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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>WS-Policy and Beyond: Application of OWL Defaults to Web Service Policies</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vladimir Kolovski</string-name>
          <email>kolovski@cs.umd.edu</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Bijan Parsia</string-name>
          <email>bparsia@cs.man.ac.uk</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>College Park, MD</addr-line>
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>School of Computer Science, The University of Manchester</institution>
          ,
          <country country="UK">UK</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Recently, there has been an increased amount of attention dedicated to WS-Policy - it has become a W3C submission and a working group was formed to standardize the specification. In our previous work, we provided a mapping of WS-Policy to OWL-DL. In this paper, we continue that work by analyzing the operation of policy intersection (determining whether two web service policies are compatible). We show how this operation motivates the use of a non-monotonic extension of OWL in the form of OWL default rules. We discuss our prototype implementation of an OWL defaults reasoner based on Baader and Hollunder's terminological defaults.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Recently, there have been many different web service policy language proposals with
varying degrees of expressivity and complexity [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref21 ref6">21, 6, 1</xref>
        ]. One of these languages,
WSPolicy became a W3C member submission and is the basis for the WS-Policy working
group 3.
      </p>
      <p>
        In previous work [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] we described a translation of WS-Policy to a standardized
logic (OWL-DL). This mapping essentially provided a formal semantics for the
framework, and allowed us to use an OWL DL reasoner for policy processing tasks such as
determining policy equivalence, incompatibility, containment, incoherence and
explanation. In this paper, we provide additional results on the translation by exploring the
operation of policy intersection. This operation determines whether two policies are
compatible and generally involves domain-specific processing. In the official
specification of WS-Policy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
        ], only an approximation algorithm is defined for this operation.
Instead, we describe an algorithm based on OWL-DL extended with default rules.
Because default logic is computationally more expensive than the logic behind OWL-DL,
we do provide clear motivations for our usage of defaults.
      </p>
      <p>
        To provide reasoning support for OWL defaults we have extended an open-source
OWL-DL reasoner (Pellet). Our implementation is based on Baader and Hollunder’s
3 WS-Policy Working Group web site: http://www.w3.org/2002/ws/policy/
terminological default logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] (adapted to OWL-DL). To retain decidability, the
terminological default logic of Baader and Hollunder restricts the default rules to named
individuals only, similar to DL-safe rules. We provide a brief description of our system
in Section 6.
2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Preliminaries</title>
      <p>In this section we provide brief overview of the WS-Policy framework and Reiter’s
default logic, which served as the basis of our implementation.
2.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>WS-Policy Framework Overview</title>
        <p>The WS-Policy Framework provides a general purpose model and syntax to describe
the policies of a Web service. Its scope is limited to allowing endpoints to specify
requirements and capabilities needed for establishing a connection. Its initial goal is not
to be used as a language for expressing more complex, application-specific policies that
take effect after the connection is established. For this purpose, WS-Policy introduces
a simple and extensible grammar that consists of assertions and alternatives.</p>
        <p>An assertion is the basic unit of a policy. For example, an assertion could declare that
the message should be encrypted. The actual definitions and meaning of the assertions
are domain-dependent and not defined in the WS-Policy Framework. An assertion is
defined by a unique Qualified Name, and can be a simple string or a complex object
with many sub elements and attributes. Note that an assertion can contain a nested
policy expression.</p>
        <p>A set of assertions is called a policy alternative, and a set of alternatives comprises
a policy. For an alternative to be supported by a web service requester, all assertions in
that alternative have to be satisfied by that requester. For a policy to be supported by a
requester, one or more alternatives need to be supported. Following is a schema outline
for the normal form of a policy expression:
Reiter’s default logic is a nonmonotonic formalism for expressing commonsense rules
of reasoning. These rules, called default rules (or simply defaults), are of the form:
α : β</p>
        <p>γ
where α, β, γ are first-order formulae. We say α is the prerequisite of the rule, β is
the justification and γ the consequent. Intuitively, a default rule can be read as: if I can
prove the prerequisite from what I believe, and the justification is consistent with what
I believe, then add the consequent to my set of beliefs.
