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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Propagating Trust and Distrust to Demote Web Spam</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Baoning Wu Vinay Goel Brian D. Davison</string-name>
          <email>davisong@cse.lehigh.edu</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Algorithms</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Performance</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Department of Computer Science &amp; Engineering Lehigh University Bethlehem</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>PA 18015</addr-line>
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>2</fpage>
      <lpage>10</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Web spamming describes behavior that attempts to deceive search engine's ranking algorithms. TrustRank is a recent algorithm that can combat web spam by propagating trust among web pages. However, TrustRank propagates trust among web pages based on the number of outgoing links, which is also how PageRank propagates authority scores among Web pages. This type of propagation may be suited for propagating authority, but it is not optimal for calculating trust scores for demoting spam sites. In this paper, we propose several alternative methods to propagate trust on the web. With experiments on a real web data set, we show that these methods can greatly decrease the number of web spam sites within the top portion of the trust ranking. In addition, we investigate the possibility of propagating distrust among web pages. Experiments show that combining trust and distrust values can demote more spam sites than the sole use of trust values.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Categories and Subject Descriptors</title>
      <p>H.3.3 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Information
Search and Retrieval</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>General Terms</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>In today's Web, a link between two pages can be
considered to be an implicit conveyance of trust from the source
page to the target page. In this case, trust implies that
the author of the source page believes that the target page
provides some content value.</p>
      <p>
        With the increasing commercial interest of being ranked
high in search engine results, content providers resort to
techniques that manipulate these results. This behavior is
usually termed Web spam, or search engine spam. Many
kinds of spam have been discovered [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref24 ref5">24, 12, 5</xref>
        ]. Henzinger
et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ] mention that Web spam is one of the major
challenges faced by search engines. There is no universal method
that can detect all kinds of spam at the same time.
      </p>
      <p>
        Trust can be used to combat Web spam. Gyongyi et
al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] present the TrustRank algorithm based on this idea.
This technique assumes that a link between two pages on
the Web signi es trust between them; i.e., a link from page
A to page B is a conveyance of trust from page A to page
B. In this technique, human experts, initially, select a list of
seed sites that are well-known and trustworthy on the Web.
Each of these seed sites is assigned an initial trust score. A
biased PageRank [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ] algorithm is then used to propagate
these trust scores to the descendants of these sites. The
authors observed that on applying this technique, good sites
had relatively high trust scores, while spam sites had low
trust scores.
      </p>
      <p>TrustRank shows that the idea of propagating trust from
a set of highly trusted seed sites helps a great deal in the
demotion of Web spam. But TrustRank is just one
implementation of this idea. This approach makes certain
assumptions with regard to how trust is propagated from a parent
page to a child page. For example, the authors claim that
the possibility of a page pointing to a spam page increases
with the number of links the pointing page has. Because of
this, they proposed the idea that the trust score of a parent
page be equally split amongst its children pages.</p>
      <p>This assumption is open to argument. Why should two
equally trusted pages propagate di erent trust scores to
their children just because one made more recommendations
than the other? Also, with respect to the accumulation of
trust scores from multiple parents, TrustRank puts forth
just one solution, that of simple summation. Clearly, there
are other alternatives.</p>
      <p>A natural extension of the idea of the conveyance of trust
between links is that of the conveyance of distrust. Here,
distrust has a di erent meaning to that in the context of social
networks. In social networks, distrust between two nodes A
and B usually means that A shows distrust explicitly to B.
In contrast, in our system, distrust is a penalty awarded to
the source page for linking to an untrustworthy page. Hence,
this distrust is an indication that we don't trust some web
pages, not an indication that one page doesn't trust another
page on the web. Actually, the trust score of a page can also
be interpreted as how much we trust this page.</p>
      <p>In general, spam pages can be considered to be one type
of untrustworthy pages. To elaborate on this idea, consider
that a page links to another page and hence according to the
above de nition of trust, this page expresses trust towards
the target page. But if this target page is known to be a
spam page, then clearly the trust judgment of the source
page is not valid. The source page needs to be penalized
for trusting an untrustworthy page. It is likely that the
source page itself is a spam page, or is a page that we believe
should not be ranked highly for its negligence in linking to
an untrustworthy page.</p>
      <p>In this paper, we explore the di erent issues present in the
problem of propagating trust on the Web. We also study the
application of propagating distrust on the Web.
