<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Is there a place for Machine Learning in Law?</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Stephan Ralescu CETANA</string-name>
          <email>Anca.Ralescu@uc.edu</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>LLC ralescu@gmail.com</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Anca Ralescu Senior Member IEEE EECS Department, machine learning 0030 University of Cincinnati Cincinnati</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>OH 45221</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2017</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>29</fpage>
      <lpage>32</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Research in artificial intelligence and law goes back approximately 40 years. It remains largely based on formal logic, including non-monotonic logic, case-based reasoning, and logic programming. However, some researchers in and practitioners of law have argued in favor of quantitative approaches (e.g. probability) to account for uncertainties in legal arguments. Other researchers have pointed some of the shortcomings of the current artificial intelligence and law research, e.g. inability to take context into account. At the same time, machine learning has made huge inroads in many different fields and applications, and therefore, the question is whether machine learning has anything to offer to the theory, and, equally important, the practice of law. As a position paper, this is a preliminary study towards the exploration of a synergistic integration of current artificial intelligence approaches in law, with machine learning approaches. It puts forward the idea that formal, logic-based approaches, currently very popular the Artificial Intelligence &amp; Law research, could benefit from an extension with a machine learning component, and discusses some ways in which machine learning could be integrated into these approaches.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>When it comes to machine learning and law, there are
two, quite unrelated, directions of study. On one hand,
researchers are interested in legal issues raised by the
research in machine learnig. For example, the symposium
Machine Learning and the Law, held in conjunction with
NIPS-20161, had as goal to ”explore the key themes of
privacy, liability, transparency and fairness specifically as they
relate to the legal treatment and regulation of algorithms
and data. On the other hand, the second direction is that of
actually use of machine learning in law research and
practice.</p>
      <p>Stimulated on one hand, by progresses, as well as by
shortcomings of artificial intelligence approaches in law (as
perceived by various researchers), and on the other hand, by
the tremendous recent machine learning succeses in many
different directions (not including law), this paper suggests
that there is scope for using machine learning in law, and
1Annual meeting of the Neural Information Processing Society
moreover, that a formal treatment may be used towards this
end.</p>
      <p>
        The paper is inspired by work on logic-based
formalization of legal reasoning,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">(Prakken and Sartor 1996)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Prakken
and Sartor 1997)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">(Prakken and Sartor 1998)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref9">(Prakken and
Sartor 2002)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref9">(Sartor 2002)</xref>
        , as well as by ideas from
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">(Tillers
2011)</xref>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Tillers 1993)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Franklin 2012)</xref>
        making the case for
continuous mathematics tools (probability, mathematical
evidence, fuzzy sets and logic), and the promise2 that machine
learning holds for law. An example of a predictive system
can be found in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">(Campbell et al. 2016)</xref>
        , for the restricted area
of patent law.
