The authors formalise a taboo as a prohibition on speaking (in general, on informing). Three levels of norms are distinguished. First are basic prohibitions, Forbidden X. These are norms which prohibit basic actions, Norm(¬X). Second-level norms comprise primary taboos which prohibit information about facts or fakes, Norm(¬Inf(X)), but permit them to happen. Thirdlevel norms comprise meta-taboos, which prohibit information that a primary taboo exists, Norm(¬Inf(Norm(¬Inf(X)))). The message also is that a taboo on the essential causes A of an effect E can be officially camouflaged with a fake relationship between certain facts B and E. The research in this paper is related with the study of the concept of legal machines and regulatory compliance. Here legal machine is defined as a machine in a system whose actions have legal importance and legal consequences.
The word ‘taboo’ means “a social or religious custom prohibiting or restricting a particular practice or forbidding association with a particular person, place, or thing.”1 A taboo is a vehement prohibition of an action based on the belief that such behaviour is either too sacred or too accursed for ordinary individuals to undertake.2 In the fairy tale “The Emperor’s New Clothes”, an example of a taboo is the prohibition on the mention that the Emperor is naked.3
See The Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/taboo. See Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, “Taboo”, and Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taboo. Common taboos involve restrictions on or ritual regulations for killing and hunting; sex and sexual relationships; reproduction; the dead and their graves; and food and dining (primarily cannibalism). See also the term nefas in archaic Roman law.
Danish author Hans Christian Andersen wrote about two weavers who promise an emperor a new suit of clothes, which they say is invisible to those who are unfit for their positions, stupid, or incompetent. When the Emperor parades before his subjects in his new clothes, no
In this paper, a taboo is treated as a prohibition on speaking (in general, informing). In this way, we narrow the broader meaning of a taboo, which is a prohibition on an action. We restrict ourselves to the prohibition of a specific action, namely informing.
Specifically, a taboo is imposed on giving information about the essential causes of an effect (which is typically evaluated negatively). We assume an effect E, and facts A, B, C that are in a causal relationship with this effect, as denoted by A →c E, B →c E, and C →c E. Suppose A is the main cause, and a taboo is imposed on it, that is, a prohibition on speaking caused by A. We also suppose that the official information is that B causes E, which is fake. This situation is depicted on the left-hand side of Fig. 1. Taboos can have various meanings and social reasons, such as top-down institutional repression, vertical authoritative power, odd morality, etc.
The present research is carried out in the context of legal informatics and the study
of the concept of legal machines; see
The concept of a taboo is briefly overviewed by Duschinsky (2014).4 He notes that
according to Freud, “The meaning of ‘taboo’, as we see it, diverges in two contrary
directions. To us it means, on the one hand, ‘sacred’ or ‘consecrated’, and on the other
‘uncanny’, ‘dangerous’, ‘forbidden’, ‘unclean’”
Taboos may be sensitive from several perspectives: morally, religiously, culturally,
socially, politically, and also legally. Taboo norms can be evaluated negatively,
although various positions can be explored. Broyde (2002) discusses three different
problems: informing a bandit, informing an abusive government, and informing a
(procedurally) just system of government. The view “No prohibition to inform when
government is just” has a place in a discussion
Let us denote by Inf (X) that information about X exists (in reality or in a model such as a database). For example, information that A causes E is denoted by Inf (A →c E). Let us follow the notation in deontic logic and denote that it is forbidden that X by F X or F(X). The obligatoriness of X is denoted by O X and the permissibility of X is denoted by P X. The prohibition F X can be defined as O ¬X (obligatory to omit X, i.e. it is obligatory to not do X) or ¬P X (no permission to do X).
We start by defining taboo as a prohibition to speak. Thus, a restriction is imposed
on a general prohibition F X of any action X. Taboo means that a phenomenon X may
be permitted, but informing about X is prohibited. An example is a taboo on genitals:
4 Duschinsky begins with the following definition: “‘Taboo’ is a Polynesian term, which has
come to refer in Western academic and public discourses to topics, spaces, or practices that
are consecrated as prohibited or to the process itself of marking them off”
A taboo can be expressed with a formula in modal logic T X = def F Inf (X), where T is treated as a modal operator that is syntactically analogical to the deontic operators O, P and F. Formalisation of normativity implies a norm as an entity. A taboo on X means a norm that prohibits informing about X:
Taboo(X) = def N(¬Inf (X)) (1)
In our formalisation, all the entities, including actions, facts and norms, exist as truth (true or false) in the realm of science, i.e. in a model such as a database. Norms N() correspond to the Ought realm or its representation in the model, while Inf corresponds to the Is realm. The irreducible Is-Ought duality corresponds to a very old mythical and religious duality between the Earth and Heaven. In the figures, Is is coloured light green and Ought is coloured blue.
