=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-2254/10000147
|storemode=property
|title=Development
of the protocol «ELECTRONIC CASH» with inspection correction rules of
the electronic e-cash number for e-Commerce systems
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2254/10000147.pdf
|volume=Vol-2254
|authors=Igor Kalmykov,Maria Lapina,Natalija
Kononova,Maxim Kalmykov
}}
==Development
of the protocol «ELECTRONIC CASH» with inspection correction rules of
the electronic e-cash number for e-Commerce systems==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2254/10000147.pdf
Development of the protocol ¾ELECTRONIC CASH¿ with
inspection correction rules of the electronic e-cash number
for e-Commerce systems
Igor Kalmykov. Writter Mariya Lapina. Writter Natalija Kononova. Writter
kia762@yandex.ru mlapina@ncfu.ru knv_fm@mail.ru
Maxim Kalmikov. Writter
kmi762@yandex.ru
Department of Information Security of Automated Systems
North-Caucasus Federal University
Stavropol, 355009
Abstract
The purpose of the research is to reduce the time to determine an in-
truder who tries to pay for a purchase with an electronic coin with a
fake serial number by developing an algorithm which allows the seller
to ensure that the buyer has correctly generated serial number Si for
electronic note i, as well as number Ti , which is used in the equation
of checking for double payment of an electronic note. Various crypto-
graphic protocols are utilized in modern e-commerce systems. Among
them, it is possible to highlight the protocols of "withdrawal", "sin-
gle coin payment" "whole wallet payment", "double-payment check for
the same coin". Most of these protocols are built on the evidence of
absolute non-disclosure of information. However, known protocols for
"single coin payment" only allow a seller to determine presence of the
electronic signature of the bank that issued an electronic wallet for a
customer. The check of correct generation of an electronic coin serial
number will allow a seller to determine an intruder prior to making a
sell. Therefore, the development of a "single coin payment" protocol
with checks for correct generation of an electronic note serial number
which does not allow an intruder to pay using an electronic coin with
a fake serial number is a signi cant task.
Keywords: electronic payments systems, cryptographic protocols data protection, pseudo-random function
the zero-knowledge protocol, unauthorized access.
Copyright c by the paper's authors. Copying permitted for private and academic purposes.
In: Marco Schaerf, Massimo Mecella, Drozdova Viktoria Igorevna, Kalmykov Igor Anatolievich (eds.): Proceedings of REMS 2018
Russian Federation & Europe Multidisciplinary Symposium on Computer Science and ICT, Stavropol Dombay, Russia, 1520
October 2018, published at http://ceur-ws.org
1 Introduction
The explosive growth in the number of Internet users has become one of the main factors for the creation and
rapid development of e-business. E-business is characterized by high dynamics of change of the environment
in which economic activity is performed. Moreover, its organization and management in electronic form put a
number of speci c problems related to the correct functioning and ensuring its safety. A signi cant increase in
the number of participants in economic activities and transferring of its part to the informational space leads
to the fact that the business organization's security issues acquire extremely relevant content. Particularly
great demands on information security systems apply to electronic payment systems (EPS) which use electronic
cash [Can16, Cha16, Dre16].
It is obvious that one of the main properties of any system of cashless payments is safety of all its components at
all stages of functioning of this system. At the same time the buyer who uses electronic cash, the seller, the issuer
and the acquirer should be sure of protection of their investments. Unfortunately, the inclusive development of the
Internet and mobile communications do not fully allow ensuring the required level of data protection. Therefore,
the development of the protocols having high degree of data protection against unauthorized access (UA) and
preventing an intruder from paying using an electronic coin with a fake serial number is an urgent task.
2 Research objective
The analysis of payment systems domestic market, which is still at the stage of its development, shows that it
actually has several dierent solutions, ranging from traditional payment cards and ending with electronic cash.
At the same time the last are becoming universal means of payment, due to the low cost of transaction execution,
ease of divisibility and poolability, a higher degree of protection from theft, forgery, and denomination.
