<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Strength calculation of rewards</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mariela Morveli-Espinoza</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ayslan T. Possebom</string-name>
          <email>possebom@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Cesar A. Tacla</string-name>
          <email>cesar.tacla@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>CPGEI - Federal University of Technology - Parana ́</institution>
          ,
          <country country="BR">Brazil</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2016</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>8</fpage>
      <lpage>13</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Persuasive negotiation involves negotiating using rhetorical arguments (such as threats, rewards, and appeals), which act as persuasive elements that aim to force or convince an opponent to accept a given proposal. In the case of rewards, these have a positive nature as they use the argument that something positive will happen to the opponent if he accepts to do the requirement sent by the proponent. A proponent agent can generate more than one reward depending on the information he has modeled of his opponent. The problem appears when the agent has to choose a reward, to send to his opponent, among a set of rewards. One measure that could help him in his choice is the strength each reward has. Thus, the goal of this work is to analyze the rewards components and to propose a model for calculating their strength. We propose two ways for calculating the strength of rewards depending on the kind of negotiation the agent is participating. The first proposal is to be used when the agent negotiates only with one opponent, and the second when the agent negotiates with more than one opponent.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        Persuasive negotiation involves negotiating using
rhetorical arguments, which act as persuasive elements
that aim to force or convince an opponent to accept a
given proposal [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Although some authors argue that threats are the
strongest rhetorical arguments ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]), the choice of
which kind of argument will be used by a proponent
agent depends on the information he has modelled
about his opponents. According to Ramchurn et al.[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ],
it also depends on the convenience of the proposal
for the proponent and the degree of trust that exists
between the two agents. Therefore, as appropriate, a
reward could be more e↵ective than a threat. In this
work we study rewards, which have a positive nature
as a proponent agent can entice an opponent of him to
do certain action by o↵ering to do another action as a
reward [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Let’s see the following persuasive negotiation
scenario where boss is an agent proponent, employee
an agent opponent and the goal of boss is that
employee works every weekend1. Taking into account
the knowledge base of agent boss, the following
rewards can be generated:
• boss: if you work every weekend, you will receive
an interim payment.
• boss: if you work every weekend, you will have
more holidays.</p>
      <p>
        The question is which of these rewards will boss
choose to persuade employee to work every weekend?
One way of knowing this is by calculating the strength
of the generated rewards. According to Ramchurn et
al.[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], a strong argument (in this case a reward) is one
that quickly convinces an opponent to do a proposal,
while a weak argument is less persuasive. Therefore,
calculating the strength of rewards is important in
persuasive negotiation dialogues, since the quickness
of persuasion depends on it.
      </p>
      <p>
        Rewards are constructed using both proponent and
opponent’s goals (for example, earning more money).
Some researches on this topic take into account the
importance of the opponent’s goal for the agent
opponent and the certainty level of the beliefs used
for the argument generation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ][
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. However, there are
other additional criteria that are necessary. Following,
some examples of situations that show this need:
1. Agent boss knows that “visiting his parents” (g1)
is a more important goal for employee than “fixing
his car” (g2). Considering only the importance, boss
would use g1 for generating a reward. However, what
happens if boss knows that g1 is less achievable than
1This scenario is inspired by the example presented in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]
g2 since visiting his parents is not possible for the
moment because employee has a spine disorder that
does not let him travel long distances? In cases like
this, the importance is no longer the best or the unique
criterion, related to the goal of the opponent.
      </p>
      <p>2. Agent boss has already done rewards before and
he has rarely fulfilled it, and obviously employee knows
about it. In this case, the strength of a reward is
also influenced by the execution credibility that the
proponent has from the point of view of his opponent.
Thus, even when the goal of an opponent is very
important and/or achievable, a low level of credibility
could diminish the value of the strength of a reward.</p>
      <p>In the first case, notice that besides importance,
there exists another criterion to evaluate the quality
of the goal of an opponent, because it does not matter
how important a goal is if it is not possible to be
achieved. And in the second case, the credibility
execution level of the proponent (from the point
of view of the opponent, i.e. the execution level
the proponent believes the opponent has about him)
should also be considered.</p>
      <p>
        With respect to the first criterion, to determine
how achievable a goal is, we will use the belief-based
goal processing model proposed by Castelfranchi and
Paglieri [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. It can be considered an extension of
the belief-desire-intention model (BDI) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] model, but
unlike it, in Castelfranchi and Paglieri’s model, the
processing of goals is divided in four stages: (i)
activation, (ii) evaluation, (iii) deliberation, and (iv)
checking; and the states a goal can adopt are: (i)
active (=desire), (ii) pursuable, (iii) chosen, and (iv)
executable (=intention). The state of a goal changes
when it passes from one stage to the next. Thus, when
it passes the activation stage it becomes active, when
it passes the evaluation stage it becomes pursuable,
and so on. A goal is closer to be achieved when it is
closer of passing the last stage.