Additionally, we present techniques to combine trust and distrust
scores to improve the overall performance in demoting Web
spam.</p>
      <p>The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the
background and related work will be introduced in Section 2
and Section 3 respectively. The motivation of this work will
be introduced in Section 4. The details of our technique
are given in Section 5. The experiments and results will be
shown in Section 7. We nish with discussion and conclusion
in Sections 8 and 9.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>BACKGROUND</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Matrix Definition</title>
      <p>The web can be represented by a directed graph, given
web pages as the nodes and hyperlinks among web pages as
the directed links among the nodes. The adjacency matrix
M of the web graph is: M [i; j] equals 1 if there is a hyperlink
from page i to page j, or 0 otherwise. Suppose we use I(i) to
represent the in-degree of node i and O(i) as the out-degree
of node i, the de nition of the transition matrix T is:
and the de nition of the reverse transition matrix R is:
T [i; j] = M [j; i]=O(j)
R[i; j] = M [i; j]=I(j)
(1)
(2)
2.2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>TrustRank and BadRank</title>
      <p>
        Gyongyi et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] introduce TrustRank. It is based on
the idea that good sites seldom point to spam sites and
people trust these good sites. This trust can be propagated
through the link structure on the Web. So, a list of highly
trustworthy sites are selected to form the seed set and each
of these sites is assigned a non-zero initial trust score, while
all the other sites on the Web have initial values of 0. Then a
biased PageRank algorithm is used to propagate these initial
trust scores to their outgoing sites. After convergence, good
sites will get a decent trust score, while spam sites are likely
to get lower trust scores. The formula of TrustRank is:
where t is the TrustRank score vector, is the jump
probability, T is the transition matrix and s is the normalized
trust score vector for the seed set. Before calculation, t is
initialized with the value of s. Gyongyi et al. iterated the
above equation 20 times with set to 0:15.
      </p>
      <p>
        In many SEO discussion boards, participants discuss the
latest ranking and spam- nding techniques employed by
commercial search engines. One approach, called
BadRank1, is believed by some to be used by a commercial
engine to combat link farms.2 BadRank is based on
propagating negative value among pages. The idea of BadRank
1One description of BadRank can be found at [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
2See, for example http://www.webmasterworld.com
/forum3/20281-22-15.htm.
is that a page will get high BadRank value if it points to
some pages with high BadRank value. This idea is similar
in spirit to our mechanism of propagating distrust in this
paper.
3.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>RELATED WORK</title>
      <p>
        While the idea of a focused or custom PageRank vector
has existed from the beginning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ], Haveliwala [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ] was
the rst to propose the idea of bringing topical information
into PageRank calculation. In his technique, pages listed
in DMOZ [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ] are used as the seed set to calculate the
biased PageRank values for each of the top categories. Then a
similarity value of a query to each of these categories is
calculated. A uni ed score is then calculated for each page
containing the given query term(s). Finally, pages are ranked
by this uni ed score. Experiments show that Topic-sensitive
PageRank has better performance than PageRank in
generating better response lists to a given query.
      </p>
      <p>
        Jeh and Widom [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ] specialize the global notion of
importance that PageRank provides to create personalized views
of importance by introducing the idea of preference sets.
The rankings of results can then be biased according to this
personalized notion. For this, they used the biased
PageRank formula.
      </p>
      <p>
        Several researchers have done some work to combat
different kind of Web spam. Fetterly et al. propose using
statistical analysis to detect spam [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. Acharya et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] rst
publicly propose using historical data to identify link spam
pages. Wu and Davison [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26">26</xref>
        ] proposed using the intersection
of the incoming and outgoing link sets plus a propagation
step to detect link farms. Mishne et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ] used a language
model to detect comment spam. Drost and Sche er [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]
proposed using a machine learning method to detect link spam.
Recently, Fetterly et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] describe methods to detect a
special kind of spam that provides pages by stitching together
sentences from a repository.
      </p>
      <p>
        Benczur et al. proposed SpamRank in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. For each page,
they check the PageRank distribution of all its incoming
links. If the distribution doesn't follow a normal pattern,
the page will be penalized and used as seed page. They also
adopt the idea that spam values are propagated backward
and nally spam pages will have high SpamRank values.
Compared to SpamRank, we use labeled spam pages as our
seed set.
      </p>
      <p>
        In prior work, we [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">27</xref>
        ] pointed out that TrustRank has
a bias towards better represented communities in the seed
set. In order to neutralize this bias, we proposed \Topical
TrustRank", which uses topics to partition the seed set and
di erent mechanisms to combine trust scores from each
partition. We showed that this algorithm can perform better
than TrustRank in reducing the number of highly ranked
spam sites. Compared with that paper, we do not consider
partitions for the seed set here. Instead, we show that
different mechanisms for propagating trust can also help to
demote more top ranked spam sites. The methods proposed
in this paper can generate better performance than Topical
TrustRank.
      </p>
      <p>
        Guha et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ] study how to propagate trust scores
among a connected network of people. Di erent propagation
schemes for both trust score and distrust score are studied
based on a network from a real social community website.
