=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-2137/ws_SoLe_paper_1.pdf
|storemode=property
|title=Toward a BFO-Based Deontic Ontology
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2137/ws_SoLe_paper_1.pdf
|volume=Vol-2137
|authors=Brian Donohue
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/icbo/Donohue17
}}
==Toward a BFO-Based Deontic Ontology==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2137/ws_SoLe_paper_1.pdf
Toward a BFO-Based Deontic Ontology
Brian Donohue*
Department of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, 135 Park Hall, Buffalo NY, USA
ABSTRACT ties, namely, two classes from BFO (relational quality,
This paper discusses four candidate ways of categorizing constraint- role), one from Document Acts Ontology (D-Acts) (socio-
oriented deontic entities such as obligation, claim, permission, prohibition,
immunity, and right within the framework of Basic Formal Ontology: (1) legal generically dependent continuant), and one from IAO
relational quality, (2) role, (3) socio-legal generically dependent continuant (directive information entity). I argue that the first three of
(Document Acts Ontology), and (4) directive information entity (Infor- these should be rejected and the fourth adopted. I conclude
mation Artifact Ontology). Its principal thesis is that such entities are best with a few remarks on future work.
categorized as species of directive information entity. After considering
each candidate, rejecting the first three, and endorsing the fourth, the
paper concludes with some preliminary discussion of how to define obli- 2 THE VARIETIES OF DEONTIC ENTITY
gation as a subtype of directive information entity, namely, as a directive An initial step in the development of a deontic ontology
information entity that is issued with normative authority.
is to situate the many varieties of deontic entity into a few
intuitive, provisional groupings. One such grouping com-
1 INTRODUCTION prises those entities that concern whether an agent is con-
Recent research in biomedical information systems rec- strained with respect to some type of action or particular
ognizes the need for ontologies to formally represent deon- course of action, e.g., obligation, claim, permission, prohi-
tic entities and their relationships, e.g., a health-care profes- bition, immunity, and right. Thus, an obligation (require-
sional’s obligations to her patients, a patient’s claim to in- ment, duty) to perform some action constrains an agent’s
formation requisite for consent, the relationship between a available courses of action. Obviously the constraint in
health-care professional’s obligation and a patient’s claim question is not a restriction upon what is physically possible
on that professional, a surgeon’s permission to bring a pa- for the agent. Rather, intuitively an obligation is a constraint
tient under the knife, a husband’s power to make proxy de- upon an action in the sense that it prescribes an action that,
cisions for his incapacitated wife, a hospital administrator’s were an agent to fail to perform that action, he would (legit-
authority over her staff, a patient’s immunity from coercion, imately) be subject to blame or censure. Similar considera-
institutional norms and policies, or any of the details of fed- tions apply to notions like prohibition, where the prohibition
eral, state, and local health-care law (Almeida, et al., 2012; against doing X is a constraint not to perform X, or permis-
Brochhausen, et al., 2013; Dumontier, et al., 2014; Lin, et sion, where the permission to do X is (or at least implies) a
al., 2014; Lin, et al., 2016; Smith, 2016). The development constraint against others inhibiting the agent from doing X.
of a general ontology of deontic entities would be useful to Notions such as rule, norm, and law might fall within this
this end since it could be reused not only within particular first grouping insofar as they are likewise concerned with
biomedical ontologies, but also within other domains of constraints upon agents’ actions. However, at least from the
interest, including legal knowledge bases and military doc- perspective of ordinary language, it might be awkward to
trine and intelligence. group obligations or rights together with laws. The reason is
This paper takes some initial steps toward the develop- that rights and obligations are in some colloquial sense
ment of such an ontology by addressing the question of “had” by agents. By contrast, even if agents are subject to
where to situate the categories of obligation and right within the directives of a law or rule or norm, such entities are not
the context of Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) (Arp, et al., in the same sense “had” by agents. That is not to say that
2015). Its principal thesis is that right and obligation are rules, norms, and laws might not in fact be ontologically
best categorized as species of the BFO-based Information akin to entities such as rights or obligations. The point is
Artifact Ontology (IAO) class directive information entity. rather, in the interest of orienting this foray into the ontolo-
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, I of- gy of deontic entities, to point out that rules, norms, and
fer an approximate characterization of the relevant kinds of laws, while likewise concerned with action constraints,
deontic entity. In Section 3, I introduce BFO’s distinction might be importantly dissimilar from rights and obligations.