The carried-out analysis of studies [Can16, Cha16, Dre16] allowed allocating of a number of protocols, im-
plementation of which will allow ensuring eective functioning of an autonomous electronic payment system. In
study [Isl16] it is shown that the questions of protection of the electronic cash used by the modern EPS are
assigned to protocols of cryptography protection. At the same time for eective functioning of these systems
dierent cryptographic algorithms are used. Obviously, this approach increases the software size applied on an
electronic cash media "electronic wallet".
However, known protocols for "payment" only allow a seller to determine presence of the electronic signature
of the bank that issued an electronic wallet for a customer. Wherein, the procedure of checking correctness of
the electronic coin serial number calculation is carried out at the end of the day. During this time, an intruder
can purchase goods using fake coins. Therefore, sellers incur losses.
It is possible to eliminate this aw by applying the procedure of serial number correctness check prior to
making a sale. Thus, the purpose of the research is to reduce the time to determine an intruder who tries to
pay for a purchase with an electronic coin with a fake serial number by developing an algorithm which allows
the seller to make sure that the buyer has correctly generated serial number Si for electronic note i, as well as
number Ti, which is used in the equation of checking for double payment of an electronic note.
3 Material and methods of research
In the process of investigation of the main types of reports have been carried out, which are used in today's BOT,
working with e-money [about the protocols]. Studies have shown that the majority of EPA protocols use pseudo-
random function. The majority of PSF using an algebraic system that has the property of rings and elds. This
is due to the fact that such algebraic systems are widely used in various elds. So in the works [Moh07, Omo07,
Moh16, Che95] shows the feasibility of using integral systems with the property of the ring, in the performance of
information systems related to digital signal processing. In the papers [Kat16, Kat15, Mak17] shows the methods
and algorithms for constructing error-correcting codes in the ring of integers and polynomials. In the work [Ste16]
presented a way to correct the errors due to failures at the encoder AES algorithm based on modular codes. In
the work [Kat13] is an example of the application of the modular code using the residue number system (RNS)
in the secondary processing of navigation data systems. Using the CSR code has allowed to increase computing
speed and reduce errors in determining the space-time coordinates of the consumer. Obviously, the use of an
algebraic system possessing the property eld, will develop a pseudorandom function which can be used in a
variety of SOPs.
In the papers [Sar14, Yur17] presented protocols "withdrawals", "double-payment checks of the same
coin."These protocols use a pseudo-random function, with the help of which the calculation of the number
of electronic coins and argument Si Ti, which is used to check the double coin payment protocol.
In this paper we will show the protocol developed by "payments of the same coin", which uses a similar
function. For the organization of e-cash payment protocol user has two keys - public and private K KU public
key is used by the bank when the electronic purse issuing its subscriber-buyer. The secret key buyers to participate
in the process of payment of electronic money. But at the same time to to be in such a way that the seller is not
able to his own computer. The public key is to develop a protocol calculates,
KU = g k mod q (1)
where q - the order of the multiplicative group with the generating element g.
In [Sar14] showed that the protocol "withdrawals," the owner of the electronic cash, calculates the presentation,
which depends on the secret key K, S parameter to generate a number of electronic bills, parameter T protocol
for a "double payment. We use developed by RPA, the cryptographic resistance which is based on the -DDH
problem to calculate λ proof of the complexity of the solutions the delivery. Let the secret key K, S and T
parameters are the same length N bits. We divide them into m parts, so that
N1 + N2 + . . . + Nm = N. (2)
Then the presentation will be determined by
m −1
Q
(Kj +Sj +T j)
C=g j=1
mod q, (3)
where Kj , Sj and Tj − j -th block, resulting in the division numbers of the secret key K , the parameters S and
T into m parts. To carry out the procedure of payment of the same coin, the buyer must be in presence of the
W electronic wallet W , which contains the secret key holder K , S and T parameters, σKB (C) - the signature
of the bank on presentation of C , which is used in the preparation of a purse buyer at the bank. So the buyer
has a certain amount of coins in the electronic purse, he issued coins bank counter J . To purchase an electronic
purse owner, contact the seller. At the same time he has to prove the latter the following points: - In the wallet
W is the signature of the bank on presentation of C , ie,
σKB (C) = σKB (K, S, T ) (4)
- User generated Si correct number of i-th e-bills;
- The buyer the right number generated Ti , which is used in the equation of the double payment of electronic
bills.
