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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Computational Hermeneutics: Using Automated Reasoning for the Logical Analysis of Natural-Language Arguments</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Background</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Problem and Objectives</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Dep. of Mathematics and Computer Science, Freie Universitat Berlin</institution>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>While there have been major advances in automated theorem proving (ATP) during the last years, its main eld of application has mostly remained bound to mathematics and hardware/software veri cation. We argue that the use of ATP in argumentation can also be very fruitful, not only because of the obvious quantitative advantages of automated reasoning tools (e.g. reducing by several orders of magnitude the time needed to test some argument's validity), but also because it enables a novel approach to the logical analysis of arguments. This approach, which we have called computational hermeneutics, draws its inspiration from work in the philosophy of language such as Donald Davidson's theory of radical interpretation and contemporary inferentialist theories of meaning, which do justice to the inherent circularity of linguistic understanding: the whole is understood (compositionally) on the basis of its parts, while each part is understood only in the (inferential) context of the whole. Computational hermeneutics is thus a holistic, iterative, trial-and-error enterprise, where we evaluate the adequacy of some candidate formalization of a sentence by computing the logical validity of the whole argument. We start with formalizations of some simple statements (taking them as tentative) and use them as stepping stones on the way to the formalization of other argument's sentences, repeating the procedure until arriving at a state of re ective equilibrium: A state where our beliefs have the highest degree of coherence and acceptability.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>During this research project, we want to explore the computer-supported
application of formal logic (in particular higher-order theorem provers) to issues
involving: (i) the methodical evaluation (logic as ars iudicandi ) and
interpretation (logic as ars explanandi ) of arguments and, building upon this, we want to
tackle (ii) the problem of formalization: how to search methodically for the most
appropriate logical form(s) of a given natural-language argument, by casting its
individual statements into expressions of some su ciently expressive logic
(classical or non-classical).</p>
      <p>
        There have been some few proposals regarding the ambitious project of de ning
an e ective formalization procedure for natural language; being among the most
well-known: Davidson's theory of meaning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], Chomsky's generative grammar
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ] and particularly Montague's universal grammar program [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
        ] (and its
intellectual heirs like Discourse Representation Theory [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">24</xref>
        ] and Dynamic Predicate
Logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ] among others). Other proposals have, by contrast, focused on the task
of providing de nite adequacy criteria of formalization (e.g. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref10 ref15 ref28 ref30 ref7">7,15,30,10,1,28</xref>
        ]).
However, there seems to be still no paradigmatic method for systematically
arriving to an argument's formalization, nor de nite criteria for rigorously judging
its adequacy. The logical analysis of natural language continues to be essentially
an artistic skill that cannot be standardized or taught methodically (aside from
providing students with a handful of paradigmatic examples supplemented with
commentaries).
      </p>
      <p>
        This research aims at improving this situation by expanding on and
implementing some of the most recent proposals found in the literature, with a special
emphasis on the recent work of Peregrin and Svodoba [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref29">29</xref>
        ] who, apart from
providing syntactic and pragmatic (inferential) adequacy criteria, also tackle the
di cult problem of nding a formalization procedure by proposing the method
of re ective equilibrium, which is similar in spirit to the idealized scienti c (i.e.
hypothetico-deductive) method and, additionally, has the virtue of approaching
this problem in a holistic way: the adequacy of the formalizations of an
argument's sentences is assessed as a whole (in the spirit of Davidson's theory of
meaning1 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref13">13,12</xref>
        ] and Quine/Hempel's con rmation holism [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref32">32</xref>
        ] in philosophy).
Following a holistic hypothetico-deductive approach for logical analysis was,
until very recently, not feasible in practice; since it involves an iterative process of
trial-and-error, where the adequacy of some candidate formalization for a
sentence becomes tested by computing the logical validity of the whole argument. In
order to explore the vast combinatoric of candidate formalizations for even the
1 As Davidson himself has put it: \[...] much of the interest in logical form comes
from an interest in logical geography: to give the logical form of a sentence is to
give its logical location in the totality of sentences, to describe it in a way that
explicitly determines what sentences it entails and what sentences it is entailed by.