      </p>
      <p>Part of our proposal for calculating the strength of a
reward considers the state of the goals of the opponent.
Depending on this state, a goal can be considered
more or less rewardable, a goal is considered more
rewardable when it is closer of the executable state
and less rewardable when its state is active. Thus, the
aim of this article is to propose a model for calculating
the strength of rewards by taking into account new
criteria, which will lead to a more accurate calculation.</p>
      <p>The paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the goal processing model on which our
strength calculation model is primarily based. In
Section 3 a negotiating agent architecture that
considers the necessary mental states, structures and
functions that support our proposal is defined. A
formal definition of reward and the mechanism for
its generation are presented in Section 4. Section 5
shows an analysis of the elements of a reward and our
proposed strength calculation model. In Section 6, the
main related works are compared with our proposal.
Finally, Section 7 is devoted to some conclusions and
future works.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Belief-based goal processing model</title>
      <p>In this section, the four stages of the goal processing
model of Castelfranchi and Paglieri are presented2.
The aim of this section is not to present in detail
the beliefs used in each stage. We focus on the
goals states and make clear when a goal is considered
active, pursuable, chosen, and executable, because
these states will be used in the strength calculation
model that is proposed in this work. Following a brief
description of each stage:</p>
      <p>1. Activation stage: In this stage, goals are
activated by means of motivating beliefs. For example,
if the agent has the belief that today is Thursday,
it activates the goal of going to the French class, or
the motivating belief that today is sunny activates the
goal of playing football. When a motivating belief is
satisfied, the supported goal becomes active. An active
goal can also be seen as a desire.</p>
      <p>2. Evaluation stage: In this stage, goals
are evaluated using assessment beliefs. When there
are no assessment beliefs for a certain goal, it
becomes pursuable. Three types of assessment beliefs
were defined: (i) those that control that there is
no impossibility for a goal be pursued; (ii) those
that control goals that are realized in the world
autonomously and without the direct intervention of
the agent; and (iii) those that control goals that have
already realized, and that will remain as such.</p>
      <p>3. Deliberation stage: The aim of this stage is
to act as a filter on the basis of incompatibilities and
preferences among pursuable goals. Goals that pass
this stage are called chosen goals. These beliefs are
concerned with the di↵erent forms of incompatibility
among goals that lead an agent to choose among
them. For dealing with incompatibilities, an agent
uses preference beliefs.</p>
      <p>
        4. Checking stage: The aim of this stage is to
evaluate whether the agent knows how to achieve a
goal and if it is capable of performing the required
actions to achieve a chosen goal, in other words if the
agent has a plan and he is capable of executing it.
Goals that pass this stage are called executable goals
and have the same characteristics of intentions.
2A more detailed version of this model is presented in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
3
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>The agent</title>
      <p>In this section, we define the basic and compound
structures, and functions of the agent, which are
necessary in order to be able to generate rewards and
calculate their strengths3. This architecture is based
on the Castelfranchi and Paglieri’s model.</p>
      <p>Before defining the structures of an agent, let L
be a first order logical language which will be used to
represent the goals and beliefs of the agent. ^ ,_ and ¬
denote the logical connectives conjunction, disjunction
and negation, and ` stands for the classical inference.
Definition 3.1. (Basic structures) An agent has
five basic structures:
- K is the knowledge base of the agent;
- Op stores the opponents of the agent;
- G = Ga [ Gp [ Gc [ Ge is the set of goals of the
agent, such that Ga the set of active goals, Gp the set
of pursuable goals, Gc the set of chosen goals and Ge
the set of executable goals. It holds that Gx \ Gy = ; ,
for x, y 2 { a, p, c, e} and x 6= y;</p>
      <p>- G O = G Os [ G Oa [ G Op [ G Oc is the set of goals
of the opponent, such that G Os is the set of sleeping
goals of the opponent4, G Oa is the set of active goals of
the opponent, G Op the set of pursuable ones, and G Oc
the set of chosen ones. It holds that Gx \ Gy = ; for
x, y 2 { s, a, p, c} and x 6= y. Finally, let State(goi) = z
be a function that returns the state of a given goal; for
z 2 { 0, 1, 2, 3} where 0 means that the goal is sleeping,
1 active, 2 pursuable and 3 that it is chosen;
- Rws stores the rewards constructed by the agent.
