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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Threshold-Bounded Dominating Set with Incentives</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Gennaro Cordasco</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Luisa Gargano</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Adele A. Rescigno</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Computer Science, Universita` di Salerno</institution>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Universita` della Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Caserta</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Motivated by some problems in the area of influence spread in social networks, we introduce a new variation on the domination problem which we call Threshold-Bounded Domination with Incentives. Let G = (V; E) be a graph with an influence threshold t(v) for each node. An assignment of external incentives to the nodes of G is a cost function c : V ! N0, where c(v) is the incentive given to v 2 V . The effect of applying incentive c(v) to node v is to decrease its threshold, i.e., to make v more susceptible to be dominated. A node is in the Threshold-Bounded dominating set D if it receives an incentive equal to its threshold, that is, c(v) = t(v). A node, which is not in D, is dominated if the number of its neighbors in D plus the incentives it has received is at least equal to the node threshold t(v). The goal is to minimize the total of the incentives required to ensure that all the nodes are dominated. The problem is log-APXcomplete in general networks with unbounded degree. We prove that a greedy strategy has approximation factor ln ∆ + 2, where ∆ is the maximum degree of a node. We also give exact linear time algorithms for some classes of graphs.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>1 Introduction
1.1
Let t : V ! N = f1; 2; : : :g be a function assigning integer thresholds to the nodes
of G. An assignment of incentives to the nodes of a network G = (V; E) is a cost
function c : V ! N0 = f0; 1; 2; : : :g, where c(v) is the incentive given to v 2 V .
The effect of applying the incentive c(v) to node v is to decrease its threshold, i.e.,
to make v more susceptible to be dominated. A node is in the Threshold-Bounded
dominating set D if it receives an incentive equal to its threshold, that is, c(v) = t(v).
A node in V D is dominated if the number of its neighbors in D plus the incentives
it has received is at least equal to the node threshold t(v). We assume, w.l.o.g., that3
0 c(v) t(v) d(v).</p>
      <p>(otherwise, we can set t(u)=d(u)+1 for every node u with threshold exceeding its
degree plus one without changing the problem</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Given a set D V , consider the incentive function c : V ! N0 with</title>
      <p>{ t(v) if v 2 D
c(v) =</p>
      <p>maxft(v) dD(v); 0g if v 2 V D:</p>
      <p>We say that D is a Threshold-Bounded (TB) dominating set with incentives of cost
∑v2V c(v). We are interested in finding the TB dominating set of minimum cost.
Formally, we study the following problem.</p>
      <p>THRESHOLD-BOUNDED DOMINATING SET WITH INCENTIVES (TBDI).</p>
      <p>Instance: A network G = (V; E) with thresholds t : V ! N.</p>
      <p>Problem: Find a set D V of nodes which minimizes the following value.
c(D) = ∑ t(v) + ∑ (t(v) dD(v)):
(1)
v2D t(vv)2&gt;VdDD(v)
In the following we will refer to the set D V that minimizes (1) as an optimal TB
dominating set in G.4
1.2</p>
      <p>Related work
Domination in Graphs. Domination problems in graphs have been extensively studied
under various assumptions, both from structural and algorithmic points of view. We list
here some of them which are close to the one considered in this paper. We assume the
graph be G = (V; E).</p>
      <p>
        -domination. Close related to our work is the concept of -domination introduced in
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] by Dunbar et al.. A set D V is an -dominating set of G, if dD(u) d(u) for
all u 2 V D, i.e., for every node that does not belong to D at least an -fraction of
its neighbors belong to D. The goal is to minimize the size of D.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Monopolies. A set M V is called a self-ignoring r-monopoly if every v 2 V M</title>
      <p>
        is dominated r times, that is, jNM (v)j r. The goal is to minimize the size of M .
Monopolies have been widely studied in the literature, see [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">24</xref>
        ] for a survey.
