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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Method, algorithm and implementation of vehicles GNSS information protection with help of anti-jamming and anti-spoo ng</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Larisa Dobryakova</string-name>
          <email>ldobryakova@wi.zut.edu.pl</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Lukasz Lemieszewski</string-name>
          <email>llemieszewski@ajp.edu.pl</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Evgeny Ochin</string-name>
          <email>e.ochin@am.szczecin.pl</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Maritime University of Szczecin, Faculty of Navigation</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Szczecin</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="PL">Poland</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>The Jacob of Paradies University, Department of Technology</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Gorzow Wielkopolski</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="PL">Poland</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>West Pomeranian University of Technology, Faculty of Computer Science and Information Technologies</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Szczecin</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="PL">Poland</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>31</fpage>
      <lpage>40</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Jamming and anti-jamming technologies have become an important research topic within the GNSS discipline. While many GNSS receivers leave large space for signal dynamics, enough power space is left for the GNSS signals to be jammed. The goal of jamming is adding a noise to the satellite signal and fooling the receiver not to use signals plus noise for positioning calculations. The goal of spoo ng is a falsi cation of the satellite signal and fooling the receiver to generate a false position; thus, misleading the navigator. This article discusses the experimental approach to anti-jamming and anti-spoo ng based on the shielding of the antennas from the jammers and spoofers signals to develop an algorithm for the built-in protection system. In experimental studies, we used two types of screens: the metal funnel and the system of metallic concentric rings on a metal substrate. We also brie y consider the commercial civilian and military jammers. The presented algorithm enables the development of an integrated vehicle safety system.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>algorithm</kwd>
        <kwd>protection</kwd>
        <kwd>vehicles</kwd>
        <kwd>GNSS</kwd>
        <kwd>attacks</kwd>
        <kwd>jamming</kwd>
        <kwd>anti-jamming</kwd>
        <kwd>spoo ng</kwd>
        <kwd>anti-spoo ng</kwd>
        <kwd>shielding</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>Satellite based positioning provides the world's most precise location
information. It is possible to acquire positioning anywhere in the world where the GNSS
satellite signals are available any time of day at data rates up to 100 Hz. Raging
currents, rugged coastlines, narrow passageways, and high winds all contribute
to making marine environments some of the most challenging navigation
conditions in the world. Modern GNSS receivers, antennas, and post-processing
software provide precise, accurate, and reliable positioning measurements for a
wide range of marine applications.</p>
      <p>
        Ability and quality of measuring and monitoring the GNSS signals are
critical to assessing GNSS system usability and performance. The GNSS receiver
technology relies on signals broadcast from satellites orbiting 20 000 km above
the Earth at a frequency of approximately -163 dBW or about the strength of a
single Christmas tree bulb. This makes GNSS signals susceptible to interference
from many sources [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Jamming is a purposeful creation of active interference to reduce the
signal/noise ratio of the GNSS satellite signals. Usually, it is a part of electronic
warfare. Jamming may be targeted to all or some recipients of the signal. The
device for silencing is called the jammer.</p>
      <p>Generally, purpose of jamming is to prevent the useful information or a signal
receiver or, at least, creating inconvenience to him. As the object of jamming
can be any receiver insu ciently protected from external in uences signals:
radio, radar beacon, the wireless network, the mobile phone (or base station), etc.
Jamming can be used in actual combat conditions and in the cases of the
information war, or even competitive telecommunications companies or broadcast,
to make completely disable the security system or to transfer it to the unservice
mode.</p>
      <p>
        Development Unmanned Vehicle (UV) caused developing the special-purpose
technologies both for military and dual-use applications. And it is not only the
traditional system of military intelligence, but, also, rapidly developing
electronic warfare systems including mobile systems of noise suppression radar and
radio navigation systems (jamming) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] and mobile jamming and/or spoo ng the
GNSS signals [2, 9{16].
2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Interference for unmanned vehicles</title>
      <p>
        For positioning unmanned vehicles (UV), the GNSS and Inertial Navigation
System (INS) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3, 4</xref>
        ] are used. Accuracy of positioning using INS is not su cient.