The logical definition of a reward is given in Section 4.
Definition 3.2. (Compound structures) These
store characteristics of the basic structures.</p>
      <p>
        - Opdet = {(opi, )} such that opi 2 Op and is the
execution credibility level of rewards the proponent
has from the point of view of opponent opi. Hereafter,
we denote that 2 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
        ] such that is a real from
the given interval. Let Level Execrw(opi) = be a
function that returns the execution credibility level for
a given opponent agent;
      </p>
      <p>
        - G Odet = {(goi, , op j )} such that goi 2 G O is a
goal of opponent opj 2 Op whose importance is given
3In this work, we assume that the agent has in advance
the necessary information (importance and state of the
goals, and the value of the credibility level of execution of
rewards) for generating and calculating the strength of rewards.
Some interesting works about opponent modelling related to
argumentation are [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref7">7, 10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        4Sleeping is one of the states a goal may take that is proposed
in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. A goal is in sleeping state when it has not been activated
yet. In this work, we use the sleeping state to denote those
goals of the opponent that are not necessarily active but that are
important for him. For example, a mother knows that o↵ering
chocolates for her son may be a good reward, however it does not
mean that the son has the goal “obtaining chocolates” always
active.
by . Let Importance(goi, opj ) = be a function that
returns the importance of a given goal; the opponent
opj is taken into account as more that one opponent
may have the same goal but with di↵erent importance
degree. Finally, let Op Goals(opj ) = {goi, ...gok} be a
function that returns all the goals of a given opponent.
Definition 3.3. (Function) Besides the functions
defined previously, an agent is also equipped with the
following function:
      </p>
      <p>- EvalRecomp(goj ) is a function that takes as input
a rewardable goal of an opponent and returns a reward
action. This function lets the proponent choose an
adequate reward action, that is within the possibilities
of the proponent, thereby, he can fulfill the o↵ered
reward.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Construction of rewards</title>
      <p>A reward is constructed based on two goals:
1. An outsourced goal of the proponent:
This kind of goal needs the opponent involvement for
being achieved. For example, the goal of agent boss
is that employee works every weekend, for this goal
be achieved it is necessary that employee executes
the required action. Considering the goal processing
stages defined in Section 2 the state of this goal is
executable.</p>
      <p>Definition 4.1. (Outsourced goal) An outsourced
goal gi is an expression of the form gi(opk, gi0), such
that, opk 2 Op and gi0 is an action that opk has to
execute. Let f irst(gi) = opk and second(gi) = gi0 be
the functions that return each component of gi.</p>
      <p>2. The goal of an opponent: goi 2 G O is a
goal that proponent agent knows its opponent wants
to achieve. For example, boss knows that employee
wants to visit his parents. Besides knowing the goal of
his opponent, the proponent has to know the state of
that goal and its importance.</p>
      <p>The construction of a reward begins when (i) an
outsourced goal gi passes all the goal processing stages
and becomes executable and, (ii) after a failed first
attempt of proponent agent to make his opponent to
do the requested action gi0. The process of construction
of a reward is the following:
1. Function Op goals returns the set of rewardable
goals the proponent knows about the opponent
opj . Let Sgo = Op goals(opj ) be the returned
set.
2. If Sgo 6= ;
(a) For each goj 2 Sgo:
i. Obtain rop = EvalRecomp(goj ) to
know a reward option for goal goj .
ii. Generate the two rules necessary for
constructing a reward. The first is an
expression of the form rrw1 = gi0 ! rop
and the second is rrw2 = rop ! goj.</p>
      <p>iii. Construct a reward and save it in Rws.</p>
      <p>Rewards in Rws are called candidates. After the
strength calculation, the strongest one is sent to his
opponent to try to persuade him.</p>
      <p>
        Following, we present the formal definition of a
reward, this is based on the definition given in
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], with some modifications that consider the agent
architecture proposed in the previous section.
