=Paper= {{Paper |id=Vol-2178/SSN2018_paper_14 |storemode=property |title=Security Analysis of Smart Grids |pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2178/SSN2018_paper_14.pdf |volume=Vol-2178 |authors=Joaquín Márquez,Gabriel Rodríguez,Gustavo Betarte,Juan Diego Campo,Eduardo Grampín |dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ssn/MarquezRBCG18 }} ==Security Analysis of Smart Grids== https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2178/SSN2018_paper_14.pdf
                         Security analysis of Smart Grids

     Joaquı́n Márquez           Gabriel Rodrı́guez   Gustavo Betarte                Juan Diego Campo
                                            Eduardo Grampı́n

                                          Universidad de la República



                                                            near real-time information regarding the energy
                                                            consumption in order to help in balancing its
                      Abstract                              generation and distribution according to the
                                                            demand and also to help the customers in dy-
    The benefits of Smart Grids are beyond                  namically adapting their consumption behavior.
    doubt. However, thinking of a future
    where Smart Meters are ubiquitous raises                   Our investigation is framed within a collab-
    a lot of concerns regarding security and                oration between the Engineering School of the
    privacy. Some of these concerns include                 Universidad de la República(UdelaR) and UTE,
    the disclosure of the personal information              the public electric utility company of Uruguay.
    of consumers, the provision of false con-               This collaboration aims to identify and develop
    sumption data to the utility, or even con-              methodological proceedings and technical tools
    cerns of national security such as attacks              which aid in providing guarantees of the correct-
    to attempt to bring down parts of the                   ness of the adopted solutions for the design and
    grid or even the whole grid. The goal of                implementation of a Smart Grid, in particular in
    our investigation is to identify and develop            relation with the security properties which must
    methodological proceedings and technical                be guaranteed by those solutions. In this context
    tools which aid in providing guarantees                 our investigation aims mainly to contribute in the
    of the correctness of the adopted solu-                 development of a threat model and in defining
    tions for the design and implementation                 preventive and reactive measures to diminish the
    of a Smart Grid, in particular in relation              impact of the exploitation of those vulnerabilities.
    with the security properties which must
    be guaranteed by those solutions.                          We are still in an early stage of the investiga-
                                                            tion, studying the state of the art of Smart Grids
1   Introduction                                            and Smart Meters, with an emphasis on inves-
The deployment of Smart Grids has become a                  tigating the security issues in the context of an
matter of great interest throughout the world,              Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI).
with some countries heavily investing in research
regarding this topic due to all the benefits                2   Advanced Metering Infrastructure
they could potentially provide to both Electric                 (AMI)
Utility Companies and their customers. The key              Usually, the network of transmission lines,
feature of this type of system is the provision of          substations, transformers and more that deliver
                                                            electricity is known as the electric grid. An smart
Copyright c by the paper’s authors. Copying permitted for
private and academic purposes.
                                                            grid is the result of the integration between a
In: Proceedings of the IV School of Systems and Networks
                                                            grid and digital technology in order to provide
(SSN 2018), Valdivia, Chile, October 29-31, 2018. Pub-      the grid with more capabilities that optimize its
lished at http://ceur-ws.org                                operations.
                                                    consideration.  Some of the possible attacks
   In this context, an Advanced Metering In-        include[Ur-Reh15]:
frastructure is a crucial component of a smart
grid, which handles the two way communication           1. Eavesdropping
between smart meters and data management                   Resulting in the disclosure of personal infor-
systems, allowing to send, receive and process             mation from costumers. It has been shown
consumption data of the clients, and also addi-            that a very accurate user profile can be ex-
tional operations over the network.                        trapolated from the collected data [Mol10].

