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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Context-aware Trust Evaluation Functions for Dynamic Reconfigurable Systems</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Santtu Toivonen</string-name>
          <email>santtu.toivonen@vtt</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Gabriele Lenzini</string-name>
          <email>gabriele.lenzini@telin.nl</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ilkka Uusitalo</string-name>
          <email>ilkka.uusitalo@vtt</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Telematica Instituut</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>P.O.Box 589, 7500 AN, Enschede</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="NL">The Netherlands</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>VTT Technical Research, Centre of Finland</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>P.O.Box 1000, FIN-02044 VTT</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="FI">Finland</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>VTT Technical Research, Centre of Finland</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>P.O.Box 1100, FIN-90571 Oulu</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="FI">Finland</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2006</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>22</fpage>
      <lpage>26</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>We acknowledge the fact that situational details can have impact on the trust that a Trustor assigns to some Trustee. Motivated by that, we discuss and formalize functions for determining context-aware trust. A system implementing such functions takes into account the Trustee's profile realized by what we call quality attributes. Furthermore, the system is aware of some context attributes characterizing additional aspects of the Trustee, of the Trustor, and of the environment around them. These attributes can also have impact on trustor's trust formation process. The trust functions are concretized with running examples throughout the paper.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>
        Context influences the behavior of an agent on multiple
levels. Generally, context is any information
characterizing the situation of an entity. An entity, in turn, can be a
person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the
interaction between a user and an application, including the
user and the application themselves [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. Context-awareness
has been recognized in many research areas of information
technology, such as information filtering and retrieval [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
        ],
service provisioning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24 ref36">24, 36</xref>
        ] and communication [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref26">26, 11</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Trust is another emerging research subject. Trust is a
fundamental factor in human relationships enabling
collaboration and cooperation to take place. In Computer
Science, Trust Management [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] studies how to establish and
to maintain trust relationships among distributed software
components such as software agents and web services, and
also between users and software components. Trust
management is also a way to enhance security and trustworthiness.
As such it has been applied for example in the domains of
Semantic Web [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
        ], in Global Computing [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], and in Ad Hoc
Networks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        However, the relationship between context and trust has
not received very much attention, apart from some
occasional work, such as the ones reported in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28 ref33">28, 33</xref>
        ]. This is
unfortunate, since such relationship can easily be recognized
and its existence justified. The work reported in this paper
delves into that topic.
      </p>
      <p>At an abstract level, trust formation can be described with
mathematical functions, which take some phenomena as
input, and provide a level of trustworthiness as an output. We
formalize such functions by putting emphasis especially on
the context attributes. More specifically, the “traditional”
aspects influencing trust formation, for example reputation
and recommendations, are complemented with contextual
information. In addition, we concretize the functions via
examples.</p>
      <p>The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
summarizes some of the relevant related work. Section 3
introduces the operational framework where trust is
evaluated and proposes a distinction between quality attributes
and context attributes based on the trust scope.
Additionally, Section 3 illustrates the role of context in the trust
evaluation process. Section 4 presents the details of the
context-aware trust evaluation function. Moreover, it shows
how context information can be used to select, among a set
of past experiences and a set of recommendations, those that
are relevant with regard to the current context. Section 5
exemplifies the use of context in trust evaluation process
through an example. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper
and Section 7 points out some of our future work.
2.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>RELATED WORK</title>
      <p>
        Trust plays a role across many disciplines, including
sociology, psychology, economics, political science, history,
philosophy, and recently also computer science [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. For
example, Grandison and Sloman discuss properties of varying
definitions of trust for Internet applications, and present
different trust models dealing with them [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. They also
summarize some well-known trust management tools, such as
PolicyMaker [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], KeyNote [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] and REFEREE [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. Most of
these tools are based on the proposal of Blaze et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], who
first coined the term trust management.
      </p>
      <p>
        Recent approaches to trust management are able to deal
with incomplete knowledge and uncertainty (see for
example the surveys reported in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref13 ref17 ref29">12, 13, 17, 29</xref>
        ]). Acknowledging
uncertainty is particularly suitable when applied to a
global computing environment. The trust evaluation functions
we study in this paper are part of this global computing
approach to trust management. However, unlike other
approaches, such as those reported in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref15 ref17 ref19 ref2 ref20">1, 2, 15, 17, 19, 20</xref>
        ],
we do not develop any new algorithms for trust evaluation.
Instead, we investigate strategies for enriching traditional
trust evaluation functions with the possibility of analyzing
contextual information.
      </p>
      <p>
        We acknowledge several (trust) relationships when
studying the context-dependent trustworthiness of a trustee.
Therefore, we suggest a solution for using context data to
improve the traditional trust establishment, for example when
asking for the trustee’s reputation. This extends for
example the approach reported in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28">28</xref>
        ], in which the trustors
are mainly (human) users of some system, and the
context typically taken into account is the location/proximity of
other users. It also goes beyond [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], where the kind of trust
recognized as context-dependent only has to do with roles
of human beings (for example, having a different degree of
trust to someone acting as a doctor than acting as a car
mechanic).
