=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-2051/paper5
|storemode=property
|title=Open Data for Accountability in the Fight Against Corruption
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2051/paper5.pdf
|volume=Vol-2051
|authors=Joris Hulstijn,Darusalam Darusalam,Marijn Janssen
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/prima/HulstijnDJ17
}}
==Open Data for Accountability in the Fight Against Corruption==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2051/paper5.pdf
Open data for accountability in the fight against
corruption
Joris Hulstijn1 Darusalam Darusalam2 Marijn Janssen2
1
Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg University
2 Department of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology
j.hulstijn@uvt.nl, d.darusalam@tudelft.nl, M.F.W.H.A.Janssen@tudelft.nl
Abstract. There has been a lot of research on the use of open data in the fight
against corruption. Although there are some promising examples, it appears that
a systematic approach is lacking. What are the design principles for an
architecture to open up data and thereby reduce corruption? In this paper we use
theory about fraud, and about public accountability to derive design principles
for an open data architecture. Crucial is the sustained presence of a specific
forum: a group of people who are critical, have expertise, are free to challenge
the authorities. Unlike the general public, a specific forum has an interest in
reviewing the data. The architecture is motivated and illustrated by an extensive
example of an E-procurement system in the context of an anticorruption program
in Palembang, Indonesia.
1 Introduction
There has been a lot of attention for ‘opening up’ government data in the
field of e-government [28]. One particular application area of open data
is the fight against corruption. Corruption is a complex and difficult
problem, also in government [12]. Corruption can harm society and
result in increased poverty, reduce available money for essential public
services, destroy citizens’ trust in government and undermine economic
growth [26]. There are many factors that can lead to corruption in
government [21]. In principle, addressing these different factors will lead
to different approaches in the fight against corruption. In this paper, we
will focus on the factors of transparency and accountability. Therefore
we investigate a particular strategy to fight corruption: to open up
government data to the public [25]. One of the claimed benefits of open
data is that the government becomes more transparent and accountable
[15]. This appears intuitive. Open data allows scrutiny by the public,
which will reduce opportunities for corruption and increase changes of
detection. Indeed, there are successful examples of e-government
systems to reduce corruption, see [16] and [2] (p 265-266). There have
also been examples of system to open up government data to reduce
corruption, for example in Brazil. A recent study by Transparency
International [14] shows that a lot has been achieved in Brazil.
“Nonetheless, open data is still underutilized, and anti-corruption
enforcement is weak” [14](p 4). In particular, there are problems with
data quality. Moreover, the initiatives lack involvement: when there is a
‘lead’ there is not always a follow up. Apparently, the relationship
between open data, transparency and accountability and eventually
reducing corruption is not immediate, but rests on specific assumptions.
For instance, in the context of corporate governance, Elia argues that
opening up too much data, in too much detail, is pointless or even
counterproductive [11]. Details of illicit behavior may be drowned out.
In this discussion paper we therefore propose design principles for an
open data architecture that should foster accountability, and in turn,
reduce opportunities for corruption. We will take a theoretical approach,
based on an analogy with fraud [1, 9], and theory of public accountability
by Bovens [3]. Following Day and Klein [10], Bovens characterizes
accountability as a dialogue between an actor and a ‘significant other’,
called the forum. The actor feels obliged to provide accounts of its
conduct to the forum. In order to hold the actor accountable, the forum
should be critical and powerful enough to ask for explanations, and
eventually pass judgement about the conduct of the actor.
To motivate the approach and validate the design principles, we
discuss a case study of an e-procurement system at the local government
of Palembang in Indonesia.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
a background on corruption and how it can be reduced. Section explain
the idea of accountability as a dialogue, and derives some general
principles about the actor and the forum. Section 3 applies these
principles to an architecture for opening up data. Section 4, finally,
discusses application of these ideas in the Palembang case study.
2 Corruption and Fraud
In this section we provide a background of the notion of corruption in
government and how it can be reduced. Corruption is an important topic
that deserves a proper literature review. In this discussion paper, we
cannot provide a full review. Instead, we will focus on two elements.
First, we will draw an analogy with fraud, and derive three ways to
address corruption. Second, we will discuss anti-corruption strategies.
The word ‘corruption’ is based on Latin: corrumpere means to spoil
or destroy. Corruption is defined as “behavior which deviates from the
normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close
private clique) pecuniary or status gains” [21] (p. 4). An additional aspect
of corruption in the case of government, is the misuse of power [12]. So
similar to the notion of fraud, which is defined as a violation of trust [9],
corruption involves the misuse of responsibilities related to a public role
or duty. For instance, corruption involves “bribery (use of reward to
pervert the judgments of a person in a position of trust), nepotism
(bestowal of patronage because of ascriptive relationship rather than
merit), and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources
for private-regarding uses” [21] (p. 4).