between generic and specific dependence and consider four A second grouping of deontic entities comprises abilities
candidate upper-level categorizations of these deontic enti- to act in ways that have deontic effects, such as (deontic)
power and authority. Such entities, when possessed in some
* To whom correspondence should be addressed: bd26@buffalo.com
sense by agents, enable their bearers to perform acts which
1
Donohue
create, modify, transfer, or eliminate deontic entities identi- nerves, and so forth) in order to exist, whereas B’s headache
fied in the first grouping. Thus, if A has authority over B, (a different particular headache) depends specifically on B
then A is able to impose some (though obviously not just in order to exist. A cannot have B’s headache, and vice ver-
any) obligation upon B. sa, nor can B’s headache be transferred from himself to A.
A third grouping of deontic entities comprises what can By contrast, the novel War and Peace exists only if there
conveniently be called deontic acts, i.e., acts such as prom- is some copy of War and Peace in existence, but its exist-
ising, (authoritatively) commanding, permitting (or consent- ence is not tied specifically to this or that copy. Thus, the
ing), waiving, loaning, lending, and selling. These are acts content of War and Peace generically depends upon some
which realize the deontic abilities of agents and which actu- physical copy, rather than specifically upon some particular
ally create, modify, transfer, or eliminate constraint-like physical copy. Consequently, generically dependent contin-
deontic entities. Such deontic acts have been the subject of uants are transferable, whereas specifically dependent con-
discussion in philosophical circles, in particular, in the con- tinuants are not. An electronic document, unlike a headache,
text of Searle and Reinach’s theories of social acts (or what can be transferred from one hard drive to another, or to dif-
Searle calls speech acts), especially acts of promising, and ferent locations on the same hard drive. In this case, the
their relationship to the emergence of obligations and same particular instance of generically dependent continuant
claims. (i.e., the content) endures though the bearer is different.
The scope of this paper is fairly narrow, in that it only Given BFO’s class hierarchy, I believe that there are four
sets out to determine how to best situate the categories of potentially viable candidates for an upper-level categoriza-
the constraint-like types right and obligation within the tion of right and obligation, all of which are subclasses of
BFO framework—a task which falls short of providing a either specifically or generically dependent continuant. The
full account of what rights and obligations are. Before con- candidates are: relational quality, role, socio-legal generi-
sidering four such candidate upper-level categorizations of cally dependent continuant (D-Acts), and directive infor-
these entities, I will briefly survey the relevant portions of mation entity (IAO). In what follows, I argue that relational
the BFO class hierarchy. quality, role, and socio-legal generically dependent contin-
uant are untenable ways of categorizing right and obliga-
3 CANDIDATE UPPER-LEVEL CATEGORIES tion, and that instead they should be categorized as subtypes
At its uppermost level, BFO partitions all entities into the of directive information.
categories continuant (roughly, three-dimensional entities 3.1 Relational Qualities
that persist through time, such as objects and their proper-
The first candidate is relational quality, a subclass of
ties) and occurrent (roughly, four-dimensional entities that
quality, a subclass of specifically dependent continuant:
occur over time, such as processes), the former of which
divides in turn into those continuants which have independ-
Quality =def. A specifically dependent continuant that,
ent existence (independent continuant) and two classes of
when it exists, needs no process in order to be manifest.
dependent continuants (specifically and generically depend-
ent continuant). The distinction between specifically and
Relational Quality =def. A quality that, when it exists,
generically dependent continuant is of particular importance
inheres in multiple bearers.
