=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-1751/AICS_2016_paper_52
|storemode=property
|title=Decision Making is Caused by Information Processing and Emotion: A Synthesis of Two Approaches to Explain the Phenomenon of Confirmation Bias
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1751/AICS_2016_paper_52.pdf
|volume=Vol-1751
|authors=Robert Dunne
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/aics/Dunne16
}}
==Decision Making is Caused by Information Processing and Emotion: A Synthesis of Two Approaches to Explain the Phenomenon of Confirmation Bias==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1751/AICS_2016_paper_52.pdf
Decision Making Is Caused By Information Processing
And Emotion: A Synthesis Of Two Approaches To
Explain The Phenomenon Of Confirmation Bias
Robert Dunne
School of Computer Science and Informatics, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4.
robert.dunne@ucdconnect.ie
Abstract. In social psychology there are two dominant models of reasoning, one that
is based on information processing and another based on emotion. This paper argues
that there are problems with viewing decision making exclusively in these terms, which
is what has been done to date in the field of social psychology. While cognitive
psychologists and behavioural economists have accounted for the internal and external
cognitive processes, generally they have not accounted for the role of culture in one’s
decision making; this is one of the reasons why participants are said to be ‘irrational’ if
they fail to act in a specific way. This paper synthesises two perspectives one that is
concerned with information processing and another which is concerned with emotional
reactions in order to explain the phenomenon of confirmation bias. Areas of agreement
and disagreement will be identified, before recommendations are made for future
research. It is hoped that this can serve as an argument for a more pluralistic framework
that also acknowledges the role of ecological factors.
Keywords: Information Processing, Emotion, Biases, Heuristics, Bayesianism, Social
Intuitionist Model Of Reasoning.
1 Introduction
In social psychology there are two dominant models of reasoning, one that is based
on information processing and another based on emotion. Confirmation bias is the
tendency to acquire or process new information in a way that confirms one’s
presuppositions, it is capable of involving both information processing and emotions.
It is important to analyse the phenomenon of confirmation bias, because if it is the case
that people are simply looking for ways in order to confirm their own presuppositions,
this means that they are not trying to falsify their beliefs or analyse them for internal
consistency, but rather they are simply confirming their own presupposition which are
in part determined by one’s culture and upbringing. This affects coherence in judge-
ment. The emotional approach states that political reasoning and moral reasoning are
intertwined. The way in which one reasons in a political context is likely to tell us what
someone thinks is right or wrong, and also why they think their actions are moral or
immoral. The information based approach discusses how confirmation bias is the result
of problems with information processing. The social intuitionist model of reasoning,
which has greatly influenced the emotional approach states that moral and political rea-
soning is effectively a process of confirmation bias.
Before one can begin to synthesise the two different approaches, it is very important
that certain terminology is defined from the outset. Biased reasoning is a form of moti-
vated reasoning caused by intuitions. An intuition is the ability to understand something
without the need for conscious reasoning. Hume stated that intuitive judgements were
akin to an aesthetic judgement in that they are made without inference or the use of
reasoning [1]. An example of an intuitive judgement might be “I like that painting”.
Heuristics should be understood as simple efficient rules which people use to form
judgements. A heuristic can be considered to be a mental shortcut in decision-making,
it is common for this kind of internal process to result in the creation of biases. A bias
is an external observable phenomenon while heuristics and emotions are internal, un-
observable and descriptions of them are theoretical [2]. It has been demonstrated that
there are many different forms of bias including: judgment biases, attitudinal biases,
attentional biases, response biases and biases in relation to perceptual illusions [3].
Within the field of social psychology there are two understandings of bias one as pro-
cess in which information is filtered so that it can be processed more affectively, the
second definition is one where evaluations are distorted by some form of motivation
[3]. Motivation is being used to refer to an emotional presupposition such as an intui-
tion, the difference between a bias and an intuition and the extent to which they are
related will be discussed later [3]. When the term culture is being used it is describing
factors such as the affect of upbringing, group activity and ecological factors.
It is also important to acknowledge what this theoretical critique is not trying to do.