Figure 1. Fraud triangle [1, 9]
There is an interesting analogy between corruption and the notion of
fraud as studied in accounting [1] and criminology [9]. In Figure 1, fraud
is depicted as a triangle, involving three necessary elements.
(1) Opportunity: the actor has been trusted with responsibilities that
involve certain powers (budget; decision rights),
(2) Pressure: the actor has a ‘non-shareable problem’ (e.g. financial
problems, status), and misuse of trust can offer a ‘private solution’
(3) Rationalization: the actor provides a kind of explanation for crossing
the line: “I am only borrowing the money” or “others do it too”.
The triangle suggests three ways of reducing fraud or corruption. These
are effectively means to improve management control [19] and the
system of internal controls [8], in particular the control environment.
First, one could try to reduce opportunities for corruption. That means
limiting the powers of an actor in a certain role, by putting administrative
restrictions in the procedures or by recording details of execution (audit
trail). This is the easiest element to adjust. In modern organizations,
many institutional powers are controlled by ICT, such as the ERP system
or business process management system. In accounting, there is a lot of
expertise on ways to strengthen internal controls, partly by means of ICT.
In particular, there are so called application controls, which are built into
software applications. For instance, there are authorization tables,
restrictions on the budget a person can control, on tariffs and pricing
policies, etc. In addition, there are also many manual controls, that are
supported by technological means. For instance, if all invoices are
numbered consecutively, it is harder to make one disappear. Finally,
there are the IT general controls, that help to maintain a reliable control
environment. In particular, consider such measures as segregation of
duties, audit trail, access controls, logging and monitoring [23]
Second, one could try to reduce pressure. In the financial sector there
has been a lot of debate about remuneration. If you pay people enough,
is the argument, there should be less incentives to misuse trust for
personal gains. However, the evidence as to the effectiveness of this
measure is inconclusive, at best [24]. Another option to reduce pressure
is suggested by Cressey’s original paper [9]: foster an environment in
which people feel safe to discuss problems. In this way, when people do
have a problem (gambling debts, dissatisfaction), they are less likely to
see misuse of trust as a way out. For example, one could implement a
regular meeting structure, in which officials have an opportunity to
discuss – in secret – difficult decisions with peers.
Third, one could try to raise moral standards and make it harder for
people to ‘rationalize’ misuse of trust. This is perhaps the most effective
but also the hardest option. It involves elements of organizational
culture, such as public values, social practices and role models [13, 22].
Organizational culture can’t be managed directly. Instead, one can only
try and improve side conditions. The ‘tone at the top’ makes an enormous
difference. For example, in the Enron case, efforts to improve
compliance were useless, as executives themselves were seen to violate
the rules [24]. Public values such as quality awareness, safety or
integrity, can be stimulated. For example, to stimulate quality awareness,
one could routinely publish examples of products that are rejected. This
will demonstrate the borderline. Practices and procedures may help to
reach consensus. If it is mandatory to rate and discuss quality of a
product with colleagues, this will help establish a common threshold.
We will now discuss an example from the literature, to see how these
approaches to fraud are applied.
Example. Kim [16] reports about the OPEN system, as part of a long-
term effort in Korea to fight corruption (1998-2007). The OPEN system
“is an online system used to disclose administrative procedures (likely
to be related to corruption) to citizens in various public service areas
(such as housing and construction, sanitation, and urban planning,
among others).” [16] (p 45). The purpose was to improve efficiency, by
preventing unnecessary delays or unfair handling by civil servants, and
also to improve transparency in some areas of civil administration.
First, such a system is likely to reduce opportunities for corruption. By
allowing citizens to view the procedures and status of their requests, an
audit trail is created. Decisions can be compared. Moreover, the system
was supported by projects to clarify the procedures and design systems
that simplify, standardize, and de-personalize delivery of services [16].
Second, we do not know if the system helped to reduce pressure. We
do know, that the system reduced personal contact between applicants
and officials [16], thus reducing opportunities to be put under pressure.
Third, the ‘tone at the top’ proved decisive. The system was supported
by Kun Koh, mayor of the city of Seoul. “Mayor Koh took resolute steps
to fight corruption. He launched a variety of reform programs which
culminated in the declaration of a ‘War against Corruption’” [16] (p 46).
By doing this, Koy set values such ‘clean’ and ‘transparent’ as norms
that no one could deny.