Compared with their ideas, our de nition of distrust is not
exactly same. Their goal is to predict whether two people
will show trust (or distrust) to the other, but our goal is to
use trust and distrust to demote Web spam, especially top
ranked spam pages or sites.
      </p>
      <p>
        Massa and Hayes [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ] review several current proposals for
extending the link mechanism to incorporate extra semantic
information, primarily those that allow the authors of a web
page to describe their opinion on pages they link to. They
argue that any change to the hyperlink facility must be easily
understood by the ordinary users of the Web, but the more
expressive linking structure would produce a richer semantic
network from which more precise information can be mined.
They used a real world data set from Epinions.com as a
proxy for the Web with the analogy that web pages are
Epinions users and links are trust and distrust statements.
They show that this additional link information would allow
the PageRank algorithm to identify highly trusted web sites.
      </p>
      <p>
        Ziegler and Lausen [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28">28</xref>
        ] introduce the Appleseed
algorithm, a proposal for local group trust computation. The
basic intuition of the approach is motivated by spreading
activation strategies. The idea of spreading activation is the
propagation of energy in a network. Also, the edges between
the nodes are weighted based on the type of the edges. This
idea of energy ow is tailored for trust propagation. In
contrast, our algorithm doesn't consider a weighted graph.
      </p>
      <p>
        Gray et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] proposed a trust-based security framework
for ad hoc networks. The trust value among two nodes
connected by a path is the average of the weighted sum of trust
values of all nodes in the path. No experimental results are
shown.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>MOTIVATION</title>
      <p>The original TrustRank paper proposed that trust should
be reduced as we move further and further away from the
seed set of trusted pages. To achieve this attenuation of
trust, the authors propose two techniques, trust dampening
and trust splitting. With trust dampening, a page gets the
trust score of its parent page dampened by a factor less than
1. With trust splitting, a parent's trust score is equally
divided amongst its children. A child's overall trust score is
given by the sum of the shares of the trust scores obtained
from its parents.</p>
      <p>
        In the case of trust splitting, we raise a question: Given
two equally trusted friends, why should the
recommendations made by one friend be weighted less than the other,
simply because the rst made more recommendations? A
similar argument has been made by Guha [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        It is observed that a spam page often points to other spam
pages for the purposes of boosting their PageRank value
and manipulating search engine results [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26">26</xref>
        ]. Motivated by
the idea of trust propagation, we believe that propagating
distrust given a labeled spam seed set, will help to penalize
other spam pages.
      </p>
      <p>
        Hence, given a set of labeled spam seed set, we can
propagate distrust from this set to the pages that point to
members of this set. The idea is that a page pointing to a spam
page is likely to be spam itself. But sometimes, good pages
may unintentionally point to spam pages. In this case, these
pages are penalized for not being careful with regard to
creating or maintaining links (as suggested by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]).
      </p>
      <p>In doing so, each page on the Web is assigned two scores,
a trust score and a distrust score. In the combined model,
a link on the Web can then propagate these two scores. As
shown in Figure 1, suppose there is a link from Page A to</p>
      <p>Page B, then trust is propagated from Page A to Page B,
while distrust is propagated from Page B to Page A.</p>
      <p>We explore di erent techniques for the handling of
propagation of trust and distrust from the respective seed sets
to other pages on the Web.
5.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>ALGORITHM DETAILS</title>
      <p>In this section, we present details of our ideas on
propagating trust and distrust among web pages.
5.1</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>Propagating Trust</title>
      <p>TrustRank propagates trust among web pages in the same
manner as the PageRank algorithm propagates authority
among web pages. The basic idea is that during each
iteration, a parent's trust score is divided by the number of its
outgoing links and each of its children gets an equal share.
Then a child's overall trust score is the sum of the shares
from all its parents.</p>
      <p>Two key steps in the technique described above may be
explored. One is, for each parent, how to divide its score
amongst its children; we name this the \splitting" step. The
other is, for each child, how to calculate the overall scores
given the shares from all its parents; we name this the
\accumulation" step.</p>
      <p>For the splitting step, we study three choices:</p>
      <p>Equal Splitting: a node i with O(i) outgoing links
and trust score T R(i) will give d TOR((ii)) to each child.