This critique is not attempting to present a unified theory of decision making this is a
task that far extends the scope of this paper. Similarly a strongly positivist view is not
being taken this means that I am not proclaiming that there is a definitively right or
wrong answer to what causes confirmation bias, or if there are exact definitive grounds
for saying that one is ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’. This paper is only surveying two
approaches with a view to identifying areas of agreement and disagreement in order to
provide a more pluralistic understanding of decision making. This paper will discuss
cognitivist approaches to decision making, it could be the case that alternative views
such as enactivist ones might be able to provide better explanations. However, if one
does not discuss the problems with the existing literature, it will not be possible to
provide a better explanation. Major definitional problems exist in social psychology,
this paper will not be able to deal with all of these problems, rather it will advocate for
an approach to research that would allow these problems to be addressed. This paper
should only be seen as a theoretical critique which aims to synthesise two different
approaches and identify areas of agreement and disagreement in order to provide
recommendations for future research. It is also important that this is defined from the
outset; for the purpose of this paper, the first approach is being referred to as the
information processing based approach (which is discussed by Hahn & Harris in their
paper) and the second approach is being referred to as the emotion based approach
(which is described by Haidt in his paper). These papers have been chosen as the
exemplar papers because each of them provide an account of the history of research in
decision theory from their own individual approach. This provides a means for
analysing related work from each perspective so that the two approaches can be
evaluated effectively.
The structure will be as follow: background will be provided, the definition of
confirmation bias from two perspectives will be analysed in order to identify areas of
agreement and disagreement, incidences in which the two perspectives could be
commensurable will be examined. Before recommendations are made for future
research.
2 Background
2.1 Information Processing Approach
Confirmation bias has a colloquial definition as a process in which one searches for
and interprets information in such a way that it agrees with their predisposition. It could
be considered to be a form of motivated reasoning as opposed to one in which infor-
mation is filtered in a more affective manner. A common definition of what is meant
by confirmation bias comes from Peter Wason who defined it as “the failure to elimi-
nate hypotheses from a conceptual task”, this is based on a task in which participants
had to correctly infer a rule governing triplets of numbers (2,4,6) he found that partici-
pants generated query triplets as opposed to the correct defined rule of increasing orders
of magnitude [3]. His finding from this problem which was concerned with an infor-
mation processing task was that a large proportion of participants would seek evidence
that confirm their proposition. This was in complete contrast to the dominant Popperian
prescription of the need to falsify in the testing of scientific hypothesis, this was taken
to have failed the standard for rational inference. Popperian in this context refers to the
view on science taken by Karl Popper who stated that scientific conclusions were
reached through looking for information that could nullify a hypothesis [4]. This is the
conventional interpretation of this experiment and many would conclude that the par-
ticipants were being ‘irrational’, however, closer attention should be paid to why the
participants made the decisions that they did, others such as Kayman & Ha would take
issue with this approach (1987). An article by Klayman and Ha described a test with
similar conditions to the Wason number task, they applied an understanding of
Bayesian probability to the task. They used letters instead of numbers, so for example
they used the labels "DAX" and "MED" instead of the terms “Fits the rule” or “Doesn’t
fit the rule”. This avoided implying that the aim was finding a low probability. As result
of the findings of Klayman and Ha, future research on confirmation bias focused on the
different ways in which people reason about different topics [5]. The problem with this
account is that it only seems to describe the nature of how people go about searching
for information, as opposed to the reasons for their motivations.
In this way confirmation bias can be understood as a form of motivational reasoning,
an attentional bias which reflects a kind of “wishful thinking” [3]. This has lead to
confirmation bias becoming an umbrella term for the different ways in which beliefs
and expectations interfere with the ability to reason affectively. Below is a model for
the different factors that go into bias reasoning as outlined by Nickerson.
1. Hypothesis- 1.1 Restriction of Considering only P(D|H) and not
determined attention to a p(D|H), for example, Doherty,
information favoured Myneatt and Schivao- sometimes
seeking and hypothesis referred to as psuedodiagnosti-
interpretation cally bias; but see Crupi, Tentori
and Lombardi [3].
1.2 Preferential treatment My-side bias tendency to pro-
of evidence supporting duce reasons for favoured side,
existing beliefs for example, Baron [3].
1.3 Looking only or Tendency to ask question for
primarily for positive which answer would “yes” if hy-
cases pothesis were true: Wason [5, 6].
1.4 Overweighting For example, Gilovich [3].
positive confirmatory
instances
1.5 Seeing what one is For example, effects of expecta-
looking for tion on social perception Kelley;
but Lenki and Leggett general
tendency to respond to questions
in acquiescence to interrogator
hypothesis [3].
1.6 Remembering what Eagly, Chen, Chaiken, and
one expects Shaw-Barnes [3].