      </p>
      <p>
        Inspired by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], we integrate trust evaluation into a wider
model where both the relationships and the quality
attributes contribute to the evaluation of the composite
trustworthiness. Our reputation-based mechanism is intentionally
left at the level of templates; various specific computational
techniques can be plugged in it. Examples are those using
semirings [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref32">32</xref>
        ], linear functions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref35">35</xref>
        ], belief combination
functions over paths in the Semantic Web [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">27</xref>
        ], and reputations
as described in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref22">22, 16</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ], the authors develop a framework to facilitate
service selection in the semantic grid by considering reputation
information. In the service interrogation phase, users
evaluate the reputation of particular services with regard to a
certain aggregation of qualities (called context in the
paper), to choose a service that meets with their perceptual
requirements. In this paper, context is used to refine the
trust evaluation process of the qualities of the trustee.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>OPERATIONAL SCENARIO OF TRUST</title>
      <p>Definition 1. Trustor is the entity that calculates the
trustworthiness. Trustee is the entity whose trustworthiness
is calculated. Trustworthiness is modeled with a trust
value. Trust value expresses the subjective degree to which the
Trustor has a justifiable belief that the Trustee will comply
the trust scope.</p>
      <p>To evaluate the Trustee’s trustworthiness for a certain
trust scope, the Trustor analyzes two different kinds of
input: quality attributes and context attributes.</p>
      <p>
        Quality attributes represent the essential data
characterizing the Trustee. Without quality attributes, a Trustor has
no a priori knowledge of the object of trust, and cannot
start any trustworthiness determination on rational basis.
The only possible decisions in this case are to trust
blindly, that is, to adopt an optimistic approach, or to distrust,
which means adopting a pessimistic approach [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Context attributes represent contextual information that
the Trustor may require in addition to the quality attributes,
in order to complete the evaluation of the Trustee’s
trustworthiness. Context attributes may or may not be available
at the moment of trustworthiness evaluation. Their absence
does not prevent the trustworthiness evaluation process, but
Q
quality
attributes
environment
trustor</p>
      <p>C
context
attributes
trustee
Legend
“used by”
“describes”
can nevertheless affect the result. For example, depending
on the scenario, context may express some relevant
property characterizing the Trustor, and its impact on the trust
evaluation may strongly affect the preliminary result that
comes out from the analysis of the quality attributes.</p>
      <p>
        The division of one set of attributes into quality and
context attributes varies case by case. In this paper, we use
the notion of trust scope [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] to deal with the changes
affecting this distinction. For instance, suppose that the scope to
evaluate a network component is to establish its
trustworthiness when it is used in a networked game application. Here,
the feature of providing encrypted communication is
something that can be understood in connection to the context.
Instead, if the same component is judged for
trustworthiness when used in a payment application, security features
such as encryption are best thought of in connection to the
quality attributes.
      </p>
      <p>To conclude this section, we introduce one example of
context-depended trust scenarios. It will be used later on in
the paper when some concepts need to be concretized and
discussed.</p>
      <p>Example 1 (Messaging). 1
Alice receives an SMS with the content “We have just won
one million euros at the bingo. Cheers Bob”. The Trustor
is Alice and the Trustee is the message’s content.</p>
      <p>If the trust scope is to determine the creator/sender of the
message (for example, “Is that really Bob who cheers me?”),
quality attributes can be the message header (that includes
the phone number from where the message originated), and
perhaps the network which delivered the message. Context
attributes can be the location of the sender, the location of
the receiver, the fact that Alice has bought a lottery ticket
in the past, the knowledge (say, from local news) that there
has been a winner in the bingo, the reputation of the sender
(“he likes making jokes” versus “he never makes jokes”).</p>
      <p>
        Instead, if the trust scope is to trust the message content as
authentic (“Did we really win?”), quality attributes are the
1A more extensive version of this example appeared in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref33">33</xref>
        ].
message header, the network which delivered the message,
the fact that Alice has bought a lottery ticket, the
reputation of the sender. Context attributes can be the location of
the sender, the location of the receiver, the knowledge that
there has been a winner in the bingo. Note that this last
attribute has can change significantly Alice’s judgement, but
the absence of this piece of information does not disrupt the
trustworthiness evaluation process.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>CONTEXT-AWARE TRUST</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>EVALUATION</title>
      <p>This section gives a mathematical characterization of the
concepts for quality attributes and context attributes
illustrated in Figure 1. Moreover, this section characterizes the
mathematical structure of a context-aware trust evaluation
function in terms of relevant data domains.