The GNSS corrected the work of INS. Creation a radio interference eld for
GNSS neutralizes UV. Information from navigational monitoring devices is not
re ected in the observation area and is not up-to-dated. Furthermore, UV
themselves without knowing its coordinates with a high probability can not return to
the base and will be lost. In areas where there are woods or forest, you can not
see under the trees any objects of interest, such as a human or animal, even in
the winter when there are no leaves on the trees. Not by chance, all advertising
UV are applied to the treeless terrain with a smooth relief, i.e., in relation to
the deserts and water surfaces.
      </p>
      <p>Emphasize the importance of UV as a means of electronic warfare, i.e.,
media jammers and/or spoofers of the GNSS. In this case, the radar will observe
hundreds of decoys and the GNSS-receiver will be switched from real signals of
the GNSS to false ones.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Generation of radio noise to suppress the GNSS signals</title>
      <p>The availability and usage of low-cost GNSS jamming devices has resulted in the
increased threat of intentional and unintentional disruption of commercial and
industrial systems that rely on precise GNSS data. The basic scheme of jamming
is shown in Fig. 1.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Algorithm for the main scenario of GNSS jamming</title>
      <p>It is well known that the use of directional antennas weaken the jammer signal,
and, in some cases, it is blocked to 100%. You can use a metal funnel to change
the directionality of antenna. The main scenario of the GNSS jamming using a
funnel is shown in Fig. 2. A vehicle during normal operation carries tra c using
the GNSS. The minimal elevation angle min is known for satellite above the
horizon at which the antenna can \see" the satellites.</p>
      <p>The terrorist located at a distance from vehicle broadcasts to the vehicle a
high power radio noise or a fake signals from the spoofer and suppresses a mode
of the normal operation using GNSS. The maximal elevation angle max of the
jammer above the horizon at which the antenna \does not see" the jammer (Fig.
2).</p>
      <p>In most practical situations
funnel (angle ) you can select as</p>
      <p>, so the main parameter of shielding type
= ( + )=2.
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Experimental study of EMI shielding type funnel</title>
      <p>To test the e ectiveness of shielding type funnel, we performed experimental
studies. The funnel was made from an aluminum sheet of diameter 300 mm and
height 86.6 mm (Fig. 3). The elevation of jammer changed from 0 to a value
at which jammer \drowned" normal browser operation. The experiment showed
that this angle is almost coincided with the main parameter of funnel-shieldede
one (angle ) equal 30 .</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>The main scenario of GNSS jamming and EMI shielding</title>
      <p>
        As described in point 4, that the use of directional antennas weaken the jammer
signal, and, in some cases, it is blocked to 100%. You can use a system of metallic
concentric rings on a metal substrate to change the directionality of the antenna.
A vehicle during normal operation carries tra c using the GNSS. The antenna
Y can \see" all satellites. Terrorist located at a distance from vehicle broadcasts
to the vehicle a high power radio noise or a fake signals from the spoofer and
suppresses a mode of the normal operation using GNSS (Fig. 4). Details related
to di raction of electromagnetic wave from a jammer was described in detail in
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref9">5, 9</xref>
        ].
7
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Experimental study of EMI shielding with help of metallic concentric rings</title>
      <p>In real experiments, we used ve metallic concentric rings (Fig. 5). To test the
e ectiveness of shielding with help of metallic concentric rings, we performed
experimental studies. A jammer was used as a source of electromagnetic radiation.</p>
      <sec id="sec-7-1">
        <title>Experiment #1. Wave front propagates parallel to the X axis.</title>
        <p>The purpose of this experiment was to nd out the minimum distance along
the X axis, from which it would be possible to receive the GNSS signal using
a jammer and a screen shield. The distance was systematically increased every
10 cm between the GNSS receiver and the jammer until the satellite signal was
received by the GNSS antenna Y , as shown in Fig. 6.</p>
        <p>When the jammer was as close to the screen as possible, the antenna received
the noise from the jammer. Then, the jammer was moved in the direction x
until the receiver captured genuine GNSS signals with the help of the antenna
Y . The result of the experiment is R = 3:6 m.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-2">
        <title>Experiment #2. Wave front propagates at the angle to the axis</title>
        <p>X, 2 f15 ; 10 ; 5 ; 0 ; 5 ; 10 ; 15 g</p>
        <p>The purpose of the next experiment was to determine how the relative height
of the jammer a ected the receivers reception despite the use of the screen. As
in the previous experiment, the distance was systematically increased by 10 cm
each time, but at di erent height levels between the GNSS receiver and the
jammer until the satellite signal was received by GNSS antenna Y , as shown in
Fig. 7.</p>
        <p>When the jammer was as close to the screen as possible, the antenna received
the noise from the jammer. The jammer was then moved in the direction (x) at
the angle to the axis X, 2 f15 ; 10 ; 5 ; 0 ; 5 ; 10 ; 15 g until the receiver
captured the GNSS signals again with the help of the antenna Y . The results of
the experiment are shown in Table 1.
