=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-1751/AICS_2016_paper_55
|storemode=property
|title=A Cognitive Investigation of a Material Led Art process
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1751/AICS_2016_paper_55.pdf
|volume=Vol-1751
|authors=Fiona O'Hara
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/aics/OHara16
}}
==A Cognitive Investigation of a Material Led Art process==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1751/AICS_2016_paper_55.pdf
A Cognitive Investigation of a Material led Art process
Fiona O’Hara
University College Dublin, Stillorgan Road, Belfield, Dublin 4
fiona.o-hara@ucdconnect.ie
Abstract. There is a wealth of research investigating the cognitive engagement
of tool users and much debate about whether our cognition can extend to the
tool tip or incorporate the tool into our body schema. I contend that an expert
materials led artist, can cognitively extend beyond the tool in use to the mate-
rial that they engage during art making. I interviewed three expert artists, a
painter, a potter and a sculptor about their tool use, materiality, environment
and expertise. Their insights confirm a tacit knowledge that extends into the
materials they engage and informs their actions. The experience of these art-
ists’ forming an expertise with their chosen material offers the Enactivist ap-
proach insight into a higher-order form of Sense-making, rather than just
‘maintaining a meaningful environment’.
Keywords: materiality, art process, Enaction, extended cognition, Sense-
making, tool use, and expert artists’
1 Introduction
There is a wealth of research investigating the cognitive processes of tool use
but a deficit of enquiry into the cognitive processes of engaging beyond the
tool with materials. I contend that an expert artist can cognitively extend or
incorporate the material that they engage during art making, creating a loop,
which informs the artist’s practice and emerging work. To investigate this
contention I interviewed three expert artists, who have specialised in work-
ing with one material (clay, paint or metal) for a minimum of thirty years. I
have followed the active loop of, skilled artist, the tools being used and the
materials they are engaging which influences the artists’ response. I have
considered how the experience of these experts informs the discussion of
extended mind theory [1] while incorporating research on tool use and the
experience of materiality. I propose this process of actively engaging material
offers the Enactivist approach to cognitive science, where an autonomous
system enacts or generates its own cognitive domain [2] an account of
higher-level cognition, which has been proposed as lacking by Mc Gann [3].
2 The Art Process
A materials led artist’s practice is one of a myriad of other art practices,
which may engage a multitude of cognitive processes. I have selected a ma-
terial led artist’s practice as it offers an opportunity to research a direct
physical engagement with a tangible material. The level of focused engage-
ment the artist attains with their material varies, depending on the artists’
approach to the material and their level of skill and expertise. The three ex-
pert artists I have interviewed are: Brian Keogh, a potter who has specialised
in working with clay for 37 years, Patrick Graham, a painter who has been
painting for c58 years and John Coll, a sculptor who has specialised in metals,
mainly steel and bronze through the processes of welding and sculpting clay
for bronze casting for 32 years. Each artist’s process is unique and each of
these experts has a different experience to offer. As Noë [4] eloquently re-
lates, “Art isn’t a phenomenon to be explained. It is rather, a mode or activity
of trying to explain”. The experience of these artists’ forming an expertise
with their chosen material offers insight into a higher-order form of Sense-
making, rather than just ‘maintaining a meaningful environment’ [5] they
have created a specialised studio environment that enables a focused art
practice.
2.1 The Art Process Loop
The Art process begins with the artist attempting to get past the brains at-
tempt to ‘predict’ what it will perceive, suggested by Clark [6] as a method of
“neural frugality” of cognitive resources which is efficient in everyday per-
ception. In what Gibson [7] would call an “education of attention” the artist
engages in a deeper perception, which of course is also happening haptically.
This tactile knowledge is experienced through our highly adapted hands.
Prinz [8] illustrates how incredibly receptive our hands are, with 3,000 recep-
tors in each fingertip, proprioceptive feedback about our hands position and
kinesthetic information about the tension in our muscles. Our hands are cen-
tral to our activities and function so consistently that they become seemingly
invisible.