4.1</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Quality Attributes and Context Attributes</title>
      <p>Let us consider the example scenario of trust described
in Example 1. Let Attributes represent the information
that is potentially involved in this instance of the
scenario of trust. Attributes contains all the potential message
headers (here only phone numbers), network names,
localities, and reputation information about the sender of the
message.</p>
      <p>Formally, Attributes is a set of typed and structured data
over a signature Σ(I) = A1 × . . . × An, where Ak are types
and I = ha1, . . . , ani is an array of type names. Ak’s can be
atomic or composed, and are not necessarily distinct.</p>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>Example 2 (Messaging continued).</title>
        <p>The set of all potential data in our messaging example are
described as follows:
Σ(I) = number×name×location×location×string×bool×bool</p>
        <p>As anticipated in Section 3, within an instance of the
scenario of trust and in dependence on the trust scope σ,
we can identify two different sets of disjunct sub-tuples in
Attributes:
• the set Quality of all quality attributes, defined as the
set of data over the signature Σ(M(σ)), where M (σ) is
a sub-tuple of I (written M (σ) v I ).
• the set Context of all context attributes, defined as
the set of all data whose signature is Σ(I−M(σ)). Here
I − M (σ) is the tuple obtained by orderly removing
the M (σ)’s items from I .</p>
        <p>We assume Attributes = Quality × Context, without loss
of generality.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-2">
        <title>Example 3 (Messaging continued).</title>
        <p>The division into sub-tuples for quality attributes and
context attributes depends on the trust scope σ. In reference to
Example 1, if the trust scope of Alice is to evaluate the
trustworthiness of the message as authentic from Bob, quality
attributes are the message headers and the network names.
Formally:</p>
        <p>I w M(σ) = hheader, networki
ΣM(σ) = number×name
Quality =
h+390586, TrustFonei,
h+316453, MalisFonei,
. . .</p>
        <p>The remaining attributes define the context:
Σ(I−M(σ)) = location×location×string×bool×bool
I w I − M(σ) =
Context =
sender location, receiv location, reputation,
bought ticket, winner inthe news
hLondon, NY , “hates jokes”, false, truei,
hNY , Dublin, “likes jokes”, true, truei,
. . .
4.2</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Trust Evaluation Function</title>
      <p>This section describes the structure for the proposed trust
evaluation function, taking into account contextual data.
We also present a partial implementation, although the
generality of our functions allows different implementations as
well.
4.2.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-7-1">
        <title>Trust Values</title>
        <p>
          According to Definition 1, trustworthiness is modeled with
a value, called trust value, which is the final result of a
trustworthiness evaluation process. A trust value can be used,
in interaction with a risk analysis, to take a decision in the
case of uncertainty [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
          ]. In the literature there exist
various implementations for trust values. For example in the
Subjective logic theory [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17 ref18">17, 18, 16</xref>
          ] a trust value is a triple
(b, d, u) where b, d, u ∈ [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ] and b + d + u = 1; they
represent an opinion in terms of amount of belief, disbelief, and
uncertainty, respectively.
        </p>
        <p>
          In this paper, we assume a trust value to be a real number
in the interval [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ]. In this case, a trust value is interpreted
as a measure of trust: the values 0 and 1 stand for
complete distrust and complete trust, respectively. This choice
simplifies the exposition of our strategies for trust
evaluation, but we claim that our strategy can be adapted to other
models for trust values such as that of the Subjective logic.
4.2.2
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-2">
        <title>Basic Trust Evaluation Function</title>
        <p>
          This section describes the basic version of our
contextaware trust evaluation function. Later, we show how to
cope with reputation and recommendations, which are
generally useful capabilities in trust evaluation, context-aware
or not. The basic function for context-aware trust
evaluation is defined by the following function from attributes to
trust values:
ctrustS,σ : Quality × Context → [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ]
(1)
Here S is the Trustor, and σ is the trust scope. In this way
we underline that a trust evaluation function is subjective
to the trustor (see also [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref14">13, 14</xref>
          ]) and that it depends on the
trust scope. Moreover, ctrustS,σ is defined over the data set
Attributes which, as said in Section 4.1, is split into
quality attributes (Quality) and context attributes (Context)
depending on the trust scope σ.
        </p>
        <p>We propose the whole trust evaluation process to be
divided into two stages:
• the first stage is any traditional trust determination
process;
• the second stage analyzes contextual information to
adjust the output of the first stage.</p>
        <p>Formally, we propose that the trust function in (1) has the
following shape:</p>
        <p>
          ctrustS,σ(C, Q) , C ⊗ trustS,σ(Q)
The first stage is depicted by the function trustS,σ(Q).
This function can be one of the existing procedures
coping with trust evaluation, for example the ones specialized
for recommendation-based trust management (see for
example [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref22">17, 22</xref>
          ]). trustS,σ(Q), when given an array of quality
attributes only, returns a trust value.
        </p>
        <p>The second stage is depicted by the operator ⊗. This
operator iteratively adjusts the trust value provided at the
first stage by evaluating piece of context in the array C of
context attributes. To construct the “adjusting operator”
⊗ we first define, for each data type name ak, the following
entities:
• pk : Ak → bool, a predicate that expresses some
relevant properties over values of type Ak (of name ak.