d is a constant with 0 &lt; d &lt; 1;
Constant Splitting: a node i with trust score T R(i)
will give d T R(i) to each child;
Logarithm Splitting: a node i with O(i) outgoing
links and trust score T R(i) will give d logT(1R+(Oi)(i)) to
each child.</p>
      <p>We term d to be the decay factor, which determines how
much of the parents' score is propagated to its children. In
fact, if d equals 1, then the above \Equal Splitting" is the
same as the method used in TrustRank. As discussed in
the Section 4, why should equally trusted pages propagate
di erent trust scores just because they have di erent number
of children? With \Constant Splitting", each parent will
give a constant portion of its trust value to all of its children
irrespective of the number of its children. Thus for a child,
if two of its parents have identical trust values but di erent
number of children, then the child will get the same value
from both of these parents. The third choice, \Logarithm
Splitting" does not eliminate the e ect of the number of
children that a page has but can decrease it.</p>
      <p>Since \Equal Splitting" is the choice already being
employed in TrustRank, we will focus on \Constant Splitting"
and \Logarithm Splitting" in our experiments.</p>
      <p>For the accumulation step, we study three choices.</p>
      <p>Simple Summation: Sum the trust values from each
parent.</p>
      <p>Maximum Share: Use the maximum of the trust
values sent by the parents.</p>
      <p>Maximum Parent: Sum the trust values in such a
way as to never exceed the trust score of the
mosttrusted parent.</p>
      <p>The rst choice is the same as in PageRank and
TrustRank; using the sum of trust scores from all parents
as the child's trust score. For \Maximum Share", the
maximum value among the trust values inherited from all the
parents is used as the child's trust score. For \Maximum
Parent", rst the sum of trust values from each parent is
calculated and this sum is compared with the largest trust
score among each of its parents, the smaller of these two
values is used as the child's trust score.</p>
      <p>By using the above choices, the equation for calculating
trust score is di erent from Equation 3. For example, if
using \Constant Splitting" and \Simple Summation", the
equation will become:
where t is the trust score vector, is the jump probability, d
is the constant discussed in the above splitting choices, M is
the web matrix shown in Section 2.1 and s is the normalized
trust score vector for the seed set.
5.2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>Propagating Distrust</title>
      <p>The trust score of a page is an indication of how
trustworthy the page is on the Web. In the case of web spam, the
trust score can be seen as a measure of the likelihood that
a page is not a spam page.</p>
      <p>Similarly, we introduce the concept of distrust to
penalize the pages that point to untrustworthy pages. Now, it is
possible that pages unintentionally point to spam pages. In
these cases, we argue that the (otherwise good) page should
be penalized to some extent for not being careful in its
linking behavior.</p>
      <p>Distrust propagation makes sense when spam sites are
used as the distrusted seed set and distrust is propagated
from a child to its parent. So, based on this idea, one link can
represent two propagation processes, i.e., the trust score is
propagated from the parent to the children while the distrust
score is propagated from the children to the parent.</p>
      <p>In this technique, some known spam pages are selected
as the distrusted seeds and assigned some initial distrust
scores. During each iteration, the distrust score is
propagated from children pages to parent pages iteratively. After
convergence, a higher distrust score indicates that this page
is more likely to be a spam page.</p>
      <p>A direct method of calculating distrust score for each page
is to follow the same idea as TrustRank. The calculation can
be represented by Equation 5.</p>
      <p>n = (1
)</p>
      <p>R
n +
r
(5)
where n is the distrust score vector, is the jump
probability, R is the reverse transition matrix shown in Equation
2 and r is the normalized distrust score vector for the
distrusted seed set. Before calculation, n is initialized with the
value of r.</p>
      <p>However, as discussed in Section 5.1, the propagation
mechanism of TrustRank may not be optimal to propagate
trust or distrust for the purpose of demoting spam pages.
We propose that the same choices to propagate trust,
discussed in Section 5.1, can be taken to propagate distrust.</p>
      <p>Suppose we use DIS T R(i) to represent the distrust score
for node i. For the splitting step, we have three choices:
Equal Splitting: a node i with I(i) incoming links
and DIS T R(i) will give dD DISI(Ti)R(i) to each
parent. where 0 &lt; dD &lt; 1;
Constant Splitting: a node i with DIS T R(i) will
give dD DIS T R(i) to each parent;
Logarithm Splitting: a node i with I(i) incoming
links and DIS T R(i) will give dD lDogI(S1+TIR((ii))) to each
parent.</p>
      <p>The \Equal Splitting" choice is quite similar to that in
the case of trust propagation in TrustRank. Intuitively, this
kind of splitting may raise problems when the purpose of
propagating distrust is to demote spam. For a simple
example, by \Equal Splitting", a spam site with more parents
will propagate smaller distrust to its parents, while spam
sites with fewer parents will propagate bigger distrust to its
parents. Obviously, this policy supports popular spam sites
and this is clearly not desirable for the purpose of demoting
spam. In comparison, \Constant Splitting" and \Logarithm
Splitting" present better choices.</p>
      <p>For the accumulation step, we also have three choices:
Simple Summation: Sum the distrust values from
each child.</p>
      <p>Maximum Share: Use the maximum of the distrust
values sent by the children;
Maximum Parent: Sum the distrust values in such
a way as to never exceed the distrust score of the
mostdistrusted child.</p>
      <p>Di erent choices will employ di erent equations during
the calculation. For example, if using \Constant Splitting"
and \Simple Summation", the equation of calculating
distrust score is:
n = (1
)
dD</p>
      <p>M
n +
r
(6)
where n is the distrust score vector, is the jump
probability, d is the constant discussed in the above splitting
choices, M is the web matrix shown in Section 2.1 and r is
the normalized distrust score vector for the distrusted seed
set.