for the purposes of this paper, so I will attempt to spell it out
in some detail. (All definitions have been adapted from
Significantly, an annotation on relational quality sug-
BFO’s axioms.)
gests that one example of a relational quality is “an obliga-
tion between one person and another.” The idea here is ap-
Specifically Dependent Continuant =def. A continuant
parently that, if A is obliged to B, then that obligation is a
that depends for its existence upon some specific inde-
relational quality that inheres multiply in each or in the ag-
pendent continuant.
gregate of A and B. This strongly suggests that, at least to
the mind of some of BFO’s developers, obligation should be
Generically Dependent Continuant =def. A continuant
treated as a subclass of relational quality.
that depends for its existence upon some independent
There is some initial plausibility behind this suggested
continuant, but not upon any one in particular.
categorization. Relational qualities are qualities which co-
inhere in multiple bearers and which thus involve relations
Suppose, for example, that both A and B have a head-
of “mutual dependence” (Smith, 1993). To use one of
ache. Now A and B do not have the exact same particular
BFO’s other examples, the existence of a marriage bond
headache, even if they suffer ailments of the same type. The
depends for its existence upon two specific bearers, namely,
reason is that A’s headache (that particular headache) de-
the married partners. Thus, John’s bearing of this quality
pends specifically on A (or on his blood vessels, muscles,
depends upon Mary’s bearing it, and vice versa. Likewise,
2
Toward a BFO-Based Deontic Ontology
John’s obligation to Mary and Mary’s claim on John seem from A to C. If that is correct, then obligations cannot be
to be mutually dependent in this way. Therefore, the line of specifically dependent continuants, and so cannot be rela-
thought concludes, claim and obligation are subtypes of tional qualities. Similar considerations apply to the case of
relational quality. rights (e.g., the transference of property rights).
But this approach is untenable for at least two reasons.
3.2 Roles
First, there is a disparity between the example of being
obliged and the example of a marriage bond, namely, that in Another plausible place to situate right and obligation is
the cases of marriage the same relational quality plausibly under the category of role, which stems from the other main
inheres in both bearers, whereas in the case of being subclass of specifically dependent continuant, namely, real-
obliged, different qualities would inhere in each: an obliga- izable entity. The relevant definitions are:
tion in one and a claim in the other. Even if the obligation
and the claim are mutually dependent on one another, such Realizable Entity =def. A specifically dependent contin-
that if one ceases to exist, then the other also ceases to exist, uant that needs some process in order to become mani-
the two would not be identical entities. If a relational quality fest.
is a particular that inheres simultaneously in two entities,
then one cannot identify that relational quality with a per- Disposition =def. A realizable entity that inheres in a
son’s claim or another person’s obligation without also bearer in virtue of that bearer’s physical makeup.
treating the claim and obligation as identical.
The second, more serious reason why this approach is Role =def. A realizable entity that inheres in a bearer in
unsuccessful is that obligations are not necessarily relational virtue of the bearer’s circumstances.
in this way. Now cases of relational obligations (A’s obliga-
tion to B, which correlates to B’s claim upon A) are com- Thus, whereas qualities generally are non-dormant prop-
mon, but there are also, albeit rare, cases of what Reinach erties, whereas realizable entities are (often) dormant prop-
calls “absolute obligations” (absolute Verbindlichkeiten), erties which become manifest in processes. If the realizable
i.e., obligations an agent has which are not obligations to properties are grounded in the intrinsic physical properties
some other person in particular. In other words, it is possible of the bearer, then they are dispositions. If they are ground-
for A to be obliged to do X, but not obliged to B to do X. ed in the circumstances (whether physical or social) of the
Thus, Reinach claims, a state “is obliged to certain ways of bearer, they are roles. For example, a physician could be
acting, but this obligation does not exist over against any represented as a person who bears a physician role. Moreo-
[specific] persons” (Reinach 1919/1989, 12). In this case, ver, although being a physician may require possessing cer-
Reinach’s point seems to be that this obligation is absolute tain inherent physical properties—e.g., certain physical or
because it is generic, rather than tied to some specific person mental capabilities, or a certain degree and type of medical
(the claimant). Moreover, he notes, it is even possible for B knowledge—a person’s role as physician depends also upon
to “impose [auferlegen]” an absolute obligation on A (if A some social or legal ratification: graduation from an accred-
accepts it) in the absence of any corresponding claim in B. ited institution, a license to practice medicine, and so forth.