      </p>
      <p>
        As in many areas of research, ranging from science,
engineering, medicine, and social sciences including the
legal field, artificial intelligence has brought about
possibilities, which excited some, intrigued others. Pioneering work
done by Edwina Rissland and her students and
collaborators,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(Rissland and Skalak 1991)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">(Skalak and Rissland
1992)</xref>
        , and Hafner and Berman
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">(Hafner 1978)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">(Berman and
Hafner 1993)</xref>
        has gone a long way towards understanding
the promise and challenges that face formalization, with goal
of developing a computer system, of legal reasoning.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Artificial intelligence and law</title>
      <p>
        Formal logic is the approach of choice for artificial
intelligence and Law, as evidenced by a wealth of articles,
including those already mentioned, and others,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Bench-Capon
1997)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">(Prakken and Sartor 1996)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Prakken and Sartor
1997)</xref>
        ,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">(Prakken and Sartor 1998)</xref>
        ,published in a series of
artificial intelligence journals, including the specialized
journal of Artificial Intelligence and Law3. A critical review of
the logic-based approach can be found in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref9">(Prakken and
Sartor 2002)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        Moreover, analyzing the current results, Franklin
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Franklin 2012)</xref>
        lists challenges, not yet met by current
artificial intelligence approaches in law, for formalization of
legal reasoning. These challenges include:
      </p>
      <p>
        2According to Google’s Rob Craft We are currently at year zero
of the machine learning revolution.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">(Singh 2016)</xref>
        3https://link.springer.com/journal/10506
1. ”The open-textured or fuzzy nature of language (and of
legal concepts)”
2. ”Degrees of similarity and analogy”
3. ”The representation of context”
4. ”The symbol-grounding problem”
5. ”The representation of causation, conditionals and
counterfactuals”
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>6. ”The balancing of reasons”</title>
        <p>7. ”Probabilistic (or default or non-monotonic) reasoning
(including problems of priors, the weight of evidence and
reference classes)”
8. ”Issues of the discrete versus the continuous”</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>9. ”Understanding”</title>
        <p>
          Franklin discusses the use of fuzzy set based approaches,
to capture the nature of some concepts, or the similarity of
a case to precedents. As an example, he considers, the
concept ’vehicle’, in the ordinance ”No vehicles are allowed in
the park”, which obviously would refer first and foremost
to cars, less to motorcycles/bicycles, and even less to roller
skates. A fuzzy set of vehicles, defined by a membership
function µvehicle : U ! [0, 1], where U denotes a universe
of discourse of ’things’, would assign different degrees to
cars, motorcycles, bicycles, roller skates, for example,
respectively
µvehicle(v) =
8
&gt;&lt;
:&gt;
1
0.8
0.5
0.1
if v is a car
if v is a motorcycle
if v is a bicycle
if v is ”roller skates”
The ordinance has as goal prevention of accidents in the
park, and by consequence, the definition of the fuzzy set is
meant to reflect the common sense knowledge that cars can
cause serious accidents, motorcycles less, bicycles even less,
and so on. The actual assignment of membership degrees is
seen in
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Franklin 2012)</xref>
          as one of the difficulties of
adopting a fuzzy set based approach. However, the researchers in
fuzzy systems know that while this issue is not trivial, fuzzy
set based approaches have a rich collection of choices to
address it, including, learning the membership function.
Furthermore, it should be noted that (1) in many applications,
the relative magnitudes of the membership degrees matter
more than their actual magnitude, and (2) where the
absolute magnitudes matter, they could and should be subject to
a (machine) learning approach.
        </p>
        <p>
          The issue of similarity is of utmost importance in legal
reasoning and to illustrate the difficulties in similarity
evaluation
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Franklin 2012)</xref>
          refers to a celebrated case, Popov v
Hayashi, centered on the issue of possesion.4 The two
precedents considered for the case, both involved hunting: in the
4http://www.miblaw.com/lawschool/popov-v-hayashi-2002wl-31833731-cal-super-ct-2002/: Popov v. Hayashi 2002 WL
31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002) Case Name: Popov v. Hayashi
Plaintiff: Popov Defendant: Hayashi Citation: 2002 WL
31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002) Issue: Whether the defendant is
liable for conversion when he picked up the home run ball that was
dropped by the plaintiff. Key Facts: Barry Bonds 73rd Homerun.
first, hunting a fox with hounds did not confer rights of
possession; in the second, the whale harpooned by one
individual, and found by another on the beach was found, based on
customs of whalers, to belong to the man who harpooned it
not to the one who found it. The decision in Popov v Hayashi
was that Popov and Hayashi had equal interests in the ball; to
reach such a decision, issues such as context, continuity play
an important role, and an intelligent (artificial intelligence)
legal system must be able to deal with such issues.
According to Franklin
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Franklin 2012)</xref>
          , none of the current artificial
intelligence in law approaches, based on similarity with the
two precedents, could have actually reached this decision.