3 Tool use and Extension of Cognition
The next aspect of the art making loop are the tools the artists’ use. There
has been a wealth of philosophy and experiment to grasp an understanding
of how we utilise tools and whether tool use demonstrates an ability to ex-
tend our cognitive abilities into the environment. Merleau Ponty [9] exam-
ined how we experience tool use using an example of a blind man who can
perceive the tip of his cane. Clark and Chalmers [1] propose in their ‘Extended
Mind’ theory, that we can extend our minds into our environment. Experi-
ments on tool use, adds insight to Merleau Ponty and Clarks hypothesis’ and
formed my interview questions relating to tool use. Patients with brain dam-
age such as visual neglect1 respond differently to peripersonal space (within
arm’s reach) and extrapersonal space2 [10]. This was further clarified in the
literature reviewed, [10,11,12,13,14] which showed that when the tool used
was a stick (solid not a laser pointer), “far space became re-mapped as near
space”.
These experiments with varying tool lengths offer evidence to the extended
mind theory but further experiments sought to clarify if subjects were ‘ex-
tending’ their perception through the tool or ‘incorporating’ the tool into our
body schema. Cardinali et al [13] designed experiments to investigate tool-
use effects in healthy subjects. They asked subjects to use a 40cm mechani-
cal grabber as a tool to reach for a cube. After tool use the subjects were
blindfolded and asked to point at positions on their arm. Subjects touched
positions (on their tool using hand) indicating that they perceived their arms
as longer. Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, [15] found that after reaching for an object
1
Visual neglect; can be caused by lesions on one side of the brain, which can cause the patient not to
perceive anything on the opposing side of their body, even though their eyesight is not impaired
2
Halligan et al (2003 p126) describes extrapersonal space as, beyond arms reach unless we move or use a
tool to access it
beyond arm’s reach with a stick, observers estimate its distance to be shorter
than they do if they reach for it without the stick. Canzoneri et al [16] congru-
ently found “subjects perceived their forearm narrower and longer com-
pared to before tool-use, a shape more similar to the one of the tool”, which
indicates a perceived ‘incorporation’ into the subject’s body schema or body-
model [17].
Concurrently, De Preester and Tsakiris [17] investigated these divergent pro-
posals; they distinguish tool use as being an extension of body capacities
rather than an incorporated aspect of body schema. They discuss results
found by Botvinick and Cohen [18] who found subjects incorporated a rubber
hand into their body schema although it was not touching their body (it was
being stroked at the same time as their actual hidden hand). This caveat
brings an exception to the importance of the perceiver actively using a tool
or rubber hand to incorporate it as theirs; it suggests belief has a role to play
in our sense of embodiment. De Preester and Tsakiris [17] also found that
some people adapted better than others to their prosthetic limbs due to how
they believed they fit their body. For Thompson and Stapleton [2] transpar-
ency of the hand, body and tools, while we are in engagement with our envi-
ronment distinguishes between resources used “instrumentally and re-
sources that come to constitute the cognitive system over some stretch of
time”.
Following these findings of belief factoring into our perception of tool use, I
asked our three artists if they have a favourite tool and how they respond to
using a new tool. All three artists were immediate in their response that they
had clear favourites among their many tools. Brian described a bamboo turn-
ing tool “that fits in my hand perfectly” [19], which concurs with De Preester
and Tsakiris [17] suggestion of the importance of fit. Describing his favourite
brush Paddy says,
It is an extension, it really is an extension of myself and it is battered
and bruised and it takes on character over the years of struggling to
make the mark [20]
John’s favourite tools for clay sculpture were two stainless steel tools that
are double ended and fit within the parameters of his hand [21]. When I
asked John about using his welder he described it as “like an extra finger on
my hand” [21]. This may suggest that John perceives his TIG3 welder as “a
sixth finger” [30] because of its ‘fit’ in his hand which fits the incorporation
model related by De Preester et al’s [26]. John compared his present TIG
welder with his previous experience with stick welders (where the rod is
c20cm), which he found was “more difficult to control” [21]. Although John
listed a multitude of reasons, why the stick welder was more difficult to con-
trol, I suggest the distance between hand and weld being created was a con-
tributing factor. I suspect the designers of his present TIG welder created a
hand held device in response to this factor. I had also imagined that John’s
welding mask would be a barrier between him and the puddle of metal weld
as it is forming, however John finds it helps him to block out everything else
and just focus on the weld.