Vector Domination/Threshold Ordinary Domination/f -Domination. Given a
vector k = (kvjv 2 V ) with kv d(v) for each v 2 V , the vector domination problem
asks to find a vector dominating set (VDS) of minimum size, that is, a set S minimizing
jSj and such that jNS (v)j kv for all v 2 V [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref16">16, 1</xref>
        ]. This problem also appeared in the
literature under the name of threshold ordinary dominating sets [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ] and f -domination
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26">26</xref>
        ]; it also coincides with Threshold-Bounded Influence Dominating Set in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ].
3 Notice that in the case t(v) &gt; d(v); we can set t(v) = d(v), while the exceeding value
t(v) d(v) will be added to c(v):
4 Notice that the optimal set can always be chosen as a dominating set of the input graph; indeed
if D does not dominate a node v 2 V , then applying (1) to the sets D and D′ = D [ fvg, one
gets c(D) c(D′) = ∑u2N(v) maxf0; dD(u) t(u)g 0.
Minimum-weighted dominating set. The Minimum-Weighted Dominating Set
problem (MWDS) is a generalization of the Dominating Set, which asks to find a
Dominating Set of a graph G of minimum total weight. Until now, the best known approximation
ratio for an MWDS in a general graph is O(log ∆):
We stress that in all the above unweighted problems the focus is on the minimization
of the size of the dominating set attaining the desired property. In case of weighted
networks, the focus is on the minimization of the total weight of the set. However, the
solution of the TBDI problem can be quite different from the solutions of the weighted
Vector Dominating Set problem for a given network. As an example, consider a
complete graph K8 on 8 nodes all with threshold/weight 7: The optimal solution for the
weighted Vector Dominating Set problem consists of any subset of 7 nodes and its cost
is 7 7 = 49. The TBDI problem admits a different optimal solution where the set D
consists of 4 nodes and the remaining nodes need an incentive of value 3. The overall
cost of the incentives is therefore 7 4 + 3 4 = 40:
Social Networks. In addition to its theoretical interest, the study of the TBDI problem
is also relevant to the area of influence propagation in social networks.
      </p>
      <p>
        The problem of identifying influential individuals in a social network received a lot
of attention, as it has applications in several areas, including viral marketing, disease
prevention, disease propagation, politics, etc., see [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ] for a recent survey. For instance,
in the area of recommendation systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ], companies wanting to promote products
might try initially to convince a few individuals (using discounts for instance) which,
exploiting social contagion, can trigger a cascade of influence in the network, leading
to an adoption of the products by a much larger number of individuals.
      </p>
      <p>
        In this paper, we use the well-known threshold model to study the influence
diffusion process in social networks: For each node v 2 V , the threshold value t(v)
quantifies how hard/easy it is to influence v [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]. Most of the existing approaches regard this
as a long-term diffusion process, where information cascading occurs in several rounds
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref5 ref8">4, 5, 8</xref>
        ]. Such models do not fit situations where time is an issue. In practice, time
constraints and spreading speed are always critical concerns of marketers since they
are closely related to profit and competition [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21 ref22">21, 22</xref>
        ]. The time problem in the
spreading process has been recently algorithmically addressed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref2 ref3">3, 2, 12</xref>
        ]. In particular, one
round influence propagation has been recently studied in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] as a building block for
the design of an effective recommendation system.
      </p>
      <p>
        The classical model, also adopted in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], limits the optimizer to a binary choice
between zero or complete initial influence on each individual. This implies that the cost
of influencing a very popular (and therefore highly influential) node is the same as that
of influencing a lonely individual and only the number of nodes in the dominating set
is considered as a cost measure. Moreover, customized incentives (such as free copies,
discounts, rewards, : : :) that can be given to individual nodes could be more effective in
realistic scenarios [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20 ref23 ref7 ref9">7, 9, 20, 23</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The proposed TBDI problem, in which the cost of totally influence a node is
proportional to the node threshold (that can in turn be proportional to the node influence
capability) and a partial external influence can be applied to each node, can then be used,
among the other possible applications, to model a recommendation system (cfr. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ])
with a realistic cost counting. The above issues have been considered in the recent paper
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] dealing with the use of external incentives in time-bounded influence spreading: Let
be a bound on the number of rounds available to complete the process of influencing
all nodes of the network, find incentives of minimum cost which result in all nodes
being influenced in at most rounds. Formally, an influence process in G = (V; E), with
node thresholds t : V ! N, starting with incentives in c : V ! N0 is a sequence of
{v t(v) c(v)},
node subsets I0 = fv jc(v) = t(v)g and Iℓ = Iℓ 1 [ NIℓ 1 (v)
for ℓ 1. The TIME-BOUNDED TARGETING WITH INCENTIVES problem studied
in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] takes in input a network G = (V; E) with node thresholds t : V ! N and a
time bound and asks for an incentive assignment c : V ! N0 of minimum cost
∑v2V c(v) such that I = V:
It has been shown in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] that the above problem, in general graphs, cannot approximated
to within a ratio of O(2log1 ϵ n), for any fixed ϵ &gt; 0, unless N P DT IM E(npolylog(n)),
while exact algorithms are given for paths, complete graphs and trees. Specifically, the
complexity of the presented algorithm is O(n) for paths, O( n log n) for complete
networks and O( 2∆n) for trees.