1.7 Illusory correlation Chapman and Chapman, but see
Fielder and Krueger [3, 6].
2. Wason selection task Failure to pursue falsificationist strategy in
and formal reasoning context of conditional reasoning, Wason; but see
Oaksford and Chater [3, 5].
3. The primacy effect and Resistance of a belief or opinion to change once
belief persistence formed Pitz, Downing, and Reinhold’s inertia
effect; Lord, Ross, and Lepper “biased assimila-
tion” [3].
4. Overconfidence and the For example, Lichtenstein and Fischoff, but see
illusion of validity also Erev, Wallsten and Budescu [3].
Table 1. Phenomena that have been brought under the header of confirmation bias,
according to Nickerson [3]
The processes previously outlined in the model set by Nickerson such as: “seeing
what one is looking for” and “illusory correlation”, could be informed by what one
intuitively believes to be factually correct. Illusory correlation is when one perceives
that there is a relationship between variables when no relationship exists [6]. According
to some social psychologists an availability heuristic is what causes the illusory corre-
lation. Confirmation bias can occur even when people have no previous knowledge of
the categories and features in question, because of this it is not always caused by an
attentional bias in which one simply sees what they are looking for.
Confirmation bias could also be considered to be a form of perseverance bias, this is
when one persists with a belief despite evidence to the contrary. A problem with most
of these studies is that they are only concerned with information seeking, but when one
is seeking to confirm their predispositions is it reasonable to suggest that they’re doing
this devoid of any emotional attachment or judgement to their relevant proposition?
The importance of Bayesianism also needs to be considered, it follows from the sim-
ple premise that an agent should approximate the truth, and seek to minimise inaccu-
racy. Bayes’ rule provides normative guidance on how beliefs should be updated upon
receipt of new information [3]. Klayman and Ha’s alternative interpretation of the Wa-
son number task is part of this interpretation. The qualitative properties of Bayesian
belief revisionism are particularly relevant simply because most of the experimental
studies show only that responses are ‘different’ across conditions. Only a small amount
of the literature attempts to account for the context of the information that participants
would be exposed to, research on coherence and risk has often produced very different
results to studies on coherence in which the participants had no exposure to risk.
The information processing approach has been greatly influenced by the biases and
heuristics programme of Tversky and Kahneman, which is focused on probability
judgement and decision making [2, 7, 8]. They also note the contributions of Gigerenzer
“simple heuristics that make us smart”. The contribution of Gigerenzer are very im-
portant to the study of the biases and heuristics, largely because Gigerenzer has argued
for the study of ‘adapative heuristics’. Gigerenzer has also argued that there are crucial
flaws with the biases and heuristics programme of Tversky and Kahneman, particularly
in the area of accuracy costs. For instance, Gigerenzer has stated that the application of
heuristics may only be confined to situations in which there is little cost to getting things
wrong [9]. All of these criticisms of Tversky and Kahneman’s work are noted by Hahn
& Harris [3].
Areas that are worthy of further investigation include analysing the differences in
probabilistic reasoning among different cultures, people from different sample groups
and different cultural contexts. Research by Yates et al, has analysed the difference in
probabilistic judgement across different cultures. In a series of studies George Wright
and Lawrence Philips along with several collaborators posed the same question to
respondents in Britain and various South East Asian countries. The experiment was a
confidence study in which participants had to grade whether they believed their chosen
answer was right or wrong. For example one question was: “Is Jute (Circle One): (a) A
cereal crop or (b) a fiber crop. Now indicate the probability (50%-100%)” [10]. In this
series of studies UK students were far more likely to believe their answers were right
as opposed to their South East Asian counterparts. There are reasons as to why one may
come to different conclusions, this article stipulates many reasons for results are
different across cultures such as response bias. However, depending on the sample there
may be reasons why they are providing different answers, the reasons may be related
to other factors that cannot be accounted for by means of quantitative analysis.