5.3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-12">
      <title>Combining Trust and Distrust</title>
      <p>On propagating trust and distrust to the pages on the
web, each page will be assigned two scores, a trust score
and a distrust score. Then comes the question of combining
them to generate a uni ed ranking of pages that is indicative
of their trustworthiness.</p>
      <p>Our goal of propagating trust and distrust is to demote
spam sites in the ranking. Since the trust score is an
indication of how unlikely it is that the page is a spam page,
while the distrust score is an indication of how likely it is
that the page is a spam page, a direct solution is to simply
calculate the di erence of these two scores and use this value
to represent the overall trustworthiness of the Web page.</p>
      <p>Additionally, we may apply several methods for the
combination. For example, we may give di erent weights when
calculating the sum. Suppose we use T otal(i) to represent
the di erence of trust and distrust score for page i. Then
we can apply the following formula:</p>
      <p>T otal(i) =</p>
      <p>T R(i)</p>
      <p>DIS T R(i)
(7)
where and (0 &lt; &lt; 1, 0 &lt; &lt; 1) are two coe cients
to give di erent weights to trust and distrust scores in this
formula.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-13">
      <title>DATA SET</title>
      <p>
        The data set used in our experiments is courtesy of
search.ch search engine [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
        ]. It is a 2003 crawl of pages that
are mostly from the Switzerland domain. There are about
20M pages within this data set and around 350K sites with
the \.ch" domain. Since we were also provided with 3; 589
labeled sites and domains applying di erent spam techniques,
we used the site graph for testing the ideas we propose in
this paper.
      </p>
      <p>
        In order to generate a trusted seed set, we extract all the
URLs listed within the search.ch topic directory [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
        ] of 20
di erent topics, which is similar to the DMOZ directory but
only lists pages primarily within the Switzerland domain.
Since we use the site graph in our calculation and the topic
directory listed only pages, we used a simple transfer policy:
if a site had a page listed in a certain topic directory, we
put the site into a trusted seed set. In doing so, we marked
20; 005 unique sites to form the seed set.
      </p>
      <p>For the generation of a distrusted seed set, we use the
labeled spam list which contains 3; 589 sites or domains. In
our experiments, we use only a portion of this list as the
distrusted seed set with the rest being used to evaluate the
performance.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-14">
      <title>EXPERIMENTS</title>
      <p>We test all the ideas we propose in Section 5 by using
the search.ch data set. Since the goal of this paper is to
investigate how di erent mechanisms of propagating trust
and distrust can help to demote top ranking spam sites, we
will focus on the ranking positions of the labeled 3; 589 spam
sites.</p>
      <p>We rst calculate the PageRank value for each site based
on the search.ch site graph. These sites are then ranked
in a descending order of their PageRank values. Based on
this ranking, we divide these sites among 20 buckets, with
each bucket containing sites with the sum of their PageRank
values equal to 1=20th of the sum of the PageRank values
of all sites.</p>
      <p>
        We then calculate the TrustRank score for each site based
on the site graph, to generate a ranking of sites sorted in
the descending order of these scores. As in the case of the
TrustRank paper [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], we iterated 20 times during this
calculation. We then divide these sites among 20 buckets such
that each TrustRank bucket has an identical number of sites
to the corresponding PageRank bucket. The distribution of
the 3,589 spam sites in the 20 buckets by PageRank and
      </p>
      <p>TrustRank is shown in Figure 2. It is clear that TrustRank
is good at demoting spam sites compared to PageRank.</p>
      <p>
        In this paper, we use the number of spam sites within the
top 10 buckets as the metric for measuring the performance
of algorithms. This choice of choosing the top 10 buckets was
arbitrary as in the case of [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">27</xref>
        ]. The smaller the number of
spam sites in the top 10 buckets, the better the performance
of the algorithm in demoting spam sites from the top ranking
positions.