      </p>
      <p>The TBDI problem considered in this paper coincides with the case in which only
one round of influence can be assumed. Indeed our problem can be seen as to find
c : V ! N0 of minimum cost ∑v2V c(v) such that D = I0 and I1 = V . In such a
case, we can get novel and stronger results as described in Section 1.3.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>1.3 Our Results</title>
        <p>Our main contributions are the following: In Section 2, we prove that a natural greedy
strategy has approximation factor ln ∆ + 2. Unless P N P , the approximation ratio
of the greedy algorithm is optimal (up to lower order terms), since the TBDI problem is
not easier than the dominating set problem and, consequently, cannot be approximated
to within a ratio better than (1 o(1)) ln ∆, unless N P DT IM E(npolylog(n)). In
Section 3, we give exact linear-time algorithms for complete and tree networks.
2</p>
        <p>General Graphs
We show in this section that the TBDI problem can be optimally approximated within
a logarithmic factor.</p>
        <p>
          We first notice that the TBDI problem defined in Section 1.1 includes the
dominating set (DS) problem (in case each node has threshold 1). It was shown in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
          ] that
unless N P DT IM E(nO(log log n)), no polynomial-time algorithm can approximate
the DS problem better than (1 o(1)) ln ∆.
        </p>
        <p>Theorem 1. The TBDI problem cannot be approximated to within a ratio better than
(1 o(1)) ln ∆, unless N P DT IM E(npolylog(n)).</p>
        <p>We show now that the logarithmic factor approximation for the TBDI problem can be
attained by a greedy algorithm.</p>
        <p>In the following, let D V be a TB dominating set, we name black the nodes that
belong to the set D. Moreover, for each node v 2 V D we denote by
t′(v) = maxft(v)
dD(v); 0g
(2)
the residual threshold of the node v, that is the amount of incentive that still is required
to dominate v using D as TB dominating set. Accordingly, we partition the non-black
nodes in V D into two sets:
Algorithm 1: Greedy-TBDI(G)</p>
        <p>Input: A graph G = (V; E) with thresholds t : V ! N.</p>
        <p>Result: A TB dominating set D V of minimum cost c(D):
1 D = ∅, W = V
2 forall the v 2 V do t′(v) = t(v)
3 while 9u 2 V D such that t(u) &lt; w(u) do
4 v = argmaxu2V D ( wt((uu)) )
// Select v with largest w(v)=t(v).
the set W of white nodes, which contains non-dominated nodes (t′(v) &gt; 0);
the set of gray nodes, which contains dominated nodes (t′(v) = 0).</p>
        <p>Finally, we denote by w(v) the span of the node v, which corresponds to the number of
white neighbours plus the residual threshold (w(v) = dW (v) + t′(v)).</p>
        <p>Algorithm 1 greedily selects the node with the largest value w(v)=t(v) until there is
a node having threshold smaller that its span. It is possible to see that the algorithm can
be implemented in such a way to run in O(jEj log jV j) time. Indeed we need to process
the nodes v 2 V according to the metric w(v)=t(v), and the updates that follow each
processed node v 2 V involve at most the d(v) neighbors of v.</p>
        <p>Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 is a (ln ∆ + 2)-approximation for the TBDI problem.</p>
        <sec id="sec-3-1-1">
          <title>Proof. (Sketch)</title>
          <p>We first show that the TBDI problem is a special case of the following WTVD
problem5:</p>
          <p>WEIGHTED TARGETED VECTOR DOMINATION (WTVD).</p>
          <p>Input: A graph G = (V; E), thresholds t : V ! N, and a target set U V .