Thus, Reinach offers the example of a German Auflage law In this vein, it might be thought that rights and obliga-
which states: “The decedent can oblige his heir or legatee to tions are roles. After all, they seem to dependent entities—
perform a service without letting another acquire a right to intuitively, there can be no obligation unless there is some-
this service” (Reinach 1919/1989, 75). one who is obliged—but they also do not seem to be
With this distinction in hand, we can see why the rela- grounded purely in the inherent physical structure of an enti-
tional quality approach falls short. Even if the first difficulty ty. Rather, they plausibly might be thought to arise in virtue
could be resolved, not all obligations could be categorized of social or legal convention (e.g., as Searle argues, a collec-
as relational qualities since not all obligations are relational tively accepted social rule that promising counts as putting
in this way. Thus, at the very least, the relational quality oneself under an obligation).
approach will not, as a general strategy, take us very far. Attractive as this view may be, it faces a number of ob-
But there is also another, yet more serious objection to jections. The first is that it commits a category mistake. To
this proposal, which arises from the fact that relational qual- see how, consider the pair of statements, ‘John has a physi-
ities are specifically dependent continuants. Because rela- cian role’ and ‘John has an obligation role’. Intuitively, the
tional qualities specifically depend on their bearers, rela- second statement seems to rest on a mistake: a person is not
tional qualities are necessarily non-transferrable, just as a the kind of entity that could have an obligation role. He may
person’s mass or height is non-transferrable. But rights and be an obligor, but not an obligation.
obligations do seem to be transferrable. For example, if A This first objection gestures toward what might be a
promises top pick B up from the airport, but afterward dele- broader problem for the Searlean theory of social ontology
gates this task to C, then the obligation has been transferred (Searle, 1995; 2010), on which the BFO class role is based.
3
Donohue
Searle’s social ontology focuses largely on the question of another aggregate of conscious beings, and that needs to
what grounds social and deontic facts. At some points, he be perceived.
addresses the question of what social objects are, especially
what money is. Searle can do so because—at least, prior to Obligor Role =def. A role that is either he specified out-
the advent of online banking—money can be identified as a put of an obligation generating social act or the concreti-
physical object (a piece of paper) which has a “status- zation of a transferable obligation and that is realized by
function” (the social role of being money). Thus, the fact its bearer being the receiving part of a process that fulfills
that the dollar bill in my pocket is money is partly constitut- the previously agreed upon requirements.
ed by (1) the piece of paper in my pocket and (2) its social
role or status-function. In the case of deontic facts, however, Obligee Role =def. A role that is either the specified out-
there is no obvious physical analogue. That is, there seems put of an obligation generating social act or the concreti-
to be no tangible object that could be identified as the entity zation of a transferable obligation and that is realized by
which bears the social role of being an obligation. Rights its bearer being the providing part of a process that ful-
and obligations may be cases of what Smith calls “free- fills the previously agreed upon requirements.
