=Paper= {{Paper |id=Vol-1855/EUCognition_2016_Part18 |storemode=property |title=Solve Memory to Solve Cognition |pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1855/EUCognition_2016_Part18.pdf |volume=Vol-1855 |authors=Paul Baxter |dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/eucognition/Baxter16 }} ==Solve Memory to Solve Cognition== https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1855/EUCognition_2016_Part18.pdf
                       Solve Memory to Solve Cognition
                                                            Paul Baxter
                                             Lincoln Centre for Autonomous Systems
                                                   School of Computer Science
                                                   University of Lincoln, U.K.
                                                  Email: pbaxter@lincoln.ac.uk


   Abstract—The foundations of cognition and cognitive be-           consistent with more purely theoretical considerations, e.g.
haviour are consistently proposed to be built upon the capability    [11], that emphasise the dynamical process properties of
to predict (at various levels of abstraction). For autonomous        memory over passive information storage.
cognitive agents, this implicitly assumes a foundational role for
memory, as a mechanism by which prior experience can be                 By taking on this interpretation of memory, a more re-
brought to bear in the service of present and future behaviour.      fined process definition memory may be ventured: memory
In this contribution, this idea is extended to propose that an       is a distributed associative structure that is created through
active process of memory provides the substrate for cognitive        experience (the formation associations), and which forms the
processing, particularly when considering it as fundamentally        substrate for activation dynamics (through externally driven
associative and from a developmental perspective. It is in this
context that the claim is made that in order to solve the question   activity, and internal reactivation) that gives rise to cognitive
of cognition, the role and function of memory must be fully          processing [12], [5]. The creation of structure through expe-
resolved.                                                            rience is consistent with developmental accounts, and enforce
                                                                     the consideration of not only interaction with the environment,
        I. P REDICTION , C OGNITION , AND M EMORY                    but also the social context of the learning agent (if human-
   There are a range of competencies that are involved in cog-       like cognition is to be considered). Previous explorations have
nition: an ongoing challenge is to identify common functional        suggested how this framework can be used (in principle)
and organisational principles of operation. This will facilitate     to account for human-level cognitive competencies within a
both the understanding of natural cognition (particularly that       memory-centred cognitive architecture [13], although there
of humans), and the creation of synthetic artefacts that can         remain many gaps in this account that require addressing
be of use to individuals and society. One such principle is          before it can be considered definitive.
that of prediction [1], prospection [2], or indeed simulation
[3], as being fundamental to cognition. A further requirement                       II. A PPLICATION AND I MPLICATIONS
is the need to incorporate an account of development [4] as a           Following this definition, take for example the role that
means of an individual to gain cognitive competencies through        such a memory-centred cognitive architecture could play in
experience (of the physical and social world), rather than a         facilitating social robot behaviour, as a prototypical example
priori programming.                                                  of a cognitive competence that needs to be fulfilled. It is
   It is suggested that one common dependency of these princi-       uncontroversial to suggest that humans incrementally acquire
ples is a requirement for memory. At this point, the definition      social skills (though perhaps based on some inherently present
of memory provided is only in the broadest sense: i.e. memory        mechanisms) over time and through development. The role
is a process that acquires information through experience in         of memory within this is therefore also not controversial,
the service of current and future behaviour [5]. While broad,        particularly when skills such as intent prediction (based on
it nevertheless commits to a fundamental function/role for           prior experience) are also considered [14]. Using an associative
memory in behaviour [6]. It is on this basis that the remainder      network that learns from the behaviour of the interaction
of this contribution is focused: taking memory as fundamental,       partner [15], following the use of simple associative learning
how can it be characterised such that it serves cognition (and       in [16], it has been found that a degree of behavioural
the development thereof)?                                            alignment between a child and a robot is observed within
   In one particular perspective grounded in neuropsycholog-         real-time interactions - an effect readily seen in human-human
ical data, emphasis is placed on the associative and network         interactions. While only a basic illustration of human-like
nature of memory. This is apparent in the “Network Memory”           competence, this nevertheless demonstrates the importance of
framework for example [7], which proposes a hierarchical             memory for social HRI [17], and thus establishes associativity
and heterarchical organisation of overlapping distributed as-        as a candidate foundational mechanism for a social cognitive
sociative networks that that formed through experience, and          architecture. Similarly, with associativity being considered
whose reactivation gives rise to the dynamics that instantiate       sufficient for generating predictions as noted above, and pre-
cognition [8]. Such a perspective is not unusual, e.g. [1],          diction/anticipation being considered essential for sociality in
despite the apparent contradiction to multi-system accounts          terms of supporting coordination [18], then such an account
of memory organisation, e.g. [9], [10], with it being also           of memory remains consistent.



      Proceedings of EUCognition 2016 - "Cognitive Robot Architectures" - CEUR-WS                                            58
   An alternative implementation using similar principles of        contribution goes beyond this: that a full account of memory
associativity and interactive learning has been applied to a        may be sufficient to provide an account of cognition.
range of embodied and developmental psychology models
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     Proceedings of EUCognition 2016 - "Cognitive Robot Architectures" - CEUR-WS                                                       59