I asked all three artists’ about the extended mind theory and they all dis-
cussed ‘extending’ through their favourite tools, adding the importance of
how they afford a lack of interruption. Paddy related adapting to a new
brush as, “it’s just going to give you this awful kind of … controlled line... but
actually the white [of the new bristles] is a big intrusion” [20]. He described
his favourite pencil from a collection of 200-300 pencils, “I just reach for this
one all the time. I hate when it gets (gesturing a small pencil)… I hate pairing
it” and when it’s gone, “I have to go and breed another one” [20]. Brian
elaborating on why his bamboo turning tool is his favourite tool he said, “it’s
something that I work with spontaneously without deliberating and it carries
out the task without too much thinking”[19]. This perception of the used tool
being invisible illustrates Heidegger’s [22] hypothesis of it being “ready to
hand” whereas a new brush or pencil becomes “present to hand”, intrusive
and not invisible.
All three artists had their favourite tools for a long time, Brian had his bam-
boo tool for c20 years suggesting familiarity over time using these imple-
3
Tunsten Inert gas welder
ments contribute to the tool becoming transparent and non intrusive in the
active engagement between artist and material. Paddy described the impor-
tance of becoming familiar with a tool as, “it becomes intrusive, you have to
get rid of that notion of this thing is between you and this because otherwise
you don’t feel the medium” [20]. It is the importance of an artist being able to
feel the material or medium that I shall extend to next.
4 Materiality
Materiality is an area of research that I propose has been largely under-
researched. Malafouris [23] has also found the research in embodied cogni-
tive science, lacking a “theory of material engagement”, a sentiment echoed
by Ingold et al [24, 25] from the field of anthropology. He suggests that be-
cause from infancy, we actively build our knowledge of objects and materials
through interaction, it becomes a process of “phenomenological osmosis”
[26] that is so integrated it becomes unnoticed. The student and the expert
alike may begin with ideas of what they wish the material to express but this
can change in the process of making. Hayles [27] defines materiality as requir-
ing active, attentive focus on physical properties and yet “materiality is
unlike physicality in being an emergent property, it cannot be specified in
advance”. It is as Brian describes it a “tacit knowledge” and, “that’s some-
thing you can’t teach people” [20], it is understood through experience. I
asked the three expert artists about their experience of engagement with the
materials they have specialised in and all of them talked about extending
into the material. I asked Brian while making pottery, if he found the idea of
extending into the material credible and he replied,
You must feel in tune with the…first of all, the tool in your hand, also
the machine that you’re working on and the material that you are di-
recting the tool towards. So there has to be a unity of connection be-
tween all those things so that makes perfect sense to me... It’s a
given. It’s part of that tacit knowledge [19].
John described his responsiveness to the material as he is working as “being
open to its limitations and its possibilities” [21]. This remaining ‘open’ maxim
that John mentions, where an artist will ‘keep their mind open’ to possibili-
ties is congruent with Clark [9] he describes sensing as, “the opening of a
channel, with successful whole-system behaviour emerging when activity in
this channel is kept within a certain range”.
It is perhaps to an artist an obvious question to ask about the importance of
understanding their material; it is the aim ultimately, to understand your
material or medium so well so that you can get beyond the technical to
reach further potentials. Brian described, “Knowledge of material is a fun-
damental” [19]. Brian described putting the clay through processes that will
bring it to the ideal state to create the type of object he wishes to throw on
the wheel,
So there’s a big amount of preparation of material and there’s a lot
of forward planning to make sure the material is in the right…state.