2.2 The Emotional Approach
“The Reasoning process is more like a lawyer defending a client than a Judge or Sci-
entist seeking truth” [1]. This section will describe the social intuitionist model of rea-
soning, which has been highly influential in the field of political psychology. According
to Haidt, there are two separate cognitive processes at work intuition and reason, and
often times the reasoning component is overemphasised. The Haidt paper states that
reasoning is often motivated and consists of posthoc justifications [1]. Like Hahn &
Harris, Haidt provides a history of the understanding of reason that can serve as an
affective way to understand the emotional approach. However, according to Haidt we
experience the illusion of objective reasoning. In his paper Haidt provides a detailed
history of decision theory from the emotional perspective. Haidt also discusses Kohlbeg
and the cognitive revolution. Kohlberg argued that reasoning was ‘rational’ but it was
subject to affective forces [1]. According to the social-intuitionist model, people are
said to think about the consequences of an action before determining whether the action
is a moral violation. Before going any further it is important to note that Haidt embraces
Damasio’s definition of emotion, which is that somatic markers are bodily reactions
which are the result of environmental stimuli. According to Damasio, negative emotion
is the result of negatives experiences while positive emotions are associated with posi-
tive experiences [1].
When this is the case it is important to define what Haidt means by moral judgement,
moral reasoning and moral intuition. According to Haidt, moral judgement is defined
as evaluations (good versus bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made
with respect to a set of virtues held by a culture or subculture to be obligatory. Moral
reasoning can now be defined as: conscious mental activity that consists of transform-
ing given information about people in order to reach a moral judgment. Moral intuition
can be defined as: the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, includ-
ing an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of
having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion [1].
The social intuitionist model of reasoning has helped to inform a lot of work in political
psychology that focuses on the role of emotional reactions. This line of reasoning is
held together by four links: (i) The intuitive judgment link, which states that moral
judgments appear in the consciousness automatically and effortlessly as the result of
moral intuitions. (ii) The post-hoc reasoning link, this model proposes that moral rea-
soning is an effortful process, engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which a
person searches for arguments that will support an already-made judgment. Nisbett and
Wilson demonstrated such post-hoc reasoning for causal explanations. (iii) The rea-
soned persuasion link, which proposes that moral reasoning is produced and sent forth
verbally in order to justify one’s already-made moral judgment to others. (iv) The social
persuasion link, because people are highly attuned to the emergence of group norms,
the model proposes that the mere fact that friends, allies, and acquaintances have made
a moral judgment exerts a direct influence on others, even if no reasoned persuasion is
used. (v) The reasoned judgment link, because people may at times reason their way to
a judgment by sheer force of logic, which can override their initial intuition. In these
cases reasoning truly is causal [1]. However, Haidt believes that this kind of reasoning
is rare [1]. It is this approach to reasoning that has informed a series of studies on po-
litical and moral reasoning.
Dual process approaches are often dismissed by those who are coming from the
emotional approach, this appears to be the case in a lot of literature which focuses on
reasoning as being the result of emotion, a point made by Zajnoc in her papers [11].
However, Haidt does note that affective evaluations occur regularly. It is acknowledged
by some who embrace the emotional approach that moral judgements require more than
just social stimuli. It is stated in some literature on the topic of social attitudes that it
needs to be analysed. In relation to heuristics, Haidt says that the principle of least effort
in decision making generally prevails. Although Haidt admits that there is plausibility
in a dual process model for social judgements. He states that it’s possible for relatedness
motives and coherence motives to exist [11]. Research on the topic of cognitive disso-
nance can help to provide some insight on this issue. More recently, some research has
shown that defense motivation can reveal information about how bias is culturally de-
termined. Some studies showed that when people are asked to think about their own
deaths they appear to suppress a generalised fear of mortality by clinging more tightly
to their cultural world view [1]. This work seems to demonstrate that from a terror
management perspective, moral judgement is a special kind of management, since
moral judgemental ways implicate the cultural world view. It is plausible to say “I don’t
like asparagus, but I don’t care if you eat it.” It is not plausible to say “I think human
life is scared, but I don’t care if you kill him”. Some research shows that people do not
always seek to confirm their initial hypothesis; sometimes they ask questions to get to
the truth [12]. It should be mentioned as a side note, that the study of cognitive
dissonance as described by Haidt earlier is an area worthy of further investigation.
Research in this area which attempts to explain the way participants process
information and the emotional reaction it solicits (if any), could help to create a
theoretical framework which could unite the two accounts. A problem with a lot of
these studies is that they don’t involve moral questions and often contain propositions;
which there is no need to defend [1]. This may therefore create an unusual and non-
representative kind of moral judgment. But in real judgment situations, e.g. when peo-
ple are gossiping or arguing, relatedness motives are always at work. If more shocking
or threatening issues are being judged (e.g. abortion, euthanasia, or consensual incest)
then coherence motives will be at work too [1].