Let us consider in more detail each stage of the "payment of the same coin" protocol. In the rst phase, in order
to prove to the seller that the electronic purse present signature bank issuing electronic bills, awarding the buyer
calculates C according to expression (3). Then, using its private key, the buyer closes the data EK (C, σKB (C))
and sends the encrypted message to the seller. The seller, the buyer received a public key decrypts the message
DKU (C, σKB (C)).
After that, the seller goes to the bank and received his public key, decrypts his signature. The result of
this procedure is the presentation of C , which was presented by the buyer to the bank to get the purse. Seller
compares these values. In case of coincidence of these values the seller makes sure that the buyer has an electronic
purse, which gave the bank.
At the second stage of the protocol "payment of the same coin" the seller must ensure that the buyer is
properly generated Si number i-th e-bills and the number of Ti , which is used in the equation of the double
payment of electronic bills.
We use developed by the pseudo-random function of increased e ciency in the generation of Si number of
i-th e-bills, m −1
Q
(Kj +Sj )
S(i) = g j=1
mod q, (5)
and where Sj and ij - j -th block obtained by partitioning the parameters Si and m part on. Thus the
generation of Ti , which is used in Equation electronic bill payment double determined
m −1
Q
(Tj +Kj )
T (i) = KU g j=1
mod q, (6)
where Tj and ij - j -th block, resulting in the division of parameters T and i to m parts.
m
Y 1
mod q = aT ,
T + ij + 1
j=1 j
m
Y 1
mod q = aS .
S + ij + 1
j=1 j
The seller sends the buyer a random number that is r ∈ Zq .
After that, the buyer calculates the answers to the question r, ask the seller
a∗S = (aS − r) mod q, (7)
a∗T = (aT − r) mod q. (8)
The values obtained for the buyer uses to calculate the dark images of the serial number and denomination of
the parameter for the equation of double payments,
∗
Si∗ = g aS mod q (9)
∗
Ti∗ = g aT mod q (10)
After that, the buyer determines the product of true and dark images
Si Ti mod q = g aS KU g aT mod q = KU g (aS +aT )modϕ(q) mod q, (11)
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Si∗ Ti∗ mod q = g aS KU g aT mod q = KU g (aS +aT )modϕ(q) mod q. (12)
The results obtained using expressions (11) and (12) is sent in encrypted form to the seller.
After that, the seller, the buyer using the public key of KOT K , decrypts his signature. The seller then
calculates the ratio.
Si Ti KU g (aS +aT )modϕ(q)
A= ∗ ∗ = = g 2r mod q. (13)
Si Ti K g ( a∗
S
+a∗
T )modϕ(q)
U
If the calculated value according to equation (13) corresponds to,
A = (g r )2 mod q, (14)
this indicates that the provided e-Si i-th number of electronic bills and the corresponding parameter of Ti, which
is used in Equation double payments are generated correctly.
Results and Discussion
Let q = 43. Then g = 3. Let the secret key value be K = 37.
Then the public key value, according to (1), equals to KU = g k mod q = 337 mod 43 = 20.
To calculate the electronic coin number let us take S(1) = 28.
To prevent repetitive utilization of the same electronic coin number let us take T (1) = 19.
Let us present the secret key in binary code and divide it on two blocks with 3 digits each. We shall have
K = 37 = 100101 = 100101; K2 = 1002 = 4; K1 = 1012 = 5.
Let us present S(0) in binary code and divide it on two blocks with 3 digits each. We shall have
S(1) = 24 = 011000 = 011000; S2 (1) = 0112 = 3; S1 (1) = 0002 = 0.