      </p>
      <p>The results of this metric for the PageRank and
TrustRank algorithms are shown in Table 1. These results
will be used as the baseline results. We can see that
PageRank ranks 90 spam sites within the top ten buckets, while
TrustRank ranks only 58 spam sites.
7.1</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-15">
      <title>Different Jump Probabilities</title>
      <p>In TrustRank, the jump probability in Equation 3 is
usually assigned a value of 0:15. We measure the
performance of TrustRank with di erent values of this jump
factor.</p>
      <p>Since we use all the URLs listed in dir.search.ch as the
trusted seed set, it is quite possible that some spam sites
get included in this set too. On checking, we nd that 35
labeled spam sites are within the trusted seed set. It is
worthwhile to drop these spam sites from the seed set. We
run TrustRank again with di erent jump probabilities after
dropping these 35 labeled spam sites from the seed set.</p>
      <p>The results with both the original seed set and the cleaned
seed set are shown in Figure 3. We observe that larger jump
probabilities decrease the number of spam sites from top
ranking positions. Since a larger jump probability means
that smaller trust values are propagated from a parent to its
children, the results show that for the purpose of demoting
spam sites, in TrustRank, a better approach is of relatively
little trust propagation. We also observe that the dropping
of spam sites from the seed set results in fewer spam sites
within the top ten buckets.</p>
      <p>Algorithm
PageRank
TrustRank</p>
      <p>No. of Spam sites
in top 10 buckets
90
58</p>
      <p>As introduced in Section 5, we explore two choices in the
splitting step: \Constant Splitting" (d T R(i)) and
\Loga</p>
      <p>T R(i)
rithm Splitting" (d log(1+O(i)) ), while we have three choices
in the accumulation step: \Simple Summation", \Maximum
Share" and \Maximum Parent".</p>
      <p>The number of di erent combinations of the above choices
is six. For each combination we try using di erent values of
d ranging from 0:1 to 0:9. The results of these six
combinations with di erent values of d are shown in Table 2.</p>
      <p>From the results in Table 2, we can tell that \Simple
Summation" always generates the worst performance, which is
worse than TrustRank and even PageRank. A lot of spam
sites are raised in the ranking. Intuitively, this \Simple
Summation" will boost the rankings of sites with multiple
parents. In general, it is likely a spam site that has a large
number of incoming links will be able to accumulate a fairly
large value of trust. Hence, spam sites may be bene ted by
this \Simple Summation" method.</p>
      <p>We also observe that, in most cases, both \Maximum
Share" and \Maximum Parent" methods generate much
better performance than TrustRank and the \Simple
Summation" method. With regard to the splitting methods, we
observe that in most cases, \Logarithm Splitting" performs
better than \Constant Splitting".</p>
      <p>The results clearly demonstrate that for the purpose of
demoting web spam, propagating trust based on the idea of
\Equal Splitting" and \Simple Summation" which is used
by TrustRank, is not the optimal solution.</p>
      <p>
        Gyongyi et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] mentioned that there are di erent
possibilities for splitting trust scores; the reason that they chose
the method similar to PageRank is that only minor changes
are needed for calculating TrustRank by using existing e
cient methods for computing PageRank [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]. We argue that
if di erent choices of splitting and accumulating trust can
greatly demote spam sites, it is worthwhile to implement
these choices. In Table 2, our best result is 12 spam sites in
the top ten buckets, which is a much greater improvement
when compared to the baseline results of 58 spam sites in
Table 1.
      </p>
      <p>It is worth mentioning that by introducing the above ideas
of splitting and accumulating trust, we notice, in some cases,
long ties in the trust scores. For example, the top several
thousand of sites may have identical trust scores. This is
di erent from the values by PageRank or TrustRank. We
think this tie is still reasonable as long as few spam sites
are in the ties close to the top. Since there are 3; 823 sites
in the top ten buckets by PageRank, we consider the ties
that have rankings around this position still within top ten
buckets, thus all the spam sites before or within this tie will
still be counted within top ten buckets.</p>
      <p>Actually, we nd that for most cases, these ties can help
to demote more spam sites. But some small d may cause
a strong tie with more than 10; 000 sites and thus raise the
number of spam sites within top ten buckets. One example is
that there are 372 spam sites within top ten buckets when
combining \Maximum Parent" and \Logarithm Splitting"
with d set to 0:1.
7.3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-16">
      <title>Introducing Distrust</title>
      <p>
        Trust can be propagated from trusted seed set to the
children pages iteratively. Similarly, distrust can be propagated
from a distrusted seed set to the parent pages iteratively.
While our distrusted seed set was provided to us, in general
a search engine will maintain a spamming blacklist, using
both manual and automatic methods (perhaps, e.g., [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21 ref26 ref7 ref8">7, 8,
26, 21</xref>
        ]).