Figure 1. Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model of Reasoning [1]. (1) The Intuitive
judgement link. (2) The post hoc reasoning link, (3) the reasoned persuasion link,
(4) the social persuasion link. (5) the reasoned judgement link and (6) the private
reflection link. This is a visual representation of the model that was discussed
previously.
3 Discussion and Analysis
What is being argued is that a more pluralistic framework is possible. This section
will attempt to provide a more pluralistic understanding of confirmation bias by
identifying areas of agreement and disagreement. Areas of commensurability will be
highlighted before recommendations are made for future research.
3.1 The definition of confirmation bias: areas of agreement and disagreement.
Common ground: what the two approaches can agree on
While the two approaches are very distinct in their methodological approaches they
argue a similar point. The most significant problems with both approaches are as
follows. The information processing approach does not account for the role of emotions
or culture in their account of intuitive judgements. The emotional approach fails to
account for the literature in behavioural economics on the topic of information
processing. This is a such a large area of research it can’t be ignored.
Confirmation bias is understood to be the result of information processing and
emotional processing, one may be wondering whether the two approaches are mutually
exclusive but in fact the distinction between the two which has developed in social
psychology may be completely arbitrary in certain ways. An account of confirmation
bias that would be consistent with both papers is that it is a form of motivated reasoning
in which one attempts to justify their own viewpoint by means of post-hoc
justifications. But the two approaches disagree with what the cause of confirmation bias
is. The emotional approach seems to understand confirmation bias to be something that
occurs as a result of one’s cultural context, childhood development and one’s innate
sense of right or wrong, this forms their intuitions which leads to them providing post-
hoc justifications for their beliefs. The information processing approach seems to
understand it as the result of behaviours in which one: looks at instances in which they
expect to verify, rather than falsify, and chooses the currently preferred hypothesis by
examining incidences which only seems to confirm the existing hypothesis. When this
is the case, one will be overly confident that their view is true, and this will affect their
judgement. In this way confirmation bias could be said to be affecting coherence.
Both approaches seem to be in agreement that confirmation bias should be understood
as a combination of myside bias or “wishful thinking”; in which one believes that there
is a high likelihood that they are right and goes about trying to justify their intuitive
judgement with a post hoc explanation.
3.2 Both approaches agree that confirmation bias interferes with coherence
and that this is a problem
Both approaches can be in agreement that confirmation bias is an issue, largely
because it interferes with coherence motives. The information processing approach has
been concerned with incoherence in judgement and overconfidence. Let’s refer to the
papers by Yates et al in relation to the information processing approach. There are
factors which can be said to be influencing these results. While the information
processing approach has provided a good explanation for how the mechanics of
intuitive judgement work, it has a problem with describing how the intuitions that guide
one’s judgement are formed. The emotional approach which is concerned with how
cultural factors can shapes one’s intuitions could help to explain how affective factors
could help to shape the nature of intuitive judgements. This is a way in which the two
models could be said to interact, however, more research is required.
3.3 Constraint Ground areas of disagreement:
Although there doesn’t appear to be much disagreement on the definition of
confirmation bias, there are different explanations provided for how it may occur. In
order to understand why there is disagreement let us look at the history of this area of
research, this may provide an explanation which can help to bring about a more
pluralistic understanding. While there are distinct methodological differences both
exemplar papers cite Nessbit (1980), this text provides a valuable connection which
could unite the two accounts. The text describes reasoning as being a process in which
people develop posthoc justifications for their intuitive judgements, it also tries to
account for how external stimuli is processed in a way in which emotional judgement
is used.
The 1980 text by Nessbit is particularly concerned with the affect heuristic, the
availability heuristic and it’s affects on behaviour. Certain aspects of the social
intuitionist model of reasoning could be described using the terms affect heuristic and
availability heuristic [13]. There was a rather pluralistic understanding of what was
meant by confirmation bias and how it occurred until the 1990s, at that time
disagreements arose with new theories about the nature of emotions, Damasio’s somatic
marker hypothesis caused certain researchers to focus on emotional reaction as opposed
to how people might be trying to think logically about the information that was being
presented to them. Likewise, the work of Tversky and Kahneman has been embraced
in behavioural economics, but problems with information processing tasks seem to have
been focused on to the detriment of analysing emotional reactions. The popularity of
these theories seems to have caused diversions and a series of different explanations to
arise. When this is the case it’s important to identify areas of agreement and
disagreement so that a more pluralistic account can be developed.
