<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Position Paper: Paraconsistent Reasoning for the Semantic Web</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>S. Schaffert</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>F. Bry</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">3</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>P. Besnard</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>H. Decker</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>S. Decker</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>C. Enguix</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>A. Herzig</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Salzburg Research Forschungsgesellschaft</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Salzburg</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Austria</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Digital Enterprise Research Institute</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Galway</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IE">Ireland</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse</institution>
          ,
          <country country="FR">France</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Instituto Tecnol o ́gico de Informa ́tica</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Valencia</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="ES">Spain</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff3">
          <label>3</label>
          <institution>Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita ̈t M u ̈nchen</institution>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Due to the Semantic Web's decentralised and distributed management, contradictory information is and will remain frequent. However, classical reasoning systems fail to work properly in the presence of inconsistencies, because they implicitly or explicitly assume the ex contradictione quod libet (ECQL) principle stating that anything follows from contradictory premises. Paraconsistent reasoning challenges this ECQL principle. Stressing practical cases of reasoning on the Web, this position paper first argues that paraconsistent reasoning is likely to become a key issue for successful deployment of the Semantic Web. Then, it briefly introduces the main approaches to date to paraconsistent reasoning.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>Classical and other logic, upon which modern computing is
based, requires the complete absence of contradictions. With
the classical ex contradictione quod libet (ECQL) rule (or
principle of explosion), everything, and thus nothing useful at
all, can be inferred from a contradiction. For instance, from
a contradiction in a train information system can be derived
that the moon is made of green cheese. Nonetheless,
inconsistencies play an important role in practice (Section 2).</p>
      <p>Paraconsistent logics are a rather novel direction in
mathematical logics that challenge the ECQL principle in order
to allow “reasonable” reasoning in the presence of
inconsistencies without introducing more problems than are already
present in the data. Several different approaches to
paraconsistent logics exist and are briefly outlined in Section 3.</p>
      <p>We conclude this article with a perspective for
paraconsistent reasoning on the Semantic Web (Section 4).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Cases for Paraconsistent Reasoning</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Distributed Information Systems</title>
        <p>In distributed information systems, like the online
information systems of European railways companies,
contradictory information is frequent. For example, the German
railway company might give different arrival times for trains to
Paris than the French railway company, because construction
works on the track in France have not been entered into the
German system. Human beings can easily cope with such
inconsistencies in various ways (e.g. identify which
information is more likely or “don’t care”). Reasoning systems on the
(Semantic) Web must equally be able to derive useful
conclusions from the “inconsistency-free” premises.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Coping with Change</title>
        <p>Belief change is the field of artificial intelligence devoted to
the rational change of belief in the light of new evidence. E.g.,
a train timetable might be updated with new train
connections that have to be taken into account in further reasoning.
Likewise, train connections might have been removed
making previously drawn conclusions invalid.</p>
        <p>In practice, changes like updates to an information system
may cause inconsistencies that cannot be discarded. Standard
methods for belief change are based on classical logic and
hence accept the ECQL principle. As a consequence, they
cannot be used for deriving useful conclusions in presence of
updates causing contradictions.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Inconsistencies Welcome!</title>
        <p>In some situations, inconsistencies are even desirable. This
is, e.g., the case when contradictory viewpoints are present
and need to be reconciled. For instance, two ontologies
describing appartment rental offers and appartment sale offers
might well inconsistently describe preferences and prices for
city areas. This obviously should neither prevent considering
both ontologies nor deriving meaningful conclusions in the
same reasoning context (like helping in taking a decision for
buying or renting an appartment). Obviously, human beings
are capable of doing so without applying the ECQL principle,
and so should automated reasoning systems on the Web.</p>
        <p>Another example is policy reasoning. At the beginning of a
negotiation towards selling/buying a Web service, the policies
of the buyer and seller might be contradictory. Instead of
applying the ECQL principle, a reasoning system should strive
to overcome the inconsistencies, i.e. find a way to pass a
contract acceptable for both the service buyer and seller without
requiring them to change their policies.
“Dialetheias”
In practice, there are cases where contradictions are inherent
to the problem, so-called “dialetheias”. Since such cases arise
in knowledge modelling, they will also arise on the
Semantic Web. This is in particular the case with the well known
Liar’s Paradox where a sentence states its own falsity (“this
sentence is not true”).</p>
        <p>On the Semantic Web, dialetheias might easily arise though
reification, especially of RDF statements, and through
modalities – such as “A believes B” or “A does not believe what B
states” – that are needed e.g. for policy reasoning. Liar
sentences can also be indirect consequences of statements that
are themselves unproblematic, e.g. when combining
knowledge from different Web resources.
3</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Approaches to Paraconsistent Reasoning</title>
      <p>Most approaches to paraconsistent logic and reasoning allow
a formula F and its negation :F to hold in an interpreation
(or “model”). Major approaches of paraconsistent logics and
reasoning are stressed below:</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Relevant Logics</title>
        <p>Relevant logics have been first proposed by Anderson and
Belnap. Semantics for such logics based on “different
worlds” have been developed by Routley and Meyer.
