<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Context-Based Heuristics in Attribution</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jim Q. Chen</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ph.D.</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>National Defense University</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>U.S.A.</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2017</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>175</fpage>
      <lpage>180</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>In cyber forensics, attribution of an attack, which finds out details about the individual(s) who launched an attack, is more important than mere identification of an attack, since a precise response to the cyber attack heavily depends upon attribution. The identification of the initiator(s) in attribution provides precise targeting for a counter-attack. However, heuristics are typically deployed to find out information about attack actions rather than initiator(s) of attack actions. This paper proposes a mechanism that utilizes a weight system for guiding the way in which the heuristics prioritize the discovery of attacker initiator(s). Linking purpose, methods, time, location, and events with the identified device, the proposed heuristic approach can serve as a path towards accurate and prompt attribution.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        It is not uncommon that a cyber attack is reported without
identification of the attacker(s). Quite often, cyber defense
mechanisms and cyber forensics can help to identify the
fact that a system has been hacked and compromised and
the data on the system have been stolen. However, it
always takes a lot more time and efforts to find out who did
it and why it was done. Attribution is hard to be done even
though it is possible. Without quick and accurate
attribution, precise responses to the attacker(s) are delayed, and
direct cyber deterrence mechanisms become less effective.
In some cases, indirect deterrence mechanisms, such as
diplomatic, economic, legal, military, or other national
security instruments, have been employed, especially in
dealing with nation-state attackers. Unfortunately, the
indirect deterrence mechanisms are always taking long time to
be deployed and executed, as attribution and preparation
for the use of non-cyber national security instruments
require extra time in this process, thus causing the delay in
response or retaliation. In addition, as correctly pointed out
by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">Sterner (2011)</xref>
        , the indirect deterrence mechanisms have
limited effect on non-nation-state attackers.
      </p>
      <p>Copyright held by the author. All rights reserved. Copying permitted for
private and academic purposes.</p>
      <p>What needs to be done in order to improve the process
of attribution in the cyber domain so that direct retaliation
in the cyber domain can be quickly launched should it be
legal and necessary? To answer this question, the key
components in attribution should be identified. With this
identification, a novel approach can be figured out to
address these key components ahead of time so that the time
needed for conducting attribution can be significantly
reduced.</p>
      <p>The paper is organized as follows: In Section 1, an
introduction to the challenge is provided. In Section 2,
related works are examined. The current approaches and their
limitations are analyzed. In Section 3, an innovative
solution is proposed. In Section 4, this novel approach is
applied to a hypothetical case. In Section 5, a conclusion is
drawn.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Related Works</title>
      <p>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">Beebe (2009)</xref>
        calls for the design and implementation of
smart analytical algorithms in digital forensics since the
“cost of human analytical time spent sifting through
nonrelevant search hits is a significant issue”. He holds that
even though current “computational approaches for
searching, retrieving and analyzing digital evidence are
unnecessarily simplistic”, there exists significant information
retrieval overhead. He argues that smart analytical
algorithms should “clearly reduce information retrieval
overhead”, “help investigators get to relevant data more
quickly, reduce the noise investigators must wade through, and
help transform data into information and investigative
knowledge.” In order to design such an intelligent
algorithm, heuristics should be looked into.
      </p>
      <p>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">Marti and Reinelt (2011)</xref>
        maintain that a good heuristic
algorithm should fulfill the following properties: “A
solution can be obtained with reasonable computational effort”.
“The solution should be near optimal (with high
probability)”. “The likelihood for obtaining a bad solution (far from
optimal) should be low”.
      </p>
      <p>Hill-climbing algorithms belong to local search, which,
according to Kokash (1998), “is a version of exhaustive
search that only focuses on a limited area of the search
space”. “Such algorithms consistently replace the current
solution with the best of its neighbors if it is better than the
current.” However, a hill-climbing algorithm “always finds
the nearest local optima of low quality”. This issue is
referred to as pre-mature convergence. Heuristics is used to
deal with this problem.</p>
      <p>There are several different approaches in heuristics. The
best-first search selects the best state in the list. Simulated
annealing allows some moves to worse states in order to
explore many regions of the state space. A* algorithm,
which uses a best-first search with a modified evaluation
function, selects the shortest path that has the minimal total
cost. However, in the first trial, as evaluation is not
performed yet, it may select a path that is not the shortest one.</p>
      <p>In the context of attribution, is there a structural
configuration that helps to select the shortest path in the first trial?
