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      <title-group>
        <article-title>Security analysis of Smart Grids</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Gabriel Rodr guez Gustavo Betarte Eduardo Gramp n</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Copyright c by the paper's authors. Copying permitted for private and academic purposes. In: Proceedings of the IV School of Systems and Networks (SSN 2018)</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Valdivia</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="CL">Chile</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The bene ts of Smart Grids are beyond doubt. However, thinking of a future where Smart Meters are ubiquitous raises a lot of concerns regarding security and privacy. Some of these concerns include the disclosure of the personal information of consumers, the provision of false consumption data to the utility, or even concerns of national security such as attacks to attempt to bring down parts of the grid or even the whole grid. The goal of our investigation is to identify and develop methodological proceedings and technical tools which aid in providing guarantees of the correctness of the adopted solutions for the design and implementation of a Smart Grid, in particular in relation with the security properties which must be guaranteed by those solutions.</p>
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    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>The deployment of Smart Grids has become a
matter of great interest throughout the world,
with some countries heavily investing in research
regarding this topic due to all the bene ts
they could potentially provide to both Electric
Utility Companies and their customers. The key
feature of this type of system is the provision of
near real-time information regarding the energy
consumption in order to help in balancing its
generation and distribution according to the
demand and also to help the customers in
dynamically adapting their consumption behavior.</p>
      <p>Our investigation is framed within a
collaboration between the Engineering School of the
Universidad de la Republica(UdelaR) and UTE,
the public electric utility company of Uruguay.
This collaboration aims to identify and develop
methodological proceedings and technical tools
which aid in providing guarantees of the
correctness of the adopted solutions for the design and
implementation of a Smart Grid, in particular in
relation with the security properties which must
be guaranteed by those solutions. In this context
our investigation aims mainly to contribute in the
development of a threat model and in de ning
preventive and reactive measures to diminish the
impact of the exploitation of those vulnerabilities.</p>
      <p>We are still in an early stage of the
investigation, studying the state of the art of Smart Grids
and Smart Meters, with an emphasis on
investigating the security issues in the context of an
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI).
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Advanced (AMI)</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Metering Infrastructure</title>
      <p>Usually, the network of transmission lines,
substations, transformers and more that deliver
electricity is known as the electric grid. An smart
grid is the result of the integration between a
grid and digital technology in order to provide
the grid with more capabilities that optimize its
operations.</p>
      <p>In this context, an Advanced Metering
Infrastructure is a crucial component of a smart
grid, which handles the two way communication
between smart meters and data management
systems, allowing to send, receive and process
consumption data of the clients, and also
additional operations over the network.</p>
      <p>The most common architecture used to address
the features of smart metering systems is
presented in the following diagram [Pop14]. It
consists of:</p>
      <p>Smart meters (SM): local electronic meters
Data concentrators (DC): process data from
several meters
Head End System (HES): central data
collection point
Local area network (HAN, NAN): allows
bi-directional communication between the
smart meters and a data concentrator
Wide area network (WAN): allows
bidirectional communication between the data
concentrators and the head end system</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Security Concerns in Advance Metering Infrastructures</title>
      <p>As with any communication network there are
many security concerns that must be taken into
consideration. Some of the possible attacks
include[Ur-Reh15]:</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>1. Eavesdropping</title>
        <p>Resulting in the disclosure of personal
information from costumers. It has been shown
that a very accurate user pro le can be
extrapolated from the collected data [Mol10].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>2. Denial of Service attacks</title>
        <p>With the purpose of shutting down parts of
the grid or even the whole grid.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>3. Packet injection attacks</title>
        <p>For example providing false billing
information, generating costs for the customers or
the utilities.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>4. Malware injection attacks</title>
        <p>A ecting the communication between
devices with the goal of compromising the
billing and reporting process, disrupting the
Demand/Consumption information a ecting
the load on the grid.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-5">
        <title>5. Remote Connect/ Disconnect</title>
        <p>Potentially leaving users without access to
the service.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-6">
        <title>6. Firmware manipulation</title>
        <p>For example with the intention of
manipulating the metering functionality to report false
consumption data.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-7">
        <title>7. Man-in-the-middle attacks</title>
        <p>With the goal of providing false
consumption information to the gateway or to send
commands to the Smart Meters, potentially
bringing down the whole grid.</p>
        <p>The consequences of such attacks range from
the disclosure of information a ecting the privacy
of customers, which can have legal consequences
to utilities, to concerns of national security.
4</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Security Countermeasures</title>
      <p>Di erent countermeasures can be used to address
the concerns presented in the previous section.
Many of them may be familiar to the reader, as
they are commonly used in general purpose
networks.</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>1. Encrypted Communication</title>
        <p>Dual encryption is recommended, encrypting
at the application layer to ensure end-to-end
encryption and at the transport layer using
existing protocols such as TLS.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>2. Integrity Protection</title>
        <p>Integrity protection, such as using message
authentication codes (MAC) to assure the
integrity of the transmitted consumption data,
is vital in the context of smart grids.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-3">
        <title>3. Authenticity Veri cation</title>
        <p>Standard approaches can be used, such as
digital signatures.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-4">
        <title>4. Gateway based Approach</title>
        <p>This is a novel approach, proposed by
European countries, such as Germany and the
UK. It consists of having a Smart
Metering Gateway to act as an intermediary in
the communication between the Smart
Meters installed in the customer's premises and
the utility. The gateway receives the
consumption measurements from the meters and
communicates periodically, after a set
interval, with the utility servers to send this data,
being responsible of ensuring the privacy of
the customer. Also, the gateway receives
commands from the utility servers, such as
instructions to act based on the load on the
grid.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-5">
        <title>5. Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems</title>
        <p>This type of systems help in the identi cation
of intrusions, detection of rogue nodes and
source of attacks and exclusion of these nodes
from further communication in the network.</p>
        <p>Apart from the presented countermeasures a
security by design approach is worth taking into
account[Ur-Reh15].
5</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>An introduction to our investigation was
presented in this summary. Initial considerations
on AMI and security were described as starting
points on our research.</p>
      <p>This topic has been proven of great importance
nowadays, especially when security threats could
have a wide range of unwanted consequences,
where even national security is at risk.</p>
      <p>We plan to continue this path, analyzing
the security concerns in depth, reviewing the
protocols involved and trying to propose security
countermeasures speci cally designed for the
particular needs of UTE.
6
[Ur-Reh15] O. Ur-Rehman, N. Zivic and C.
Ruland, "Security issues in smart metering
systems," 2015 IEEE International Conference
on Smart Energy Grid Engineering (SEGE),
Oshawa, ON, 2015.</p>
      <p>[Pop14] Z. Popovic and V. Cackovic,
"Advanced Metering Infrastructure in the context of
Smart Grids," 2014 IEEE International Energy
Conference (ENERGYCON), Cavtat, 2014, pp.
1509-1514.</p>
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