Achieving it, would require quantitative approaches
including probability, fuzzy sets, and evidential reasoning, which
may go a long way to complement logic based approaches
towards an artificial intelligence based law systems.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Machine learning in rules with legal values</title>
      <p>
        In
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref9">(Sartor 2002)</xref>
        several (legal) theory constructors are given
in terms of rules and (legal) values promoted by them, in
order to formalize the legal argument. First factors, i.e.
abstract features of a case which may influence the outcome
of the case, are considered. Following
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">(Berman and Hafner
1993)</xref>
        , values underlying a case are introduced. For
example, ⇡Liv stands for the fact ” ⇡ was pursuing his
livelihood”, (⇡ denotes the plaintiff), or N poss stands for ” (
denotes defendant) was not in possession”. A legal value
V is an objective pursued by the legal argument.
Examples of values include Less Litigation(LLit ), More
productivity(MProd), More security of possession(MSec). A case
may be formalized as a collection of rules such as
d⇡Liv
d⇡land
d⇡N poss
dLiv =)
=) ⇧ e promotes M prod
=) ⇧ e promotes M sec
=) ⇧ e promotes LLit
      </p>
      <p>e promotes M prod
where ⇡Liv =) ⇧ means ”⇡ was pursuing his livelihood
is a reason why ⇡ should have a legal remedy against ”.</p>
      <p>
        To formalize, following
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref9">(Sartor 2002)</xref>
        , let {Vi, i =
1, . . . n} be a collection of legal values, where a minimal
approach to ordering is adopted, such that the theory may
specify
More over, it is assumed that
      </p>
      <p>Vi &lt; Vj ; i 6= j
Vi &lt; Vi [
[ Vj
j6=i
The plaintiff caught the ball in the upper portion of his glove but
was tackled and thrown to the ground by the crowd. The ball fell
out and the defendant picked it up and put it in his pocket. The
plaintiff sued for conversion. Holding: The plaintiff and defendant
had equitable claims and could not prove their case either way.
Reasoning: Although the plaintiff proved intent to possess the
ball, he could not establish that he would have fully possessed
the ball had he not been tackled by the crowd. If he could have
established this, his pre-possessory interest would have constituted
a qualified right to possession which can support a cause of action
for conversion. Judgment: The ball was sold for $450,000 and
the proceeds were divided equally.
(1)
(2)</p>
      <p>
        Replacing [ in (2) by the maximum _ , and using ^ for
minimum, it follows that
Equality of values must also be specified as part of the
theory. Then, enlarging upon
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref9">(Sartor 2002)</xref>
        , given the rules
⇣
Vi &lt; max Vi, Wj6=i Vj
      </p>
      <p>⇣
Vi &gt; min Vi, Vj6=i Vj
⌘
⌘
d↵ 1 =)
d↵ 2 =)
. . .
d↵ n =)
e promotes V1
e promotes V2
e promotes Vn
d↵ 1&amp;↵ 2&amp; . . . &amp;↵ n =)</p>
      <p>e
promotes
(3)
(4)
one can construct the following:</p>
      <p>[min(V1, V2, . . . , Vn), max(V1, V2, . . . , Vn)]</p>
      <p>Thus, considered together, rules (4) promote at least
the smallest value, at most the largest value, and
possibly values in between, i.e., those which lie in
[min(V1, V2, . . . , Vn), max(V1, V2, . . . , Vn)]. All promoted
values can be expressed as convex combinations of
V1, V2, . . . , Vn, that is,
d↵ 1&amp; . . . &amp;↵ n =)</p>
      <p>e promotes w1V1 + · · · + wnVn (5)
where wi 0, i = 1, . . . , n and w1 + · · · + wn = 1. For
different values of wi, i = 1, · · · , n (5) can generate any
subset of the set of values {Vi, i = 1, · · · , n}. Interpreted as
a probability, wi = P rob( to promote Vi) can be obtained
through a machine learning algorithm based on history of
(similar) cases.</p>
      <p>The mechanism outlined above has the effect of
producing a continuum of legal values (even though to begin with,
these form a discrete set), which in turn may lead to a
continuum of possible decisions.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Inference and machine learning - legal theory and practice</title>
      <p>
        This section touches upon the issue of inference in legal
reasoning. It takes its cue from
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Tillers 1993)</xref>
        and references
therein, according to which ”the governing assumption of
this body of law has been that all or practically all facts are
uncertain and that proof of facts is always or almost always
a matter of probabilities”. The necessity of mathematical
models of uncertainty (currently missing) in legal
reasoning is furthermore discussed in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">(Tillers 2011)</xref>
        and
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Franklin
2012)</xref>
        among others.