If there is one, what is it? How does this work? These are
the questions that are addressed in the next section.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Proposal</title>
      <p>A novel context-based heuristic approach is proposed in
this section. Here, the relationship among the components
for attribution is analyzed and a weight system is
employed. Combining this weight system with the Contextual
Binding Condition, this new context-based heuristic
approach is designed to discover the shortest and the most
optimal path for attribution.</p>
      <p>To accurately attribute an event to an individual, all the
following elements should be addressed: “who”, “what”,
“when”, “where”, “how”, and “why”. To do so, it is crucial
to find out the relationship among these elements.</p>
      <p>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">Sinek (2009)</xref>
        does a very good job in explaining the
relationship among some components, such as “what”, “how”,
and “why”, via the Golden Circle, as shown in Figure 1
below:
      </p>
      <p>The Golden Circle is used for inspirational leadership.
The idea is to have a goal figured out and made known
first, come up with a method or craft a strategy based on
the purpose, and then figure out what to do to achieve the
goal.</p>
      <p>As shown in this figure, the component “what”
represents actions or events. The component “how” represents
the method or the strategy used in orchestrating these
events. It is relatively less obvious than the component
“what”. The component “why” represents the goal to be
achieved via the method or the strategy employed. It is the
least comprehensible element of these three components.
However, once an understanding of the goal is gained, an
understanding of the whole picture and the relationship of
all these events is acquired.</p>
      <p>
        Given the representation in circles, this process can be
depicted as being inside out. In Sinek’s term, it all starts
with why.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">Sinek (2009)</xref>
        even looks at how this
representation corresponds with the major levels of the brain. The
“what” level corresponds with neocortex, while the “how”
level and the “why” level correspond with limbic brain.
Neocortex is responsible for rational and analytical thought
as well as language but it does not drive behavior. Limbic
brain, which drives behavior, is responsible for feelings,
such as trust and loyalty, as well as all human behavior and
decision making.
      </p>
      <p>This model demonstrates that a purpose (i.e. the “why”
component) drives methods or strategies (i.e. the “how”
component), which, in turn, drive actions (i.e. the “what”
component). From this perspective, the “why” component
is more important than the “how” component, and the
“how” component is more important than the “what”
component.</p>
      <p>It has to be pointed out that as the purpose of the Golden
Circle is not for attribution, other important components
such as “who”, “when”, and “where”, are not included in
the Golden circle. However, to build the Attribution Circle
on the basis of the Golden Circle, these three components
have to be included. What needs to be discovered is the
relationship among all these components.</p>
      <p>It needs to be noted that the component “who”, which
represents the human component, possesses the highest
priority in any investigation as it directly pinpoints to the
individual(s) who conducted the action. Other factors, such
as the reason why the action was conducted, the way the
action was conduct, the action that was conducted, the
place where it was conducted, and the time when it was
conducted, are all directly associated with the human
component, i.e. the “who” component. To a certain extent, they
are the attributes of the “who” component, which
represents the initiator of an action. It is the human who has a
purpose or a goal. It is the human who comes up with a
method or a strategy to archive the goal. Of course, the
method or the strategy has to be associated with location
and time. It is the human who conducts the action based on
the method or the strategy. The action has to occur in a
specific location within a specific time. This is why this
human component should hold relatively the highest
weight in the Attribution Circle. Also, the component
“who” is closely tied to all other components as it is the
initial driver who makes all these happen.</p>
      <p>The component “why” is the second most crucial
element, as it drives the component “how”, which, in turn,
drives the component “what”. This is why it should possess
the second highest weight in the Attribution Circle. For the
same reason, the component “how” should hold a weight
that is less than that of the component “why” but more than
that of the component “what”. As location (i.e. the
component “where”) and time (i.e. the component “when”) are
the attributes for a method (i.e. the component “how”) or
an action (i.e. the component “what”), they should hold a
weight that is less than that of the component “how”.