standing Y terms” (Smith and Searle, 2003), and thus a
place where we are pressed to accept the existence of social Note, first, that the class social act includes as subclasses
entities which do not coincide with any physical entity. acts such as deontic declarations, which create, transfer, or
A second objection is a reiteration of one we saw previ- eliminate SLGDCs or role, and document acts themselves,
ously in the case of relational qualities, namely, that roles which includes any act of creating, transferring, or eliminat-
are specifically dependent continuants, and thus non- ing SLGDCs by means of documents. Note also that the
transferrable, whereas rights and obligations do seem to be connection between rights or obligations and agents is indi-
transferrable. This idea common to both objections, that rect. First an SLGDC is concretized in an obligor or obligee
right and obligations are transferrable, has led to a third role, which is then borne by the agent. Lastly, note that this
candidate upper-level categorization of right and obligation, approach does not commit the same category mistake as the
namely, that they are species of generically dependent con- role view I discussed previously. In D-Acts, a person has the
tinuant. There are, in fact, two relevant proposals. The first role of obligor, but this role is a concretization of a generi-
of these, proposed in initial versions of D-Acts, treats right cally dependent continuant, which is transferrable.
and obligation as socio-legal generically dependent contin- In recent conversation, the authors of D-Acts have sug-
uants. The second, which this present paper endorses, han- gested that they may abandon SLGDCs, and take an agnos-
dles them as species of the IAO class directive information tic position on the nature of deontic entities such as obliga-
entity. tions. Instead, they would aim to track an agent’s obliga-
tions indirectly by means of tracking agents’ obligor and
3.3 Socio-Legal GDCs
obligee roles. Whether this strategy is adequate for such
The principal goal of D-Acts (Almeida, et al., 2012; tracking falls outside the scope of this paper. Let it suffice to
Brochhausen, et al., 2013) is to provide a formal representa- say that there remains some interest in representing rights
tion of what Smith has called “document acts” (Smith, and obligations themselves and their relations to each other,
2012; 2014), acts such as signing or stamping. Like their to deontic powers, and to deontic acts.
speech act counterparts (Searle, 1969), such document acts The SLGDC approach is apparently based on Reinach’s
have “deontic powers”: a contract can create an obligation view that rights and obligations are “temporal objects of a
and a consent form can create the permission to perform a special kind of which one has not yet taken notice,” i.e., that
procedure. Thus, to some extent, D-Acts also aims to repre- they are sui generis. Perhaps this view is correct that rights
sent deontic entities such as rights and obligations. and obligations are radically unlike any other kind of entity.
D-Acts does so by defining a class socio-legal generical- However, from a methodological perspective, it is advisable
ly dependent continuant (SLGDC) along with the classes to treat rights and obligations as sui generis only if we have
social act (following Reinach), obligor and obligee role: first exhausted all other possibilities. Thus, while this view
is perhaps not untenable, it can be rejected if we discover an
Socio-Legal Generically Dependent Continuant =def. acceptable, more conservative ontological approach. The
A generically dependent continuant that comes into ex- following section discusses such an approach.
istence through a social act and that, if it gets concretized,
is concretized as a realizable entity. 3.4 Directive Information Entities
The final proposal draws its impetus from the observation
Social Act =def. A process that is carried out by a con- that rights and obligations are action-guiding. Intuitively, an
scious being or an aggregate of conscious beings, and is obligation specifies a type or course of action, namely, one
spontaneous, directed towards another conscious being or which the obligor is in some sense required to perform.
4
Toward a BFO-Based Deontic Ontology
Likewise, a right specifies a type or course of action which the steps toward those goals. Rather, they merely prescribe
either the right-bearer may perform with impunity (in the an advisable way to achieve this goal. By contrast, some
case of negative rights) or which others must perform for pieces of directive information present themselves to the
her (in the case of positive rights). addressee as mandating some behavior. The directive in-
Such specifications or prescriptions of action have been formation concretized by a stop sign, for example, does not
represented already within IAO under the category of in- merely recommend stopping, but rather mandates (or pre-
formation content entity: sents itself as mandating) stopping. Likewise, an order from
a superior to a subordinate within the context of an organi-
Information Content Entity =def. A generically depend- zational hierarchy does not merely recommend, but man-
ent continuant that is about some thing. dates a course of action.