Question: Find a set D V of minimum cost ∑v2D t(v) such that dD(u)
t(u), for each node u 2 U D.</p>
          <p>It is possible to see the existence of a reduction from TBDI to WTVD as follows. Let
G = (V; E) with thresholds t : V ! N be an instance of the TBDI problem. For
each node v having threshold t(v), we add to the network a set fv1; v2; : : : ; vt(v)g of
t(v) nodes having threshold 1, connected to the node v and we obtain an new graph
H = (V (H); E(H)) with thresholds tH : V (H) ! N (see Fig. 1) where:
- V (H) = U [ U ′, where U = V and U ′ = ∪v2V fv1; v2; : : : ; vt(v)g;
- E(H) = E [ E′, where E′ = ∪v2V f(v; vi); for i = 1; 2; : : : ; t(v)g;
- tH (v) =
{ t(v) v 2 U ;</p>
          <p>1 otherwise:
5 To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel domination problem which can be of interest on
its own.
6</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-1-2">
          <title>Claim 1 There exists a TB dominating set D</title>
          <p>exists a set DH V (H) in H such that ∑v2DH tH (v)
each u 2 U DH .</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-1-3">
          <title>V in G such that c(D)</title>
          <p>k and dDH (u)
k iff there
tH (u), for</p>
          <p>Algorithm 2 provides a solution DH for the WTVD problem having the same cost
of the solution for the TBDI problem. Indeed, the solution for the TBDI problem can be
obtained as D = DH \ V . It is worth observing that, since the nodes in V U are set
as gray at the beginning of the Algorithm 2 (see line 3), both Algorithms 1 and 2 select
the same nodes from the set V = U as long as there exists a node u 2 V D such
that t(u) &lt; w(u) (each node v 2 U ′ has t(v) = 1 and w(v) 1). Then Algorithm 1
ends with the set D, while Algorithm 2 continues selecting some nodes in U ′ in order
to dominate all the white nodes. As observed above, the cost of the nodes selected in
the set U ′ corresponds to the incentives applied to v for the TBDI problem.</p>
          <p>Table 1 shows an example of the execution of the Algorithms 1 and 2 on the graph
G and H in Fig. 1. For each iteration the set D (TB dominating set), the set W (white
nodes) and for each node u, the metric w(u)=t(u) are provided. The Algorithm 1 ends
after 2 iterations while the Algorithm 2 needs 3 iterations. We are now going to show
that the cost of the solution DH provided by Algorithm 2 is a (ln ∆ + 2)-approximation
compared to the cost of an optimal solution D that is</p>
          <p>∑∑vv22DDH tt((vv)) ln ∆ + 2: (3)</p>
          <p>Each time, the Algorithm 2 selects a new node v of the dominating set (each greedy
step), we have cost t(v). Instead of letting this node pay the whole cost, we distribute
step D</p>
          <p>DH
1 ∅
2 fv1g
3 –</p>
          <p>∅
fv1g
fv1; v4g
fv2g
W w(u)=t(u) v D[fvg DH [fvg</p>
          <p>V = U U ′
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 . . .