      </p>
      <p>
        Since complex arguments about inferences from evidence
rest on almost innumerable subjective judgments,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">(Tillers
2011)</xref>
        proposes several purposes for mathematical and
formal analysis of inconclusive arguments about uncertain
factual questions in legal proceedings, as follows:
1. ”To predict how judges and jurors will resolve factual
issues in litigation.
2. To devise methods that can replace existing methods of
argument and deliberation in legal settings about factual
issues.
3. To devise methods that mimic conventional methods of
argument about factual issues in legal settings.
4. To devise methods that support or facilitate existing, or
ordinary, argument and deliberation about factual issues
in legal settings by legal actors (such as judges, lawyers
and jurors) who are generally illiterate in mathematical
and formal analysis and argument.”
5. To devise methods that capture some but not all
’ingredients of argument’ in legal settings about factual questions
questions.
      </p>
      <p>It can be claimed that achieving these purposes predict
- replace - mimic - support falls into the machine learning
realm, requiring machine learning algorithms of possibly
different levels of sophistication.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Machine learning in the practice of law – the low hanging fruit</title>
      <p>
        From the point of view of a typical approach to machine
learning, data (usually, a lot) is needed to construct a
machine learning algorithm - a classifier, or a clustering
algorithm. Usually, such data is thought of as history on which
to base future predictions. The need to take into account
history is discussed in the conclusion section of
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref9">(Sartor 2002)</xref>
        ,
which suggests a history-subtheory. That would add a ’sense
of history’ to a case, predicting a judge’s handling of a case
based on that judge’s history of opinions and their context.
All of these could be attacked by machine learning methods.
Issues on the representation of an argument, of an opinion,
measures of similarity must be considered. Law, like other
social sciences, seldom uses a quantitative language, rather,
it is text-based. This means that solving the issues
mentioned above is not trivial.
      </p>
      <p>Using machine learning to analyze judges’ personalities
and ruling tendencies helps tailor pleadings to their
personalities. Machine learning helps analyze attorney
personalities and use those to decide who writes what in a law firm,
and evaluate a firm’s previous work and identify strength,
weaknesses and faults.</p>
      <p>This added dimension to legal theory and practice
straddles several disciplines, including psychometry,
representation of uncertainty (e.g., fuzzy logic to represent meanings
of utterances, and similarity measures), probabilistic (point,
interval valued or imprecise probabilities), all to be used in
machine learning to build predictive algorithms of behavior.</p>
      <p>As a recent example, with far reaching consequences, of
behavior prediction, comes from the 2016 USA
presidential elections: Cambridge Analytica5 used machine learning
to specifically target independents and other voters
disenchanted with the status quo, with messages that appealed to
their personalities. A similar system that does the same - for
judges, courts - could help build a litigation strategy, tailor
language, and develop legal reasoning to the personality of
the particular court.</p>
      <p>5https://cambridgeanalytica.org/</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>We have discussed some preliminary ideas on the
challenges/issues that law research faces, which could be
approached from an machine learning point of view. This
paper only hinted at these issues and possible solutions using
machine learning. Much is to be done, including a very
thorough understanding of quantitiative ideas in legal theory put
forward by researchers in the legal profession.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>The authors are grateful for the reviewers comments, some
very enthusiastic, some very negative, on the first draft of
this paper. All served to stimulate the authors’ thinking on
how to further approach the use of machine learning in law,
and are likely to inform their future study of this field.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Bench-Capon</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>T.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1997</year>
          .