&lt;wsp:Policy&gt;
&lt;wsp:ExactlyOne&gt;</p>
        <p>[ &lt;wsp:All&gt; [&lt;Assertion&gt;
&lt;/wsp:ExactlyOne&gt;
&lt;/wsp:Policy&gt;
2.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Default Logic</title>
        <p>&lt;/Assertion&gt;]* &lt;/wsp:All&gt; ]*
Definition 1 A default theory is a pair hW , Di where W is a set of closed first-order
formulae (containing the initial world description) and D is a set of default rules. A
default theory is closed if there are no free variables in its default rules.</p>
        <p>Possible sets of conclusions from a default theory are defined in terms of extensions
of the theory. Extensions are deductively closed sets of formulae that also include the
original set of facts from the world description. Extensions are also closed under the
application of defaults in D - we keep applying default rules as long as possible to
generate an extension.</p>
        <p>Default rules can conflict. A simple example is when two defaults d1 and d2 are
applicable yet the consequent of d1 is inconsistent with the consequent of d2. We then
typically end up with two extensions: one where the consequent of d1 holds, and one
where the consequent of d2 holds.
3</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Updated OWL-DL Mapping</title>
      <p>
        In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] we presented a mapping of WS-Policy to OWL-DL based on the idea that
service policy assertions and alternatives were mapped to classes, and web service
requesters are mapped to OWL individuals. With this mapping, checking whether a web
service requester satisfies a particular policy can then be reduced to simply checking
whether the OWL individual representing the requester is a member of the OWL class
representing the policy. The mapping was relatively simple since there are only two
relevant constructs in a WS-Policy in a normal form (&lt;wsp:exactlyOne&gt;, &lt;wsp:All&gt;).
Due to the name of one of the operators (&lt;wsp:exactlyOne&gt;) and the ambiguity in
the WS-Policy specifications, we translated it to a logical XOR. Thus the policy P =
ExactlyOne(A, B) was mapped to the description logic expression: P = (A t B) u
¬(A u B) (&lt;wsp:All&gt; was mapped to logical conjunction).
      </p>
      <p>However, due to the open world assumption present in OWL-DL, our previous
mapping produces non-intuitive results. For example, if a request r comes in such that r : A,
and the policy P contains only two alternatives, A and B, we will not be able to infer
that the request r satisfies P (i.e., r is of type (A t B) u ¬(A u B) ) unless we
explicitly state that r : ¬B. To solve this issue, we simplified the mapping to represent
&lt;wsp:exactlyOne&gt; as logical disjunction (inclusive OR), and in addition we have made
the classes representing the alternatives pair-wise disjoint, so even though a requester
supports more than one alternative, he cannot use more than one at a time. This updated
translation is more concise than the old one (compare A t B with (A t B) u ¬(A u B)).
In this scenario, if a requester comes in that is a member of two alternatives, we will get
an inconsistency.</p>
      <p>Example 1. Consider the example policy in Figure 1. For each policy assertion, we
have a separate OWL class (RequireDerivedKeys, WssUsernameToken10,
WssUsernameToken11). Then, each alternative is simply the conjunction of its
assertions.</p>
      <p>Alt1 ≡ RequireDerivedKeys u WssUsernameToken10</p>
      <p>
        Alt2 ≡ RequireDerivedKeys u WssUsernameToken11
In our previous work [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] on WS-Policy, we described the services that DL
reasoners provide regarding policies: containment, equivalence, incompatibility, incoherence
(nothing can satisfy the policy) and policy conformance, among others. Thus, the
mapping allows us to use an off-the-shelf OWL reasoner as a policy engine and analysis
tool, and an off-the-shelf OWL editor as a policy development and integration
environment. OWL editors can also be used to develop domain specific assertion languages
(essentially, domain ontologies) with a uniform syntax and well specified semantics.
      </p>
      <p>
        There is one additional reasoning service that is useful for policies and warrants
more discussion. It has been argued (see [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] for example) that explanation is a crucial
requirement for a policy language. To address this requirement, we can use recent
advances in the field of debugging OWL ontologies [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ], esp. in providing explanations
for both ontology inconsistencies and arbitrary entailments for OWL-DL.