Conjunction and disjunction behave in the usual way, but each
world w has an associated world w such that :A is true in
w iff A is false in w (not in w). As a consequence, if A is
true in w and false in w , then A ^ :A is true in w. Note that
requiring w = w yields the standard classical logic.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Many-Valued Systems</title>
        <p>A multi-valued logic is a logic with more than two truth
values. The formulas that hold in a multi-valued interpretations
are those which have a specific truth-value, the so-called
designated formulas. A multi-valued logic is paraconsistent if it
allows both a formula and its negation to be designated.</p>
        <p>The simplest approach uses three truth values: true and
false, like in classical logic, and a third truth-value denoting
“both truth and false” such that if a formual F has this third
truth-value in an interpreation, then so does also :F .
Considering the real numbers between 0 and 1 instead of discrete
values results in a paraconsistent fuzzy logic.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Non-Adjunctive Systems</title>
        <p>A non-adjunctive logic is a logic in which one cannot
conclude A from A ^ B. The first non-adjunctive logic, and also
the first paraconsistent logic, ever proposed is the discussive
(or discursive) logic of Jaskowski. In dicussive logic,
several contributors state “opinions”. Each opinion is consistent
in itself but might be inconsistent with another opinion. A
modal logic (S5) is used to define interpretations: a world
corresponds to a contributor, and in it, all the contributor’s
sentences are true. Thus, A ^ :A can hold in an
interpretation consisting of several worlds, but not in a single world.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Non-Truth-Functional Logics</title>
        <p>Non-truth functional logics have been introduced by da
Costa. Their idea is to make negation “non-truth-functional”
while keeping the other connectives like in standard, e.g.
classical, logics. Seeing an interpretation as a function mapping
formulas to 0 (false) or 1 (true), a non-truth funtional logic
gives rise to defining the truth-value of :A independently of
that of A (while keeping the usual functional dependencies of
the truth-value of A ^ B, A _ B, A ) B, etc. to the truth
values of A and B).</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Paraconsistency on the Semantic Web</title>
      <p>We believe that dealing with inconsistencies will play a
central role in the emergence of the Semantic Web.
Paraconsistent reasoning provides foundations and techniques that will
allow future applications to function properly in the presence
of inconsistencies. In particular, we think that paraconsistent
reasoning will influence the following areas:</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Paraconsistency in Ontology Reasoning</title>
        <p>Ontology reasoning (e.g. instance checking) on the
Semantic Web is usually based on reasoning techniques, e.g. the
tableaux calculus, developed for description logics.
Therefore, a first step towards an “inconsistency-aware”
Semantic Web will be to adapt existing reasoning algorithms using
techniques from paraconsistent reasoning.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>Paraconsistency in Query Languages</title>
        <p>Querying data plays a very important role on the Semantic
Web, as indicated by the multitude of existing Semantic Web
query languages. Building upon ontology reasoning,
Semantic Web query languages will likely need to be adapted so as
to work in the presence of inconsistencies.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>Paraconsistency and Trust</title>
        <p>In a distributed environment like the Semantic Web, where
anyone can author content, trust is a key issue. Conflicts with
classical logic are apparent: for example, different sources
might make conflicting assertions about the trustworthiness
of a site, and users might be interested in more fine-grained
levels of trust besides the binary “trusted” or “not trusted”.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          [1]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.D.</given-names>
            <surname>Belnap</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>A Useful Four-valued Logic: How a computer should think</article-title>
          . In
          <string-name>
            <surname>A.R. Anderson</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>N.D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Belnap</surname>
          </string-name>
          , and J.M. Dunn, editors,
          <source>Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity</source>
          . Princeton University Press,
          <year>1992</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          [2]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
            <surname>Besnard</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <surname>A</surname>
          </string-name>
          . Hunter, editors.
          <source>Handbook of Deasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems</source>
          , volume
          <volume>2</volume>
          . Kluwer Academic Publishers,
          <year>1998</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          [3]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Franc</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>¸ois Bry. An Almost Classical Logic for Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning</article-title>
          .
          <source>In Paraconsistent Computational Logic</source>
          <year>2002</year>
          ,
          <year>2002</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          [4]
          <string-name>
            <surname>N.C.A.</surname>
          </string-name>
          da Costa.
          <source>On the Theory of Inconsistent Formal Systems. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic</source>
          ,
          <volume>15</volume>
          (
          <issue>4</issue>
          ),
          <year>1974</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          [5]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.M.</given-names>
            <surname>Dunn</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>G. Restall. Relevance</given-names>
            <surname>Logic</surname>
          </string-name>
          . In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors,
          <source>Handbook of Philosophical Logic</source>
          , volume
          <volume>6</volume>
          . Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2nd edition,
          <year>2002</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          [6]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Jaskowski</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems</article-title>
          . In Studia Logica, volume
          <volume>24</volume>
          .
          <year>2001</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          [7]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
            <surname>Priest. Paraconsistent Belief</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Revision</article-title>
          . In Theoria, volume
          <volume>67</volume>
          .
          <year>2001</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          [8]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>G. Priest. Paraconsistent</given-names>
            <surname>Logic</surname>
          </string-name>
          . In D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors,
          <source>Handbook of Philosophical Logic</source>
          , volume
          <volume>6</volume>
          . Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2nd edition,
          <year>2002</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>