fv1; v2; v3; v4; v5g 5=2 7=3 5=2 5=2 5=2 1 . . . v1 fv1g fv1g
fv2; v3; v4; v5g – 5=3 3=2 5=2 3=2 1 . . . v4 fv1; v4g fv1; v4g
– 1=3 1=2 – 1=2 1 . . . v6 –
fv1; v4; v6g
the cost to all the nodes affected by this choice, plus the node v itself (when t′(v) &gt; 0)
according to the portion of the span w(v) covered by each node. For instance consider
the node v1 in Fig. 1 having initial threshold t(v1) = 2 :
- Assume that v1, is selected in line 5 of the Algorithm 2 when its residual threshold
is t′(v1) = 2 (i.e., as a white node) and it has three white neighbors. In this case, the
span of the node v1 is w(v1) = dW (v1) + t′(v1) = 5 and each of its white neighbors
gets charged t(v1)=w(v1) = 2=5, while v1 is charged (t(v1)
t′(v1))=w(v1) = 4=5.</p>
          <p>Overall the charge is (t(v1)
dW (v1))=w(v1) + (t(v1)
t′(v1))=w(v1) = 2 = t(v1):
- On the other hand, if v1 is selected as a gray node (t′(v1) = 0), while it has two white
neighbors, only the neighbors get charged (they all get t(v1)=w(v1) = 2=2 = 1) and
again the overall charge is t(v1).</p>
          <p>Assume now that we know a dominating set D
of minimum cost ∑
By the definition of the WTVD, each node v, which is not in U
D
neighbor from D . Hence we can associate to each node v 2 U
Then for each node v
the nodes in U</p>
          <p>D
having a dominator (v</p>
          <p>we build a star, centered in v , which contains as leaves,
that have been associated to it. Hence we have jD j stars, each</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>2 D ) as center and non-dominators as leaves. An example is</title>
      <p>presented in Fig. 2. Notice that each node v 2 U
have t(v) copies of the node v). Clearly, the contribution of the star centered in v to
D
appears in t(v) stars (that is we</p>
      <p>v 2D t(v ).</p>
      <p>has at least t(v)
D , t(v) nodes in D .
the overall cost of an optimal solution is t(v ).</p>
      <p>
        It is possible to show that the amortized cost (distributed costs) of the Algorithm 2
is at most t(v )(ln ∆ + 2) for each star. This suffices to prove (3).
⊔⊓
3 Efficient algorithms for the TBDI problem
In this section we show that the TBDI problem can be efficiently solved when the graph
G is a complete graph or a tree. Our results improve on those in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] where polynomial
time exact algorithm were presented for the Time-Bounded Targeting with Incentives
problem within a fixed number 1 of rounds. For the TBDI problem we show the
existence of linear time algorithms.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>3.1 Complete graphs</title>
        <p>Let Kn = (V; E) be the complete graph with node set V = fv1; v2; : : : ; vng. We will
prove the following theorem.</p>
        <p>Theorem 3. For any complete network Kn = (V; E), threshold function t : V ! N,
the TBDI problem can be solved in linear time.</p>
        <p>
          The following lemma, proved in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ], gives us a tool to design our efficient algorithm.
Lemma 1. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ] Given thresholds t(v1) t(v2) : : : t(vn), if there exists an optimal
TB dominating set D in Kn such that jD j = j then also D = fv1; : : : ; vj g is an
optimal TB dominating set in Kn.
        </p>
        <p>In the following, we assume t(v1) t(v2) : : : t(vn). Notice that the sorting can
be done in O(n) time using counting sort because 1 t(v) n 1 = d(v) for all
v 2 V .</p>
        <p>If the TB dominating set of Kn has j nodes, for some 1 j n, then they
are v1; v2; : : : ; vj by Lemma 1; furthermore, each of the n j remaining nodes in V
has j neighbors (i.e., v1; v2; : : : ; vj ) in the TB dominating set. For such a remaining
node v either t(v) j or v has incentive c(v) = t(v) j. Hence, if we denote by
Dj = fv1; v2; : : : ; vj g, it follows that the optimal TB dominating set of Kn is
D = arg min c(Dj ) = arg min @∑ t(vi) +
1 j n 1 j n
0 j
i=1
n
∑ maxft(vi)
i=j+1</p>
        <p>
          1
j; 0gA :
(4)
We show now that D can be computed in time O(n). To this aim, we can pre-compute
an auxiliary vector s where, for j = 1; : : : ; n, s[j] contains the smallest index i j
such that t(vi) &gt; j if it exists, otherwise s[j] = n+1. Clearly, s[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ] s[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ] : : : s[n].