      </p>
      <p>
        For example, the why query mentioned in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] can be handled by the explanation for
arbitrary entailments. If a user asks why the requester r satisfies the policy P, then the
debugging framework is simply asked to provide justification for the type assertion r:P.
On the other hand, if a web service request causes an inconsistency (for example
because of violating a domain disjointness constraint), then the debugging framework can
provide explanation of why the inconsistency occurred. More specifically, if an
OWLDL ontology is inconsistent, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ] provides the minimal set of axioms in the ontology
that causes the inconsistency (the set of axioms is called a justification).
      </p>
      <p>These techniques are already implemented in Pellet, and there is also a UI for
debugging implemented in SWOOP.
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Policy Intersection</title>
      <p>
        Policy intersection is used when a web service requester and provider both express
policies and want to compute the compatible policy alternatives between them. This
commutative and associative function takes two policies as input and returns a policy
containing the compatible alternatives. As defined in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
        ], two alternatives are
compatible if each assertion in the first alternative is compatible with an assertion in the
second, and vice-versa. If two policy alternatives are compatible, their intersection is an
alternative containing all of the assertions in both alternatives.
      </p>
      <p>Determining whether two policy alternatives are compatible involves domain-specific
processing. In an attempt to automate the operation, one might be tempted to mark the
incompatible policy assertions as mutually disjoint classes. Then, to determine whether
two policies A and B are compatible we only check whether A u B is satisfiable.
However, this will prevent us from having entities support assertions of different types, since
it will render the policy ontology inconsistent. Since it is usually the case that entities
do support different assertion types (example: an entity can support some specific
encoding and some type of reliability, and encoding and reliability are different assertion
types), the simple approach of marking incompatible assertions as disjoint classes is
incorrect.</p>
      <p>To overcome this problem, we introduce an additional property in the policy
ontology - compatibleWith. Then, for two policy assertion classes A and B, if we want to
say that A is not compatible with B, we can simply use A v ¬∃compatibleWith.B.</p>
      <p>
        As stated in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
        ], assertion authors are encouraged to factor assertions such that two
assertions of the same assertion type are typically compatible. We can model this using
inheritance hierarchies (with exceptions). For instance, the policy modeler can state that
for two classes representing assertions C, D, which she knows are compatible, every
pair of classes Ci, Di that are subclasses of C, D (i.e., Ci v C and Di v D) is also
compatible by default. This can be expressed with the following default rule:
C(x) ∧ D(y) : compatibleWith(x, y)
      </p>
      <p>compatibleWith(x, y)</p>
      <p>In the cases when two assertions are incompatible (even though they are a inherit
from the same type) the policy developer can add a disjoint axiom by hand, overriding
the default rule above.</p>
      <p>The basic algorithm would be as follows: for two policies A and B and a default
theory KB = hW, Di (where W is an OWL-DL ontology and D is a set of defaults), to
determine whether they are compatible start with the alternatives of A and try to find one
compatible alternative in B, and vice-versa. If for at least one alternative in one policy,
we succeed in finding compatible alternatives in the other policy, we conclude that the
policies can intersect. The intersection of the policies is the policy containing the
mutually compatible set of alternatives. To determine whether two alternatives are
compatible, we try to match their assertions. For each assertion Asserta ∈ A, we try to find
an assertion Assertb ∈ B s.t. KB |= compatibleWith(Asserta, Assertb).
If the assertion has a nested policy, then we try to match it with a nested policy from the
other alternative, by asking recursively whether they are compatible.
6</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>OWL Defaults</title>
      <p>
        Both of the default logic scenarios described above could be plausibly met with Reiter’s
default logic, which is one of the most studied non-monotonic logics. Reiter’s default
logic, while very expressive, is, like many non-monotonic formalisms, known to be
computationally difficult even in the propositional case. In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], Baader and Hollunder
showed that even a restricted form of defaults coupled with a description logic that
contains a smaller set of constructors than OWL-DL was undecidable. They also showed
that if one restricted the defaults to apply only to named individuals (or, equivalently,
restricted the logic to closed defaults), then a robust decidability ensued.
