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        <article-title>The Truth of Nagarjuna: Something Beyond Nirvana</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Dr. Erden Miray YAZGAN YALKIN</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Garfield &amp; Priest</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Op.Cit, p.6</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>İstanbul University, Literature Faculty, Philosophy Department, Systematical Philosophy Sub Department</institution>
          ,
          <country country="TR">Turkey</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
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      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>By considering his (in terms of) Logic-related works, we shall call Arya Nagarjuna as
the most important Buddhist thinker in the Indian Antiquity. The most important parts
of his works are the criticisms of thoughts which were presented by Buddhist tradition.
Nagarjuna, who develops his ideas from the critical point of view by considering both
Buddhist and it’s opposite Nyaya system of thoughts, is accepted as the founder of
Madhyamaka which is called either Buddhist and also unique system of thought as its
own. This brilliant and famous dialectician in his own period, manifests the most
important parts of the fundemental princibles of his doctrine by six of his works.
Especially four of six, which are throughly related with his studies on logic, includes
these fundemental principles. Theese four main logical works of his are known as
Vigraha-vyavartani-karika, Pramana-vihetana/Pramana-vidhvamsana,
Upaya-kausalyahrydra-sastra and Mulamadhyamaka-karika (MMK). First three of these works contains
his criticisms on Aksapada’s logical studies and alternative ideas that he developed in
this direction. But of course, undoubtedly the most important work of his own is MMK,
which is also a milestone in the Indian history of logic. Buddhist doctrine accepts
Nirvana as undetermined one. However, on the contrary to this, Nagarjuna shows in his
doctrine that just because of what Buddhist thinkers generally say: “Nirvana can not
be undetermined one”, it also can not be the ultimate truth but it only can be the one
face of The Truth. In fact, according to Nagarjuna, the ultimate truth itself is “ there is
not a such a thing as ultimate truth”; if one needs to talk about The Truth itself, only
this can be said: “Everything -even emptiness itself- is empty”.1According to
Nagarjuna, Nirvana is a concept which needs to be solved in the context of The Truth.
In his MMK, he proves that it is not such a thing hat we can call as ultimate. And
beside this, by asking “…so what is Truth?”, he asserts that it is something as we can
call a dialectical whole which is also beyond Nirvana. In this paper by considering this
first we will talk little bit about his criticisms in MMK on Svabhava and Nasti to figure
out his understanding of essence as emptiness. Secondly, we will take a look at two
fundamental Buddhist Princibles called Madhmayamaka and Catuskoti to understand
how he epistemologically and logically grounds his both ontological and metaphysical
ideas on two faces of the truth as so called Samsara and Nirvana. Than we will have
our clear conclusion on The Truth by explaining what we are metioning with
“Something beyond Nirvana”: “The Truth is there is no Truth at all!”</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Conclusion</title>
      <p>According to Nagarjuna Nirvana which was advised by Buddha as absolute Truth is
sunyata (emptiness).2 Nagarjuna defends that for understanding of the subject sunyata
(emptiness) first it must be make clear and comprehend that what sunya (being empty)
is. As it was mentioned before one by one every being, even emptiness itself is empty. 3
Here what means by empty is something not being in something, being empty concern
of being non-exist. As stated in Nagarjuna, this thing which is not being exist in other
thing itself is svabhava (substance).4 Shortly by Nagarjuna being empty be identified as
not including substance in itself. In this direction Nagarjuna asserts in his MMK that
non-of the beings have substances in themselves.5 In line with Nyaya doctrine svabhava
is something that does not depend on anything or occur, non-changeable,
nonconceptual, non-comprehensible, stable, ineffable something which does not contains
any varieties.6 According to Nagarjuna just because of that it is not possible to say
anything about its existency. So, no bhavas (beings) includes svabhavas.7As Nagarjuna
mentions, being empty does not mean non existency at all.8 Emptiness itself is the
cause of interdepended existency.9 Nagarjuna says that every being does asset win in
some determined relations between each other. In other way to put this, everything
coarise contingently and dependently to eachother10 These conditional situations do
appear as qualities, reasons, results, and etc.11 Every being does come to being with
some qualities and combined between each other.</p>
      <p>Nagarjuna explains this situation in the frame of Madhmayamaka (absolute
middle/middle way) as everything (every bhavas) being asset win independently from
svabahva (substance) but inter-related with other beings. This also means that the
whole only assets win with particles (pieces) by principle of interdependent existency
(that is contingently and dependently co-arisen (svabhava /essence)) and vice versa. 12
This interdependent existence means that no being that does not have substance
(svabhava) could exist independently from each other. On account of being empty,
every being are equal to each other in terms of ontology. 13 These every equal beings
2Priest, “Nāgārjuna’s Mulamadhyakamakarika”, p. 132.; Satischandra, Op.Cit, p. 252.