Definition 4.2. (Reward) A reward is a triple rw =
hRrw, gi0, goji, where:
- Rrw = rrw1 [ rrw2 contains both reward rules,
- gi0 = second(gi), such that gi 2 Ge,
- Rrw [ { gi0} ` goj such that goj 2 GO.
      </p>
      <p>Let’s call Rrw and gi0 the support of the reward and
goj its conclusion.</p>
      <p>Example 4.1. Let us define the mental state of boss:
Ge = g1, where:
g1 = make(employee,‘work(weekend)’) is an
outsourced goal, and therefore g10 = work(weekend)
GOa = {go1}, where go1 = visit(parents),
GOc = {go2}, where go2 = f ix(car),
GOdet = {(go1, 0.8, employee), (go2, 0.6, employee)},
Op = {employee}, Opdet = {(employee, 1)},
Rws = {}</p>
      <p>Let us suppose that agent employee rejected to do
action g10 = work(weekend). Therefore, boss begins
the process of construction of candidate rewards:
1. Sgo = Op goals(employee), so Sgo = {go1, go2}
2. Sgo 6= ; , then
(a) EvalRecomp(go1) = have(holidays)</p>
      <p>Generate Rrw1 = {g10 ! have(holidays),
have(holidays) ! go1}</p>
      <p>Construct rw1 = hRrw1, g10, go1i
(b) EvalRecomp(go2) = give(inter paym)</p>
      <p>Generate Rrw2 = {g20 ! give(inter paym),
give(inter paym) ! go2}</p>
      <p>Construct rw2 = hRrw2, g20, go2i</p>
      <p>Finally, Rws = {rw1, rw2}
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Strength calculation</title>
      <p>The strength of a reward is mainly based on the
“value” that the rewardable goal has for the opponent.
On the other hand, the credibility the proponent has
in the face of his opponent(s) regarding his ability to
fulfill his rewards is an aspect that also influences the
strength calculation.</p>
      <p>
        The strength calculation of a reward depends on:
1. The goal of the opponent goi (or
rewardable goal): two aspects are considered:
(a) Its importance: Like in some related works ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ],
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]), we will take into account the importance the
rewardable goal has for the opponent.
      </p>
      <p>(b) Its state: Let’s recall that we use 0 to denote
that a goal is sleeping, 1 to denote that it is active, 2
to denote that it is pursuable, and 3 to denote that it
is chosen.</p>
      <p>2. Execution credibility level: It is also
important that the proponent agent be able to execute
its rewards, from the point of view of his opponent.
This value (represented in the proponent) reflects what
the proponent believes the opponent thinks about the
execution level of credibility of the proponent.</p>
      <p>Considering these aspects, the formalization of our
proposal is defined as follows.</p>
      <p>Definition 5.1. (Basic strength of a reward) The
basic strength of a reward depends on the importance
and the state of the rewardable goal. Let rw =
hRrw, gi0, goji be a reward, its the basic strength is
obtained applying:</p>
      <p>State(goj)
+ Importance(goj)
2
STbasic(rw) = num states
1
(1)</p>
      <p>Where num states = 4 is the total number of states
that an opponent goal can have and function State
return the state of the opponent’s goal (0=sleeping,
1=active, 2=pursuable, and 3=chosen).</p>
      <p>
        A direct consequence of the above definition is that
the value of the basic strength of a reward is a real
value between 0 and 1. Formally:
Property 5.1. Let rw = hRrw, gi0, goji be a reward.
STbasic(rw) 2 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
        ], where 0 represents the minimum
value and 1 represents the maximum value the basic
strength can have.