• wk ∈ Weights, a numerical weighting wk that
expresses the impact of the context attributes of type name
ak in process of refinement.</p>
        <p>Here, a predicate p will be used to determine whether
certain context value c has a positive (true) or negative
(false) influence on the trust tuning/adjusting.</p>
        <p>Set Weights represents the set of possible weightings. We
assume (Weights, &gt;) to be a totally ordered set, with w0
its minimum element. Weightings are used to increase or
decrease the impact of context data during the process of
adjusting. The larger2 the weight, the larger will the tuning
effect be. Note that if the weight is large the adjustment
can be quite significant: this reflects situation in which that
context data (for example the Trustor’s location) is
considered (by the Trustor) to effect strongly a preliminary trust
evaluation based on Trustee’s quality attributes only.</p>
        <p>The minimum w0, is devoted to represent the “I do not
care” weighting, that is, context attributes of weight w0 will
not have any impact in the process of refinement.</p>
        <p>
          In addition we define two functions
inc : Weights → ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ] → [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ])
dec : Weights → ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ] → [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ])
(2)
(3)
for the positive and the negative adjustment of a trust
value v, depending on a certain weight w.
        </p>
        <p>
          Note 1. Chosen a weighting w ∈ Weights, incw and
decw are the functions of type [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ] → [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ] that given a
trust value v return an adjusted (respectively incremented,
decremented with regard to the weighting w) trust value v0.
        </p>
        <p>Definition 2. inc, and dec are said well behaving
defining functions if in their own domain:
2When talking about Weights, any reference to terms that
involve a concept of ordering must be intended with regard
to the relation &gt;.
1. For any w 6= w0, incw(v) &gt; v and decw(v) &lt; v, for all
v ∈ ]0, 1[, that is, they represent positive and negative
adjustment as expected.
2. incw0 (v) = decw0 (v) = v, that is, weighting w0 has
no impact in the adjustment.
3. When w &gt; w0, incw(v) &gt; incw0 (v) and decw(v) &lt;
decw0 (v) for all v ∈]0, 1[, that is, the larger the
weighting the more the result of the adjustment.</p>
        <p>
          Note 2. In items 1. and 3., the exclusion of the points
v = 0, 1 is due to two main motivations. The first,
obvious, is that we cannot go beyond [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ] when decreasing and
increasing. In other words, incw(1) = 1 and decw(0) = 0.
The latter, concerns the possibility of having incw(0) ≥ 0
and decw(1) ≤ 1; here, because 0 and 1 express complete
(dogmatic) belief and complete disbelief, we make the
restriction that no change in context can have effect in the trust
evaluation.
        </p>
        <p>Other restrictions over inc and dec may be required (for
example, incw(decw(v)) = decw(incw(v)), the property of
being reciprocally commutative), but here we prefer to
define our adjustment functions in the most general way. More
specific sub-families of the functions can be introduced
caseby-case.</p>
        <p>Although we will provide concrete example of adjustment
functions in the following section, a comprehensive study
over them is beyond the target of this paper and it is left as
future work.</p>
        <p>Given a trust value v, arrays C = hc1, . . . , cmi of context
data, hw1, . . . , wmi of weights, and hp1, . . . , pmi of
predicates, the procedure that implements ⊗ consistently with
certain incw(v) and decw(v) functions is described by
Algorithm 1.</p>
        <p>Algorithm 1 Context Tuning
procedure ⊗(C, v)
for all i ← 1, m do
if pk(ck) then v ← incwk (v)
else v ← decwk (v)
end if
end for
return v
end procedure</p>
        <sec id="sec-7-2-1">
          <title>Example 4.</title>
          <p>An instance of our framework can be specified, for example,
by setting Weights any interval [1, N ] of rational number,
with N a fixed constant. In this case w0 = 1. The following
family of functions are used to calculate the positive and
negative adjustment for a certain weighting w:
Figure 2 depicts the effect of some example weightings. Note,
that inc and dec are well behaving functions according to
Definition 2. Moreover they satisfy the following additional
properties:
4. incw(decw(v)) = v and decw(incw(v)) = v, that is,
they are mutually commutative;
0.8
0.6
5. fw(gw0 (v)) = gw0 (fw(v)) where f, g ∈ {inc, dec}, that
is, their are order-independent with regard to the
context data array.</p>
          <p>Let now suppose to have a trust value t = 0.7, and to analyze
the context attributes (c1; c2) = (2.2; 2.5). The associated
weighting are (w1, w2) = (2; 32 ), while the relative predicates
are p1(c) = p2(c) = (c &gt; 2.4). We apply Algorithm 1 to
calculate (2.2; 2.5) ⊗ 0.7, and we obtain the following trace
of execution:
t0
The analysis of context attributes has changed a trust value
(coming from a first phase) from 0.7 to 0.56.</p>
          <p>Additional example functions are briefly discussed in
Section 7.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-3">
        <title>4.2.3 Context Ontology</title>
        <p>
          In the presence of a context ontology which connects the
context attributes with each other in an appropriate manner,
some reasoning can be made even if assigning the boolean
predicate pk to the context parameter currently under
inspection is not possible. The flexibility enables utilising
context attributes which do not exactly match the query, but
are “close enough” to it [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref31 ref9">31, 9</xref>
          ]. For example, the QoS
properties of a network, over which some software component is
downloaded, can be described in such ontology (cf. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref34">34</xref>
          ]).