3Garfield &amp; Priest, “Nagarjuna and The Limits of Thought”, p. 6.
4Westerhoff, Op.Cit, p. 19.
5Priest, “Nāgārjuna’s Mulamadhyakamakarika”, p. 130; Garfield &amp; Graham, “Nagarjuna and The
Limits of Thought”, p. 6; Satischandra, Op.Cit, p. 254.
6Richard Hubert Jones, “The Nature and Function of Nāgārjuna's Arguments”, Philosophy East and
West, Vol. 28, No. 4, University of Hawaii Press, Oct., 1978, p.488; Robinson, Op.Cit, p. 326.
7Robinson, Op.Cit, p. 325-331, 326; Westerhoff, Op.Cit, p. 24.
8Garfield, Op.Cit, p. 6.
9Ibid
10Robinson, Op.Cit, p. 326; Garfield &amp; Priest, “Nagarjuna and The Limits of Thought”, p.6.
11Priest, “Nāgārjuna’s Mulamadhyakamakarika”, p. 130.
12Satischandra, Op.Cit, p.254; Garfield, “Nagarjuna and The Limits of Thought”, p. 6.</p>
      <p>13Priest, “Nāgārjuna’s Mulamadhyakamakarika”, p. 131.
does exist because of this principle itself. Nagarjuna gives examples on his ideas of
interdependent existency in MMK.14 According to him substantiality of spacial
qualities of something can not be asserted. And the very reason of this is un-possibility
of referring spacial qualities of something without its existence (while it is non-exist).
And in the same way it is not possible to talk about something which does not have
spacial qualities.15 As it is understood, according to Nagarjuna the principle of
interdependent existency becomes the shape of absolute existency.16In this direction,
the absolute existence is existing as being empty that is emptiness (sunyata) itself. By
sa ying everything -even emptiness itself -is empty Nagarjuna mentions that the
emptiness which he approves as absolute Truth (sunyata) does asset win with this
essence which he calls as absolute True. And by saying the only thing which does not
exist is something which is not empty, he asserts that the only and very Truth is there is
no ultimate Truth as absolute truth at all. Yet when we talk about Truth by considering
its existency this Truth itself must be empty. And accordance with this essence
(sunyata), its (Truth) existency necessitate another being which it can interdependently
exist by completing that dualist structure of theirs. 17</p>
      <p>Nagarjuna’s explanation of absolute existency as being the principle of
interdependent existency and by that mentioning two kinds of existency as being
interdependent and absolute can cause us to think that he comprehends Buddha’s
doctrine of absolute middle (middle way) as something does exist or vice versa, but
both of them are true anyway. Thusly Satischandra in his History of Indian Logic 18says
that Nagarjuna asserts and accepts that both of these premises are True and the
knowledge is some kind of reality that leads us to some kind of Truth.19Absolute
middle/middle ways is to see the whole picture as both being and non-being. In this
regard, absolute middle/middle way shoudl not understand as something right between
extreme ends. As a matter of fact, what is mentioning here is not something like
acceptance of the third choice (possibility) between being and non-being. At the same
time, by considering absolute middle/middle way it does not mean to avoid these
extreme ends and rejecting them. Because absolute middle/middle way which brings all
every determination under itself, under one unique whole does not stands beyond these
determinations. It is a unifying principle. Every particular determination takes their
characteristics from this universal unity.20Therefore in Nagarjuna’s doctrine absolute
middle/middle way means avoiding two extreeme ends and arrive at an agreement
between them. To say it in other way, it is the cognizance of division of two kinds of
satyas (Truths) which stays on the base of its ontological, epistemological and
metaphysical sights and the cognizance of unity at this division. Once this division get
comprehend as whole (One), Nirvana which is the fundamental element of Buddhism
will show itself up to us as absolute Truth.</p>
      <p>Nagarjuna, the frame of his madhmayamaka (absolute middle/middle way)
Doctrine drow attentions to two Realities which corresponds to comprehension of two
14Garfield, Op.Cit, p. 149-152.
