=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-1964/S2
|storemode=property
|title=Continuous Authentication on Smartphones Using An Artificial Immune System
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1964/S2.pdf
|volume=Vol-1964
|authors=Nawaf Aljohani,Joseph Shelton,Kaushik Roy
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/maics/AljohaniS017
}}
==Continuous Authentication on Smartphones Using An Artificial Immune System==
Nawaf Aljohani et al. MAICS 2017 pp. 171–174 Continuous Authentication on Smartphones Using An Artificial Immune System Nawaf Aljohani1, Joseph Shelton, Kaushik Roy Department of Computer Science, North Carolina A&T State University, Greensboro, U.S.A naaljoha@aggies.ncat.edu1 Abstract [Chang et al., 2012]. Nowadays, most mobile devices use Most of the authentication systems require the users to graphical password that have a larger and more accepted provide their credential for authentication purposes by password space. Though graphical password increases the providing their passwords or their biometric data. password space in touch screen handheld mobile devices, However, as long as the user remains active in the there are no further authentication processes after system, there is no mechanisms to verify whether the user who provides the credential is still in control of unlocking the touch screen. Thus, the attacker has the the device or not. Most mobile devices rely upon ability to access and control all the users’ data and passwords and physical biometrics to authenticate resources as long as the attacker gains access to a device users only when they start using the device. Active after it is unlocked. This research aims to continuously authentication based on analyzing the user’s touch authenticate the users without asking them to provide the interaction could be a reasonable solution to verify that a legitimate user is still in control of a smartphone login information multiple times while the smartphones or or tablet. In this research, an Artificial Immune tablets are in use. System (AIS) is proposed to apply to continuously authenticate the users based on touch patterns. Our In this research, an artificial immune system (AIS) results show that AIS is able to actively authenticate approach will be used to secure mobile devices. The 96.89% of the users correctly. immune system is considered to be a highly complex functional system that protects the body from foreign Introduction diseases causing pathogens [Shojaie and Moradi, 2008]. During the authentication process, a primary concern for This immunology inspired researchers to develop the computational intelligence technique, which is called AIS. users and designers is the level of security. The process of AIS has been used in solving complex computational authenticating an individual must be both secure and problems, such as classification, recognition, and network effective to be applicable for a real world authentication security [Dudek, 2012]. This research makes use of an AIS system. In the event that the authentication process is which has the ability to continuously keep track of any compromised, other aspects in the system such as changes in the environment based on recognizing the availability, confidentiality, and integrity would be easily patterns of ‘self’ and predicting and detecting new patterns compromised as well. Knowledge-based authentication of ‘non-self’. systems, such as password or pin, have several drawbacks, but many systems still use this method to authenticate This research uses a set of 11 behavioral touch features that legitimate users due to their simplicity and flexibility. This were extracted while the users were interacting with their smartphones. This research uses touch data collected from research proposes an authentication method for the users 100 users and each subject has 100 instances [Sitová et al. based on finger swipe movements. 2016]. This research proposes the use of an AIS to continuously authenticate the smartphones users where the Touch screen technology is used in many mobile devices security of smartphone is enhanced. where users have the ability to access various data and resources at anytime. Most of the smartphones use PINs to authenticate the users. However, a traditional PIN typically Related Work consists of four to eight digits, making it easy to guess with Sitová et al. proposed a set of behavioral features based on its small password space and thus vulnerable to attacks hand movement, orientation, and grasp to continuously authenticate mobile users [Sitová et al. 2016]. The data is Copyright held by the author(s). collected from 100 participants under two conditions: 171 Continuous Authentication on Smartphones Using An Artificial Immune System pp. 171–174 walking and sitting. The achieved equal error rates (EERs) Proposed Approach are 7.16% (walking) and 10.05% (sitting) where walking interactions are more richer than sitting interactions due to There are three types of AISs reported in the literature: 1) the distinctive body movements caused by walking and Negative selection, 2) Clonal selection, and 3) Immune hand-movement dynamics from taps. Sitová et al. believe Network [Watkins et al., 2002]. that each mobile user has postural preferences for interacting with touch screen which can be used to The main goal of the Negative Selection (NS) is to provide authenticate the users. In their dataset, Sitová et al. tolerance for self cells that indicate the ability to detect non designed 96 features and extracted data while