        </p>
        <p>
          Suppose that the current network is not pre-evaluated
with regard to its impact on trustworthiness. However, as
its neighbors in the ontology are networks which have
preevaluated trustworthiness values. By using these values as
well as their “semantic distance” to the current network,
the trustworthiness can be estimated. The Object Match
algorithm, outlined in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref31">31</xref>
          ], would calculate this semantic
distance by taking into account the “upwards cotopy”, that
is, the distance between the currently investigated concept
and a root-concept of the ontology.
        </p>
        <p>Wireless</p>
        <p>Wireline</p>
        <p>Network</p>
        <p>Circuit
Switched</p>
        <p>GSM</p>
        <p>G
dec1.1(v)
Packet</p>
        <p>Switched
Bluetooth</p>
        <p>UMTS
B1</p>
        <p>B2
inc/dec?
inc1.2(v)</p>
        <p>U
inc1.5(v)</p>
        <p>Furthermore, the networks are organized in a network
ontology, as depicted in Figure 3. Say that the current
network B1 is a bluetooth network, of which there are no
pre-evaluated trustworthiness values. However, there exist
trustworthiness values of three other networks, which are as
follows:
• B2, a bluetooth network which would entail inc1.2(v),
semantic distance to B1 ≈ 0.67
• U, a UMTS network which would entail inc1.5(v),
semantic distance to B1 ≈ 0.43
• G, a GSM network which would entail dec1.1(v),
semantic distance to B1 = 0.25</p>
        <p>Considering these networks as equal, that is, without
taking into account the semantic distance, would entail
tuning the trust with 1.2 1.√5v1.1 ≈ inc1.64(v). Instead, if the
semantic distance is incorporated, the calculation goes as
follows: 1.2∗0.67 1.5∗0.4√3v(1.1∗0.25) ≈ inc1.89(v). In other
words, the trust is increased more, since the kind of network
causing the decrement (G) is semantically further away from
the current node, and therefore considered less important.
This example showed how considering the semantic distance
can amplify the increment/decrement effect.</p>
        <p>Note that in this example ontology the concepts are
organized based on the properties of a network, such as whether
the network in question is circuit switched or packet
switched. Typically, other details concerning the network, for
example its provider, are more important with regard to trust
evaluation than its implementation details. That is why the
weights assigned for the semantic distance in an ontology
such as the one presented in this section should be relatively
small. In our approach, the trust related to the the network
provider can be considered in terms of reputation and
recommendations, both of which will be considered later on in
the paper.
This section shows how context can be used to
complement traditional aspects influencing trust formation. More
specifically, we consider reputation and recommendations.
Before we can do that, however, we must address the notion
of time-line, since it is needed for coping with the
historydependent nature of these topics.</p>
        <p>We assume a time line for distinguishing between
different instances where we apply the trust evaluation procedure.
We can generally assume that Time is the set of natural
numbers, where 0 ∈ Time is the initial time. With the
concept of time we also implicitly assume that the result of a
trust evaluation process varies over time. Note that such
variation is due to the fact that the input data used by the
trust evaluation function changes over time, while the way
of reasoning about trust does not. In certain scenarios, even
the mechanism of reasoning about trust may change in time,
but dealing with this concept of second order dynamism in
trust is outside the scope in this paper.</p>
        <p>Observation 1. In this case the use of time is part of the
operational semantics we are giving to our trust evaluation
functions. It must not be confused with contextual
information “time” that may be used as an input, that is, as part of
Context.</p>
        <p>If we assume that the trust evaluation happens at time
i, we need to bind the time also with the input that is
used by the evaluation procedure. Then we indicate with
Attributesi the set of data in the instance of a scenario of
trust at evaluation time i</p>
        <p>i</p>
        <p>We indicate with Qσ ∈ Qσ the vector of quality
attributes that are available for the Trustor at time i. Note that
Qσ v Attributesi. We work under the simplified
assumpi
tion that Q0σ = Qiσ, for all i &gt; 0. This means that the
quality attributes do not change along a time line of trust
evaluation, unless the Trustee itself is changed. In a more
general situation the quality attributes may depend on time.
For example, a curriculum vitae of a person may be
updated. This assumption allows us to concentrate on contextual
aspects and problems. However, should there be a need,
some of the techniques here restricted to context attributes,
i
can be applied also to quality attributes. We write Cσ ∈ Cσ
to indicate the state of context at time i.</p>
        <sec id="sec-7-3-1">
          <title>Example 5 (Messaging Continued).</title>
          <p>In reference to Example 1 and in case of trust scope “Is that
really Bob who cheers me?”) quality attributes and context
attributes at a certain time i are represented by the following
tuples:</p>
          <p>h+300586, MalisFone, NY ,
Attributesi = { Dublin, “hates jokes”, true, falsei }
Qiσ = {h+390586, MalisFonei}
Cσi = {hNY , Dublin, “hates jokes”, true, falsei}
(4)
(5)</p>
          <p>As a matter of notation, we indicate with ctrustiS,σ(Q)
the evaluation of trust performed at time i ≥ 0:</p>
          <p>ctrustiS,σ(Q) , ctrustS,σ(Q, Cσi)</p>
          <p>The implementation of this function does not change with
respect to the one given in the previous section. We only
need to bind the evaluation with time i, as follows:
ctrustiS,σ(Q) , Ci ⊗ trustiS,σ(Q)
here trustiS,σ(Q) represents the result of a
context-independent trust evaluation function, applied at time i. Note that
although we have assumed Q to remain constant, trustiS,σ(Q)
may provide different results along the time. For example,
the recommendations may change in the course of time due
to the recommenders’ new experiences of dealing with the
trustee.