In this latter case, the directive information prescribes
An information content entity is concretized by some par- some course of action as required. If this prescription is ap-
ticular set of qualities or realizable entities. For example, the propriately authoritative (a point to which I will return in the
content of War and Peace is concretized in the glyphs and following section), then simply in virtue of being the ad-
spaces inside the physical book (Smith, et al., 2013). The dressee of such directive information, that addressee is obli-
class directive information entity is then defined: gated to comply. In the case of the stop-sign, there is a (de-
feasible, prima facie) legal obligation; in the case of the
Directive Information Entity =def. An information con- order, there is a (defeasible, prima facie) professional or
tent entity whose concretizations indicate to their bearer institutional obligation. What, then, is a right or obligation?
how to realize them in a process. Previously we identified them as kinds of constraint upon
action. But this is precisely what at least one species of di-
This definition is somewhat ambiguous insofar as it sug- rective information entity does. Thus, even if not all di-
gests that the concretizations of a directive information enti- rective information entities mandate the courses of action
ty are responsible for indicating how the directive may be they prescribe or specify, directive information entity is
followed. This suggestion makes sense in the case of a reci- nonetheless the appropriate superclass under which to situ-
pe book whose qualities concretize a recipe, since the quali- ate right and obligation.
ties of the recipe book do help indicate how to realize the The second argument is based on the connection between
recipe in the process of cooking. But IAO also speaks of the deontic social acts and the emergence of rights and obliga-
concretization of directive information in the dispositions of tions. Consider, again, the case of a superior issuing an or-
some agent, e.g., the disposition in a prospective chef to der to a subordinate. This issuing of the command is a mani-
cook to follow the recipe. But it is hard to see in this case festation of the superior’s authority over that subordinate—
how the disposition is responsible for “indicating” anything authority which is in large part constituted by the power to
to its bearer (the prospective chef). impose obligations upon his subordinates. But this scenario
Moreover, this definition suggests that the concretizations can also be described in the following terms: the superior is
of a directive information entity always indicate to the bear- the agent of an act of commanding, which conveys directive
ers of those concretizations how the directive may be real- information content to the subordinate, who is the addressee
ized. But this also seems incorrect. For example, a recipe in of that directive information. Here the superior’s authori-
a recipe book certainly bears qualities which concretize the ty—his power to put the subordinate under some obliga-
recipe, but the bearer (the book) is not identical to the ad- tion—is cashed out in terms of the ability to issue binding
dressee of the directive (the prospective chef). directives to the subordinate. Viewed from this angle, these
If we set aside these potential issues with the definition of appear to be two ways of describing the same thing: to put
directive information entity, the proposal is that right and the subordinate under the obligation just is to make him the
obligation can be classified as subtypes of directive infor- addressee of the binding directive because the obligation
mation entity. There are at least two arguments in favor of just is the directive information addressed to the subordi-
this proposal. The first stems from the parity between cases nate. (Similar considerations might be brought to bear upon
of rights and obligations on the one hand and of other direc- the case of promising, which can be described in terms of an
tives on the other. To see how, consider the fact that di- agent’s issuing of a binding directive which has himself as
rective information comes in several flavors. In some cases, the addressee.)
a piece of directive information prescribes or specifies only If entities such as right and obligation are species of di-
an advisable means to achieving some goal. Recipes, maps, rective information entity, and if the latter is the kind of en-
and assembly instructions do not pretend to mandate the tity that needs to be concretized, then one might wonder
adoption of the goals of making particular foods, traveling how right and obligation would be concretized on this pro-
to particular destinations, or assembling particular pieces of posal. The limitations of this present paper will allow only a
furniture. Nor do they pretend to mandate the adoption of few terse remarks on this subject. First, the concretization of
5
Donohue
these directive information entities as rights and obligations ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
must be kept distinct from their concretization in any quali- Thanks are due to Barry Smith and J. Neil Otte for helpful
ties. For example, the directive information of a written or- conversations on the ideas in this paper.
der may be concretized in the qualities of a piece of paper,
but it would be incorrect to describe the piece of paper as REFERENCES
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biomedical domain and beyond.
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