The location must be given relative to a speci c deductive theory; so logical form
itself is relative to a theory." ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] p. 140)
simplest argument, we have to test its validity at least several hundreds of times
(also to account for logical pluralism). It is here where the recent improvements
and ongoing consolidation of modern automated theorem proving technology
(for propositional logic, rst-order logic, and in particular higher-order logic)
become handy.
      </p>
      <p>One of the aims of this research is to combine and apply theoretical insights
from both inferential (proof-theoretical) and semantical (model-theoretical)
approaches to the analysis and assessment of concrete arguments, particularly in
ethics and politics.2 An important deliverable of this research will consist in the
development of an experimental software providing functionalities for automated
logical analysis and evaluation of natural-language arguments.
2
2.1</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Current and Previous Work</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Computational Hermeneutics</title>
        <p>
          In current work [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18 ref20 ref21">20,18,21</xref>
          ], we have introduced an approach named computational
hermeneutics aimed at improving the tasks of logical analysis and interpretation
of arguments in a semi-automated fashion by exploiting the computing power
and usability of modern proof assistants (Isabelle/HOL [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26">26</xref>
          ] in particular). This
method has been developed as a result of re ecting upon previous work on the
application of Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) for the formalization and
assessment of arguments in metaphysics (e.g. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref4 ref5">4,5,17</xref>
          ]) and is especially suited
to the utilization of di erent kinds of classical and non-classical logics through
Benzmuller's technique of semantic embeddings [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">3,2</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          The ideas behind computational hermeneutics have been inspired by Donald
Davidson's theory of radical interpretation [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref14">13,14</xref>
          ], by drawing on his well-known
principle of charity and a holistic account of meaning. We defend the view that
the processes of logical analysis (formalization) and concept explication can take
place in the very practice of argumentation through the explicitation of the
inferential role that terms {both logical and non-logical{ play in some theory or
argument of our interest (see logical and semantic inferentialism in the
philosophy of language [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27 ref8 ref9">9,8,27</xref>
          ]). In the case of formal arguments (in any arbitrary
logic) this task of concept explication is carried out, for instance, by providing
de nitions (i.e. by directly correlating to a de niens) or by axiomatizing
interrelations among terms. Concrete examples of the application of this approach
to the logical analysis and assessment of ontological arguments can be found in
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref18 ref20">20,18,17</xref>
          ] (using the Isabelle proof assistant).
        </p>
        <p>There are ongoing e orts to formulate the computational hermeneutics approach
as a combinatorial optimization problem in order to take advantage of existing
2 Speci cally, in the context of Benzmuller's current research project: Consistent
Rational Argumentation in Politics (CRAP) at the Free University Berlin.
algorithmic solutions (e.g. simulated annealing, evolutionary algorithms, etc.)
and to integrate them with current state-of-the-art automated theorem provers
and model nders in order to evaluate tness and selection criteria. At this early
stage of the project we can provide, as an illustration, a rough outline of the
iterative structure of the computational hermeneutics approach:
1. Argument reconstruction (initially in natural language):</p>
        <p>Add or remove sentences and choose their truth-values. Premises
and desired conclusions would need to become true, while some other
'unwanted' conclusions would have to become false. Deciding on these issues
would expectedly involve a fair amount of human judgment.</p>
        <p>
          Establish inferential relations, i.e., determine the extension of the
logical consequence relation: which sentences are to follow (logically) from
which others. This task can be done manually or automatically by letting
our automated tools nd this out for themselves, provided the argument
has already been formalized (even if only roughly after some few
iterations). Automating this task frequently leads to the simpli cation of the
argument, since current theorem provers are quite good at detecting idle
premises/axioms (see, e.g., Isabelle's Sledgehammer tool [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ]).