Well aged, that is clay that has been recycled and slaked down in wa-
ter and sometimes left over a period of months. To break down and
be re constituted with new clay…which produces a well…mixed and
plastic body for throwing that won’t crack in the making or won’t be
stressed by the making [19].
Whereas the oil based clay that John sculpts with is formulated so as not to
dry out; which affords John the opportunity to work on a portrait head over
long periods of time with no drying-out issues. The environment also influ-
ences this tacit knowledge of materials and how they are best worked, in the
most immediate case the artists’ studio.
I asked all three artists’ when they approached working directly with materi-
als how they set up their working space. Brian when he was in pottery pro-
duction set up his studio space, as “it required a degree of order, cleanliness
…so that the flow of production could continue uninterrupted” [19]. Paddy
passionately described his process laying all his tools and materials out be-
fore painting as, “It’s war! Get all your troops ready, this is a[n] … assault
course” [20]. Their studio spaces afford an individualised environment that is
created to enable a flow of uninterrupted work.
5 Conclusion
I have investigated a material’s led art process as a cognitive process. I pro-
pose this investigation offers the Enactivist approach to cognitive science an
account of higher-level cognition, informed by the experience of three expert
artists. The enactive approach has encompassed a wide range of animal and
environment couplings or engagements including examples of single cell
autoposeis, this “bareness of autopoesis as a norm”, concerns Mc Gann [3]
who also enlists similar concerns from Di Paolo et al [28].
I have found it surprising that the premise of the Enactive approach, action
and agency have been approached so theoretically, (computational model-
ing, dynamical systems models etc). I am biased by my immersion in the field
of art-based practice that is in itself a fundamental research of experience
and engagement. Merritt [29] has approached these same criteria through
the engagement of dance, which she relates as “kinetic intelligence” which is
an interesting comparison to the “tacit knowledge” described by Brian in his
interview. For Merritt ‘thinking-is-moving”[29], the dancer evolves their
movements as they move, which is a different preface than materiality
where the cognitive extension into the material offers this ‘thinking’ or in-
forming. Merritt does discuss the interaction among interpretive dancers
responding to each other offering a valuable insight into this form of artistic
cognition. From a comparison of just two fields of expertise (art and dance) a
wide range of cognitive engagement is revealed. There is still much to learn
from expert specialists in their individual practices of engagement.
I have examined the art engagement loop from the embodied artist, tool use
and materiality by engaging the experience of experts in a variety of media.
Interviewing three expert artists’ about their subjective experience, of their
art practice may be questioned by some as not very scientific. I disagree, and
I am not alone, Csikszentmihalyi [30] advocated that we have learned much
from brain damaged patients and comparisons with healthy functioning sub-
jects but we have underutilized researching exceptional people. As phe-
nomenological and Enactivist concerns overlap and their researchers align I
imagine their research methods will also be shared. Creswell [31] proposes
interviews as phenomenological research method.
There have been valuable insights into visual perception through new fields
of study such as Neuroaesthetics that tends to rely heavily on fMRI data,
which to my perception, as the technology stands at present, offers a blurry
picture particularly when investigating the wider activity of human engage-
ment. However I suggest that a matrix of all of these research formats neu-
roscience, case studies of brain injuries, experiments incorporating healthy
subjects and interviews and research with expert practitioners as I have used
in this paper do prove a valuable resource to the overall field of study.
I have considered Clark’s theory of ‘extended mind’ [1] through the experi-
ence of three expert artists’ and a wealth of research encompassing, case
studies, practical lab experiments and fMRI experiments offering a wide set
of approaches that offer strong evidence that a sense of ‘extension’ and ‘in-
corporation’ is experienced by tool users. I am reticent to adopt the concept
of extension of a ‘mind’ however as it brings to bear a plethora of ambiguous
meanings and definitions. I prefer to integrate the term, extended cognition
as defined by Chemero [32] to define the actively engaged artist who is
closely coordinating perception and action. De Preester and Tsakiris [17]
sought to clarify a distinction between ‘incorporation’ into a body model
versus ‘extension’ of the body model during tool use and propose that pros-
thetic limbs can be incorporated into a body model but tools do not change
our body model and are thus an example of extension. I suggest that the
‘body model’ schema rings too close a tune to an internal and external no-
tion of cognition that I have found no grounds for while investigating an art-
ist engaging material. John’s perception of his welder being like a “sixth fin-
ger” combined with all three artists unanimously concurring that extension
into the material not just the tool is a vital part of their practice suggests that
the extension versus incorporation debate may not be as clear cut or per-
haps relevant as proposed by De Preester and Tsakiris [17].