users are self antigens. This idea is used in many areas such as walking and sitting. The dataset was divided into two types network security, where NS generates detectors and then of features that grasp resistance and stability and the data removes those that can detect self patterns. The rest of was collected by using three sensors: accelerometer, detectors can be used to detect anomaly. The detectors, gyroscope, and magnetometer [Sitová et al. 2016]. The which are randomly generated, are representation for user touch data was acquired using Samsung Galaxy S4 matching the authorized users’ patterns to create the self smartphone where the average duration of a user’s profile [Greensmith et al., 2010]. A detector is a set of interaction with touch screen was 11.6 minutes per session. intervals for each feature a detector is created for. Any self Sitová et al. used scaled Manhattan (SM), scaled Euclidian pattern number lies in the interval of a detector means that (SE), and 1-class Support Vector Machines (SVM) to the detector detects the self pattern. As a result of that all verify the users. detectors that detect self patterns must be removed. The remaining detectors are used to detect unauthorized users. Frank et al. [Frank et al., 2013] determined whether or not a classifier could be used to continuously authenticate Clonal Selection (CS) differs from the NS approach by users based on their interaction with the touch screen. selecting the detectors that proliferate over those that do Authors in [Frank et al., 2013] proposed 30 behavioral not. The main feature of CS is the new detectors that are touch features that could be collected from raw touch the copies of their parents and reactivated detectors are screen logs. These features were used to identify a user eliminated afterwards. In this research, CS is implemented based on the way he/she interacts with the touch screen. to authenticate smartphone users continuously instead of Furthermore, Frank et al. explained the reasons that mobile NS because CS, in some cases, gives better accuracy than devices are at higher risk than that of desktop computers NS due to the fact that the nearest created detectors cloned due to that fact that mobile devices can be easily lost or (See Figure 1). First, CS generates n detectors and searches stolen. Their dataset consists of 41 subjects and the data for new patterns. CS selects the nearest detectors to be was collected from four different smart phones. cloned using distance metric such as the Euclidean distance. CS clones the nearest detectors from the detectors Feng et al. [Feng et al., 2012] introduced FAST: and the new pattern. CS then finds best matching clone Fingergestures Authentication System using Touchscreen. and assigns clone class to antigen. Finally, it deletes other Their idea was to extract data from touch screen superfluous clones and for each deletion, replaces with interactions and validate the data by using a digital sensor new randomly generated detectors [Greensmith et al., glove. Their proposed approach relied on Random Forest 2010]. In this research, we created 100 detectors and then (RF) and Bayesian network classifiers to authenticate remove those detectors that can detect self elements. Self mobile users continuously. Feng et al. used a dataset that elements in the dataset represent one subject. The consisted of 40 users and authors obtained a False Accept remaining subjects are non-self elements. The detectors Rate (FAR) of 4.66%, while the False Reject Rate (FRR) detect the self elements by exploring self subject’s features was 0.13%. patterns. Suppose the smartphone is unlocked by an attacker, detectors created by CS are used for continuously Meng et al. [Meng et al., 2013] proposed a scheme based authenticating the user by tracking the user’s interactions on touch dynamics that used a set of behavioral features to with touch screen. As long as the smartphone is unlocked, improve the accuracy of user authentication. Their dataset CS detectors are used to analyze the user’s interactions via detectors. Once a certain number of detectors detect consisted of 21 features that were collected form users abnormal interactions, the device is locked due to interaction with the touch screen. All data was extracted unauthorized access. In our experiments, abnormal from 20 Android phones. Researchers in [Meng et al., interactions must be detected by four detectors to detect 2013] found that a Neural Network (NN) achieved an unauthorized access. average error rate of 7.8%. In addition, Meng et al. optimized the NN by implementing Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) and they reported an average error rate of about 3%. 172 Nawaf Aljohani et al. MAICS 2017 pp. 171–174 We ran the AIS on the entire dataset for 20 times. For each run, we experimented it for 1000 generations. Also, for each run, we use 100 detectors. The best accuracy for 20 runs is 96.89% and the average is 93.81% (See Figure 3). The average of FRR out of 20 runs is 0.9381 which shows unauthorized users detections. The average of FARs on the other hand is 0.06. Figure 1. Clonal selection concept Table 2. Results of adding each user User Accuracy User accuracy User accuracy Table 1. behavioral features [Sitová et al., 2016]. 