      </p>
      <p>Proof Since the value of the basic strength is based
on the values of the importance and the normalization
of the states value of goj, and this values are of
between 0 and 1, then the value of the basic strength
is also limited by 0 and 1.</p>
      <p>When the proponent agent constructs a set of
rewards only for one opponent, the value of the
basic strength is enough to choose the reward that
will be sent. Nevertheless, a more exact value can
be obtained if the execution credibility level is also
considered. This aspect is even more important when
the proponent agent generates rewards for more than
one opponent as it will let him know which opponent
may be convinced more quickly when faced with one
of his rewards.</p>
      <p>Definition 5.2. (Combined strength of a
reward) The combined strength of a reward depends
on the basic strength of the reward and the execution
credibility level of the proponent. Let rw =
hrrwk, gi0, goj i be a reward and opn 2 Op the opponent
whose rewardable goal is goj . The combined strength
of rw is obtained applying:
STcomb(rw) = STbasic(rw) ⇥ Level Execrw(opn) (2)
Property 5.2. The maximum value of the combined
strength of a reward is at most the value of its basic
strength: STcomb(rw) 2 [0, STbasic(rw)].</p>
      <p>Example 5.1. Let us continue with example 4.1:
State(go1) = 1, Importance(go1) = 0.8
State(go2) = 3, Importance(go2) = 0.6</p>
      <p>Level Execrw(employee) = 1 is the execution
credibility level of agent boss from the point of view of
agent employee.</p>
      <p>Applying equation 1, the basic strengths of rewards
in Rws are STbasic(rw1) = 0.57 and STbasic(rw2) =
0.8. Since agent boss generated rewards only for one
opponent, he can choose the strongest one without
calculating the combined strengths, even more when
in this case the values of the combined strengths are
the same of the basic strengths. Therefore, boss would
sends rw2 because it is the strongest reward.
Example 5.2. Let us suppose that boss has
another opponent: employee2. Let us also
suppose that boss has generated two rewards
for employee2 with the following basic strengths:
STbasic(rw3) = 0.85, STbasic(rw4) = 0.55, with
Level Execrw(employee2) = 0.7.</p>
      <p>Taking into consideration only the basic strengths,
the strongest reward is rw3 = 0.85. This means that
boss could send this reward to employee2 as it seems
that it would be more e↵ective than sending a reward
to employee. However, the execution credibility level
of boss (from the point of view of employee2) is
lower than the execution credibility level from the
point of view of employee. Thus, the combined
strengths (equation 2) have the same values of the
basic strengths for employee, but di↵erent values for
employee2:</p>
      <p>STcomb(rw1) = 0.57 ⇥ 1 = 0.57
STcomb(rw2) = 0.8 ⇥ 1 = 0.8
STcomb(rw3) = 0.85 ⇥ 0.7 = 0.6
STcomb(rw4) = 0.55 ⇥ 0.7 = 0.41</p>
      <p>Therefore, the best option for boss is to sent reward
rw2 to his opponent employee.
6</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Related works</title>
      <p>
        Servapali et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] propose a model where
the rhetorical strength of rewards varies during
the negotiation depending on the environmental
conditions. For calculating the strength value, it is
taken into account a set of world states an agent can
be carried to by using a certain reward. The intensity
of the strength depends on the desirability of each of
these states. For a fair calculation, an average over all
possible states is used.
      </p>
      <p>
        In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], a formal definition of rewards and an
evaluation system are presented. For the evaluation
of strength of rewards, the certainty of beliefs that
are used for the generation of the reward and the
importance of the goal of the opponent are considered.
The same authors have other later articles about
rhetorical arguments ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]). In these works, the
calculation of strength of rewards is done always
by taking into account the two criteria previously
mentioned. For our proposal, we made a deeper
analysis of the components of a reward and defined
new criteria for calculating its strength. Another
di↵erence is in relation to the reward rules, meanwhile
in Amgoud and Prade [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] it is part of the knowledge
base since the beginning, in our work it is constructed
from an own goal of the proponent agent and the
goals of the opponent, giving more flexibility for the
generation of rewards.
7
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Conclusions and future works</title>
      <p>This work makes a deeper analysis of the components
of a reward and considers new criteria for the
calculation of their strength. Using these criteria,
two forms for calculating the strength of a reward
were proposed: the basic strength and the combined
strength calculation. These two di↵erent ways of
calculus is one of the advantages of our proposal as,
depending on the need of the situation, the proponent
can use either the basic or the combined equation.</p>
      <p>We also presented a process for rewards
construction and an agent architecture based on
the goal processing model of Castelfranchi and
Paglieri. We believe that our proposed process gives
more flexibility for the generation of rewards as
the rewards rules are generated dynamically from
the set goals of the opponent and by applying the
EvalRecomp function, which evaluates the rewardable
goal to return an adequate reward.</p>
      <p>As future works, we want to analyse the calculation
of strength of rewards from the point of view of the
opponent. Besides the importance and the state of
the rewardable goal, the utility of the reward for the
opponent may be considered.</p>
      <p>We also want to work on experience-based
calculation; this would be done after the proponent
receives the answer of the opponent, which can
be positive or negative. When it is negative, a
recalculation of the initial strength should be done.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          [1]
          <string-name>
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