2. Choosing a logic for formalization, by determining the logical
structure of the natural-language sentences occurring in the argument. The
(partial) automation of this task can be supported by searching in a catalog of
semantic embeddings of di erent logics in HOL (see [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">3,2</xref>
          ] and next section) in
order to select a candidate logic (modal, free, deontic, etc.) satisfying some
given syntactic or semantic criteria (drawing, for instance, on the output of
linguistic parsers).
3. Argument formalization (in the chosen logic), while getting
continuous feedback from our automated reasoning tools about the argument's
correctness (validity, consistency, non-circularity, etc.). This stage is itself
iterative, since, for every sentence, we charitably (in the spirit of the principle
of charity ) try several di erent formalizations until getting a correct
argument. Here is where we take most advantage of the real-time feedback o ered
by our automated tools. Some main tasks to be considered are:
        </p>
        <p>Translate natural-language sentences into the target logic, by
relying either on our pre-understanding or on provided de nitions of the
argument's concepts. This step can be partially automated by using
semantic parsers, but would also need some human-support.</p>
        <p>Vary the logical form of already formalized sentences. This can
be done systematically and automatically by relying upon a catalog of
(consistent) logical variations of formulas (see semantic embeddings in
next section) and the output of automated tools (ATPs, model nders,
etc).</p>
        <p>Bring related terms together, either by introducing de nitions or
by axiomatizing new interrelations among them. These newly introduced
formulas can be translated back into natural language to be integrated
into the argument in step 1.1, thus being disclosed as former implicit
premises. The process of searching for additional premises with the aim
of rendering an argument as formally correct can be seen as a kind of
abductive reasoning ('inference to the best explanation'), which can be
partially automated using current AI technology but still needs human
support.
4. Are termination criteria satis ed? That is, have we achieved the
reective equilibrium? If not, we would come back to some early stage. Both
termination and selection criteria are to be based on the adequacy
criteria of formalization found in the literature.3 Furthermore, the introduction
of automated reasoning tools makes it feasible to apply these criteria while
working with a database of correct and incorrect/fallacious arguments of a
considerable size.
2.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Semantic Embeddings of Non-Classical Logics in HOL</title>
        <p>
          A parallel stream of work consists on improving and broadening Benzmuller's
technique of semantic embeddings (see [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">3,2</xref>
          ]), which allows us to take advantage
of the expressive power of classical higher-order logic (as a metalanguage) in
order to embed the syntax and semantics of a target logic (as object language).
Using this technique we can, for instance, embed a modal logic by de ning the
modal and operators as meta-logical predicates and using quanti cation
over sets of `possible worlds' (using Kripke semantics). This approach allows us
to reuse existing ATP technology for classical HOL and apply it for automated
reasoning in non-classical logics (e.g. free, modal, temporal and deontic logics).
In previous work with Christoph Benzmuller [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref19">17,19</xref>
          ], we presented a shallow
semantic embedding for an intensional higher-order modal logic (IHOML) using
the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26">26</xref>
          ]. This logic has been originally introduced
by Melvin Fitting in his book Types, Tableaus and Godel's God [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ] and can
3 Consider, e.g., Peregrin and Svodoba's ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28 ref29">28,29</xref>
          ]) proposed inferential criteria for
evaluating the adequacy of formalization:
(i) The principle of reliability : \ counts as an adequate formalization of the
sentence S in the logical system L only if the following holds: If an argument form in
which occurs as a premise or as the conclusion is valid in L, then all its perspicuous
natural language instances in which S appears as a natural language instance of
are intuitively correct arguments."