2 1 35 0.939246 68 0.919757 Name Description 3 1 36 0.9409309 69 0.924135 Systime Absolute time-stamp 4 1 37 0.9417141 70 0.920664 5 1 38 0.9473414 71 0.922134 EventTime Sensor event relative time- 6 0.993333 39 0.9471731 72 0.927492 stamp 7 0.993036 40 0.9375915 73 0.923671 ActivityID Belonged activity 8 0.991111 41 0.938403 74 0.923728 Pointer_count 1: Single touch 9 0.991444 42 0.941495 75 0.924533 2: Multi-touch 10 0.994636 43 0.940016 76 0.919508 PointerID 0: Single touch; or first pointer 11 0.99447 44 0.941293 77 0.927949 in multi-touch 12 0.991282 45 0.952014 78 0.930393 1: Second pointer in multi- 13 0.987418 46 0.940592 79 0.927764 touch 14 0.970905 47 0.941241 80 0.923218 ActionID 0 or 5: DOWN 15 0.9675 48 0.941101 81 0.92879 1 or 6: UP 16 0.964118 49 0.945453 82 0.922505 2: MOVE 17 0.966471 50 0.944878 83 0.926952 X Touch location in X 18 0.965409 51 0.944246 84 0.897615 coordination 19 0.964263 52 0.939213 85 0.926551 20 0.950119 53 0.941237 86 0.927851 Y Touch location in Y 21 0.963009 54 0.946933 87 0.921804 coordination 22 0.9543478 55 0.936571 88 0.925723 Pressure Touch pressure 23 0.9558696 56 0.946563 89 0.923815 Contact_size Touch contact size 24 0.9473167 57 0.939958 90 0.926972 Phone_orientation 0: Portrait and no rotate 25 0.9522769 58 0.955611 91 0.923371 1: device rotated 90 degrees 26 0.9377635 59 0.954308 92 0.917491 counterclockwise 27 0.9335714 60 0.931101 93 0.91647 3: device rotated 90 degrees 28 0.9355788 61 0.913392 94 0.910208 clockwise 29 0.9428851 62 0.919519 95 0.917088 30 0.9464194 63 0.914184 96 0.921645 31 0.9375403 64 0.916935 97 0.919436 32 0.9340909 65 0.922818 98 0.925315 Experimental Results 33 0.9328699 66 0.921142 99 0.922192 We conducted our experiments on TouchEvent dataset that 34 0.9395126 67 0.922046 has 11 behavioral features [Sitová et al. 2016]. A list of features is shown in Table 1. First, we ran the AIS with only two subjects, and we achieved an accuracy of 100%. The accuracy remains 100% as long as we are using 5 subjects. After adding 6th subject and its instances, the accuracy went down to 99.33%. Initially, we added a new subject to the dataset and ran AIS. The accuracies for all the users are shown in Table 2. It is clear that at a certain point, adding users do not affect the accuracy of AIS as shown in Figure 2. For each run, AIS is executed for 1000 generations and the number of detectors is 100. Unauthorized user is detected if at least 4 Figure 2. CS Performance generated detectors are able to detect the touch screen interactions. 173 Continuous Authentication on Smartphones Using An Artificial Immune System pp. 171–174 [Frank et al., 2013] Frank, M., R. Biedert, E. Ma, I. Martinovic, and D. Song. (2013) "Touchalytics: On the Applicability of Touchscreen Input as a Behavioral Biometric for Continuous Authentication." IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 8.1 pp.136- 48. Print [Greensmith et al., 2010] Greensmith, J., Whitbrook, A., & Aickelin, U. (2010). Artificial immune systems. In Handbook of Metaheuristics (pp. 421-448). Springer US. [Meng et al., 2013] Meng, Yuxin, Duncan S. Wong, Roman Schlegel, and Lam-For Kwok. (2013) "Touch Gestures Based Figure 3. CS Performance Biometric Authentication Scheme for Touchscreen Mobile Phones." Information.Security and Cryptology Lecture Notes in Computer Science. pp. 331-50. Print. Conclusion and Future Work [Shojaie et al., 2008] Shojaie, S., & Moradi, M. H. (2008). An evolutionary artificial immune system for feature selection and We find from the experimental results that AIS can be used parameters optimization of support vector machines for ERP to authenticate smartphone users continuously. AIS assessment in a P300-based GKT. In Biomedical Engineering approach has the flexibility in restricting the authentication Conference, 2008. CIBEC 2008. Cairo International (pp. 1-5). process based on the sensitivity of the mobile devices by IEEE. reducing the number of detectors. The best performance of [Sitová et al., 2016] Sitová, Z., Šeděnka, J., Yang, Q., Peng, G., CS on the entire dataset was 96.89%. However, there Zhou, G., Gasti, P., & Balagani, K. S. (2016). HMOG: New behavioral biometric features for continuous authentication of seems to be a promise with the increasing number of smartphone users. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics detectors for each run. This research uses CS for an AIS to and Security, 11(5), 877-892. continuously authenticate the users. [Watkins et al., 2002] Watkins, Andrew and Timmis, Future work will be focused on evaluating the impact of Jon (2002) Artificial Immune Recognition System each behavioral feature on the overall accuracy. (AIRS):Revisions and Refinements Furthermore, future work will evaluate the effect of increasing the number of detectors. This may improve accuracy by increasing the chance of detecting more unauthorized mobile interactions. Also, a comparison between CS and NS will be conducted. In addition, the performance of CS and NS will be compared with other classifies such as SVM. Acknowledgements This research is supported by the Army Research Office (Contract No. W911NF-15-1-0524). References [Chang et al., 2012] Chang, T. Y., Tsai, C. J., & Lin, J. H. (2012). A graphical-based password keystroke dynamic authentication system for touch screen handheld mobile devices. Journal of Systems and Software, 85(5), 1157-1165. [Dudek, 2012] Dudek, G. (2012). An artificial immune system for classification with local feature selection. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, 16(6),p.847-860. [Feng et al., 2012] Feng, Tao, Ziyi Liu, Kyeong-An Kwon, Weidong Shi, Bogdan Carbunar, Yifei Jiang, and Nhung Nguyen. (2012). "Continuous Mobile Authentication Using Touchscreen Gestures." 2012 IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST). Print. 174