4.3.2</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-4">
        <title>Adding Reputations</title>
        <p>
          The next concept we need to consider in trust evaluation
is reputation [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ]. Taking care of the Trustee’s reputation
means that trust evaluation performed at time i &gt; 0 may
be affected by past experiences happened at a previous time
j, 0 ≤ j &lt; i. Reputation introduces a history-dependent
dimension in trust evaluation. We formalize the high-level
definition of ctrustS,σ( , ) history-dependence by
proposing an updated definition of the trust evaluation function,
which accepts a trust value as an additional parameter in
input:
        </p>
        <p>
          ctrustS : Quality × Context × [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ] → [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ]
We trigger the process of trust evaluation at time i &gt; 0 with
the following function call:
        </p>
        <p>
          ctrustiS (Q) , ctrustS(Q, Ci, ri)
where ri is an appropriate reputation value, available at time
i. Here the term “appropriate” means that when we look for
a past experience performed in a context that is compatible
with the one considered at the present time i [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>We formalize compatibility among two context values c, c0
of type ak, written c ∼ c0, as the following binary predicate:
c ∼ c
0
⇐⇒</p>
        <p>pk(c) == pk(c0)
Here == means evaluating as the same, that is, c ∼ c0 if
and only if the predicate pk( ) returns the same value when
applied both to c and c0.</p>
        <p>When dealing with an array of context data, we need to
calculate their “grade of compatibility”, that is, their
closeness in terms of the compatibility function ∼. To this aim
we propose the following function d( ):
d(C, C0) ,
m
i=k</p>
        <p>0
wk · (ck ∼ ck)</p>
        <p>W
where W = km=1 wk. Function (5) measures the weighted
and normalized grade of affinity with regard to the
predicates we have defined over context type, of two array of
context data.</p>
        <p>Our selection of a compatible past experience is based
on the quest for the experience performed in the past time
M , such that the grade of compatibility with the present
context Ci is maximal. In case there exists more than one
past experience with this maximum value, the most recent
one is chosen. Formally, M is such that:
• d(Ci, CM ) = maxik=1{d(Ci, Ck)}</p>
        <p>0 0
• 6 ∃ M &gt; M such that d(Ci, CM ) = d(Ci, CM )
As a conclusion, we are now able to specify the term ri,
of “appropriate” reputation at time i, as the trust
evaluation result of the Trustor S, for scope σ, performed in the
most recent past where the context has maximum degree of
compatibility with the present one. Formally:</p>
        <p>ri = ctrustSM,σ(C)
where M is calculated as explained above.
4.3.3</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-5">
        <title>Adding Recommendations</title>
        <p>The final concept we need to consider in trust evaluation
is recommendation. A recommendation is a kind of
communicated reputation:</p>
        <sec id="sec-7-5-1">
          <title>Definition 3 (Recommendation [29]). A recommen</title>
          <p>dation is an attempt at communicating a party’s reputation
from one community to another. The parties can be for
example human users, devices, software components, or
combinations of these.</p>
          <p>
            Despite the intuitive definition given above, there exists
no consensus on the nature of recommendation. In the
literature there are two different complementary trends: either a
recommendation is or is not a trust value. In the first case,
a recommendation is the trust value assessed by the
recommender about the Trustee. This option is, for instance,
used by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
            ]. A recommender can
say, for instance, “in my opinion, c is totally trustworthy”
without explicitly providing any proof or data supporting
the assessment. In the latter case, a recommendation is any
collection of data except a trust value that the recommender
possesses about the Trustee. For example, a
recommendation can be a log of events describing the recommender’s
experience with the Trustee [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref30">30</xref>
            ].
          </p>
          <p>
            In order to consider the recommendation, the Trustor has
to share with its recommender at least a common vision of
trust. This statement is implicitly included in Definition 3,
where the word “attempt” denotes that the source and
target of a recommendation may be incompatible if they belong
to different communities [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref29">29</xref>
            ].