(ii) The principle of ambitiousness : \ is the more adequate formalization of the
sentence S in the logical system L the more natural language arguments in which S
occurs as a premise or as the conclusion, which fall into the intended scope of L and
which are intuitively perspicuous and correct, are instances of valid argument forms
of S in which appears as the formalization of S." ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref29">29</xref>
          ] pp. 70-71).
be seen as an improved variant of the intensional logic originally developed by
Montague [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
          ] and later expanded by Gallin [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
          ] by building upon Church's
type theory and Kripke's possible-world semantics. In contrast to the earlier
approaches, intensions and extensions are, in IHOML, both rst-class objects.
In this work we also presented an exemplary, non-trivial application of this
reasoning infrastructure in the emergent eld of computational metaphysics : the
computer-supported formalization and critical assessment of Godel's modern
variant of the ontological argument and two of its proposed emendations (see
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref31">16,31</xref>
          ] for further details).
        </p>
        <p>
          Our approach to the semantic embedding of IHOML has built on previous
work on the embedding of multimodal logics with quanti cation [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ], which we
have expanded to allow for restricted (aka. actualist) quanti cation, intensional
terms, and their related operations. From an AI perspective we contributed
a highly exible framework for automated reasoning in intensional and modal
logic. IHOML, which had not been automated before, has several applications,
in particular, regarding the deep semantic analysis of natural language rational
arguments, as envisioned in the research project mentioned above (CRAP. See
footnote 2).
3
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Ongoing and Future Work</title>
      <p>
        As illustrated above (and in greater detail in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref18 ref20">20,18,17</xref>
        ]) computational
hermeneutics can be carried out in a semi-automatic fashion: We work iteratively on an
argument by (i) xing truth-values and inferential relations among its sentences;
(ii) (tentatively) choosing a logic for formalization; and (iii) working back and
forth on the formalization of its axioms and theorems (eventually adding new
ones), making gradual adjustments while getting real-time feedback about the
suitability of our changes (e.g. validating the argument, avoiding inconsistency
or question-begging, etc.). This steps are to be repeated until arriving at a state
of re ective equilibrium: A state where our beliefs have the highest degree of
coherence and acceptability according to syntactic and, particularly, inferential
adequacy criteria (such as the ones mentioned above).
      </p>
      <p>Computational hermeneutics can thus be seen as an instance of the
hypotheticodeductive (aka. scienti c) method, since it features the sort of holistic mutual
adjustment between theory and observation, which characterizes the idealized
scienti c inquiry. While modern ATP technology gives us the means to deductively
draw inferences from our hypotheses (and to falsify them), the most
challenging task remains how to systematically come up with the candidate hypotheses.4
4 Together with Benzmuller's research team, we are currently exploring the potential of
combining ATP with machine learning techniques, as applied particularly in natural
language processing (NLP).
We are currently exploring the idea of approaching the problem of formalization
as a combinatorial optimization problem, by using (among others) inferential
criteria of adequacy to de ne the tness/utility function of an appropriate
optimization algorithm. The principle of charity will inspire our main selection
criteria: an adequate formalization must validate the argument and guarantee
some minimal qualitative features (consistency and independence of premises,
invalidation of implausible conclusions, no question-begging, etc.). It is worth
noting that, for the kind of non-trivial arguments we are interested in (e.g.
ethics and metaphysics), such a selection criteria would aggressively prune our
search tree. Furthermore, the evaluation of our tness function is already, with
today's technologies, not only completely automatizable, but also seems to be
highly parallelizable.</p>
      <p>Signi cant resources will be devoted to the development of working software. The
main touchstone for the validity of the gained insights will be the implementation
of a software system, whose main functionality will be that of (semi-)automated
logical analysis: accepting an argument in natural-language as input and
generating as output its most appropriate formalization (under consideration of
di erent logics in view of some well-de ned criteria). This software will interface
and cooperate with other existing systems and technologies such as software for
linguistic analysis and text mining/analytics, automated theorem provers (e.g.
Leo-III, Satallax, Vampire) and interactive proof assistants (e.g. Isabelle, Coq).
Further applications in areas like knowledge/ontology extraction, semantic web
and legal informatics are currently being contemplated.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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