The vector s can be precomputed in O(n) time once the nodes are sorted by
nondecreasing threshold value. Noticing that
c(D1) = t(v1) +
        </p>
        <p>1); and for j = 2; : : : ; n
c(Dj ) =
n
∑ (t(vi)</p>
        <p>
          j)
j
∑ t(vi) +
i=1
j
= ∑ t(vi) +
i=1
n
∑ (t(vi)
i=s[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ]
i=s[j]
n
∑
i=s[j 1]
0
(n
s[j
jA
we obtain that O(n) total time suffices to compute all the c(Dj ), for j = 1; : : : ; n.
Example 1. Let K8 = (V; E) be a complete graph having 8 nodes V = fv1; v2; v3; v4;
v5; v6; v7; v8g having thresholds 1; 2; 3; 3; 5; 5; 5; 5 respectively. Using the above
strategy, we have that an optimal TB dominating set is D = fv1; v2; v3; v4g. Hence, the
optimal incentive function is c(v) = t(v), for each v 2 D , while, for each v 2= D ,
c(v)=5 jD j=1 and c(D ) = ∑v2D t(v) + ∑v2=D c(v) = 9 + 4 = 13.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>3.2 Trees</title>
        <p>Let T = (V; E) be a tree having n nodes. In the following, we will assume that T is
rooted at some node r and for any node v, we denote by Tv the subtree rooted at v, by
C(v) the set of children of v and, whenever v is not the root r, by p(v) the parent of v.
Furthermore, for any incentive function c and any node v, we will denote by c(Tv) the
sum of the incentives c assigns to the nodes in Tv.</p>
        <p>We give a dynamic programming algorithm that proves Theorem 4.</p>
        <p>Theorem 4. For any tree T = (V; E), threshold function t : V
problem can be solved in linear time.
! N, the TBDI
The algorithm performs a post-order visit of T — so that each node is considered after
all of its children have been processed — and for each node v, it solves three different
TBDI problems on the subtree Tv, according to some conditions on v regarding the fact
that it and its parent belong or not in the TB dominating set.</p>
        <p>Definition 1. Let D be a TB dominating set in T . For each v 2 V , we define:
Y [v] as the minimum cost for TB dominating all the nodes in Tv, in case v 2 D.</p>
        <p>N [v] as the minimum cost for TB dominating all the nodes in Tv, assuming that both
v ̸2 D and p(v) 2= D.</p>
        <p>R[v], if v ̸= r, as the minimum cost for TB dominating all the nodes in Tv, assuming
that v ̸2 D and p(v) 2 D.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Notice that if p(v) 2 D then the threshold of node v in Tv is t(v) 1 since p(v) is one</title>
      <p>of the neighbors of v in D.</p>
      <p>We set the above values equal to infinity when their constraints are not satisfiable.
For instance for a leaf node v if v 2= D and p(v) 2= D then v can not be dominated and
consequently N [v] = 1.</p>
      <p>The minimum cost of the TB dominating set in T can then be obtained by computing
minfY [r]; N [r]g:
(5)
We proceed in a post-order fashion, so that the computations of the values Y [v], N [v]
and R[v] for a node v are done after all of the values for v’s children are known.</p>
      <p>Consider a leaf v (with threshold t(v) = 1) and the one-node subtree Tv. Either v is
in the TB dominating set or its parent p(v) is in the dominating set (i.e., the threshold
of v in Tv is t(v) 1 = 0), we have that for each leaf node v holds</p>
      <p>Y [v] = t(v) = 1 N [v] = 1 R[v] = t(v) 1 = 0 (6)
Let v be any internal node. In order to compute the value Y [v], consider that we
assume that v is in the TB dominating set and then the incentive of v is exactly its
threshold t(v); furthermore, the minimum cost for TB dominating all the nodes in the
subtree rooted at any children u 2 C(v) is the minimum between Y [u] (that reflects the
case that u belong to the TB dominating set), and R[u] (that reflects the fact that u is
not in the TB dominating set while v (the parent of u) is in the TB dominating set and