Let us present T (0) in binary code and divide it on two blocks with 3 digits each. We shall have
T (1) = 19 = 010011 = 010011; T2 (1) = 0102 = 2; T1 (1) = 0112 = 3
Let us calculate the sums with modulo = 43.
We shall receive
(S1 (1) + K1 ) mod p = (0 + 5) mod 43 = 5,
(S2 (1) + K2 ) mod p = (3 + 4) mod 43 = 7,
(T1 (1) + K1 ) mod p = (3 + 5) mod 43 = 8,
(T2 (1) + K2 ) mod p = (2 + 4) mod 43 = 6.
Let us calculate the backward multiplicative elements for the received sums modulo p = 43. We shall receive
(S1 (1) + K1 )−1 mod p = 5−1 mod 43 = 26,
(S2 (1) + K2 )−1 mod p = 7−1 mod 43 = 37,
(T1 (1) + K1 )−1 mod p = 8−1 mod 43 = 27,
(T2 (1) + K2 )−1 mod p = 6−1 mod 43 = 36.
Let us calculate the values
2 +
Y 1
aS (1) = mod q = 26 · 37 = 38,
S + Kj
j=1 j
43
and
m +
Y 1
aT (1) = mod q = 27 · 36 = 6.
T + Kj
j=1 j
43
Then, the actual values of parameters S(1) and T(1) equal to
S(1) = g aS mod q = 338 mod 43 = 17,
T (1) = g aT mod q = 36 mod 43 = 41.
The seller sends the buyer random number r = 3.
Afterwards, the buyer calculates the responses to question r = 3, according to (7) and (8)
a∗S (1) = (aS (1) − r) mod q = (38 − 3) mod 43 = 35,
a∗T (1) = (aT (1) − r) mod q = (6 − 3) mod 43 = 3.
These values are used by the buyer to determine the shadow samples of the note serial number and the parameter
for the equation of double-payment checking, according to (9) and (10)
∗
S ∗ (1) = g aS (1) mod q = 335 mod 43 = 7
∗
T ∗ (1) = g aT (1) mod q = 33 mod 43 = 27
After that, the buyer determines the product of the actual and the shadow samples, according to (11) and
(12)
+
S(1)T (1) mod q = 17 · 41 · 20 = 8,
43
+
S ∗ (1)T ∗ (1) mod q = 7 · 27 · 20 = 39.
43
The results obtained with expressions (11) and (12) are sent to the seller in the encrypted form EK (3, 41, 8, 39).
Following that, the seller, using public key of the buyer pub = 20, decrypts DKU (3, 41, 8, 39) Afterwards, the
seller calculates the ratio, according to (13)
S(1)T (1) + 8 +
∗ ∗
= = 41.
S (1)T (1) 43 39 43
Knowing number r = 3, the seller checks, according to (14)
A0 = (g r )2 mod q = (33 )2 mod 43 = 41.
Since value A0 = A = 41, this allows us to conclude that the buyer is not an intruder, who tries to pay for the
goods with an electronic coin with a fake serial number.
Thus, the protocol was developed "the payment of the same coin", which allows the seller to verify the
presence of the electronic wallet of the buyer, as well as the correct generation number i-th e-bills Si, as well as
the parameter Ti , which is used in the equation of the double payment of electronic coin.
4 Conclusion
The protocol of "single coin payment", which can be applied in e-commerce systems, is presented in the research.
Unlike known "single coin payment" protocols, which only allow a seller to check the electronic signature of the
bank that issued an electronic wallet for a buyer, the developed protocol allows to carry out a check for correct
generation of an electronic coin serial number. The desired goal is achieved by developing the algorithm which
allows the seller to ensure that the buyer has correctly generated serial number Si for electronic note i, as well as
number Ti , which is used in the equation of checking for double payment of an electronic note. The developed
protocol allows a seller to determine an intruder prior to making a sell. Application of the developed protocol
reduces the time required to determine an intruder who attempts to make a purchase with an electronic coin
with a fake serial number compared to the protocols known before.
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