Strategies to Combat Corruption
Activities to reduce corruption are often presented as phases in an anti-
corruption cycle: prevention, detection, investigation and sanction [20].
Alternatively, the literature mentions four strategies to combat
corruption: prevention, enforcement, access to information and
empowerment, and capacity building [16]. Unlike the stages, which
focus on officials, these strategies also assign an important role to
citizens. They indicate how ICT or open data can help: by providing
access to information and empowering citizens, and by helping to
organize and improve expertise, i.e. capacity building. In the next
section, we will try to make these ideas about empowerment more
systematic, by relating them to a theory of public accountability.
3 Accountability as a dialogue
Accountability has positive connotations, and is used as a kind of
synonym to good governance. However, the meaning of the term
depends on the context, on a relationship with others: “Accountability
can be defined as a social relationship in which an actor feels an
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant
other” [10]. According to Bovens [3, 4] an accountability relationship
involves an actor and a forum (Figure 2). The actor can be a person or
agency. Then there is some significant other, who can be a person or
agency, but can also be a more abstract entity, such as God or ‘the
public’. Bovens calls this the forum.
Figure 2. Accountability as a dialogue
The accountability relationship develops in three stages. First, the
actor must feel obliged to inform the forum about its conduct, including
justifications in case of failure. The obligation may be both formal, i.e.,
required by law or by contract, or informal and self-imposed, for instance
because the actor is dependent on the forum. Second, the information
may be reason for the forum to challenge the actor, ask for explanations
and debate the adequacy of the conduct. The actor responds, providing
additional facts or motivations. Third, the forum passes judgement on
the actor’s conduct. A negative judgment often leads to some kind of
sanction; again this can be both formal and informal. This means that an
accountability relation should provide room for discussion: it is not a
one-way stream of reports, but rather a dialogue. The process can be
formalized as a dialogue game [5].
Bovens [3] identifies five necessary conditions of public
accountability, which characterize the dialogue game just described:
(1) “public accessibility of the account giving—and not purely internal,
discrete informing;
(2) explanation and justification of conduct—and not propaganda, or the
provision of information or instructions to the general public;
(3) the explanation should be directed at a specific forum—and not be
given at random;
(4) the actor must feel obliged to come forward—instead of being at
liberty to provide any account whatsoever; and
(5) there must be a possibility for debate and judgment, including an
optional imposition of (informal) sanctions, by the forum—and not
a monologue without engagement” [3] (p 185); italics added.
The prototypical example of an accountability relation exists between
government and parliament, where parliament derives its power from the
population, and can send the government home (confidence vote).
Journalists play an important role, demanding transparency and
challenging the government. By informing the public, they can mobilize
the underlying power of parliament.
Another example of an accountability relation is auditing [6, 5]. In that
case, management is the actor, reporting the annual financial accounts.
The shareholders act as a forum. The forum is assisted by an auditor,
who has the expertise and authority to evaluate the financial accounts,
compare them to standards and norms and provide assurance about their
reliability [17]. However, the auditor as such has little power. The power
derives from the shareholders, or other powerful stakeholders, such as
the board of directors or regulators.
Based on these examples, we derive four additional necessary
conditions for a fruitful accountability relationship, compare also [6] .
(6) The organization of the actor must provide reliable reports about its
conduct. Reports must be accurate (correspond to reality) and
complete (contain all relevant aspects of reality). In practice this can
be ascertained by internal controls.
(7) The forum must be independent of the actor, allowing it to challenge
the actor, as stated in (5) above. In particular, the forum should not
depend on the actor for employment. Individual members should not
have family ties, or personal relationships.
(8) The forum must have, or have access to, expertise, to evaluate the
reports, compare them to standards and norms, and eventually pass
judgement. If necessary, the forum can be supported by experts or
auditors, who possess specific expertise. That means that those
experts must also be independent.
(9) The forum must wield enough power or influence over the actor to
“make the actor feel obliged to come forward” as in (4), and to have
a credible claim to sanctions, as in (5). In particular, when the actor
is dependent on the forum in some way, the forum has the power to
withhold whatever the actor depends upon.
4 An open data architecture for accountability
So how can we apply these ideas to an open data architecture?
An architecture is a set of fundamental concepts or properties of a
system in its environment, embodied in its elements, relationships, and
in the principles of its design and evolution [18] (p 2).
What are the components, what are their relationships, and what are
the design principles? If we want to conform to conditions (1) – (9)
above, we have to include some form of governance. So we will treat
architecture here in a broad sense, including also the organizational
structure. An open data architecture is a socio-technical system [7].