15Garfield &amp; Priest, Op.Cit, p. 6.
16Ibid
17Ibid, p.7.
18Satischandra, Op.Cit, p. 254.
19Priest, “Nāgārjuna’sMulamadhyakamakarika”, p. 131; Garfiedl &amp; Priest, Op.Cit, p. 6,10.
20Ibid, p. 251.</p>
      <p>Truths and two Truth Values which gives us these Realities.21 The truths which stays in
field of conditional Truths and gives us Conditional Realities are called as Conditional
truths (trues). Conditional truths (trues) are all about empirical world (the world in
appearance).22 By more open statement we shall say, the premises which includes
knowledges about being or non-beings in combined relations carries these kinds of
Truth Values. Conditional Truths (trues) are the Truths (trues) that are adopted in daily
life, relative and deceptive time to time. Because of that they never give us absolute
Realities and so absolute Truths.23Particular beings which are exist because of absolute
being namely conditional beings and related things to their complex relationships are
the conditional Truths (trues). These conditional Truths (trues) only gives us
conditional realities. In other way to put it conditional beings and conditional true
values about them only about conditional realities.24 Becuase of that Conditional truth
values (trues) only helps us to comprehend conditional Truth itself. Conditional
Realities conceptually points at the field of conditional Truth. This understanding of
Conditional Truth has a very important place in Nagarjuna’s system because of the
comprehension of absolute Truth that is called Nirvana. Conditional Truth is a step
which carries us to hold absolute Truth. In MMK 24:8-10 Nagarjuna makes it very
clear from Buddha’s mouth (as we have mentioned before).25 According to us, the field
of conditional Truth for Nagarjuna is a cyclical field which includes every component
of absolute being and presents us some truths (trues) which can help us to comprehend
the conditional Truth. This so called the Conditional Truth is the field which we can
call as Samsara (which is a very fundamental element of Buddhism again).26</p>
      <p>According to Nagarjuna knowing Nirvana (the Absolute Truth) is only possible by
comprehension of absolute True. The Absolute True is the judgement of -everything is
empty.27 On account of this, it is possible to cognize sunyata (emptiness) as absolute
True.28 In this context sunyata points at the absolute direction of The Truth. As we have
mentioned before, emptiness is the absence of svabhava in every particular being. 29
And this emptiness is the principle of interdependent existency itself as absolute being
(existency). Absolute being is the essence that expresses imperative (necessary)
relations between imperative (necessary) beings which Nagarjuna asserts as implicit
knowledge adversely to Nyaya’s substance in particular beings. Because this essence is
something exist in and for itself and for other beings that exist because of it, it has its
characteristics as being absolute. Absolute True gives us absolute Reality and thus
absolute being (existency). In this respect, absolute reality is essence which is absolute.
Nagarjuna, moving from his acceptance of absolute Reality which is put forward by
absolute True corresponds to conceptionally the field of absolute Truth, asserts that
absolute Truth itself is the emptiness which is absolute as it is.</p>
      <p>21Westerhoff, Op.Cit, p. 9; Jones, Op.Cit, p. 495; Garfield &amp; Graham, Op.Cit, p. 4; Jones, Op.Cit,
p.495.
22Garfield &amp; Priest, Op.Cit, p. 5.
23Priest, Graham, “Nāgārjuna’s Mulamadhyakamakarika”, p. 2.
24Garfield &amp; Priest, Op.Cit, p.7.
25Priest, “Nāgārjuna’s Mulamadhyakamakarika”, p. 131.
26Westerhoff, Op.Cit, p. 9.
27Garfield &amp; Priest, a.g.e., p. 6.; Priest, “Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyakamakarika”, p. 4.
28Ibid
29 Robinson, Op.Cit, p. 326. Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of philosophy in India,
p.3; Westerhoff, Op.Cit, p. 53.</p>
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