      </p>
      <p>In order to investigate whether introducing distrust can
help to improve the performance in demoting spam sites,
we randomly select a portion of labeled spam sites as the
distrusted seed set and calculate distrust values for each
site. The ranking positions of the remaining spam sites will
be used to evaluate the performance.
7.3.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-16-1">
        <title>Basic Propagation of Distrust</title>
        <p>As described, there are several di erent choices of
propagating distrust among web pages, we rst use the method
shown in Equation 5.</p>
        <p>We randomly select 200 spam sites from the 3; 589 labeled
spam sites as the distrusted seed set to calculate distrust
score. Then we calculate the sum of this distrust score and
the trust score generated by TrustRank. By using the sum
for ranking, we count the number of spam sites (m) in the
top ten buckets as in the case of previous experiments.</p>
        <p>But we can not compare the above number m directly with
the results shown in Table 1. The reason is that some top
ranked spam sites may have been selected in the distrusted
seed and they will get demoted as an e ect of their selection,
not as an e ect of our algorithm. Thus, in order to be fair,
we need to count the number of spam sites (n) that are
in the top ten buckets by TrustRank which are also in the
distrusted seed set. Only when the sum of m and n is smaller
than 58, which is listed in Table 1, we can claim that the
performance is better than that of TrustRank.</p>
        <p>Also the random selection of distrusted seeds may still
not be representative of the 3; 589 spam sites. In order to
neutralize this bias, we repeated the above seed selection
ve times for calculating distrust scores. Then we use the
average results as the nal results for the distrusted seed set
with 200 seeds. On average, there are 54 spam sites still in
the top ten buckets and 4 spam sites are in the distrusted
seed set. The sum of 54 and 4 equals the number of spam
sites, which is 58, in top ten TrustRank buckets; this shows
that using TrustRank's mechanism (Equation 5) to
propagate distrust is not helpful in demoting top ranked spam
sites.</p>
        <p>In order to verify whether introducing more distrusted
seeds with this basic distrust propagation is useful, we
generated distrusted seed sets of sizes ranging from 200 to 1; 000.
Similarly, for each seed set size, we repeated this generation
ve times. The average results are shown in Table 4. The
results show that no matter how many seeds are selected
for the distrusted seed set, the sum of the second element
and third element in Table 4 is always around 60. Since this
sum is quite close to the 58 spam sites in Table 1, we believe
that using the same mechanism as TrustRank to propagate
distrust can not help to demote top ranked spam sites.
7.3.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-16-2">
        <title>Different Choices of Propagating Distrust</title>
        <p>Since we have shown that propagating distrust by using
the TrustRank mechanism may not be helpful, the next
obvious step is to investigate whether the choices of propagating
trust can also be applied for propagating distrust in order
to demote top ranked spam sites.</p>
        <p>Similar to the methods used for generating results in
Table 2, we applied the six combinations of di erent choices
for the splitting step and accumulation steps to the
propagation of distrust. In order to evaluate the performance, for
each combination, we calculate the sum of the distrust value
and TrustRank value for each site. Then this sum is used
for ranking. Since the TrustRank value is unchanged for
Number of
seeds
200
400
600
800
1000</p>
        <p>No. of Spam sites No. of Spam
in top 10 buckets sites in seed set
54 4
55 5
49 12
48 13
45 16
each di erent combination, we can see how di erent choices
of propagating distrust can a ect the overall performance
and thus we can tell which choice is better for propagating
distrust. For simplicity, we only choose 200 spam sites to
generate the distrusted seed set once. Results of six di erent
combinations with di erent d values are shown in Table 3.</p>
        <p>From the results in Table 3, we can see that some choices
can help to demote more spam sites than others. For
example, the combination of \Logarithm Splitting" and
\Maximum Share" with d set to 0:7 or 0:9.
7.4</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-17">
      <title>Combining Trust and Distrust Values</title>
      <p>In the above experiments, we use the sum of the trust and
distrust values as the nal value for ranking. As discussed
in Section 5, we may use di erent weights to combine trust
and distrust values.</p>
      <p>In practice, we did the following experiment to show how
the combination of trust and distrust values can a ect
performance.</p>
      <p>To calculate trust score, we select the choice that can
generate best performance in Table 2, i.e., using
\Maximum Share" for accumulation and \Logarithm
Splitting" for splitting while with d set to 0:3.</p>
      <p>To calculate distrust score, we select the choice that
can generate best performance in Table 3, i.e., using
\Maximum Share" for accumulation and \Logarithm
Splitting" for splitting with dD set to 0:9.</p>
      <p>For combining trust and distrust values, we follow the
Equation 7, with equals 1 . Test with di erent
values of .</p>
      <p>We test with di erent numbers of distrusted seeds.</p>
      <p>The results for these experiments are shown in Figure 4.