Thompson and Stapleton [2] reflecting on the differences between the ex-
tended mind theory and the Enactive theory of Sense-making, postulate that
the tools and materials of the artists’ should be considered part of the cogni-
tion system if they function transparently. The transparency of these artists’
tools offers an uninterrupted attentive engagement which may be referred
to as ‘flow’, a state when the artist, tool and material become a looping cog-
nitive system. However the engaged art material doesn’t become transpar-
ent it becomes the ultimate locus of the extended cognition. This raises an
interesting caveat to Thompson and Stapleton [2] who ascertained that
transparency signifies inclusion in a cognitive system. These artists’ are ex-
tending their perceptive focus to the crucial active materiality of engage-
ment, coupling with the material. This engagement combines a multitude of
facets including tacit knowledge and meaning making which is attributed to
by emotion and belief.
The artists’ emotion is suggested by Thompson and Stapleton [2] to attribute
“salience and value for the system”, which contribute to autonomy, an es-
sential factor in an Enactive system. I asked each artist, why they continue to
engage their specialist material, John about Bronze said, “I think it’s to do
with an inherent luminosity in Bronze that comes through… It makes clay
look…it brings clay alive” [21]. Paddy said, “the ecstasy of being lost in a crea-
tive nothingness and having to stagger your way out of it, that’s the journey”
[20]. Brian about clay said, “it will also give back responses that sometimes
are unpredictable, surprising, sometimes disappointing but sometimes ex-
hilarating” [19]. I conclude that there is no shortage of emotion and value for
these artists in their chosen engagement. Thompson and Stapleton [2] cite
Clark’s “information-processing models as limited”, as they fail to explain
autonomy and therefore cognition, there is no such limitation in the en-
gagement of an expert individual.
The artist picks out which aspects of the world he or she “structurally cou-
ples with” [33] which, is an Enactive “co-emergence of self and world ‘sense-
making’”, a utilization of affordances to meet their needs. Cognition is rela-
tional, it is an active state not bound to a cluster of neurons, muscles, or the
like but active engagement. These expert artists’ assert that knowing your
material is “essential”, “fundamental”, and coupling or looping with this ma-
terial at a new level every time is their research, their Sense-making, and this
research continues to challenge them and inform us all.
Acknowledgements I wish to thank Dr. Fred Cummins for his ‘open mind’
and generosity of time in supporting my research interests. I also wish to
thank artists’; John Coll, Patrick Graham and Brian Keogh for giving their time
and knowledge to this research, it is much appreciated.