A norm N(A) must be assigned certain semantics. Consider N(A) as a commandment to do A and N(¬A) as a prohibition on doing A. The relation between a norm (rule) and the normative status of the duty can be explored; see Lachmayer (1977), pp. 75–76:
Meta-taboo (X) = def N(¬Inf (N(¬Inf(X)))) (2)
In a literal sense, a meta-taboo can be linked with the expression “taboo on the mention of taboo”, which is used in the literature; cf. Attridge (2014).7 4
A fact, its content and its institutional meaning are distinguished
Consider a language L for expressing statements about facts, fakes and taboos. Its basic entities can be Fact (denoted by FC) or Fake (denoted by FK). The reference area of L sentences comprises more entities. Firstly there is Meaning (ME); then relations, such as Causality (→c), Telos (→te), Equality (→=), and Transformation (→tr); see Fig. 2. The relations hold between the entities and express the semantics of L. Norms 1. The next entity within L is a norm (denoted by N). There are several levels of norms. The first level (Norms 1) comprises norms about facts, N1(FC), and fakes, N1(FK); see Fig. 3.
1. N1(FC) means a commandment to establish a fact FC. For instance,
N(door_closed), represents a commandment to close the door. Closing the door is a
compliant action. This type of norm refers to Fact; see Fig. 3.
2. N1(¬FC) means a prohibition of a fact FC. For instance, N(¬door_closed), means
a prohibition on closing the door. Opening the door is a compliant action. This type
of norm also refers to Fact.
8 Kelsen writes: “The command of a gangster to turn over to him a certain amount of money
has the same subjective meaning as the command of an income-tax official, namely that the
individual at whom the command is directed ought to pay something. But only the command
of the official, not that of the gangster, has the meaning of a valid norm, binding upon the
addressed individual”
We do not explore case 5. It is important only to focus on cases 1 and 2, which refer to Fact, and cases 3 and 4, which refer to Fake.
Info 1 and Norms 2. Information is next entity in L to be explored. Information about X is denoted by Inf(X). More precisely, the latter means the output of an act of informing about X. Information is primarily about facts, fakes and norms. The first-level information, Info 1, firstly comprises informing that FC exists as a fact, denoted by Inf 1(FC), or, secondly, informing that FK exists as a fake, denoted by Inf 1(FK); see link (i) in Fig. 4. This can be treated as follows. Given a (news) statement X, the act of informing Inf 1 produces a flag (or a tag) which means that X is either of true content (thus assigning X to Facts) or false content (thus assigning X to Fakes).
Second-level norms, Norms 2, formalise primitive taboos; see Fig. 4. Here, norms are of the type
N 2(¬Inf 1(FK)) (3)
This means a prohibition N 2 to inform that FK is a fake; see link (ii) in Fig. 4. Hence, Norms 2 secure fakes. Note that Equation (3) above coincides with the righthand side of Equation (1) after substituting X with FK. Fakes flourish (on the basic level) because they are secured by Norms 2. Recall “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.” (https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Edmund_Burke). Therefore Norms 2 can be evaluated as evil.
Info 2 and Norms 3: Meta-taboo. The second level of information, Info 2, consists of information about primitive taboos; see link (iii) in Fig. 5. Indeed, Inf 2(N 2(¬Inf 1(FK)) means an act of informing that a prohibition N 2 exists against informing Inf 1 that a fake FK exists.