      </p>
      <p>
        We have implemented a prototype of the terminological defaults of Baader and
Hollunder that is based on recent advances in description logic reasoning: tableaux tracing
for the description logic SHOIN and incremental reasoning support. The
implementation is provided as an extension to Pellet and it provides realization of individuals in
terminological default theories. We have also provided a UI for defaults by extending
the open source OWL Ontology editor SWOOP. More specifically, we added support
for default rules editing and updating the current ontology with the set of inferred facts
from the defaults. We refer the reader to [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] for more details.
7
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Related Work</title>
      <p>
        There have been a number of proposals for ontology-based web policy systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref16 ref18 ref8">16, 10,
18, 8</xref>
        ] - because of lack of space, we will only briefly cover Rei and KaOS.
      </p>
      <p>
        Rei [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] is a policy specification language based on a combination of OWL-Lite,
logic-like variables and rules. It allows users to develop declarative policies over domain
specific ontologies in RDF and OWL. Rei allows policies to be specified as constraints
over allowable and obligated actions on resources in the environment. A distinguishing
feature of Rei is that it includes specifications for speech acts for remote policy
management and policy analysis specifications like what-if analysis and use-case management.
Our goal is to encode WS-Policy in a not very expressive logic formalism (so as to be
able to perform policy analysis), and our opinion is that we do not need a language as
expressive as Rei for WS-Policy.
      </p>
      <p>
        KaOS Policy and Domain Services [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ] use ontology concepts encoded in OWL
to build policies. These policies constrain allowable actions performed by actors which
might be clients or agents. The KAoS Policy Service distinguishes between
authorizations and obligations. The applicability of the policy is defined by a class of
situations which definition can contain components specifying required history, state and
currently undertaken action. Even though we use the same representation language as
KaOS (OWL-DL), our reasoning support is provided by tableaux-based description
logic reasoners which are sound and complete for OWL-DL. In addition, by using
Pellet we were able to leverage its ontology debugging support.
      </p>
      <p>
        In addition, there are a number of proposals [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref20">20, 14</xref>
        ] of policy/authorization
languages based on logic programs extended with default rules - the difference with our
approach is that we use description logics as the underlying logic formalism.
8
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Conclusions and Future Work</title>
      <p>While most policy language proposals are based on logic programs, in this paper we
explored the alternative of using OWL-DL as a language for expressing web service
policies. We argued that the policy services that DL reasoners provide out of the box,
the advances in explanation mechanisms for DL, and the ability to closely integrate
OWL-DL with default logic make an OWL-based policy framework worth exploring.
Also, OWL-DL is a W3C standard, a language with clear syntax and semantics that is
ubiquitous in the Semantic Web. As a consequence, the number of reasoners and
OWLDL editors has been growing steadily. A policy language based on OWL-DL should be
able to capitalize on the popularity of OWL-DL.</p>
      <p>
        Despite the advantages mentioned above, policies, being associated with rules first
and foremost, seem to demand greater expressivity than OWL-DL (as argued in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ],
for example) in the form of monotonic rules. However, because of the recent advances
in hybrid (description logic + logic programs) knowledge bases, and successful
implementations ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ] ) we believe that OWL-DL combined with rules is reaching a maturity
level where it will be a suitable alternative for a policy framework.
      </p>
      <p>
        During the past couple of years, there has been great advances [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref19 ref5 ref7">7, 5, 19, 17</xref>
        ] in the
area of automated trust negotiation (ATN) between policy entities. ATN deals with the
problem of exchanging of sensitive credentials between strangers in order to establish
trust. We plan to investigate how we can integrate our OWL-based system with such
mechanisms.
      </p>
      <p>
        Finally, it is unfortunate that we cannot provide clear semantics for policy
intersection because its dependence on domain-specific reasoning. The WS-Policy
framework requires each domain to specify its own policy assertions, but there is no generic,
domain-independent language for expressing these assertions. As a result, every
domain has its own language (with unclear semantics ) that makes it hard to reason and
analyze the assertions. We plan to investigate how we could couple OWL with concrete
domains (e.g. XPath) so as to be able to express and give semantics to some of these
domains. A promising step toward a domain-independent policy assertions language is
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]; we plan to investigate the idea further.
8
      </p>
    </sec>
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