6 References
1. Clark, A & Chalmers, D (1998) "The extended mind". Analysis 58 (1): 7–19 Oxford University
Press
2. Thompson, E and Stapleton, M (2009 p29) Making Sense of Sense-making: Reflections on
Enactive and Extended mind theories Topoi 28:23-30 Springer p24
3. Mc Gann, M (2007) Enactive Theorists Do it on purpose Phenomenology and the cognitive
Sciences 6(4), 463-483
4. Noë, A (2015 p133) Strange Tools Art and Human nature Hill and Wang New York
5. Kaufer S and Chemero A (2015 p211) Phenomenology An Introduction Polity Cambridge UK
and Maiden USA
6. Clark, A (2016) Interview with Dr. Andy Clark, Author of Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction,
Action, and the Embodied Mind on the BrainSciencePodcast.com with Ginger Campbell
Episode 126 Originally aired 01 /28/2016
7. Gibson, J. J. (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin
8. Prinz, J (2013) Foreward: Hand manifesto In Radman, Zdravko (2013) The Hand, an Organ
of the Mind MIT Press Massachusetts & London p x
9. Merleau Ponty’s (1962) Phenomenology of Perception (trans. by Colin Smith) New York:
Humanities Press, and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
10. Halligan, Fink, Marshall & Vallar (2003) Spatial Cognition: evidence from visual neglect
Trends in Cognitive science Vol7 no. 3
11. Longo M and Lourenco S (2006) On the Nature of near space: Effects of tool use and the
transition to far space Neuropsychologia 44, 977-981
12. Halligan Peter, Marshall John (1998) Neglect of Awareness Consciousness and Cognition 7,
356-380 Article no. CC980362
13. Cardinali L, Frassinetti F, Brozzoli C, Urquizar C, Roy A and Farnè A (2009a) Tool-use induces
morphological updating of the body schema, Current Biology 19:R478-R479
14. Cardinali L, Brozzoli C and Farnè A (2009b) Peripersonal Space and Body Schema: Two la-
bels for the same concept Brain Topography 21: 252-260
15. Witt, JK., Proffitt, DR., & Epstein,W (2005) Tool use affects perceived distance, but only
when you intend to use it Journal of experimental psychology; human perception and per-
formance 31 (5), 880-8 In Brockmole et al (2013) The World Within Reach: Effects of Hand
Posture and Tool Use on Visual Cognition
16. Canzoneri E, Ubaldi S, Rastelli V, Finisguerra A, Bassolino M, Serino A (2013 p17)Tool-use
reshapes the boundaries of body and peripersonal space representations Exp Brain Res
(2013) 228:25–42 DOI 10.1007
17. De Preester, H & Tsakiris, M (2009 p317) Body extension versus body-incorporation: Is
there a need for a body-model? Phenom Cogn Sci 8:307-319
18. Botvinick, M & Cohen J (1998) Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see Nature 391, 756 In
De Preester, H & Tsakiris, M (2009) Body extension versus body-incorporation: Is there a
need for a body-model? Phenom Cogn Sci 8:307-319
19. Interview with potter Brian Keogh on 27.7.2016
20. Interview with painter Patrick Graham on 25.7.2016
21. Interview with Sculptor John Coll on 20.7.2016
22. Heidegger, M (1927/1962) Being and Time (translated by John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson) Blackwell publishing
23. Malafouris, Lambros (2013) How Things Shape the mind a theory of Material engagement
MIT press
24. Ingold, Tim (2007) Materials against Materiality Archaeological dialogues 14 (1) 1-16 Cam-
bridge University press
25. Ingold, Tim (2007) Materials against Materiality Archaeological dialogues 14 (1) 1-16 Cam-
bridge University press
26. Leder, D (1990) The Absent body University of Chicago press In Malafouris, Lambros (2013)
How Things Shape the mind a theory of Material engagement MIT press
27. Hayles, K (2012 p92) How we think, Digital media and Contemporary Technogenesis
28. Di Paolo ,E., Rohde, M., De Jaegher, H (2010) Horizons for the Enactive Mind: values, social
interaction and play In Mc Gann, Marek (2007) Enactive Theorists Do it on purpose Phe-
nomenology and the cognitive Sciences 6(4), 463-483
29. Merritt, Michelle (2015) Thinking-is-moving: dance, agency, and a radically enactive mind
Phenomenological Cognitive science 14:95-110 Springer
30. Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (1997) Creativity, Flow and the psychology of discovery and inven-
tion Harper Perennial: New York (p11)
31. Creswell, JW (1998) Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five tradi-
tions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
32. Chemero, Anthony (2011) Radical Embodied Cognitive Science MIT Press. Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts, London, England p212
33. Kaufer S and Chemero A (2015 p211) Phenomenology An Introduction Polity Cambridge UK
and Malden USA p212 &p203