8</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Commercial civilian GNSS jammers</title>
      <sec id="sec-8-1">
        <title>GNSS jammer for a car</title>
        <p>
          There are a few civilians that use jamming GNSS signals, mostly privacy related,
including the ability to conceal oneself or one's vehicle, in the case, when it is
being tracked by a GNSS receiver. A practical application would be a
salesperson or delivery driver that may wish to lunch outside their territory or return
home for a forgotten item without having to do a lot of explaining due to the
GNSS tracking on their vehicle. The range of the most civilian GNSS jammers is
su cient to cover even the largest of vehicles giving the user a cloak of privacy
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          For car, truck, bus, van, or even boat security, stopping the GNSS tracking
signals is provided by simply plugging the jammer into any cigarette lighter or
vehicle power outlet of 12V. With up to 10 meter coverage, it will protect you
from being detected. It will automatically protect you by blocking any GNSS
signals that are being sent to track you inside and outside your vehicle. This
tracking jammer is a popular item with sales personnel, truckers, and delivery
drivers, who wish to take lunch or make a personal stop outside of their territory
or route \o the radar" [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-8-2">
        <title>8.2 Cell GNSS PRO</title>
        <p>The PRO model secures the area and prevents both cell phone and GNSS
application with the most popular combination of the cell phone and GNSS units.
This high powered handheld PRO model features a built-in fan to keep the unit
cool during extended periods of use, as well as switch selectable settings; so, you
can choose which channels to block. The PRO creates a protected zone around
you, your vehicle, or your meeting by blocking cellular and/or GNSS signals at a
distance of up to 25 meters (under best conditions). The indicator lights on top
of the unit con rm which bands are actively being inhibited, and the durable
rubber coated antennas will not be brken with rugged use.
8.3</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-8-3">
        <title>High power combination unit</title>
        <p>This model provides secure area coverage and prevents both cell phone and
GNSS application with our highest powered handheld. This model features a
built-in fan to keep the unit cool during extended periods of use, as well as
switch selectable settings; so, one can choose, which channels to block.</p>
        <p>Jamming:
700{800 MHz (4G)
850{965 MHz (GSM)
2400{2500 MHz
2500{2700 MHz
2100{2170 MHz (3G)
1800{1990 MHz (PCS)</p>
        <p>GNSS L1
GNSS L2
9</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Military GNSS jammers</title>
      <p>
        In the world, there are many di erent versions of Military GNSS jammers. Here,
we give as an example the station Autobase-M 1L222M (Fig. 8), which may
operate in a mode jammer. The 1L222M \Autobase-M" complex is the
executive radio-technical reconnaissance (EW) mobile complex component with the
jamming stations SPN-2/SPN-4 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
In this study of GNSS anti-jam and anti-spoof techniques, we have contributed
by summarizing various approaches and discussed open research issues in the
eld [9{16]. Di erent GNSS jammers attack in various ways and their attacks are
signi cantly di erent. For instance, a constant jammer consumes all resources
available and continuously jams the GNSS, but it is easily detected. On the
other hand, a smart jammer senses the medium and only attacks when a certain
condition is satis ed. So, it is a good choice for resource-constrained hardware.
Shielding of the UV antenna in order to protect against GNSS-spoo ng, and the
reduction of di raction at the edge of the shielding rings are presented in detail.
Physical experiments have shown that the distance between the GNSS receiver
and the jammer or spoofer, as well as the di erence in altitude between the two
devices, has a signi cant e ect on the resulting disturbance of the receiver. The
higher the setting of the receiver is, the easier it is for the jammer or spoofer
to suppress the original satellite signal. Moreover, if a jammer or spoofer has
a periodic low power, it is hard to detect it; a powerful jammer or spoofer will
certainly jam (spoof) most of the networks but will be easily detected. The
presented physical experiments and algorithm created on their basis will allow
to develop a program for the built-in vehicles safety system.
      </p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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