1. Creating Data (e.g.
producing, collecting,
storing and paying for
data)
(Governmental) 2. Opening data
organizations
5. Discussing and
providing feedback on
(linked) open data
Users
3. Finding open data
4. Using open data (e.g.
curating, annotating,
enhancing, processing,
visualising, linking)
Figure 1. Conceptualizing open data [27] (p 157)
At first sight, an open data architecture seems to be just a website to
publish data in a particular format. The website makes the data available
to the forum (D0. Availability). Crucial elements are the legislation,
policies and business rules that determine which data eventually gets
published (D1. Data selection). Published data should be relevant to the
issues addressed by the application, and later to the challenges or
inquiries made. Data should be fit to be published. In particular, state
secrets, data that are recognized to be confidential (e.g. medical;
military) or data about individual persons should not be published. This
means that data selection should involve a careful trade-off between
transparency and confidentiality. Ideally, the forum should have an
advisory role on setting the roles and policies for data selection.
Moreover, data sets should adhere to representation standards, that
improve interoperability between various systems, and allow for
comparison (D2. Representation standards). Data sets are filled with real
data by interfaces with day-to-day operational systems, such as databases
and ERP systems (D3. Content). A coherent system of internal controls
should help guarantee reliability of the data (accuracy and completeness)
(D4. Reliability). Note that completeness is hard to ensure, as it involves
comparison to what is considered to be ‘all’. Once selected for
publication, officials should not be able to delete data or obstruct
publication. Finally, the architecture should have features to respond to
challenges and inquiries with data that are relevant (D5. Relevance).
Because accountability involves a relationship, the architecture should
not only focus on what governments have to do in order to reliably ‘open
up’ data sets, but also on the forum. That means in particular that the
architecture should have components for the forum to gather, and
mobilize support (F0. Mobilize). Consider for example outlets on social
media. Clearly, mobilizing a forum is not the responsibility of the
government! The government should collaborate with those institutions
that happen to represent the forum, such as pressure groups, branch
organizations, watchdogs, regulators, parliaments, etc. Given such
collaboration, the platform should allow all members of the forum easy
access (F1. Access). The platform should have components for the
forum, or experts and auditors, to analyze the data (F2. Analysis). The
architecture should have components to pose challenges and questions,
about specific data elements and get a relevant proper response
(F3. Challenge and response), see also D5. Responses should be
archived, and should in principle also be made public (F4. Archive). In
some cases, absence of a response would also be telling. Finally, the
architecture should make it possible to escalate and file complaints, in
case of a suspected deviation from the policies (F5. Complaints
procedure). In addition, the architecture should have specific support for
journalists, experts or auditors (F1 and F2).
The list of requirements is summarized in Table 1.
Data publishing requirements Forum requirements
D0. Availability F0. Mobilize
D1. Data selection policies F1. Access
D2. Representation standard F2. Analysis
D3. Content F3. Challenge and response
D4. Reliability F4. Archive
D5. Relevant F5. Complaints procedure
Table 1. Requirements for an open data architecture, focusing both on
publishing open data (D) and on the role of the forum (F)
5. Case: E-procurement in Palembang
Data Collection Data for this case study was collected by investigating
various sources, including the official website, official documents, prior
research and the participating observations of one of the authors.
Case Description. The local government in Palembang South Sumatera
Indonesia uses the Systems Electronic Procurement Service (LPSE) for
the procurement of government goods and services. The LPSE system
has been introduced to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, quality, and
transparency in the procurement of goods and services. The system
matches vendors and governments. LPSE is hosted by a unit formed
across ministries and other institutions. This system facilitates
procurement officers and also provides services for the provider of goods
and services, in the territory of the LPSE concerned.
The procurement process starts by defining the needs, which is
followed by publishing the Request for Quotation (RFQ). Next, suppliers
receive the RFQ and develop their quotes. The supplier sends the quotes
to government, government who receives the proposals. Once the
proposals are received and the deadline has passed, the proposals are
evaluated and supplier(s) will be selected and a final tender will be
requested and the contract is signed. Thereafter follows the execution of
the contract in which the products and services are delivered and paid.
Finally, the delivered products and services can be evaluated.
According to local government regulation, all working units of local
government must use the LPSE system. This should prevent bypassing
and the risks of fraud. All the working units are obliged to announce their
planning, implementation and results of their procurement processes via
the LPSE system. As such, there is a huge potential for opening data.
The types of data available in the LPSE system are as follows:
Auction announcement: The LPSE system provides an
announcement about what types of procurement are available from
working units in Palembang;
Information about system failure: The system provides information
in case a package cannot be generated, or if a file failed to upload, so
the system can provide solutions;
Electronic Catalogue (EC): This catalogue provides a detailed listing
of vendor offerings. For example, description of products, prices,
delivery times.