Naturally, a weight system comes into being.</p>
      <p>All these relations can be successfully captured in the
Attribution Circle proposed in Figure 2 below:</p>
      <p>In the leadership environment, an effective directional
relationship is inside out. Similarly, a well-designed attack
follows this directional relationship. An attacker has a goal
to achieve. To achieve that goal, the attacker needs to
figure out a method or a strategy. The attacker then
orchestrates various actions in different locations at different
times according to the method or the strategy. This clearly
reflects an inside-out directional relationship, which is
displayed in Figure 3 below:</p>
      <p>However, in the cyber forensics environment, an
effective directional relationship is outside in. Investigators
usually observe seemingly irrelevant actions in different
locations at different times. The analysis helps them to link the
dots of these actions and eventually to figure out the
method or the strategy used. Based on the understanding of the
method or the strategy used as well as the link between an
action and an actor, the suspect(s) can be eventually
attributed to. This reflects an outside-in directional
relationship, which is displayed in Figure 4 below:</p>
      <p>Evidently, the directional relationship truly reflects the
order of events. The Attribution Circle can effectively
capture the relationship.</p>
      <p>Based on the above analysis, the following stipulation
can be made to capture the proportion of weight of
probability for each component in attribution:
(1) Weight of probability for each component:
“who”: W1 = 0.3
“why”: W2 = 0.25
“how”: W3 = 0.15
“when”: W4 = 0.1
“where”: W5 = 0.1
“what”: W6 = 0.1
The total weight of probability equals 1.</p>
      <p>If a component is known, it carries the value “1”.
Otherwise, it has the value “0”.</p>
      <p>The probability of successful attribution can be express
as follows:
(2)</p>
      <p>Given the weight of each component listed in (1), the
formula in (2) can be expanded as follows:
(3)
= (X1*W1) + (X2*W2) + (X3*W3) + (X4*W4)</p>
      <p>+ (X5*W5) + (X6*W6)
= (1*0.3) + (1*0.25) + (1*0.15) + (1*0.1)</p>
      <p>+ (1*0.1) + (1*0.1)
= 0.3 + 0.25 + 0.15 + 0.1 + 0.1 + 0.1
= 1</p>
      <p>This means that if all the six components are known, the
individual who launched the attack can be successfully
attributed to.</p>
      <p>
        Also, when the attributes represented by these
components are all properly addressed in an expected way, the
Revised Restrictive Contextual Binding Condition
proposed in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">Chen (2016)</xref>
        is satisfied, as the variables are
properly bound by their corresponding contextual
operators. This binding condition is listed below:
      </p>
      <p>Assume X is an entity, and CO is a contextual operator.
(4) In a specialized time, location, environment, and
background, if X is directly related to CO with
respect to all the attributes such as action-initiator
(who), action (what), action-recipient
(who/what_recipient), time (when), location
(where), method (how), and purpose (why) in such a
setting:</p>
      <p>COi[WHO1, WHAT2, WHAT_RECIPIENT3,
WHEN4, WHERE5, HOW6, WHY7]
{……Xi[WHO1,WHAT2,
WHAT_RECIPIENT3,</p>
      <p>WHEN4, WHERE5, HOW6, WHY7]……}
then Xi is contextually bound by COi in a restrictive
way.</p>
      <p>
        As pointed out in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">Chen (2016)</xref>
        , this is a typical
representation of Type 1 Binding as all the attributes in the variable
are contextually bound by the attributes in the contextual
operator. “If one contextual attribute in the variable is not
directly related to the corresponding attribute in the
contextual operator, the variable is not contextually bound by the
contextual operator in the restrictive sense.”
      </p>
      <p>Putting (3) and (4) together, if all the attributes of a
variable (i.e. “who”, “why”, “how”, “when”, “where”, and
“what”) are known, then P(X) = 1, and the variable is
properly, (i.e. 100%) bound by the contextual operator
(CO). However, if only “what”, “when”, and “where” are
known, then P(X) = (1*0.1) + (1*0.1) + (1*0.1) = 0.3, and
the variable is 30% bound by the CO.</p>
      <p>As the attribute “who” possesses the highest weight, i.e.