then the threshold of u is t(u) 1). It follows that Y [v]can be computed in O(d(v))
time as ∑</p>
      <p>Y [v] = t(v) +
minfY [u]; R[u]g:</p>
      <p>(7)
u2C(v)</p>
      <p>Now, we derive the value N [v]. Recalling that in this case v and its parent are
not in the TB dominating set we have that its threshold is t(v) and the threshold of
each children u 2 C(v) is t(u). In this case at least one of its children should be in
the TB dominating set. Let S be a subset of j 1 children of v that are in the TB
dominating set. Hence, t(v) j is the incentive of v. Furthermore, the minimum cost
for TB dominating all the nodes in each subtree Tu with u 2 S is Y [u], while the
minimum cost for TB dominating all the nodes in each subtree Tu with u 2 C(u) S
is N [u]. It follows that</p>
      <p>0
N [v] =
1 j t(v) S C(v) @t(v)
min min
jSj=j
j +
∑ Y [u] +
u2S</p>
      <p>∑
u2C(v) S</p>
      <p>1
minfY [u]; N [u]gA
(8)</p>
      <p>The value R(v) can be derived following the same arguments used to have N [v]
excepting for the fact that the threshold of v is t(v) 1 and so the parent of v is a
neighbor of v in the TB dominating set. This implies that if S is a subset of j children
of v that are in the TB dominating set, it holds 0 j t(v) 1. It follows that
0 1
R[v]= 0 jmti(nv) 1 SmCin(v) @t(v) 1 j+
jSj=j
∑ Y [u]+
u2S</p>
      <p>∑
u2C(v) S
minfY [u]; N [u]gA (9)
Example 2. Let T = (V; E) be the three in Fig 3. Using the above strategy, one can
easily fill the table in the figure. The minimum cost of the TB dominating set in T
corresponds to N [v6] = 4. Indeed an optimal TB dominating set is D = fv4; v5g.</p>
      <p>The time complexity of the computation of N [v] and R[v] can be strongly reduced
by using a particular ordering of the children of v. Assume to have sorted the d =
d(v) 1 children of v, let say v1; v2; : : : ; vd, according to the non-decreasing order of
the differences between Y [vi] and N [vi] for each i = 1; ; d, i.e.,
1
j +</p>
      <p>j t(v)
∑ Y [vi] + ∑ minfY [vi]; N [vi]gA
i=1
i=j+1
1
2∆
and then the sorting (10) can be done using counting sort in O(∆) time. To have (11),
we make two simple considerations:
– Take the incentives assigned to the nodes in Tvi to have N [vi] and increase the
incentive assigned to vi so that it becomes t(vi). This gives a new solution for TB
dominating all the nodes in Tvi with vi in the TB dominating set; hence, we have
Y [vi] t(vi) + N [vi] and so Y [vi] N [vi] t(vi) d(vi) ∆.
– On the other hand, take the incentives assigned to the nodes in Tvi to have Y [vi]
and, decrease by 1 the incentive assigned to vi, increase the incentive assigned to some
u 2 C(vi) so that it becomes t(u) d(u) ∆, and finally increase by 1 the incentive
assigned to each of the remaining d(vi) 1 children of vi. This gives a new solution
for TB dominating all the nodes in Tvi in which vi is not in the TB dominating set and
whose cost is at most Y [vi] 1+d(vi) 1+∆ Y [vi]+2∆ and so Y [vi]+2∆ N [vi].
Lemma 2. If there exists an optimal dominating set D in Tv such that v ̸2 D and
j 1 children of v are in D then there exists an optimal dominating set D′ in Tv such
that v ̸2 D′ and v1; v2; ; vj 2 D′.</p>
      <p>By using the ordering (10) and Lemma 2, the recurrence (8) can be simplified as follows.
j +</p>
      <p>j t(v)
∑ Y [vi] + ∑ minfY [vi]; N [vi]gA</p>
      <p>1
i=1
i=j+1
Hence, (8) can be computed in time O(t). Similarly,
(11)
can be computed in time O(t).</p>
      <p>In conclusion, the value in (5) can be computed in time
∑ O(t(v))</p>
      <p>∑ O(d(v)) = O(n):
v2V</p>
      <p>v2V</p>
      <p>Standard backtracking techniques can be used to compute an optimal TB
dominating set in the same O(n) time.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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