3.4 Which aspects of the information processing approach are compatible with
the emotional approach: a synthesis towards a more pluralistic framework
It appears as if both approaches can be in agreement that lack of coherence in
judgement is a problem that requires an explanation. In order to explain why these
problems occur a more pluralistic account of decision making needs to be created.
Based on the analysis in this paper, researchers should consider what aspects of the
information processing could be commensurable with the emotional approach. In his
book Descartes Error, Damasio acknowledges that the work of Tversky and Kahneman
helps to point out errors in human judgement. However, Damasio’s views do stand in
contrast to many in the field of behavioural economics who wish to say that decision
making consists of people conducting cost and benefit analysis. However, there are
accounts of reasoning in the study of heuristics that may be commensurable with the
accounts provided by Damasio whose work has greatly influenced Haidt and
researchers from the emotional approach.
An approach to heuristics that may be commensurable with the emotional approach
is the fast and frugal approach to heuristics, this refers to the idea that when individuals
are presented with less information as opposed to more information they will make
better decisions. The book which discusses this approach to heuristics Simple Heuris-
tics That Makes Us Smarter was referenced in the paper by Hahn & Harris, it describes
deep thought as “an unaffordable luxury” [9]. This approach to heuristics was noted
earlier. A type of heuristic which would account for the role of emotional judgements
is the affect heuristic in which one uses emotions to carry out a risk and benefit analysis
in order to process information and solve problems in a more efficient manner [14, 15].
Although these two accounts come from two different methodological approaches
they are rather similar, but there are two main problems. Firstly, they are couched in
separate vocabularies. Secondly, the role of external factors needs to be accounted for
and current findings need to be interpreted in line with this information. This account
would be consistent with studies by Damasio which showed that neurological
abnormalities which blocked somatic markers impaired the ability to make risky
decisions [1]. Other research by Wilson et al, demonstrates that decision making suffers
when affective inputs are negatively affected and participants are forced to make a
decision systematically weighing up the pros and cons. Some in social psychology have
embraced Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. Gigerenzer and Damasio would both
be in agreement that it isn’t possible for people to be thinking deeply about their every
single move. If the two accounts are to be commensurable there needs to be some
acknowledgement that individuals aren't thinking in a systematic manner.
It needs to be acknowledged that reasoning is not going to be the same in every
circumstance; the context of the information can vary and a person’s reaction could be
caused by environmental factors (e.g. culture, upbringing, values, etc). Therefore,
reactions shouldn’t just be dismissed as being ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’. The emotional
approach which is concerned with the nature of intuitions and affective factors could
help to account for behaviours that quantitative methods can’t easily account for.
4 Recommendations For Future Research and Conclusion
What should be derived from studying the two approaches is, it’s important to
analyse the reasons why people make decisions. In many contexts it makes sense to
have experiments with a normatively defined rule or a rational standard, but this is not
always the best method to tell us about the different ways in which people are capable
of reasoning. Focusing too much on whether participants are being ‘rational’ or
‘irrational’, could mean that researchers will overlook the different ways in which
participants are capable of reasoning and why they reach the conclusions that they do.
Future research, should be concerned with understanding what Thaler & Sunstein
referred to as choice architecture, and the different kinds of conclusions that individuals
may reach depending on the factors which form their intuitions and guide their
judgement [16]. No theoretical perspective succeeds in uniting the two approaches and
there isn’t always going to be a clear demarcation criteria for whether data that one
receives is an entirely information based or if it is more emotionally charged. There is
no exact way to quantify how emotional a piece of data is. Any devised measurement
could not possibly account for how data can be interpreted differently by people. This
means that future research shouldn’t be attempting to obtain findings which can be
generalised out to the entire population, rather they should be looking at the way in
which different individuals can reach different conclusions and what is leading them to
make those conclusions. Likewise, studies which presume that people aren’t trying to
think logically can be problematic. It’s not inconceivable that many different forms of
cognitive architecture could exist. Observational studies, free from problems such as
forced choice should be considered, they could give participants the opportunity to
describe their mental processes. Experiments which are qualitative should be
considered. It’s important to analyse why people reach the conclusions that they do.
This way we can learn more about why people make the choices that they do. It is
possible that many factors are affecting participants abilities to make decisions. The
work of Haidt which attempts to interpret data by analysing information from a variety
of different disciplines, is an approach that could provide a greater understanding of
choice architecture and the different kinds of architecture that can exist. This could help
to create a more pluralistic account of decision making, an overarching theoretical
perspective which succeeds in uniting the two approaches.
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