There are three lines in the gure. Each represents the
results by using 200, 400, 600 spam sites as distrusted seed
respectively. From these results, we can tell that an increase
in the size of the distrusted seed set will result in an increase
in performance.</p>
      <p>Compared with the baseline results in Figure 1, more than
80% of spam sites disappear from the top ten buckets. This
veri es our hypothesis that using di erent trust
propagation methods together with distrust propagation can help
to demote spam sites e ectively.</p>
      <p>Actually, the results in Figure 4 are not our best results.
During our experiments, we nd that by using \Constant
Splitting" and \Maximum Parent" for trust propagation,
\Logarithm Splitting" and \Maximum Share" for distrust
propagation with d, dD and as 0:1, we can remove all the
spam sites from the top ten buckets. We believe that there
may be several other combinations that generate optimal
results. However, due to resource constraints, we have not
enumerated every such combination.
7.5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-18">
      <title>Impact of Trust Propagation</title>
      <p>Since the trust or distrust scores are propagated from
limited number of seed pages, it is quite possible that only a
part of the whole web graph can be touched by this
propagation. In other words, some pages will have zero values
after the algorithm is employed. We are not in a position
to make trust judgments with regard to these pages. It is
highly desirable to have a well performing algorithm that
with a limited seed set enables us to make trust judgments
about a large fraction of web pages.</p>
      <p>Intuitively, di erent values for in Equation 3 or d in
\Constant Splitting" and \Logarithm Splitting" will
determine how far trust and distrust are propagated. In
TrustRank, smaller means that more trust will be
propagated to children pages in each iteration; thus more pages
may have nonzero value after 20 iterations. In order to show
this, for the same experiment shown in Figure 3, we check
what percentage of sites have nonzero values according to
di erent values of . The results are shown in Table 6.</p>
      <p>If more sites have nonzero values by using di erent
choices, then we can claim that the trust scores are
propagated further by these choices. Since the results obtained
by using \Maximum Share" and \Maximum Parent" in
Table 2 are better than TrustRank, we check the percentage of
pages with nonzero values for these choices. The results are
shown in Table 5.</p>
      <p>The results in Table 5 show larger numbers when
compared to the results in Table 6. This demonstrates that
our choices can a ect more pages as well as generate better
performance in the demotion of top ranking spam sites.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-19">
      <title>DISCUSSION</title>
      <p>In this paper, we investigate the possibility of using
different choices to propagate trust and distrust for ranking
Web pages or sites. We only focus on the demotion of spam
sites. In the future, we intend to study how the propagation
of trust or distrust can help raise high quality sites in the
ranking positions.</p>
      <p>We show that mechanisms such as \Logarithm Splitting"
or \Maximum Share" for propagating trust and distrust can
do better than TrustRank in demoting top ranked spam
sites. We intend to explore other choices that can help
improve the performance.</p>
      <p>In our paper, we combine trust and distrust scores only
at the nal step. It is possible that this combination can be
done during the calculation of trust and distrust scores. We
aim to study the di erent choices that may be taken into
this combination.</p>
      <p>Ranking algorithms such as PageRank are used by
several popular search engines for ranking Web pages to given
queries. The concept of authority and trustworthiness are
not identical|PageRank gives an authority value for each
page, while propagating trust from seed sets tells how
trustworthy a page on the web is as a source of ranking
information. In this paper we have only explored the value of trust
propagation for spam demotion; ultimately the goal,
however, is to improve the quality of search results. We plan to
investigate combinations of trust and distrust with
authority to measure the e ect on search results ranking (quality
of results).</p>
      <p>
        All of our experiments are based on the search.ch data
set. This data set may have special characteristics di erent
from the whole web. We need to test the ideas presented
here on a larger data set, such as the WebBase [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ] data set,
in the future.
9.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-20">
      <title>CONCLUSION</title>
      <p>In this paper, we show that propagating trust based on
the number of outgoing links is not optimal in demoting top
ranked spam sites. Instead, we demonstrate that using
different choices such as \Constant Splitting" or \Logarithm
Splitting" in the splitting step and \Maximum Share" or
\Maximum Parent" in the accumulation step for
propagating trust can help to demote top ranked spam sites as well
as increase the range of trust propagation.</p>
      <p>Additionally, by introducing the concept of propagating
distrust among Web pages or sites, we show that the
performance of demoting top ranked spam sites can be further
improved.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-21">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This work was supported in part by the National Science
Foundation under award IIS-0328825. We are grateful to
Urban Muller for helpful discussions and for providing access
to the search.ch dataset.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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