying theory of data and
knowledge. The boundary between data and knowledge can be
localized at that place, where facts are transformed into propositions.
In our examples these propositions are very simple; they present
only small pieces of knowledge. For the development of a
fullfledged ontology of knowledge we will use ideas in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(Herre 2013)</xref>
        ,
where a bridge between formal ontology and knowledge
organization was established.
      </p>
    </sec>
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