0.3, and the attribute “why” possesses the second highest
weight, i.e. 0.25, the missing of these two attributes
immediately points out a new path of search, namely, the quest
for the attributes “who” and “why”. Once these two
attributes are known, 55%, i.e. (1*0.3) + (1*0.25) = 0.55, of the
puzzle is solved. Let us compare the pair of the attributes
“who” and “why” with the pair of attributes “how” and
“what”. As the weight of the attribute “how” is 0.15 and
the weight of the attribute “what” is 0.1, the total weight of
the latter pair is P(X) = (1*0.15) + (1*0.1) = 0.25. This
means that getting to know these two attributes solves 25%
of the puzzle. Evidently, 25% is less than 55%; and the
pair of the attributes “how” and “what” has less priority
than the pair of the attributes “who” and “why” does. With
such a weight system in place, the attribute “who” is
always the first one to go after if it is unknown. The attribute
“why” is the second one to go after, and the attribute
“how” is the third one to go after. The pair of the attributes
that possesses the highest weight, i.e. the attributes of
“who” and “why”, which possesses 55% of the total
weight, is the first one to go after as a pair. The pair of the
attributes that holds the second highest weight, i.e. the
attributes of “who” and “how”, which holds 45% of the total
weight, is the second one to go after as a pair. As shown
here, the weight system proposed in this paper helps to set
up the priority in the search and helps to heuristically
choose an optimal path for the quest. This structural
configuration helps to select the shortest path in the first trial,
thus making heuristic algorithms more optimal and more
efficient, especially in the quest for attribution.</p>
      <p>In addition, this weight system can help the process of
intelligence collection for the sake of prevention in the
cyber domain. If a request for a service is received from a
device that is unknown, the server service should hold the
normal response and immediately start the query for the
unknown factors. Picking up the component with the
heaviest weight in the list, the server service goes after the
component “who”. The server service now engages the
device of the attack-initiator into a dialog by asking it
questions related to the “who” attribute. The idea is to
make the device of the attack-initiator to reveal its identity
information. If no answer or unsatisfactory answer is
received, the request from the attack device is immediately
rejected and the normal response is not provided at all. If a
satisfactory answer is received, the server service goes
after the component “why”, which possesses the second
heaviest weight in the list. The server service now asks the
device that makes the request to provide reasons for its
request. Again, if no answer or unsatisfactory answer is
received, the request from the attack device is immediately
rejected and the normal response is not provided at all.
Otherwise, a normal response is provided. The questions
related to the “why” attribute can help to detect a zombie
since a zombie either does not have a good reason for the
request or has to wait for the attack-initiator to provide a
reason. The unsatisfactory answer or the delay in response
is a good indicator in detecting a zombie system.
Evidently, this new context-based heuristic approach can help
intelligence collection for the sake of prevention.</p>
      <p>
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">Chen and Dinerman (2016)</xref>
        examine the unique
characteristics of cyber conflicts and discover the following three
cyber feature sets, namely intelligence collection, stealth
maneuvers, and surprise effect. They argue that these
unique feature sets can be turned into unique cyber
capabilities that serve as force multipliers, if they are integrated
appropriately into conventional conflicts as complementary
military capacities. As shown in this paper, this new
context-based heuristic approach not only can assist
intelligence collection but also can speed up the attribution
process. This capability is exactly what is needed for force
multipliers.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Case Study</title>
      <p>In this section, the proposed context-based heuristics is
applied to a hypothetical case, which is a typical attribution
challenge.</p>
      <p>Let us assume that a server suddenly receives 2,000
repetitive packets within a second from the same source right
at 5:00 PM on Monday. This abnormal behavior
immediately triggers the context-based heuristics for investigation,
as the server usually receives less than 1,000 different
packets within a minute. A quick scrutiny reveals the
packets are all echo packets utilizing UDP Port 7. The message
echoed is exactly the same. This started a minute ago. It
only occurs on this particular server at that time.</p>
      <p>This quick scrutiny discloses the attributes of “what”,
“when”, “where”, and “how”. The fact that the server is hit
by 2,000 echo packets per second accounts for the attribute
of “what”. The time at 5:00 PM on Monday accounts for
the attribute of “when”. The location of the server accounts
for the attribute of “where”. Echo packets utilizing UDP
Port 7 in that particular location at that particular time
accounts for the attribute of “how”. So far, the known
attribute are “what”, “when”, “where”, and “how”. The
unknown attributes are “who” and “why”. Given the
weighted system, the weight of the known attributes is
((1*0.15) + (1*0.1) + (1*0.1) + (1*0.1) = 0.15 + 0.1 + 0.1
+ 0.1 = 0.45, namely, 45% of the puzzle is known. The
context-based heuristics recommends an inquiry for the
attribute “who” first as it possesses 30% of the total
weight.</p>
      <p>Now, the engagement mechanism is triggered, and the
intelligence collection process gets started. It examines the
source MAC address and the source IP address within the
echo packets. As the source MAC address is the address of
the switch that the server is directly connected to, the
server asks the switch for the source MAC address of the
packet that the switch receives. The switch will ask the router
that it directly connects to for the source MAC address and
the source IP address within the echo packets that the
router receives. The router provides the information. Now, the
MAC address and the IP address that sends the echo
packets to the router are discovered. The engagement
mechanism approaches that device and asks the same question.