          <article-title>Argument in artificial intelligence and law</article-title>
          .
          <source>Artificial Intelligence and Law</source>
          <volume>5</volume>
          (
          <issue>4</issue>
          ):
          <fpage>249</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>261</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Berman</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>D. H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Hafner</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>C. D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1993</year>
          .
          <article-title>Representing teleological structure in case-based legal reasoning: the missing link</article-title>
          .
          <source>In Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law</source>
          ,
          <volume>50</volume>
          -
          <fpage>59</fpage>
          . ACM.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Campbell</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>W.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Li</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>L.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Dagli</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Greenfield</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Wolf</surname>
            , E.; and Campbell,
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2016</year>
          .
          <article-title>Predicting and analyzing factors in patent litigation</article-title>
          .
          <source>NIPS2016, ML and the Law Workshop.</source>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Franklin</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2012</year>
          .
          <article-title>Discussion paper: How much of commonsense and legal reasoning is formalizable: A review of conceptual obstacles</article-title>
          .
          <source>Law, Prob. &amp; Risk</source>
          <volume>11</volume>
          :
          <fpage>225</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Hafner</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>C. D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1978</year>
          .
          <article-title>An information retrieval system based on a computer model of legal knowledge</article-title>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Prakken</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sartor</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1996</year>
          .
          <article-title>A dialectical model of assessing conflicting arguments in legal reasoning</article-title>
          .
          <source>In Logical Models of Legal Argumentation</source>
          . Springer.
          <fpage>175</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>211</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Prakken</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sartor</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1997</year>
          .
          <article-title>Argument-based extended logic programming with defeasible priorities</article-title>
          .
          <source>Journal of applied non-classical logics 7</source>
          (
          <issue>1</issue>
          -2):
          <fpage>25</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>75</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Prakken</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sartor</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1998</year>
          .
          <article-title>Modelling reasoning with precedents in a formal dialogue game</article-title>
          .
          <source>In Judicial Applications of Artificial Intelligence</source>
          . Springer.
          <fpage>127</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>183</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Prakken</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sartor</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2002</year>
          .
          <article-title>The role of logic in computational models of legal argument: a critical survey</article-title>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          Springer.
          <fpage>342</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>381</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Rissland</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>E. L.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Skalak</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>D. B.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1991</year>
          .
          <article-title>Cabaret: rule interpretation in a hybrid architecture</article-title>
          .
          <source>International journal of man-machine studies 34</source>
          <volume>(6)</volume>
          :
          <fpage>839</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>887</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sartor</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2002</year>
          .
          <article-title>Teleological arguments and theory-based dialectics</article-title>
          .
          <source>Artificial Intelligence and Law</source>
          <volume>10</volume>
          (
          <issue>1-3</issue>
          ):
          <fpage>95</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>112</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Singh</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2016</year>
          .
          <article-title>The tech-legal aspects of machine learning: Considerations for moving forward</article-title>
          .
          <source>NIPS2016, ML and the Law Workshop.</source>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref14">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Skalak</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>D. B.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Rissland</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>E. L.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1992</year>
          .
          <article-title>Arguments and cases: An inevitable intertwining</article-title>
          .
          <source>Artificial intelligence and Law</source>
          <volume>1</volume>
          (
          <issue>1</issue>
          ):
          <fpage>3</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>44</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref15">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Tillers</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1993</year>
          .
          <article-title>Intellectual history, probability, and the law of evidence.</article-title>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref16">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Tillers</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2011</year>
          .
          <article-title>Trial by mathematics - reconsidered. Law, probability and risk 10(3</article-title>
          ):
          <fpage>167</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>173</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>