          </p>
          <p>Note 3. We assume a recommendation to be a trust
value.</p>
          <p>The version of the trust evaluation function that considers
also recommendations is as follows:</p>
          <p>
            ctrustS : Quality × Context × [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
            ] × 2[
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0,1</xref>
            ] → [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
            ]
Here 2[
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0,1</xref>
            ] represents the set of recommendations. We
trigger the process of trust evaluation at time i &gt; 0, with the
following function call:
          </p>
          <p>ctrustiS (Q) , ctrustS(Q, Ci, ri, Ri)
where ri is an appropriate reputation value available at time
i, and where Ri is an appropriate set of recommendations
available at time i. Again, to obtain “appropriate”
reputations, we resort to the context data. Reputations can be
filtered by considering the context compatibility. Let us
assume to have a certain acceptance grade of compatibility we
require in order to consider a reputation to be significant.
Here we can use another set of weights, different from the
weights we considered when tuning trust. From the set of
recommendations R we prune out those which cannot reach
the required grade of compatibility.</p>
          <p>Let us assume R = {(ru, Cu)| u ∈ S} to be the set of
recommendations from a set R of recommenders. Each
recommendation (r, C) carries the context C it relates to.
The appropriate set of recommendations we consider in our
trustS,σ is the filtered set Ri = {(r0, C0) ∈ R| d(C0, Ci) &gt;
T }, where T represents a compatibility threshold decided by
the Trustor. Note that here we are not interested in coping
with the set of recommendations and reputations according
to the trust management practice, because this problem is
assumed to be solved by the function trustS,σ we use in the
first stage of the evaluation.
5.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>EXAMPLE</title>
      <p>A game application running on a gaming device is
composed by a game manager component (GM) and by one
game scenario component (GS). Figure 4 depicts the
scenario of a game application composed of these two components.
A new game may be composed by downloading new
components. Game managers and game scenarios are available
on the Internet and they are supplied by different software
providers on their Web sites.</p>
      <p>Before downloading and installing a new component, the
game application checks the hardware and software
characteristics of the new game, to evaluate whether the new
composition is trustworthy enough or not when running on
the current device. This evaluation can include considering
both the quality attributes, and the contextual information
describing the current situation. It might be the case that
the new component is available by different providers or by
different mirror sites of one provider. These sites can have
varying context attributes such as the current availability.
In addition, the sites can have different versions of the
needed component(s), which have impact on the interoperability:
For example, the GS Dungeon v103 presupposes GM v112 or
higher, whereas GS Dungeon v102 can manage with GM v070
or higher. Furthermore, the different component
versions can have varying requirements on the device hard- and
software.</p>
      <p>We now further concretize the running example by
assigning actual values to the context attributes appearing in it.
More specifically, we extract two trust scopes (σ1 and σ2)
for the user/trustor (S). The scopes differ with regard to
context. σ1 has the user on the bus, having access only to
a heavily loaded wireless network, and using a small device
with limited capabilities (both estimated and actual). σ2,
in contrast, has the user at home, having a broadband
access to the Internet, and using a PC with lots of available
memory and CPU time.</p>
      <p>Furthermore, there are two versions of the Game
Scenario components available. Both versions perform the same
functionalities and are in that sense applicable in both trust
scopes. However, they differ in respects that can be
significant in terms of the trust scopes σ1 and σ2. Suppose that
Game Scenario component version A is large in size, requires
ctx
trusts
ctx
composes</p>
      <p>provided by
ctx</p>
      <p>ctx
interdependencies
composes
ctx
ctx
provided by
Quality
Attributes
Context
Attributes</p>
      <p>Player / Game
Application</p>
      <p>trustor
- device profile
- user profile
- ?</p>
      <p>Composition
a lot of memory and CPU time, its provider has a good
reputation based on S’s past experience, and the provider is also
recommended by a good friend of S. Component version B,
in turn, is small in size, requires little memory and CPU.
However, its provider is unknown to S and therefore has no
reputation history nor recommendations available to S. Say
that the initial trust values for the respective components
are tA : 0.6 and tB : 0.5 (tA is a little higher, because A’s
provider is known by S to have a good reputation and is
also recommended to S).</p>
      <p>Based on the trust scopes σ1 and σ2, S’s device can
perform the following context-aware trust calculations to the
available component versions. In the following we use the
definition of inc and dec given in Example 4:
• Trust scope σ1
• Trust scope σ2
– Game Scenario component version A
∗ Large in size: dec2(t)
∗ Requires a lot of memory: dec1.5(t)
∗ Requires a lot of CPU time: dec1.5(t)
∗ Good reputation: inc1.25(t)
∗ Recommended by a friend: inc1.25(t)
– Game Scenario component version B
∗ Small in size: inc2(t)
∗ Requires little memory: inc1.5(t)
∗ Requires little CPU time: inc1.5(t)
– Game Scenario component version A
∗ Large in size: dec1.1(t)
∗ Requires a lot of memory: dec1.1(t)
∗ Requires a lot of CPU time: dec1.1(t)
∗ Good reputation: inc1.5(t)
∗ Recommended by a friend: inc1.5(t)
– Game Scenario component version B
∗ Small in size: inc1.1(t)
∗ Requires little memory: inc1.1(t)
∗ Requires little CPU time: inc1.1(t)</p>
      <p>Based on this information, we can calculate the
contextaware trust value. First, for trust scope σ1 and software
version A, we can calculate according to the following steps,
starting from trust value t0, which is 0.6:</p>
      <p>So the final value for Game Scenario component A is 0.23.