The third-level norms, Norms 3, formalise meta-taboos. Here the norms are of type N 3(¬Inf 2()). This means a prohibition N 3 on informing Inf 2 about anything; see link (iv) in Fig. 5. Specifically, Norms 3 comprise a prohibition N 3 to inform, Info 2, that a prohibition N 2 exists to inform, Info 1, that a fake FK exists. Thus a meta-taboo secures a primitive taboo; see the top-down path (iv)–(iii)–(ii)–(i) in Fig. 5. Taboo on Fact. Taboo on fact and taboo on fake form a duality. A taboo on a fact FC, denoted by Taboo(FC), means a prohibition on informing that FC holds as a fact. The proof is based on the idea that FC being a fact implies that ¬FC is a fake. Indeed, the content of FC being true implies that the content of ¬FC is false. Let us apply the taboo on fakes, Equation (3), and substitute FK with ¬FC to obtain N 2(¬Inf 1(¬FC)); this reads ‘A prohibition to inform that ¬FC is a fake’. This is equivalent to reading ‘A prohibition to inform that FC is a fact’. This paragraph explains the definition (1). Example. In the fairy tale, a fact is that the emperor is naked. A taboo is formally imposed on this fact as a norm N 2(¬Inf 1(‘The emperor is naked’ is a fact)). Dually, a fake is that the emperor is wearing new clothes. A taboo is formally imposed on this fake as a norm N 2(¬Inf 1(‘The emperor is wearing new clothes’ is a fake)). Taboo on Any Basic Entity. Above, we have explored the taboo on fakes and facts. A taboo can also be imposed on other basic entities, such as the causal relation between facts, teleology of actions, equality of meaning of facts, transformation of meaning, etc. 5
A binary relation R between two sets S1 and S2 is defined as a subset of a Cartesian product R S1×S2. For any xS1 and yS2 we write xRy to abbreviate (x,y)R. Elements of the set R are pairs (x,y).
Fig. 6. A taboo on a causal relationship A – →c E – is camouflaged in three steps, with a teleological relation →te between B + and a certain goal G +, which is evaluated positively: 1) in fact, both A – and E – are evaluated negatively; 2) therefore, the official version is announced that a certain cause B +, which is evaluated positively, causes E –; 3) a camouflage is that B + serves a good goal G +, which outweighs E –
Several meanings can be assigned to a taboo on the causal relation A →c E between a fact A and an effect E. The original meaning is a prohibition to inform that A causes E. The second idea is a prohibition to inform about the fact A only, Taboo(A). The third meaning is a prohibition to inform about the effect E, Taboo(E), and fourthly, a prohibition to inform about the causality relationship →c (its intentional description), Taboo(→c). The last meaning appears, for example, in the case of a fake official version that the relation A →c E is accidental or a correlation, in other words, the causality →c is simply a mystery of faith (mysterium fidei).
The last taboo, Taboo(→c), can appear, for example, in a network of facts, effects and other entities, such as actions, goals, teleological relations, etc. Suppose a taboo exists on the relation A – →c E –. To camouflage this taboo, a teleological relation B + →te G + can be introduced, where the goal G + is evaluated positively (Fig. 6). Additionally, a fake official version can be introduced that the effect E – is caused by a certain fact B +. Thus the principle “the end justifies the means” is followed. 6
We have modelled the meaning of Andersen’s fable as a taboo on speaking that the emperor is naked. This tale illustrates the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, which defined as a situation where “no one believes, but everyone thinks that everyone else believes” and is mainly studied in social psychology. Hansen (2011) describes pluralistic ignorance as “the phenomenon where a group of people shares a false belief about the beliefs, norms, actions or thoughts of the other group members” and formalises it using epistemic/doxastic logic (based on plausibility models). Hansen focuses on the question of what it takes to dissolve the phenomenon, and talks about the dynamics of knowledge and beliefs of a group of agents. Public announcements are the simplest form of actions. In addition to Andersen’s fable, Hansen provides classical examples including the “questions in a classroom”.9 Hansen formulates examples in terms of beliefs, but notes that pluralistic ignorance is often defined in terms of norms, e.g. “a situation where a majority of group members privately reject a norm, but assume (incorrectly) that most others accept it”; see (Centola et al. 2005). The latter also note that “It is not hard to find everyday examples of this fable in the academic kingdom. We can all think of prestigious scholars who are widely proclaimed as having the most brilliant new ideas, yet privately, people find the work entirely incomprehensible”. Centola et al. study the “willingness to feign support for a public lie” and provide further examples.
We would model the classroom example with a primitive taboo on questions, i.e. a
norm that prohibits students from saying that they have questions. The fact is that
students do have questions.
9 “[T]he classroom example in which, after having presented the students with difficult
material, the teacher asks them whether they have any questions. Even though most students do
not understand the material they may not ask any questions. All the students interpret the
lack of questions from the other students as a sign that they understood the material, and to
avoid being publicly displayed as the stupid one, they dare not ask questions themselves. In
this case the students are ignorant with respect to some facts, but believe that the rest of the
students are not ignorant about the facts.”
Modelling taboo in this paper gives rise to a terminological framework, which is depicted in Fig. 5. Three levels of norms and two levels of information are singled out. We introduce the terms ‘primitive taboo’ and ‘meta-taboo’, which secures the former.