                                                        2. Denial of Service attacks
   The most common architecture used to address
                                                           With the purpose of shutting down parts of
the features of smart metering systems is pre-
                                                           the grid or even the whole grid.
sented in the following diagram [Pop14]. It con-
sists of:                                               3. Packet injection attacks
                                                           For example providing false billing informa-
    • Smart meters (SM): local electronic meters           tion, generating costs for the customers or
                                                           the utilities.
    • Data concentrators (DC): process data from
      several meters                                    4. Malware injection attacks
                                                           Affecting the communication between de-
    • Head End System (HES): central data collec-          vices with the goal of compromising the
      tion point                                           billing and reporting process, disrupting the
    • Local area network (HAN, NAN): allows                Demand/Consumption information affecting
      bi-directional communication between the             the load on the grid.
      smart meters and a data concentrator              5. Remote Connect/ Disconnect
    • Wide area network (WAN): allows bi-                  Potentially leaving users without access to
      directional communication between the data           the service.
      concentrators and the head end system             6. Firmware manipulation
                                                           For example with the intention of manipulat-
                                                           ing the metering functionality to report false
                                                           consumption data.

                                                        7. Man-in-the-middle attacks
                                                           With the goal of providing false consump-
                                                           tion information to the gateway or to send
                                                           commands to the Smart Meters, potentially
                                                           bringing down the whole grid.

                                                       The consequences of such attacks range from
                                                    the disclosure of information affecting the privacy
                                                    of customers, which can have legal consequences
                                                    to utilities, to concerns of national security.
Figure 1: Example of AMI architecture [Pop14]       4     Security Countermeasures
                                                    Different countermeasures can be used to address
3    Security Concerns in Advance Me-
                                                    the concerns presented in the previous section.
     tering Infrastructures                         Many of them may be familiar to the reader, as
As with any communication network there are         they are commonly used in general purpose net-
many security concerns that must be taken into      works.
    1. Encrypted Communication                              This topic has been proven of great importance
       Dual encryption is recommended, encrypting         nowadays, especially when security threats could
       at the application layer to ensure end-to-end      have a wide range of unwanted consequences,
       encryption and at the transport layer using        where even national security is at risk.
       existing protocols such as TLS.
                                                            We plan to continue this path, analyzing
    2. Integrity Protection                               the security concerns in depth, reviewing the
       Integrity protection, such as using message        protocols involved and trying to propose security
       authentication codes (MAC) to assure the in-       countermeasures specifically designed for the
       tegrity of the transmitted consumption data,       particular needs of UTE.
       is vital in the context of smart grids.

    3. Authenticity Verification                          6   References
       Standard approaches can be used, such as
       digital signatures.                                [Ur-Reh15] O. Ur-Rehman, N. Zivic and C.
                                                          Ruland, ”Security issues in smart metering
    4. Gateway based Approach                             systems,” 2015 IEEE International Conference
       This is a novel approach, proposed by Eu-          on Smart Energy Grid Engineering (SEGE),
       ropean countries, such as Germany and the          Oshawa, ON, 2015.
       UK. It consists of having a Smart Meter-
       ing Gateway to act as an intermediary in             [Pop14] Z. Popovic and V. Cackovic, ”Ad-
       the communication between the Smart Me-            vanced Metering Infrastructure in the context of
       ters installed in the customer’s premises and      Smart Grids,” 2014 IEEE International Energy
       the utility. The gateway receives the con-         Conference (ENERGYCON), Cavtat, 2014, pp.
       sumption measurements from the meters and          1509-1514.
       communicates periodically, after a set inter-
       val, with the utility servers to send this data,      [Mol10] Molina-Markham, A., Shenoy, P., Fu,
       being responsible of ensuring the privacy of       K., Cecchet, E., Irwin, D.: Private memoirs of
       the customer. Also, the gateway receives           a smartmeter. In: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM
       commands from the utility servers, such as         Workshop on Embedded Sensing Systems for
       instructions to act based on the load on the       Energy-Efficiency in Building, Zurich. ACM
       grid.                                              (2010).

    5. Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
       This type of systems help in the identification
       of intrusions, detection of rogue nodes and
       source of attacks and exclusion of these nodes
       from further communication in the network.

   Apart from the presented countermeasures a
security by design approach is worth taking into
account[Ur-Reh15].

5     Conclusions
An introduction to our investigation was pre-
sented in this summary. Initial considerations
on AMI and security were described as starting
points on our research.