This process keeps running until it reaches to the device
that launches these echo packets.</p>
      <p>Once it gets to the device that launches these echo
packets, the engagement mechanism makes an inquiry about the
attribute “why”, which possess 25% of the total weight. If
this device is a zombie, it may provide an unsatisfactory
reason; or it may be slow in providing the reason as it waits
for it from the command and control (C2) server. Note that
this type of control requires connectivity. If the
engagement mechanism further asks for the current status of its
connectivity, and if the zombie device provides the answer,
the IP address of the C2 server is revealed.</p>
      <p>Using the same back-tracking method, the engagement
mechanism can eventually trace to the C2 server. From the
neighboring device of this C2 server, the engagement
mechanism is able to find out the MAC address as well as
the IP address of the C2 server. Once discovered, the
engagement mechanism makes an inquiry about the attribute
“why”. The C2 server either refuses to provide an answer
or provides an unsatisfactory answer. This may give up its
real intention. At this point, a close surveillance is initiated
in order to find out the host name of the devices and the
user name if possible. In addition, the engagement
mechanism tries to verify if the device is used by the real attack
initiator and if the owner/user of the device is the real
attacker. Eventually, 100% of the puzzle is solved, or at least
a very higher percentage of the puzzle is solved.</p>
      <p>Note that this operation is conducted at the very early
stage of a denial of service attack. So, deterrence
mechanisms, defense mechanisms, and recovery mechanisms can
be immediately launched to halt the denial of service
attack. In cyber operations, every minute counts. The sooner
an attacker can be identified, the sooner a counter-attack
can be launched, and the less impact can be left on the
affected systems and networks. Meanwhile, the evidence
collected can be used for prosecution and retaliation
purpose. This supports cyber deterrence.</p>
      <p>As shown in this hypothetical case, the context-based
heuristics plays a significant role in search for a target and
in collecting intelligence and evidence about the target.
With no doubt, it helps accurate attribution.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>Attribution is a challenge in the cyber domain. However,
as shown in this paper, heuristics can guide the most
optimal search based on some structural configurations with a
weight system. Eventually, it is capable of limiting the
search time of information discovery heuristics in
supporting cyber operations. Linking purpose, methods, time,
location, and events with the identified device, the proposed
heuristic approach can serve as a path towards accurate and
prompt attribution.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Beebe</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2009</year>
          .
          <article-title>Digital Forensic Research: the Good, the Bad and the Unaddressed</article-title>
          . Advances in Digital Forensics V, Springer. pp.
          <fpage>17</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>36</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Chen</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2016</year>
          .
          <article-title>Contextual Binding and Intelligent Targeting</article-title>
          .
          <source>Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence</source>
          . pp.
          <fpage>701</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>704</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Chen</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          &amp;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Dinerman</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2016</year>
          .
          <article-title>On Cyber Dominance in Modern Warfare</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security</source>
          . pp.
          <fpage>52</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>57</lpage>
          . Reading, UK: Academic Conferences &amp; Publishing
          <string-name>
            <surname>International (ACPI) Limited</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kosash</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>1998</year>
          .
          <article-title>An Introduction to Heuristic Algorithms</article-title>
          . University of Trento, Italy.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Marti</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          &amp;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Reinelt</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>G.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2011</year>
          .
          <article-title>Heuristic Methods. The Linear Ordering Problem, Exact and Heuristic Methods in Combinatorial Optimization 175</article-title>
          , DOI: 10.1007/978-3-
          <fpage>642</fpage>
          -16729-
          <issue>4</issue>
          _2. pp.
          <fpage>17</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>40</lpage>
          . Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sinek</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2009</year>
          .
          <article-title>Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action</article-title>
          . USA: Penguin Group.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sterner</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>E.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2011</year>
          . Deterrence in Cyberspace: Yes, No, Maybe. Returning to Fundamentals: Deterrence and
          <string-name>
            <surname>U.S. National</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Security in the 21st Century</article-title>
          . pp.
          <fpage>27</fpage>
          .
          <string-name>
            <surname>Washington</surname>
            <given-names>DC</given-names>
          </string-name>
          : George C. Marshall Institute.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>