Monitoring and online evaluation: The system provides information
about planning packages of procurements, financial progress,
physical progress, procurement of goods and services progress;
Whistleblowing: The LPSE system has a link to
https://wbs.lkpp.go.id/container.php. This website provides an
opportunity for a person who has information about illegal, unethical
or corruption related behavior related to procurement. The person
can report these activities to the corruption watch or audit board.
In the current system, all this data is not yet open to the public. In the
next section we present patterns for opening data.
Case Problem. How could opening up such data, help to reduce
corruption?
Case Solution. In earlier research on the case, we found six types of
patterns for corruption detection, which are presented in Table 2. These
patterns are all based on internal control measures [23].
Evaluation. The patterns show that not only the resulting data should be
opened, but also information about the operation of the administrative
processes and the implemented internal control measures to prevent
corruption should be opened. However, these internal control principles
are not commonly known. Accounting expertise is needed to evaluate
which segregations of duties, ought to be met. This puts additional
requirements on the kind of audience that the Palembang authorities are
trying to reach. Without proper guidance, providing such meta-data may
distract users from viewing the actual procurements.
Pattern name Description Categorization
1. Storing and opening Opening of documents generated in Process data
documentation several activities
2. Cross-data Comparison of data collected in Process data
comparison different phase to detect discrepancies
3. Four-eyes-principle Process data, should demonstrate that Control data
decisions are made by at least two
independent persons
4. Segregations of Process data, should demonstrate that Control data
Duties a single individual or department is
not allowed to process a transaction in
its entirety
5. Authorization Process data, should demonstrate that Control data
only people who are authorized to
approve an activity, have done so
6. Application controls Opening of data about built in Control data
measures to avoid the making of
mistakes and the availability of alerts
in the system
Table 2. Opening data, based on patterns to detect corruption
A possible ‘forum’ for this case is the pool of potential vendors. It is
likely that competitors of the vendor who received the procurement
contract, have enough interest to actually analyze the data, and challenge
the local government in case of irregularities. Collectively, the pool of
vendors is large enough to wield some power or influence over the local
government, as they form a substantial portion of the voting population.
The most promising pattern seems to be number 2: cross data
comparison. This may help to identify whether awarded contracts
actually conform to the stated contract requirements, and whether there
are any oddities in awarding behavior.
6 Conclusions
Opening up government data to the public, seems a good strategy to try
and fight corruption. The claim is that opening up government data will
somehow improve transparency and accountability. Current examples of
systems that attempt to open up data in the fight against corruption,
therefore make an ad hoc impression. In this paper, we have tried to
provide some theoretical underpinning to these attempts, in two ways.
First, we have used an analogy with fraud, to identify three ways of
reducing fraud or corruption: (1) by reducing opportunities for misuse of
trust, essentially by strengthening the internal controls, (2) by fostering
an environment in which people talk about their problems, before they
become insurmountable, and (3) by stimulating an organizational
culture, in which normative decisions are being discussed and recorded,
establishing consensus on norms and values.
Second, we have used the theory of public accountability of Bovens,
with five necessary conditions for a fruitful accountability relationship.
Based on an analogy with accounting, we derived another four necessary
conditions: reliable reporting (for the actor), and independence, expertise
and power (for the forum). These conditions can be translated into a set
of five requirements for an architecture and governance procedure for
opening up data (Availability, Data selection policies, Representation
standard, Content, Reliability, Relevance) and five requirements
focusing on establishing a critical forum (Mobilize, Access, Analysis,
Challenge and response, Archive and Complaints procedure).
Some of these requirements were discussed in the context of a case
study of an e-procurements system in Palembang, that makes it possible
to open up crucial data about the procurement process. The case shows
that indeed it is crucial to identify a specific forum. This is contrary to
current practice in the open data community, where data is being opened
up for a general public, in the hope they will find some purpose for it
(e.g. hackatons). Lack of a specific audience and purpose for the data
being shared, means in particular, that reliability and relevance are hard
to establish. This may partly explain the current problems with data
quality that are reported for many open data initiatives, e.g. [28].
In the Palembang e-Procurement case, it is likely that the forum will
include vendors, in particular the competitors of those vendors who
received the contract, because they have an incentive to protect their
interests. The case also shows, that it makes sense to open up meta-data,
to reveal if the internal controls that ensure reliable reporting, are
effective. However, this will require the forum to involve experts, such
as accountants, who can interpret and evaluate such data.
Future research will have to show whether also the dialogue-related
aspects of the theory are valid in this case.
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