In the same way, component version B in trust scope σ1
receives the value 0.89. In trust scope σ2, instead, A receives
the value 0.74 and B the value 0.59. In other words, in trust
scope σ1 the component version B is valued over component
version A, because it better fits the contextual requirements.
In scope σ2, the valuations for the components are closer to
each other, but this time the component version A is valued
over B.</p>
      <p>
        This example clearly verifies the hypothesis presented
earlier, namely that the weights assigned to the context
attributes should be quite small. Here the smallest value
assigned for w was 1.1 and the largest 2, and still the
trustworthiness values varied between 0.23 and 0.89, therefore
consuming a large portion of the scale [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0,1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Another way to draw a line between trust scopes would
be to consider the game scenario in one scope, and the
whole composite game in another. This way the following
situations could be extracted:
Trust scope focusing on the game scenario: The game
application is interested in evaluating the trustworthiness of
a single piece of software representing the new game
scenario. Quality attributes are the names of the component
and the provider, version of the component, reputation of
the software provider, recommendations from friends on the
provider. Context attributes are the actual size of the
component being downloaded, the current download speed of the
site from where the software is downloaded, the throughput
of the network over which the software is going to be
downloaded, and the also the hardware characteristics of the game
device (its available RAM memory, and the current CPU
load).</p>
      <p>Trust scope focusing on the composite game: The game
application is evaluating the trustworthiness of the composite
game as a whole. Quality attributes are all the quality
attributes of the components participating in the composition,
as well as their providers’ quality attributes. In addition, the
estimated average CPU and memory usage of GS and GM
together and the interdependencies between the versions of
the GS and GM components are considered as quality
attributes in this example. Context attributes, in turn, are
the actual size and resource (CPU and memory)
consumption of the downloaded and composed components, and the
current hardware characteristics of the game device.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>CONCLUSIONS</title>
      <p>Situational details can have impact on how trustworthy a
trustor considers the trustee. These situational details can
characterize the trustor, the trustee, and the environment
around them. Inspired by this observation, we described
and formalized functions for context-aware trustworthiness
evaluation. Such functions take into account the individual
context attributes, and assign them with values influencing
the trustworthiness evaluation process. Depending on the
importance of a given context attribute, determined by what
we call a trust scope, weights can be applied to amplify or
weaken the influence.</p>
      <p>Trustee’s reputation, that is, the trustor’s past
observations of the trustee, can further impact the trustworthiness
evaluation. We apply the notion of context also to the
reputations by emphasizing more the observations that have
taken place under similar conditions as where the trustor
currently is. Finally, the trustworthiness evaluation can
include recommendations from others. There are two
relationships between recommendations and context. First, as
was the case with reputation, the contextual details at the
time when the recommendation was made can be considered
and compared with the trustor’s current context. Note that
considering this is not as straightforward as was the case
with reputation, since recommendations come from others,
not from the trustor. Secondly, the recommendation content
can be context-dependent.</p>
      <p>We concretized our formalizations with an example
concerning a game application, which is composed out of
downloaded components.
7.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>FUTURE WORK</title>
      <p>Our future work includes further refining the trust
functions, as well as testing them with real applications. We
now present some initial ideas for additional examples of
adjusting functions. The first example is an extension of
Example 4. We use the same class of functions to define
different increment decrement adjustments. The alternative
definitions for the positive and the negative adjustment for
a weighting w ∈ [1, N ] are defined as follows:
inc and dec are well behaving according to Definition 2;
moreover, they enjoy the same properties 4. and 5. stated
in Example 4.</p>
      <p>
        Another example of families of adjusting functions comes
from considering a beams of functions generated by one
single “kind” of curve. In this case the weightings are used as
amplification/de-amplification factors. For example, if we
choose Weights = [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
        ] a simple example is given as follows:
decw(v) , v + w
incw(v) , v − w
restricted on [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
        ]. Figure 5(A) gives a graphical
representation of them.
      </p>
      <p>
        If we choose w ∈ Weights = [0, √2], another family of
functions can be defined as follows:
restricted on the [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
        ]. Here R π4 is the rotation matrix,
and v0 is the value corresponding to v in the non-rotated
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
coordinated system. Figure 5 (B) shows the graphic of these
functions.
      </p>
      <p>We envisage that working with running examples helps us
to extract the truly relevant context attributes, as well as
give us guidelines on the weights to be assigned to them. In
addition, visualizing the trustworthiness evaluation from the
end user’s perspective should receive some attention. The
user should be aware of the characteristics and interrelations
of the factors which compose the trustworthiness.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</title>
      <p>The authors have been supported by the European ITEA
project Trust4All. The authors would like to thank the
anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions that brought
to an improvement of the paper. S. Toivonen thanks H.
Helin for his comments on the context ontology. G. Lenzini
thanks A. Tokmakoff for his comments on the whole paper,
and I. De la Fuente for her hints on alternative functions.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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